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Post 160

Monday, April 16, 2007 - 9:50pmSanction this postReply
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Im going to have to disagree with you here G. Or, at least, Im going to make a corrective comment.

First of all, we have to know how we get information: epistemology. The axiom of existence (existence exist) could still be claimed, I suppose, with a god. However, the axiom of identity (A is A) could not.

Thats the second of all. If there is a god there can be no real acceptance of identity. This is the answer to GWLs question, what do you mean reality...and what would it mean to suspend or change it. If what we perceive, prove, know to be real, is not really real (if it can changed without the aid of nature or man) we can know nothing. The interruption of reality is a virgin conception or the sun standing still or numerous other Biblical and spiritual events.

If our epistemology is wrong our metaphysics will be.

A belief in god is not only inconsistent with Objectivism, it is at odds. Either be a theist and pick a system of altruism or be an atheist and choose Objectivism. The two, theism and Objectivism, are contradictory.

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Post 161

Tuesday, April 17, 2007 - 2:00amSanction this postReply
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Brendan: "...we do not need to investigate round objects to justify the claim that all circles are round ..."

Ed: We, initially, did (when the roundness of circles had to first be perceived in order to be believed...

You can perceive round objects but you cannot perceive roundness, although if you are a realist on universals, you could claim to directly apprehend or intuit roundness.

But if you reject the real existence of universals, as Rand does, then roundness is a concept, in which case it cannot be perceived in the way that we perceive material objects external to the mind.

Having said that, its true that one must understand the terms all, circle, are and round in order to understand that all circles are round. But thats not the same as perceiving roundness.

Brendan


Post 162

Tuesday, April 17, 2007 - 7:24pmSanction this postReply
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Brendan,

You can perceive round objects but you cannot perceive roundness,
So what? You can still conceive of roundness -- after first perceiving some kine of example of it (which, if it's not that easily perceptible, is my point). Another way to say this is that, without perception, there could be no conceptual awareness (actually, no awareness at all). Everything hinges on it.

But if you reject the real existence of universals, as Rand does, then roundness is a concept, in which case it cannot be perceived in the way that we perceive material objects external to the mind.
Thank you. It appears that you inadvertantly agree with me then, and are continuing to "argue" with me because of one of 2 possible reasons ...

1) you don't fully understand what you're saying (it just "sounded good" at the time)
2) you understand but retain a streak of malice in you (you "fight" for "fun")

Here's your quote, repeated with a different style of commentary from myself ...

Brendan: "...we do not need to investigate round objects to justify the claim that all circles are round ..."
Right, because "roundness" comes to be known conceptually (but always and only after perceiving round things) ...

Clearer?

Ed


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Post 163

Wednesday, April 18, 2007 - 6:05pmSanction this postReply
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Ed: So what? You can still conceive of roundness

Thank you, Ed. Im pleased that we agree that we do not perceive roundness.

My initial challenge arose from this claim: The truth (i.e., the correspondance to reality) of axioms, however, is something that can be perceived You have quietly but sensibly resiled from that position, which is wise, since it is unsupportable. So we can now also agree that the axiomatic concepts are not perceived, in the same way that roundness is not perceived.

What then of your amended claim: We are merely required to think straight about our perceptions -- in order to gain the employment of axiomatic concepts. (post 113)

Thinking straight is a means to knowledge. In ITOE Rand tells us that the building-block of man's knowledge is the concept of an "existent" She then goes on to claim that in order to reach the conceptual stage, the concept existent undergoes three stages of development: entity, identity, unit.

The concept unit is the key, the entrance to the conceptual level of man's consciousness. The ability to regard entities as units is man's distinctive method of cognition

Among other things, then, Rand is claiming that the concept identity is logically prior to the concept unit, and that the latter is the basis for knowledge. So in order for you to start thinking about your perceptions, you need to have some basic concepts in mind, including existent, entity, identity, unit.

In that case you need not gain the employment of these concepts by thinking about your perceptions, since you have already employed them to kick-start the thinking process.

Therefore, these concepts are not known a posteriori, in which case they are known a priori.

Brendan

Post 164

Wednesday, April 18, 2007 - 9:05pmSanction this postReply
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Brendan,

My initial challenge arose from this claim: The truth (i.e., the correspondance to reality) of axioms, however, is something that can be perceived You have quietly but sensibly resiled from that position, which is wise, since it is unsupportable.
Not so fast. Man are you ever good at rhetoric! Don't take that as a compliment, though. Let's try to get to "the truth" of axioms (rather than to our conceptual understanding of them) without perception, shall we? ... Oops, sorry, but that's impossible. In fact, without perception you can't tell if ANY proposition (any about reality) corresponds to reality.

Darn, and when you wrote the above -- it really sounded like you were winning this point, too! That's what good rhetoric can do, I guess -- make nonsense sound intellectually-sophisticated. Well, I guess you can always "quietly but sensibly [resile] from that position, which is wise, since it is unsupportable."

;-)

So we can now also agree that the axiomatic concepts are not perceived ...
There you go again! Damn, are you ever good at this (making nonsense sound intellectually-sophisticated)! Like I would ever say or believe that a concept is perceived?!!! I'm one of the most staunch defenders of the non-perception of concepts in this whole forum. I have probably over 100 posts, arguing against the perception of concepts (and more than one article discussing it!) and -- if I'm not mistaken -- over a dozen of those posts were directed to YOU!!! What a short memory you must have!

Brendan, to paraphrase James Donald: when arguing with you I really have to laugh, so as to avoid weeping. I ... I ... I have to stop there for now, Brendan. I'll get to your other points in due time, but I've just got to laugh (or cry) now. I can't go on like this; not right now ...

Ed


Post 165

Wednesday, April 18, 2007 - 10:44pmSanction this postReply
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Ed: Like I would ever say or believe that a concept is perceived?!!!

So you agree that concepts are not perceived? Im glad we have that one sorted out. What you need to do now is show me, and anyone else whos watching, how we gain the axiomatic concepts. They are not perceived, and they are not gained via Rands theory of concept formation. So: how?

I'll get to your other points in due time, but I've just got to laugh (or cry) now. I can't go on like this

No, you cant. But thats my line. And Im sure you will get to my other points, eventually, with a gentle reminder.

Brendan

Post 166

Thursday, April 19, 2007 - 2:46pmSanction this postReply
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Brendan, you are not understanding my criticism of your thinking here.

So you agree that concepts are not perceived? Im glad we have that one sorted out.

As I alluded to above, "we" have had "that one" sorted out for OVER 2 YEARS NOW.

I'm going to take a break from you for awhile, Brendan, if only for self-preservatory purposes.

Ed
 

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 4/19, 2:54pm)


Post 167

Thursday, April 19, 2007 - 5:31pmSanction this postReply
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Bill,

What logical flaw? All conscious beings are animals, and all animals are material organisms. Q.E.D.


The Q.E.D. shows the logical problem. The fact is all you can really say is "all conscious beings that I have experienced are animals." But this may be cleared up as we explore what you mean by "conscious."

It is matter in motion (i.e., material organisms) that are bound to follow the laws of nature (i.e., to act according to their nature as conscious organisms).

And there is the rub. The fact is you can't get from matter in motion to anything other than matter in motion.

As a magician I can easily see sleight of hand when it is right in front of me. Normally, I don't expose it, magician's code and all, but this is philosophy and you will be exposed. All you are doing in the above is simply putting words together and pretending they have meaning. You have never been able to demonstrate how you get from your set of cosmological propositions to your conclusions. Let me review my original statement and question:

Consciousness can only fall into one of the following categories:

1) It is matter in motion bound to follow the laws of nature.
2) It is not matter in motion, yet it is bound to follow the laws of nature.
3) It is matter in motion and independent of the laws of nature.
4) It is not matter in motion and independent of the laws of nature.

So, which one is it?

