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Post 180

Friday, May 4, 2007 - 10:36amSanction this postReply
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Ted wrote: 
Theists argue that God is perfect. Does perfection include having unnecessary attributes? A conscious god is like a gilded lily - imperfect by overkill.
On the contrary, absolute perfection includes all positive, simple properties.  And it is perfectly possible for a single Being to possess all of these properties. 

Leibniz proved it with the following demonstration: 

I call a perfection every simple quality which is positive and absolute, i.e. which expresses whatever it expresses without any limitations.

But since such a quality is simple, it follows that it is unanalysable, i.e. indefinable; for if it is definable, it will either not be one simple quality, but an aggregate of many; or if it is a single quality, it will be defined by its limitations, and hence will be understood through negations of further progress; but this goes against the initial assumption, which was that it is purely positive.

From this it is not difficult to show that all perfections are compatible with each other, i.e. that they can co-exist in the same subject.

For let there be a proposition of the following sort: A and B are incompatible (understanding by A and B two simple forms of this sort, i.e. perfections; and it is the same if more than two are taken simultaneously). It is obvious that this proposition cannot be proved without analysing either or both of the terms A and B; for otherwise what they are would not be taken into account in the process of reasoning, and incompatibility could equally well be demonstrated of any other things as of them. But (ex hypothesi) they are unanalysable. Therefore this proposition cannot be demonstrated of them.

But if it were true, it certainly could be demonstrated of them, because it is not true by itself. But necessarily true propositions are either provable or known by themselves. Therefore this proposition is not necessarily true — in other words, it is not necessary that A and B are not in the same subject. Therefore they can be in the same subject, and since the same reasoning is valid for any other qualities of this sort you might choose, it follows that all perfections are compatible with each other.

Therefore there is, or can be understood, the subject of all perfections, or a most perfect being.

From which it is obvious that he also exists, since existence is included in the number of perfections.

(The same can also be shown of forms compounded from absolute ones, provided there are such.)

 


 


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Post 181

Saturday, May 5, 2007 - 11:01amSanction this postReply
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The core of the problem lies in the following, so I will deal with this area:

Bill wrote:

And, of course, your ambiguity problem comes into play, big time. If by "consciousness" you mean a purely material and mechanical thing, then you are quite right. Are you saying that?
A consciousness is purely material only in the sense that the organs of consciousness, the brain and sensory nervous system, are themselves purely material. However, because consciousness is an experiential manifestation of the operation of these organs, it is often identified as "non-material," which I think this is a mistake, or at the very least misleading. Consciousness is no less material than any other attribute, which doesn't mean that it doesn't exist qua consciousness. But as a consciousness, it is simply the subjective manifestation of the action of the brain and sensory nervous system, whose biological function is the satisfaction of the organism's survival needs.



The problem is that organs don't "experience," they are simply matter in motion passively responding to antecedent causes. We keep falling further and further back. First, it was the person that experiences, then the consciousness that experiences, now it is the organs that somehow have experiential manifestations, whatever that means. What could that possibly mean? What is the referent to an "experiential manifestation" of an organ? You admit that consciousness is material. Therefore, it is nothing more than an effect of matter in motion, it is necessarily determined by antecedent causes, as is everything else (according to the basic propositions of your worldview). But, you also want to say that there is something that is not necessarily determined, so you introduce, Ad Hoc, phrases that are meaningless to the material, such as "qua conscious," "experiential manifestation" and "subjective manifestation."

Are you saying that any "manifestation" is something other than an effect necessarily determined by material antecedent causes?

But if by "purely material," you mean lacking awareness, then no, a conscious organism is not purely material in that sense. Still a conscious organism is nothing more than the combination of its material parts, even though the combination produces a property that none of the parts by itself possesses. Just as it is the combination of hydrogen and oxygen (H2O) that produces the emergent property of wetness, a property which hydrogen and oxygen by themselves do not possess,* so it is the combination of a conscious organism's material constituents that produces the emergent property of awareness, a property which the material constituents by themselves do not possess
Here is another meaningless term to the material, "awareness." Is not "a property" just another word for "effect?" And is not "combination of parts" just another phrase for "antecedent causes?" If so, then is not "awareness" just the necessarily determined effect of antecedent causes?

Your example of water as an emergent property fails the test. The wetness of water is necessarily determined by it antecedent causes. It could be no other than it is. It is completely mechanistic, and necessarily determined by antecedent causes. Is that what you mean by "consciousness?"

By "emergent property" you want to imply that there is something in consciousness that is not mechanistic and not necessarily determined, yet all the examples of emergent properties you give are mechanistic and are necessarily determined. I fail to see their value.

There seems to be a black box here. You stuff purely mechanical and necessarily determined matter in one side of the box, and you magically get non-mechanistic and non-deterministic "consciousness" out of the other side. And just as a magician offers the phrase "Alakazam" as the magic phrase that does the job, you offer the equally meaningless phrase, "emergent property" as the phrase that does the magic. When pressed for the meaning, all you can come up with is completely mechanistic and totally determined examples.

Your assertion that "a conscious organism is not purely material in that sense," makes no sense. At least it makes no sense when you try to explain it from the basic propositions of your world view. That is the trouble you are having.