You should notice that you never answered my original question. I didn't ask you to redefine matter in motion, I ask you what consciousness is. I didn't ask you to redefine laws of nature as "their nature", the term "nature" is being used in two different ways. I asked you which of the above 4 possibilities does consciousness fall into. Since you saw fit not to answer the question and to equivocate on the term "nature." Let me make it clear:

Is consciousness matter in motion bound to follow the laws of physics?
Is consciousness not matter in motion, yet it is bound to follow the laws of physics?
Is consciousness matter in motion and independent of the laws of physics?
Is consciousness not matter in motion and independent of the laws of physics?

I understand that you don't want to really answer the above because three out of the four contradict your cosmology and the implications of the fourth contradicts what you seem to be affirming about life and consciousness. But those are the breaks. You will notice this has been the same question that you have not been able to answer from the very first.

You try to play the "emerging property" card by saying:

 It is true that an entity often exhibits properties that the parts by themselves do not possess, but this does not imply the existence of some supervening principle of order or entelechy
and then you offer the following example:

"[I]magine that we are presented with two hemispherical pieces of wood, each having a sticky substance on its flat side. Alone, neither hemisphere can roll; when joined to form a sphere, the whole can roll. Rolling is thus an emergent form of action completely determined by the individual separate properties of the parts and their arrangement. Obviously the whole formed by uniting the two hemispheres is, in a sense, 'greater than its parts' -- but it is just as obvious that this 'extra something' of the whole (its ability to roll) is not to be explained by the supervention of a 'principle of order' or 'entelechy.' There is no 'transcendence' of the natures of the parts nor of the laws governing their behavior."
So, where did the hemispherical pieces of wood come from? Where did the sticky substance come from? Unless the two pieces are set together fairly square the two pieces won't roll any better together than they would separately, who set them together? The fact is, this whole thing stinks to high heaven of design and intent. The design and intent that you deny exists in nature.

But if this is all you mean by an emergent property, I have no problem with that. If all you mean is that "life" and "consciousness" are merely matter in motion acting with the same mechanistic determinism that forces a ball rolling down the hill to take a certain path, then we are agreed that your cosmology gets you there.

You seem to be going in this direction when you write:

Life, consciousness and rationality can thus be explained as "emergent" properties, completely determined by the individual separate properties of the parts and their arrangement. Life exhibits principles of action that differ from those governing inanimate matter; sentient life exhibits principles of action that differ from those governing plant life; and man exhibits principles of action that differ from those governing the lower animals.
 But I can't be sure, because of the above equivocations, that this is really what you mean. Perhaps you could state your position plainly.

Regards,

G. Brady Lenardos

(Edited by G. Brady Lenardos on 4/19, 5:40pm)


Post 168

Thursday, April 19, 2007 - 9:36pmSanction this postReply
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I wrote, "What logical flaw? All conscious beings are animals, and all animals are material organisms. Q.E.D." Brady replied,
The Q.E.D. shows the logical problem. The fact is all you can really say is "all conscious beings that I have experienced are animals."
Well, what evidence do you have that it is even possible for a non-animal to be conscious? Consciousness arose as a consequence of biological evolution. It is a property of animal life and depends on the animal's survival; when the animal dies, so does its consciousness. Moreover, the possession of a consciousness would serve no useful purpose nor have any practical function for an entity that had nothing to gain or lose by its actions. It is for this reason that it makes no sense to speak of a robot, on the one hand, or of an immaterial spirit, on the other, as possessing conscious awareness. In neither case, would such a faculty have any value.

I wrote, "It is matter in motion (i.e., material organisms) that are bound to follow the laws of nature (i.e., to act according to their nature as conscious organisms)."
And there is the rub. The fact is you can't get from matter in motion to anything other than matter in motion.
Why do you say that? If by "matter in motion," you simply mean inanimate matter, then why, according to you, is it impossible for life and human consciousness to evolve from inanimate matter, yet possible for them to have been designed by an immaterial consciousness? As I've pointed out in previous posts, an immaterial consciousness would have no means or form of awareness and could not therefore exist as a designer of anything, let alone something as sophisticated as life and human consciousness. The only reasonable explanation for human consciousness is that it arose as a result of biological evolution.
Is consciousness matter in motion bound to follow the laws of physics?
Is consciousness not matter in motion, yet it is bound to follow the laws of physics?
Is consciousness matter in motion and independent of the laws of physics?
Is consciousness not matter in motion and independent of the laws of physics?
The problem I'm having with your questions is that I don't understand what you mean by "matter in motion." If you mean inanimate matter in motion, then conscious behavior is not "matter in motion" in that sense of the term, because it is the action of a living organism. If you mean any action performed by a material entity, then yes, conscious behavior is matter in motion, because it is the action of a living organism.

Admittedly, conscious behavior does not conform to the laws of physics, if only because it does not conform to Newton's First Law of Motion, which states that "unless acted upon by an outside force, a body at rest tends to stay at rest, and a body in motion tends to stay in motion." Unlike inanimate matter, the action of living organisms, including conscious behavior, is goal-directed; it is teleological not mechanistic.
You try to play the "emerging property" card by saying:
It is true that an entity often exhibits properties that the parts by themselves do not possess, but this does not imply the existence of some supervening principle of order or entelechy.
and then you offer the following example:
"[I]magine that we are presented with two hemispherical pieces of wood, each having a sticky substance on its flat side. Alone, neither hemisphere can roll; when joined to form a sphere, the whole can roll. Rolling is thus an emergent form of action completely determined by the individual separate properties of the parts and their arrangement. Obviously the whole formed by uniting the two hemispheres is, in a sense, 'greater than its parts' -- but it is just as obvious that this 'extra something' of the whole (its ability to roll) is not to be explained by the supervention of a 'principle of order' or 'entelechy.' There is no 'transcendence' of the natures of the parts nor of the laws governing their behavior."
So, where did the hemispherical pieces of wood come from? Where did the sticky substance come from? Unless the two pieces are set together fairly square the two pieces won't roll any better together than they would separately, who set them together? The fact is, this whole thing stinks to high heaven of design and intent. The design and intent that you deny exists in nature.
The example was simply to illustrate that an emergent property can be due to the arrangement of the parts without any supervening principle of order. Although it happened to involve a deliberate placement of the two halves, what reason is there to assume that emergent properties could not have arisen naturally, as the evolutionary record suggests, especially since (a) we have no evidence that they were intelligently designed, and (b) an immaterial designer would have no means of executing the design.
But if this is all you mean by an emergent property, I have no problem with that. If all you mean is that "life" and "consciousness" are merely matter in motion acting with the same mechanistic determinism that forces a ball rolling down the hill to take a certain path, then we are agreed that your cosmology gets you there.
No, that's not what I mean. You are taking the analogy too literally and failing to abstract the essential principle.
You seem to be going in this direction when you write:
Life, consciousness and rationality can thus be explained as "emergent" properties, completely determined by the individual separate properties of the parts and their arrangement. Life exhibits principles of action that differ from those governing inanimate matter; sentient life exhibits principles of action that differ from those governing plant life; and man exhibits principles of action that differ from those governing the lower animals.

By "completely determined," I didn't mean subject to mechanistic determinism; I meant "determined" in the broader sense of being completely caused by the arrangement of the parts themselves without any complementary principle of order.

- Bill



Post 169

Friday, April 20, 2007 - 2:14pmSanction this postReply
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My argument was that brains and supporting bodies are necessary for human thought, but a human body with the appropriate physiology (i.e., a conscious, fully functioning brain, sensory organs and nervous system) is sufficient as well. If a person is alive, awake and well with no sensory or brain dysfunction, then he will be conscious.

Right, but this is amounts to you just asserting your position.  For it may be necessary that every person possesses an immaterial part, viz. a soul-- in which case a person "alive, awake, and well" would be conscious by necessity--and the conditions you've described as being sufficient for consciousness would contain an additional condition within them, viz. ensoulment. 

My argument is not simply that I know of no conscious entity that lacks materiality; therefore, none exists. I know of no houses that are pink with purple polka dots, but that doesn't mean that none exists. My argument is that an immaterial consciousness is inconceivable, because consciousness requires material organs of perception and cognition. 
In other words, "immaterial consciousness is inconceivable because (insert unfounded assertion here)".   

You have no idea that consciousness requires material organs in order to exist.  I've even provided a way in which consciousness is possible without sensory experience. 

Perception, by its nature, always takes a particular form, which is determined by the organ of perception, e.g., vision through the eye, hearing through the ear, smell through the olfactory nerve, etc. Formless perception is nonsensical and inconceivable.
Obviously an immaterial consciousness would not be the sort of thing capable of the sort of perception we have.  It would only perceive, stricly speaking, its own mental content.  And this is hardly "nonsensical and inconceivable."  We do it all the time.        
Similarly, we know that thought is an activity of a material organ, the brain, which depends on its proper functioning.
No, we don't.  All we know is that thoughts are affected and/or influenced by the brain. 
Could thought exist without such an organ? I don't see how. There has to be something that does the thinking-- that processes the sensory input.
The immaterial substance would do the thinking. 

Nothing would have to process such a substance's sensory imput, as it would not have sensory imput by virtue of its immateriality. 

In short, to say that consciousness activity can exist without a body, brain and physical sense organs is like saying that digestion can exist without a stomach, walking without legs, or respiration without lungs
No it isn't.  The activity of digestion is possible without a stomach.  Give me a beaker and the appropriate chemicals (e.g. Coca-cola).  The activity of locomotion is possible without legs.  Give me a set of wheels.  The chemical process of respiration is possible without lungs.  Again, give me the appropriate chemicals and the right laboratory set-up. 

I see no reason, then, why conscious activity is impossible without a body.  In fact, I'd be interested in knowing how conscious activity is possible without an immaterial component.   
  
An immaterial consciousness is an action without an entity, which is a metaphysical impossibility.

The entity is the immaterial substance.  If you believe the existence of immaterial substances is impossible, this is more indicative of a dogged commitment to materialism than a conclusion drawn from a serious philosophical objection.

Everything acts according to its nature.
Right, and since natures are primarily known by actions, this is question begging.
A law of nature is simply a description of how things characteristically act or behave. It is by no means limited to the laws of physics. 
So causality is not a law so much as a description, which means that 'Everything acts according to its nature' (which you derive from causality) cannot be accorded the dogmatic status of metaphysical law. 
You mention an alleged "leap" from inanimate to animate, as if life were to be explained by some principle other than the organization or arrangement of its material constituents. However, the evolutionary record suggests that life did indeed arise from inanimate matter. It is true that an entity often exhibits properties that the parts by themselves do not possess, but this does not imply the existence of some supervening principle of order or entelechy. It can be explained by the arrangement of the parts themselves.
I accept the evolutionary record.  I also accept the notion of emergent properties.  But the idea of immaterial properties emerging from material entities seems a bit strange to me.   
In his book, The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts, Harry Binswanger gives the following example:

"[I]magine that we are presented with two hemispherical pieces of wood, each having a sticky substance on its flat side. Alone, neither hemisphere can roll; when joined to form a sphere, the whole can roll. Rolling is thus an emergent form of action completely determined by the individual separate properties of the parts and their arrangement. Obviously the whole formed by uniting the two hemispheres is, in a sense, 'greater than its parts' -- but it is just as obvious that this 'extra something' of the whole (its ability to roll) is not to be explained by the supervention of a 'principle of order' or 'entelechy.' There is no 'transcendence' of the natures of the parts nor of the laws governing their behavior." (p. 22)
Anyone can clearly see that two hemispheres joined together along their flat surfaces can roll-- because two hemispheres so joined amount to a sphere, and spheres can roll.   

William takes from this: 
Life, consciousness and rationality can thus be explained as "emergent" properties, completely determined by the individual separate properties of the parts and their arrangement.
In the first case, you go from two material entities forming a composite third material entity which undergoes an action whose description is explainable in terms of a series of physical movements.  In the second, however, you want to go from interacting material entities (of whatever variety-- neurons, quarks, electrons, etc.) to immaterial effects like thoughts.  This is problematic, for it seems to violate your beloved (and absolutely vacuous without further explanation) 'A is A' principle, which here I might take to mean that 'x is y iff x has the same properties as y'. 
Life exhibits principles of action that differ from those governing inanimate matter; sentient life exhibits principles of action that differ from those governing plant life; and man exhibits principles of action that differ from those governing the lower animals.
Obviously, but this doesn't further the discussion. 
It is matter in motion (i.e., material organisms) that are bound to follow the laws of nature (i.e., to act according to their nature as conscious organisms).
But didn't you earlier concede that conscious organisms possess an immaterial part?  He's asking how you get from law-abiding material organisms to 'supervening' immaterial properties. 

Steve wrote: 
If there is a god there can be no real acceptance of identity. This is the answer to GWLs question, what do you mean reality...and what would it mean to suspend or change it. If what we perceive, prove, know to be real, is not really real (if it can changed without the aid of nature or man) we can know nothing.
Sure you can.  You can know your perceptions and the relationships attending to them. 
The interruption of reality is a virgin [sic] conception or the sun standing still or numerous other Biblical and spiritual events.
If you've defined reality a priori as precluding events of supernatural intervention, then of course you won't permit events like the virginal conception into your worldview.  But you've provided no reason as to why reality cannot include the presence of the supernatural.     

I'm off to Mass.  More later.

-GWL 


Post 170

Sunday, April 22, 2007 - 7:38pmSanction this postReply
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I wrote, "Perception, by its nature, always takes a particular form, which is determined by the organ of perception, e.g., vision through the eye, hearing through the ear, smell through the olfactory nerve, etc. Formless perception is nonsensical and inconceivable."
Obviously an immaterial consciousness would not be the sort of thing capable of the sort of perception we have. It would only perceive, strictly speaking, its own mental content.
If God could only perceive his own mental content, then all he would be capable of is introspection. How then could he be aware of reality -- of the external world?
And this is hardly "nonsensical and inconceivable." We do it all the time.
You don't perceive your own mental content; you introspect it. Perception is not introspection; it's extrospection, which is an awareness of the external world. Moreover, in order to be aware of your own mental content, you would first have to be aware of the external world, from which you acquire the sensory basis for the content. You cannot have any mental content without some sensory input, which always takes the perceptual form of that input (e.g., visual images, auditory impressions, etc). Imagination presupposes perception. In other words, your memories, dreams and mental images are always experienced in the form of one of your five senses, which indicates that they are based on your perceptions of the external world. An immaterial consciousness could have no mental content, because the content would have no sensory form.

I wrote, "Similarly, we know that thought is an activity of a material organ, the brain, which depends on its proper functioning."
No, we don't. All we know is that thoughts are affected and/or influenced by the brain.
Thoughts are merely "influenced" by the brain?? In that case, thought could take place independently of the brain. But thought does, in fact, depend on the brain, just as vision depends on the eye; hearing, on the ear, etc.

I wrote, "Could thought exist without such an organ? I don't see how. There has to be something that does the thinking-- that processes the sensory input."
The immaterial substance would do the thinking.

Nothing would have to process such a substance's sensory imput, as it would not have sensory imput by virtue of its immateriality.
Then how could it be aware of the external world -- by what means and in what form? The answer is, there wouldn't be any means or form of external awareness, in which case, it could have no mental content to be aware of introspectively.

I wrote, "In short, to say that consciousness activity can exist without a body, brain and physical sense organs is like saying that digestion can exist without a stomach, walking without legs, or respiration without lungs."
No it isn't. The activity of digestion is possible without a stomach. Give me a beaker and the appropriate chemicals (e.g. Coca-cola). The activity of locomotion is possible without legs. Give me a set of wheels. The chemical process of respiration is possible without lungs. Again, give me the appropriate chemicals and the right laboratory set-up.
Although I was referring to a human being's digestion as requiring a stomach, the main point is that digestion requires at least some material vehicle. You say locomotion is possible without legs. Of course, but I was referring not to locomotion in general but to walking in particular. As for respiration, I meant the process of human respiration, not simply respiration in general. The main point of these examples was simply to illustrate that you cannot have a process without an entity to perform it.
I see no reason, then, why conscious activity is impossible without a body. In fact, I'd be interested in knowing how conscious activity is possible without an immaterial component.
Well, I've already explained why consciousness requires physical organs for its existence and operation. As for its immateriality, a mental phenomenon is called "immaterial" only in the sense that it differs from things that one can see and touch. One is aware of its existence only introspectively.

I wrote, "An immaterial consciousness is an action without an entity, which is a metaphysical impossibility.
The entity is the immaterial substance. If you believe the existence of immaterial substances is impossible, this is more indicative of a dogged commitment to materialism than a conclusion drawn from a serious philosophical objection.
I'm sorry, but I don't understand an immaterial substance. Consciousness is an attribute or property of a material organism, not a stand alone entity.

I wrote, "Everything acts according to its nature."
Right, and since natures are primarily known by actions, this is question begging.
How is it question-begging? It is simply a fact; how a thing behaves depends on the kind of thing it is. For example, birds fly, because flying is part of their nature. Horses gallop, because galloping is part of theirs.

I wrote, "A law of nature is simply a description of how things characteristically act or behave. It is by no means limited to the laws of physics."
So causality is not a law so much as a description, which means that 'Everything acts according to its nature' (which you derive from causality) cannot be accorded the dogmatic status of metaphysical law.
No, it's a law, if we assume that all of the relevant conditions remain the same. The law of causality is a corollary of the law of identity. Since there is no Lockean "substratum" underlying and uniting its characteristics, a thing just is all of its characteristics. If it exists under the same conditions, it will possess the same characteristics, including the same action.

I wrote, "You mention an alleged 'leap' from inanimate to animate, as if life were to be explained by some principle other than the organization or arrangement of its material constituents. However, the evolutionary record suggests that life did indeed arise from inanimate matter. It is true that an entity often exhibits properties that the parts by themselves do not possess, but this does not imply the existence of some supervening principle of order or entelechy. It can be explained by the arrangement of the parts themselves."
I accept the evolutionary record. I also accept the notion of emergent properties. But the idea of immaterial properties emerging from material entities seems a bit strange to me.
Yet the idea of disembodied spirits does not? I find that a bit strange. We know that consciousness is a property of a physical organism and that it does not exist outside of that context. When the organism dies, its consciousness ceases to exist, just like all of its other bodily processes. To call consciousness "immaterial" is, therefore, a bit misleading, because it suggests that consciousness has a non-physical existence -- an existence independent of a physical organism. Granted, the idea of a stone is not the same as a stone itself, which is why we call an idea "immaterial," but there is no such thing as an immaterial substance. Consciousness is a property or a faculty of a physical organism. It is a subjective manifestation of the function of the brain in the same way that vision is the subjective manifestation of the function of the eye. Just as vision does not exist in isolation from the organ of perception which makes it possible -- the eye -- so thought does not exist in isolation from the organ of cognition which makes it possible -- the brain. We know from evolutionary science that sentient forms of life emerged from a new and more complex arrangement of non-sentient forms, just as living entities emerged from a new and more complex arrangement of non-living entities.

I wrote, "In his book, The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts, Harry Binswanger gives the following example: '[I]magine that we are presented with two hemispherical pieces of wood, each having a sticky substance on its flat side. Alone, neither hemisphere can roll; when joined to form a sphere, the whole can roll. Rolling is thus an emergent form of action completely determined by the individual separate properties of the parts and their arrangement. Obviously the whole formed by uniting the two hemispheres is, in a sense, "greater than its parts" -- but it is just as obvious that this "extra something" of the whole (its ability to roll) is not to be explained by the supervention of a "principle of order" or "entelechy." There is no "transcendence" of the natures of the parts nor of the laws governing their behavior.'" (p. 22)
Anyone can clearly see that two hemispheres joined together along their flat surfaces can roll-- because two hemispheres so joined amount to a sphere, and spheres can roll.

William takes from this:
Life, consciousness and rationality can thus be explained as "emergent" properties, completely determined by the individual separate properties of the parts and their arrangement.
In the first case, you go from two material entities forming a composite third material entity which undergoes an action whose description is explainable in terms of a series of physical movements. In the second, however, you want to go from interacting material entities (of whatever variety-- neurons, quarks, electrons, etc.) to immaterial effects like thoughts. This is problematic, for it seems to violate your beloved (and absolutely vacuous without further explanation) 'A is A' principle, which here I might take to mean that 'x is y iff x has the same properties as y'.
What I'm saying is that just as the sphere in Binswanger's example comprises two hemispheres that lack the ability to roll while the sphere itself possesses that ability, so an animal comprises constituents that lack the faculty of awareness, while the animal itself possesses that faculty. This is the definition of an emergent property -- a property possessed by the whole that none of the parts possesses.

I wrote, "It is matter in motion (i.e., material organisms) that are bound to follow the laws of nature (i.e., to act according to their nature as conscious organisms)."
But didn't you earlier concede that conscious organisms possess an immaterial part?
Not an immaterial "part" in the sense that conscious organisms are composed of both a material and immaterial substance, each of which can exist independently of the other. Consciousness is a property or an attribute of a physical organism, not a "part" of the organism in the sense that that term is normally used. Besides, my point was not that conscious organisms are bound to follow the laws of physics (such as Newton's first law of motion); clearly, they are not. All I was saying is that conscious organisms are bound to follow the laws of nature that apply to them, which are biological and psychological. Not all laws of nature are laws of physics.

- Bill


Post 171

Monday, April 23, 2007 - 12:04pmSanction this postReply
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Bill wrote:
 All conscious beings are animals, and all animals are material organisms. Q.E.D.
The Q.E.D. shows the logical problem. The fact is all you can really say is "all conscious beings that I have experienced are animals."
Well, what evidence do you have that it is even possible for a non-animal to be conscious?



I don't need evidence, you are the one making the universal affirmative. You are the one who inserted the deductive tag, Q.E.D., "thus it is proved!" I simply pointed out that your sampling is not universal and your conclusion (even though you really didn't state a conclusion) is not deductively necessary.



So, where did the hemispherical pieces of wood come from? Where did the sticky substance come from? Unless the two pieces are set together fairly square the two pieces won't roll any better together than they would separately, who set them together? The fact is, this whole thing stinks to high heaven of design and intent. The design and intent that you deny exists in nature.

The example was simply to illustrate that an emergent property can be due to the arrangement of the parts without any supervening principle of order. Although it happened to involve a deliberate placement of the two halves, what reason is there to assume that emergent properties could not have arisen naturally, as the evolutionary record suggests, especially since (a) we have no evidence that they were intelligently designed, and (b) an immaterial designer would have no means of executing the design.
Bill, it would nice, if you are going to insist that "emergent properties" do not arise from intent, volition or design that you use an example that does not require intent, volition and design. But even a rock that is smoothed by hard conditions, so that it can roll, does not have an emergent property, unless by "emergent property" you mean any change at all to any thing at all.

If you want to discuss intelligent design and evolution I will be happy to discuss that in another thread. But, we do not need that discussion to resolve our problem.


Is consciousness matter in motion bound to follow the laws of physics?
Is consciousness not matter in motion, yet it is bound to follow the laws of physics?
Is consciousness matter in motion and independent of the laws of physics?
Is consciousness not matter in motion and independent of the laws of physics?
The problem I'm having with your questions is that I don't understand what you mean by "matter in motion." If you mean inanimate matter in motion, then conscious behavior is not "matter in motion" in that sense of the term, because it is the action of a living organism. If you mean any action performed by a material entity, then yes, conscious behavior is matter in motion, because it is the action of a living organism.



The problem I am having is you never tell us how the animate differs from the inanimate or the sentient differs from the non-sentient. In an atheistic and accidental worldview, what does it mean to be a "living organism"? Does something exist other than particles in motion, atoms in motion, molecules in motion? In your worldview, is "life" something other than a complex arrangement of material particles, atoms and molecules? Is consciousness something other than a complex arrangement of material particles, atoms and molecules?

In a previous post you wrote:


Life, consciousness and rationality can thus be explained as "emergent" properties, completely determined by the individual separate properties of the parts and their arrangement. Life exhibits principles of action that differ from those governing inanimate matter; sentient life exhibits principles of action that differ from those governing plant life; and man exhibits principles of action that differ from those governing the lower animals.
Then, in your last post you added:
By "completely determined," I didn't mean subject to mechanistic determinism; I meant "determined" in the broader sense of being completely caused by the arrangement of the parts themselves without any complementary principle of order.


I am afraid I don't understand how "complete determination" at all differs, in any real sense, from "mechanistic determination." Mechanistic determination means that every action is an effect, completely caused by prior arrangement of the parts. If in your atheistic view, this is not what consciousness is, what is it?

G. Brady Lenardos



Post 172

Monday, April 23, 2007 - 6:19pmSanction this postReply
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I wrote that All conscious beings are animals, and that all animals are material organisms, implying that all conscious beings are material organisms. Brady replied, "The fact is all you can really say is 'all conscious beings that I have experienced are animals.'" To which I replied, "Well, what evidence do you have that it is even possible for a non-animal to be conscious?"
I don't need evidence, you are the one making the universal affirmative....
You don't need evidence that it's possible for a non-animal to be conscious? Well, if you have no evidence that it's possible for a non-animal to be conscious, then on what grounds do you deny that all conscious beings are animals? Suppose I said that all rocks are inanimate and all inanimate objects are non-sentient, implying that all rocks are non-sentient. Would you challenge my statement in the same way, by replying: "The fact is all you can really say is 'all rocks that I have experienced are inanimate"?? It is your view that I cannot say that all rocks are inanimate, because I just might discover an animate rock under the next bush?
Bill, it would nice, if you are going to insist that "emergent properties" do not arise from intent, volition or design that you use an example that does not require intent, volition and design. But even a rock that is smoothed by hard conditions, so that it can roll, does not have an emergent property, unless by "emergent property" you mean any change at all to any thing at all.
As I understand it, the idea of an emergent property is that various parts combine to form an entity, which thereby acquires properties that the individual parts did not by themselves possess. The example I gave of two hemispheres coming together to form a sphere does not depend on intent or design. The combination could occur naturally, although it is far less likely to. Suppose that you had two naturally occurring hemispherical pieces of wood -- not perfect hemispheres but close approximations -- with one of them having some kind of sticky sap on its flat side, and that a strong wind blew them together to form a sphere -- improbable, to be sure, but let's say that it happened. In that case, you'd have an emergent property that arose naturally without intent or design.

Another example is the emergence of life, which requires water and DNA or something that copies like DNA, perhaps RNA. But that is a subject for the science of chemistry; I'm not a chemist. In any case, certain conditions are required for the origin of life, in the absence of which, life does not occur. If life were designed by a God, then why does it depend on a specific set of natural conditions? Why is its occurrence impossible without those conditions? I should think that its dependence on certain conditions of nature would be strong evidence that it arose naturally.

But if your view is that everything in the universe is a product of intent or design, then what would you accept as an example of something that isn't? And what would it mean to say that something is "designed," if everything is a product of design? Designed in contrast to what? I understand what it means to say that something is designed only in contrast to what occurs naturally. A watch, computer or automobile is designed in contrast to rocks, trees, animals, planets and stars, which are naturally occurring.

I wrote, "The problem I'm having with your questions is that I don't understand what you mean by 'matter in motion.' If you mean inanimate matter in motion, then conscious behavior is not 'matter in motion' in that sense of the term, because it is the action of a living organism. If you mean any action performed by a material entity, then yes, conscious behavior is matter in motion, because it is the action of a living organism."
The problem I am having is you never tell us how the animate differs from the inanimate or the sentient differs from the non-sentient. In an atheistic and accidental worldview, what does it mean to be a "living organism"?
The alternative to a designed universe is not an "accidental" one. What occurs naturally is not an "accident." It results from the nature of the acting entities. The fact that the earth revolves around the sun is not an accident. The earth and sun have a certain identity which determines how they will act under certain conditions. They could only act differently if they were different.

You ask, "what does it mean to be a living organism"? According to Objectivism, it means an organism that engages in "a process of self-sustaining, self-generated action." If an organism fails in that action, it dies; its chemical elements remain, but its life goes out of existence.
Does something exist other than particles in motion, atoms in motion, molecules in motion?
No, but certain combinations of these elements exhibit properties that differ from the elements themselves; they exhibit emergent properties.
In your worldview, is "life" something other than a complex arrangement of material particles, atoms and molecules?
No, which is why I am not a vitalist. As I said before, there is no entelechy, elan vitale or mysterious life force supervening that arrangement. Life just is the consequence of the arrangement.
Is consciousness something other than a complex arrangement of material particles, atoms and molecules?
Same answer. Consciousness just is the consequence of the arrangement.

I wrote, "Life, consciousness and rationality can thus be explained as 'emergent' properties, completely determined by the individual separate properties of the parts and their arrangement. Life exhibits principles of action that differ from those governing inanimate matter; sentient life exhibits principles of action that differ from those governing plant life; and man exhibits principles of action that differ from those governing the lower animals." I explained that "[b]y 'completely determined," I didn't mean subject to mechanistic determinism; I meant 'determined' in the broader sense of being completely caused by the arrangement of the parts themselves without any complementary principle of order."
I am afraid I don't understand how "complete determination" at all differs, in any real sense, from "mechanistic determination." Mechanistic determination means that every action is an effect, completely caused by prior arrangement of the parts. If in your atheistic view, this is not what consciousness is, what is it?
That's not how I define "mechanistic determination," which I take to refer to actions that are not goal directed or purposive. The actions of living organisms exhibit goal-directedness -- the goal being the preservation of the organism's life. Conscious action is another form of goal directed behavior. Goal directed action operates according to what Aristotle referred to as "final causation," since it is directed towards an "end." Mechanistic action, which characterizes the behavior of inanimate objects, operates strictly according to the laws of physics, such as Newton's first law of motion. Such action is not goal directed, but is simply a reaction to a previous action. The capacity for goal-directed behavior by a living entity is determined entirely by a prior arrangement of the parts from which the entity is formed. Once the arrangement is complete, the action of the entity thus produced becomes self-generating and self-sustaining within the limits of its abilities and of the conditions under which it exists. As a living organism, the entity exhibits an "emergent" form of action that differs from the purely mechanistic action of its individual parts or components.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 4/23, 6:22pm)


Post 173

Tuesday, April 24, 2007 - 12:17amSanction this postReply
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Ed: As I alluded to above, "we" have had "that one" sorted out for OVER 2 YEARS NOW.

That was an interesting exchange, although it did not specifically deal with the axiomatic concepts. Also, my references to perception and concepts were by way of a query about Rands position, not a statement of my own views.

Your accusation of rhetoric on my part ignores an important aspect of this debate, which is that both you and Rand advance claims that are at the least ambiguous.

I re-quote your previous comment: The truth (i.e., the correspondance to reality) of axioms, however, is something that can be perceived, as well as Rands: An axiomatic conceptis the fundamentally given and directly perceived or experienced

I think it is reasonable to investigate these claims in order to clarify what you both mean by them.

Given the length of our cyber relationship, I think I may presume to offer some advice. Accusations of rhetoric and stomping off in a fit of pique make it appear you cannot cut the debating mustard.

Im sure that is not true, but spitting the dummy is never a good look.

I believe that my claim about the derivation of the concept unit is an important aspect of the Objectivist epistemology. But by all means take your time in dealing with it.

Brendan

Post 174

Tuesday, May 1, 2007 - 8:22amSanction this postReply
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Hi Bill,

Sorry to be gone for so long. I had to deal with some health and business issues.

Bill wrote:

You don't need evidence that it's possible for a non-animal to be conscious? Well, if you have no evidence that it's possible for a non-animal to be conscious, then on what grounds do you deny that all conscious beings are animals?
You are the one making the universal affirmative statement based on a limited number of particulars, experienced on a limited part of only one planet, in a very short period of time, in only one solar system, in only one galaxy. That said, we also recognize that your perceptions about those particulars still remain unjustified. The only rational conclusion is that your said universal is far from Q.E.D.

In fact, this whole thread is a discussion of whether or not, given the basic proposition of your worldview, you can reach a universal at all (or any other knowledge for that matter). You have made a lot of claims that you can make such statements, but you have never been able to demonstrate how you get to them from your basic propositions.

I don't need a counter example or a counter argument, because there is no deductively valid argument to counter. You have drastically overstated your case and you have been called on it.

Suppose I said that all rocks are inanimate and all inanimate objects are non-sentient, implying that all rocks are non-sentient. Would you challenge my statement in the same way, by replying: "The fact is all you can really say is 'all rocks that I have experienced are inanimate"?? It is your view that I cannot say that all rocks are inanimate, because I just might discover an animate rock under the next bush?
"Rocks" are inanimate by definition and "inanimate objects" are non-sentient by definition. You are attempting to prove that "All conscious beings are animals." The fact that you are offering an argument shows that this is not a tautology. You have made a category error. Now, you may want to say that those definitions of "rocks" and "inanimate" are also based on limited experiences. Then I will answer, "Fine, show me how you get to any real universal at all from your basic propositions?" Do you just pretend that there are real universals until a counter example is shown? Isn't that your above argument, "If you can't show a counter example, then I can pretend that my statement is a universal!" My point is, there may be counter examples we don't know about (or even, given our limited senses, can't know about) or it may be that there are no counter examples and your statement is really a universal, but you can't "know" that either way . Your worldview does not have the elements that allow you to "know" that.

Well, I think I'll stop for now and come back to your other points this afternoon.

Regards,

G. Brady Lenardos


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Post 175

Tuesday, May 1, 2007 - 11:17pmSanction this postReply
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Bill: All conscious beings are animals; all animals are material organisms; therefore, that all conscious beings are material organisms.

Brady: The fact is all you can really say is "all conscious beings that I have experienced are animals."

Bill: Well, what evidence do you have that it is even possible for a non-animal to be conscious?

Brady: I don't need evidence, you are the one making the universal affirmative.

Bill: You don't need evidence that it's possible for a non-animal to be conscious? Well, if you have no evidence that it's possible for a non-animal to be conscious, then on what grounds do you deny that all conscious beings are animals? Suppose I said that all rocks are inanimate and all inanimate objects are non-sentient, implying that all rocks are non-sentient. Would you challenge my statement in the same way, by replying: "The fact is all you can really say is 'all rocks that I have experienced are inanimate"?? It is your view that I cannot say that all rocks are inanimate, because I just might discover an animate rock under the next bush?
"Rocks" are inanimate by definition and "inanimate objects" are non-sentient by definition. You are attempting to prove that "All conscious beings are animals." The fact that you are offering an argument shows that this is not a tautology.
I wasn't attempting to prove that all conscious beings are animals; I was attempting to prove that all conscious beings are material organisms based on the fact that all conscious beings are animals and that all animals are material organisms. In any case, there is nothing which says that the premises and conclusion of a valid argument cannot be tautologies. For example:

All rocks are inanimate.
No inanimate objects are sentient.
Therefore, no rocks are sentient.

This is a perfectly valid argument, even though the premises and conclusion are tautologies.
You have made a category error.
What category error?!
Now, you may want to say that those definitions of "rocks" and "inanimate" are also based on limited experiences. Then I will answer, "Fine, show me how you get to any real universal at all from your basic propositions?"
I don't subscribe to the analytic/synthetic dichotomy, the way you do. A rock is inanimate by definition, a proposition which is empirically verifiable. By the same token, a conscious organism is an animal by definition, a proposition which is also empirically verifiable. Just as you can't show me a rock that's not inanimate, because if it weren't inanimate, it wouldn't be a rock, so you can't show me a conscious organism that's not an animal, because if it weren't an animal, it wouldn't be a conscious organism.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 5/01, 11:19pm)


Post 176

Wednesday, May 2, 2007 - 10:54amSanction this postReply
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Bill wrote:

I wasn't attempting to prove that all conscious beings are animals; I was attempting to prove that all conscious beings are material organisms based on the fact that all conscious beings are animals and that all animals are material organisms. In any case, there is nothing which says that the premises and conclusion of a valid argument cannot be tautologies. For example:

All rocks are inanimate.
No inanimate objects are sentient.
Therefore, no rocks are sentient.

This is a perfectly valid argument, even though the premises and conclusion are tautologies.

I thought I was clear, but apparently not, so let me try again.

1) I never said that tautologies are not permitted in a deductive syllogism. If you think I did, please show me where!

2) I understand that you are attempting to prove that "all conscious beings are material organisms."

3) Your minor premise, "all animals are material organisms," is indeed definitional.

4) Your major premise, "all conscious beings are animals," is not definitional and no sound deductive argument can be given to prove it. This is where your problem lies. You must assert a universal affirmative for your argument to be sound. But as I pointed out in my last post, you only have particular affirmatives to work with. Given the basic propositions of your worldview, the only way you can make any universal statements that are not definitional is to pretend that particulars equal a universal, this you have done. I have called you on it. A deductive argument can only be sound if all the premises are true. You have no way of knowing if your major premise is true, you only have faith that it is based on a limited number of particulars, experienced on a limited part of only one planet, in a very short period of time, in only one solar system, in only one galaxy.

There may be counter examples out there. There may be no counter examples out there and you may be right. You have no way of knowing and therefore can make no universal statements about the subject.

The main point of my last post was, given the basic propositions of your worldview, you just don't know if your major premise is true. Therefore, your argument can not by an means be called sound.

Another problem with your argument (that I pointed out a while back and still remains) is ambiguity. I still have no idea of what "consciousness" means in your worldview and how it ontologically differs from non-consciousness. Until you have rid yourself of this ambiguity, you cannot have a sound argument either.

Let's move on:

You have made a category error.
What category error?!

You confuse definitional statements like, "No inanimate objects are sentient," with non-definitional statements like, "all conscious beings are animals." They are not the same thing. You can pretend they are, but they are not.

I don't subscribe to the analytic/synthetic dichotomy, the way you do. A rock is inanimate by definition, a proposition which is empirically verifiable.
Bill, please forgive me, but that is completely absurd! The only way you can "empirically verify" the proposition is because of the definition. Your "empirical verification" adds NOTHING! In fact, it is not really a verification, it is merely an identification. You can pretend that you verified something, but actually you just took the definition, looked around and identified an example of it.

so you can't show me a conscious organism that's not an animal, because if it weren't an animal, it wouldn't be a conscious organism.
But the problem has never been with the phrase "conscious organism." You are quite right all conscious organisms are animals. The problem is with the phrase, "conscious beings." And, of course, your ambiguity problem comes into play, big time. If by "consciousness" you mean a purely material and mechanical thing, then you are quite right. Are you saying that?

Regards,

G. Brady Lenardos


Post 177

Wednesday, May 2, 2007 - 9:12pmSanction this postReply
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Your major premise, "all conscious beings are animals," is not definitional and no sound deductive argument can be given to prove it.
I don't see how it's any less definitional than the statement, "all rocks are inanimate." You say that a rock is inanimate by definition. Well, in that case, a conscious being is an animal by definition. There is no difference between these two statements.
This is where your problem lies. You must assert a universal affirmative for your argument to be sound. But as I pointed out in my last post, you only have particular affirmatives to work with.
Right, and it is particular affirmatives which tell me that all rocks are inanimate "by definition." In order to say that all rocks are inanimate, according to your epistemology, I'd have to inventory every rock in the universe. Yet even you would say that all rocks are inanimate, on the grounds that a rock is inanimate by definition. However, the fact that rocks are inanimate by definition does not mean that the nature of a rock is not to be identified empirically. I know that rocks are inanimate, only because I can see that they lack biological characteristics; that's why I say that they're inanimate "by definition." But if I can say that all rocks by their nature are inanimate simply from observing a limited number, then why can't I say that all conscious beings are animals by their nature simply from observing a limited number?

You say that I could conceivably discover a conscious being that's not an animal in some other corner of the universe? Very well, then why couldn't I discover a rock that's not inanimate in some other corner of the universe? If you say that it's part of a rock's nature to be inanimate, so that if it's not inanimate, then it's not a rock, then I can say that it's part of a conscious being's nature to be an animal, so that if it's not an animal, then it's not a conscious being.
Another problem with your argument (that I pointed out a while back and still remains) is ambiguity. I still have no idea of what "consciousness" means in your worldview and how it ontologically differs from non-consciousness. Until you have rid yourself of this ambiguity, you cannot have a sound argument either.
Consciousness is identified introspectively. Its definition is ostensive, which means that it is understood by direct experience. Conscious organisms differ from non-conscious organisms, inasmuch as the latter do not have experiences, awareness, thoughts, feelings, etc. What other difference did you expect me to cite? That's all you can say about how consciousness differs from non-consciousness. However, it is well to remember that consciousness is not a separate, independent existent, but a property of a material organism. Suppose I said, "There is a consciousness in the next house," and you asked, "What is it that is conscious?" and I replied, "Oh, it's nothing that IS conscious; it's just pure consciousness." Well, of course, that's nonsense. It's no different than if I said, "I have red in my pocket, and you asked, "What is it that's red? Is it a red handkerchief, a red wallet, a red pen?" And suppose I replied, "Oh, it's nothing that IS red; it's just pure red." Again, that's nonsense, because red is not an entity; it is an attribute or property of an entity. Similarly, consciousness is not an entity, but an attribute or property of an entity.

I wrote, "I don't subscribe to the analytic/synthetic dichotomy, the way you do. A rock is inanimate by definition, a proposition which is empirically verifiable."
Bill, please forgive me, but that is completely absurd! The only way you can "empirically verify" the proposition is because of the definition. Your "empirical verification" adds NOTHING! In fact, it is not really a verification, it is merely an identification. You can pretend that you verified something, but actually you just took the definition, looked around and identified an example of it.
How do you know that a rock is animate? The only way you can know it is by observing that it lacks evidence of biological activity. That's empirical, isn't it?

I wrote, "So you can't show me a conscious organism that's not an animal, because if it weren't an animal, it wouldn't be a conscious organism."
But the problem has never been with the phrase "conscious organism." You are quite right all conscious organisms are animals. The problem is with the phrase, "conscious beings."
Okay, I should have said "conscious beings" to be consistent in the form of my argument. The reason I didn't is because it's not possible for a consciousness to exist outside the context of living organisms. Consciousness is goal-directed or purposive by its nature, and it is only the concept of "life" that makes the concept of "goal" or "purpose" possible, for it is only a living entity that has anything to gain or lose by its actions.

"To make this point fully clear, try to imagine an immortal, indestructible robot, an entity which moves and acts, but which cannot be affected by anything, which cannot be changed in any respect, which cannot be damaged, injured or destroyed. Such an entity would not be able to have any values; it would have nothing to gain or to lose; it could not regard anything as for or against it, as serving or threatening its welfare, as fulfilling or frustrating its interests. It could have no interests and no goals.

"Only a living entity can have goals or can originate them. And it is only a living organism that has the capacity for self-generated, goal directed action." (Rand, VOS, pp. 15, 16)
And, of course, your ambiguity problem comes into play, big time. If by "consciousness" you mean a purely material and mechanical thing, then you are quite right. Are you saying that?
A consciousness is purely material only in the sense that the organs of consciousness, the brain and sensory nervous system, are themselves purely material. However, because consciousness is an experiential manifestation of the operation of these organs, it is often identified as "non-material," which I think this is a mistake, or at the very least misleading. Consciousness is no less material than any other attribute, which doesn't mean that it doesn't exist qua consciousness. But as a consciousness, it is simply the subjective manifestation of the action of the brain and sensory nervous system, whose biological function is the satisfaction of the organism's survival needs.

But if by "purely material," you mean lacking awareness, then no, a conscious organism is not purely material in that sense. Still a conscious organism is nothing more than the combination of its material parts, even though the combination produces a property that none of the parts by itself possesses. Just as it is the combination of hydrogen and oxygen (H2O) that produces the emergent property of wetness, a property which hydrogen and oxygen by themselves do not possess,* so it is the combination of a conscious organism's material constituents that produces the emergent property of awareness, a property which the material constituents by themselves do not possess.

--------------

* It is true that if you cool H2 and O2 far below room temperature, they can become liquid, but at room temperature, they exist only as dry gasses.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 5/02, 9:46pm)


Post 178

Wednesday, May 2, 2007 - 9:25pmSanction this postReply
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"Your major premise, "all conscious beings are animals," is not definitional and no sound deductive argument can be given to prove it. This is where your problem lies. You must assert a universal affirmative for your argument to be sound." - Brady

The statement is contextual and, within the (perceptual) experience of everyone on this list, is contextually absolute. You say that no deductive argument can be given to prove the truth of the statement. This implies that you believe that deductive arguments from prior premisses do prove things. Well, where did those prior arguments come from, if not induction? Deduction isn't the only player in the game. If we didn't form valid concepts by induction - and form them prior to deduction, we could never even learn to deduce.

As for the specifics of animal consciousness, we know that certain types of animals are conscious from observation, and once we understand (induce the concept of) evolution, we know that consciousness is a property of animals which adapts them to survival in their environments. Once this is understood, the idea that a rock - which cannot face alternatives of which it would need to be conscious, or that an omnipotent perfect being, which couldn't be harmed would need consciousness is absurd.

Theists argue that God is perfect. Does perfection include having unnecessary attributes? A conscious god is like a gilded lily - imperfect by overkill. And why or how, even, would an immortal soul be conscious?

Since we have no reason to believe that artificial consciousness has yet been created, and we can see that the mere idea of a conscious ghost or God is arbitrary and without explanation, the assertion that only animals are conscious is the only sensible belief which we can induce. Any deductions we try to make that contradict it are absurd.

Ted Keer

Post 179

Thursday, May 3, 2007 - 12:03amSanction this postReply
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You don't perceive your own mental content; you introspect it. Perception is not introspection; it's extrospection, which is an awareness of the external world.
Counterexample:  Perceptions can be induced to replicate sensations from the external world by means of direct stimulation of  brain tissue.  These simulated perceptions do not count as awareness of the external world, yet they are perceptions.  Hence, your claim is false.    
Moreover, in order to be aware of your own mental content, you would first have to be aware of the external world, from which you acquire the sensory basis for the content. You cannot have any mental content without some sensory input, which always takes the perceptual form of that input (e.g., visual images, auditory impressions, etc).
This is false on its face.  It is logically possible that (given a purely materialistic conception of mind) one could recreate your brain composition, perhaps by cloning the necessary tissue.  This twin brain would share all of your mental content without needing any experience of the external world.     
Imagination presupposes perception. In other words, your memories, dreams and mental images are always experienced in the form of one of your five senses, which indicates that they are based on your perceptions of the external world. An immaterial consciousness could have no mental content, because the content would have no sensory form.

Plainly false.  Mathematical and basic logical propositions, though they may be grounded in perception, are not conceived in the form of any sense. 

But I would go even further, and ask how it is that sheer perception can be assimilated and understood without recourse to preexisting, latent mental concepts.  Abstraction from perception, for example, presupposes an ability to differentiate properties, since abstraction amounts to isolating certain properties of an empirically given object. 
Thoughts are merely "influenced" by the brain?? In that case, thought could take place independently of the brain. But thought does, in fact, depend on the brain, just as vision depends on the eye; hearing, on the ear, etc.

Thoughts are not completely causally dependent on the brain, for thoughts, like propositions or desires, can actually cause further mental action and hence can elicit a response from the brain.  For example, in mathematical proofs, certain conclusions are drawn from prior axioms qua axioms.  These axioms themselves, and the analysis of their influence and relationships, cause and determine the nature of the conclusion drawn from them. 
Then how could it [an immaterial substance or God] be aware of the external world -- by what means and in what form? The answer is, there wouldn't be any means or form of external awareness, in which case, it could have no mental content to be aware of introspectively.

By virtue of the knowledge of His creative activity.  God perceives possibilia (all possible worlds) in himself and thus knows by nature all true propositions--both necessary and contingent truths-- in himself.  God knows things in the actual world insofar as he continually produces them and is aware of all of their activities by merely perceiving their a priori individual concepts, which are instantiated through creation.    
The main point of these examples was simply to illustrate that you cannot have a process without an entity to perform it.
God, understood atemporally, transcends process, and knows and wills all things immediately, i.e. eternally. 
Well, I've already explained why consciousness requires physical organs for its existence and operation.
You've explained why you think that consciousness requires physical organs for its existence and operation, but you've failed to offer sufficient support for this assertion.   
As for its immateriality, a mental phenomenon is called "immaterial" only in the sense that it differs from things that one can see and touch.
No, a mental phenomenon is non-physical.  Propositions qua propositions, for example, are non-physical

I'm sorry, but I don't understand an immaterial substance. Consciousness is an attribute or property of a material organism, not a stand alone entity.

If consciousness (or mental phenomena) is causally efficiacious on the brain, then it cannot be a mere attribute or property of a material organism.  Properties could emerge from the brain, but they could not causally influence it.  This is just what epiphenomenon means, viz. an effect arising out of a primary phenomenon.
How is it question-begging? It is simply a fact; how a thing behaves depends on the kind of thing it is. For example, birds fly, because flying is part of their nature. Horses gallop, because galloping is part of theirs.

Tisn't always this simple.  One can always attribute what appears to issue as an effect from a substance to that substance's nature, even though it is perfectly possible that the effect has a cause outside of that substance, and only appears to issue from it.   
No, it's a law, if we assume that all of the relevant conditions remain the same. The law of causality is a corollary of the law of identity.
Argumentative circularity detected.  Did you not just support the law of identity of substances by the notion that all things act according to their nature?  And is not the notion that all things act according to their nature only established by perceiving what are ostensibly causes and effects?  And does not the support of such allegedly causal perception derive from the law of identity? 

You're trying to establish the law of causality as a corollary to the law of identity, even though the law of identity depends on and presupposes the law of causality.  That's called circularity. 
Since there is no Lockean "substratum" underlying and uniting its characteristics, a thing just is all of its characteristics. If it exists under the same conditions, it will possess the same characteristics, including the same action. 

False.  How could you ever prove this?  You've just never experienced an instance to the contrary.  But that hardly amounts to establishing it as a necessary truth that the same thing in the same conditions will undertake the same action, since necessary truths are only those truths whose contraries entail contradictions.   
We know that consciousness is a property of a physical organism and that it does not exist outside of that context.
Do we?  I somehow missed the rational support for this conclusion. 
When the organism dies, its consciousness ceases to exist, just like all of its other bodily processes.
This is actually false.  Certain bodily processes (like the pumping of the heart) can continue for a time even after the person is dead.  But this is beside the point. 

I would take issue with the idea that it is necessarily true that death amounts to a cessation of consciousness.  Perhaps God immediately provides the soul with a new hylomorphic compound after its bodily host dies out, but this hylomorph exists in a parallel universe, such that we assume that consciousness ceases since in our universe, empirically speaking, it does.   
To call consciousness "immaterial" is, therefore, a bit misleading, because it suggests that consciousness has a non-physical existence -- an existence independent of a physical organism. Granted, the idea of a stone is not the same as a stone itself, which is why we call an idea "immaterial," but there is no such thing as an immaterial substance.
You've not shown that there is no such thing as an immaterial substance, though you admittedly have become quite adept at tirelessly repeating this assertion, as if its cogency might accrue from mere repetition. 
Consciousness is a property or a faculty of a physical organism. It is a subjective manifestation of the function of the brain in the same way that vision is the subjective manifestation of the function of the eye. 
You've not shown that conscious is merely a property or faculty of a physical organism, though you admittedly have become quite adept at tirelessly repeating this assertion, as if its cogency might accrue from mere repetition.

Adducing vision as a subjective manifestation of the function of the eye does not work as an analogy to understanding mental activity as a subjective manifestation of the function of the brain.  Why?  For the simple reason that vision itself is a form of mental activity, which is precisely what you were attempting to provide an analogy for. 
Just as vision does not exist in isolation from the organ of perception which makes it possible -- the eye -- so thought does not exist in isolation from the organ of cognition which makes it possible -- the brain. 
It's still a failed analogy.  Visual sensations can be created without the eye by directly stimulating the brain.   
We know from evolutionary science that sentient forms of life emerged from a new and more complex arrangement of non-sentient forms, just as living entities emerged from a new and more complex arrangement of non-living entities.

Of course we do.  But this says nothing conclusively about the mechanism responsible for the emergence of sentience. 
What I'm saying is that just as the sphere in Binswanger's example comprises two hemispheres that lack the ability to roll while the sphere itself possesses that ability, so an animal comprises constituents that lack the faculty of awareness, while the animal itself possesses that faculty.
Yet another poor analogy.  We know that a sphere is made of two hemispheres and can roll.  Similarly, we know that animals possess consciousness, but we do not know whether animals are wholly material substances. 
This is the definition of an emergent property -- a property possessed by the whole that none of the parts possesses.

Of course, but the issue is whether consciousness is an emergent property. 
Besides, my point was not that conscious organisms are bound to follow the laws of physics (such as Newton's first law of motion); clearly, they are not.
If conscious organisms are wholly material substances then they must follow the laws of physics. 
All I was saying is that conscious organisms are bound to follow the laws of nature that apply to them, which are biological and psychological. Not all laws of nature are laws of physics.

In a wholly materialistic universe, all laws--including biological or psychological laws--reduce to physics.  Cf. grand unification and string theories. 

You don't need evidence that it's possible for a non-animal to be conscious? Well, if you have no evidence that it's possible for a non-animal to be conscious, then on what grounds do you deny that all conscious beings are animals? Suppose I said that all rocks are inanimate and all inanimate objects are non-sentient, implying that all rocks are non-sentient. Would you challenge my statement in the same way, by replying: "The fact is all you can really say is 'all rocks that I have experienced are inanimate"?? It is your view that I cannot say that all rocks are inanimate, because I just might discover an animate rock under the next bush?
A swift refutation of the rock analogy: 

Given that you define a rock as a material object having a certain set of properties--among them the privative property 'lack of consciousness'-- the conclusion does follow that all rocks are inanimate. 

However, the rational structure of the above argument is not followed in making the following argument:  A conscious being (based on exceptionless empirical evidence) is an animal, i.e. a physical organism.  Hence, (by induction) all conscious beings must be physical organisms. 

In the former argument:  
\forall{x}{\in}\mathbf{X}\, P(x)
where x is a rock and p(x) is the proposition 'x is inanimate.'  

However, the latter argument cannot justifiably take the universal quantifier.  It can only say (existentially):
xE X P(x)
where x is a conscious being and p(x) is the proposition 'x is an animal.'  You think it ought to have a universal quantifier as it does in the rock argument, but you could only use a u.q. if you defined x as an animal, and this would result in a trivially true universal, viz. that all animals are animals, because not all animals are conscious.  (Sponges aren't conscious, for example)

In short, you are justified in saying that some animals are conscious beings, but you are not justified in saying that all conscious beings are animals.  Similarly, you are justified in saying that all rocks are inanimate objects, but not justified in saying that all inanimate objects are rocks. 

(Edited by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz on 5/03, 12:28am)


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