You recognize and experience independence in yourself. The basic propositions of your worldview necessarily implies the denial that independence. So, you keep jumping back and forth between your experience and your worldview. Since you believe in atheism and you believe in independent thought, therefore, you believe they both must be true and compatible. But they are not. The jumping back abd forth is an attempt to avoid admitting the necessary contradiction between the two. So, you are forced to have a consciousness that is purely material in one paragraph and not purely material in another paragraph. You may want to say that is not in the same sense. But then why bring it up? I don't care about equivocations, if you mean something else, simply use different words. The fact is, we are talking about the same sense, and that is your problem. All your causes are mechanistic and necessarily determined, and your worldview tells us that all mechanistic and necessarily determined causes yield mechanistic and necessarily determined effects. Yet when it comes to consciousness, you insist it is an effect that is not mechanistic or necessarily determined, even though all its antecedent causes are mechanistic and necessarily determining. A real contradiction does in fact exist.

Regards,

G. Brady Lenardos



Post 182

Saturday, May 5, 2007 - 6:40pmSanction this postReply
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GWL, the notion you have of perfection is confused and incoherent. Perfection means completeness, surely you know the Latin? Perfection is measured according to some standard. A perfect hammer doesn't lay chicken eggs, even though laying chicken eggs is a positive quality.

If God has all positive qualities (and how do we define positive?) then is he perfectly red and perfectly blue? Does he suffer emotions? If you want to follow Spinoza, and identify God with nature, fine. But attributing to God the qualities of an ancient Semitic king hardly seems to be perfection to me.

But Spinoza did not see God as undergoing mental processes in the way that we do. His idea of the "idea of God" was non-termporal. This hardly allows us to assert that he is conscious in any way analogous to the workings of the human brain. Denying that all (as yet known and existing) conscious beings are animals is arbitrary.

Ted

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Post 183

Saturday, May 5, 2007 - 8:23pmSanction this postReply
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GWL, the notion you have of perfection is confused and incoherent.
I beg to differ. 
Perfection means completeness, surely you know the Latin?
I do know the Latin, but I do not believe that I have misused the term here.  God is complete in that he possesses all positive perfections without limitation, i.e. infinitely. 
Perfection is measured according to some standard.  A perfect hammer doesn't lay chicken eggs, even though laying chicken eggs is a positive quality.
But you've shifted the meaning of the term.  Applied to limited beings of specific nature, perfection is measured with reference to the ideal expression of the particular, limited being under consideration.  However, in a most perfect Being, perfection is measured according to the standard of being itself, not according to the measure or ideal expression of a limited form or kind of being. 
If God has all positive qualities (and how do we define positive?) then is he perfectly red and perfectly blue?
A positive property is one without limitation, or one that does not include a privation of some sort. 

God is not perfectly red and perfectly blue.  For these predicates are analyzable, and hence (as we understand them) must be limited in some way.  Therefore, they can hardly be possessed by God. 
Does he suffer emotions?
I follow St. Thomas Aquinas, and maintain that if certain passions or emotions can be understood as perfections, then they can be (and should be) attributed to God.  Among these, Aquinas lists delight, joy, and love.  

Concerning delight and joy, Aquinas writes: 

--There are some passions which, though they do not befit God as passions, nevertheless, so far as their specific nature is considered, do not involve anything inconsistent with divine perfection. Of the number of these is Delight and Joy. Joy is of present good. Neither by reason of its object, which is good, nor by reason of the relation in which the object, good actually possessed, stands to the subject, does joy specifically contain anything inconsistent with divine perfection. Hence it is manifest that joy or Delight has being properly in God.--     

And as to love, he writes:   

--The essential idea of love seems to be this, that the affection of one tends to another as to a being who is in some way one with himself. The greater the bond of union, the more intense is the love. And again the more intimately bound up with the lover the bond of union is, the stronger the love. But that bond whereby all things are united with God, namely, His goodness, of which all things are imitations, is to God the greatest and most intimate of bonds, seeing that He is Himself His own goodness. There is therefore in God a love, not only true, but most perfect and strong.-- 

Those passions which by their nature cannot be understood as perfections, cannot be possessed by God.  Aquinas lists fear, repentance, sadness, and anger as examples of these. 

If you want to follow Spinoza, and identify God with nature, fine.
To identify God with nature is to slander His Goodness, for there is quite obviously evil and imperfection in nature. 
But attributing to God the qualities of an ancient Semitic king hardly seems to be perfection to me.

Probably a reference here to the portrayal of God given in the Old Testament.  But so long as we remember that Scripture, although inspired by the Holy Spirit, was nevertheless written under the constraints of language and culture, we will be content in knowing that the true nature of God--absolute perfection--is forever grasped by us imperfectly. 
But Spinoza did not see God as undergoing mental processes in the way that we do.
Neither does orthodox Christianity.  When Scriptures speak of God "thinking" or "resting" or "considering", this is analogical language. 
His idea of the "idea of God" was non-termporal. This hardly allows us to assert that he is conscious in any way analogous to the workings of the human brain.
How so?  The conscious activities of will, intellection, and love, are all activities we experience, and can all be understood eternally. 
Denying that all (as yet known and existing) conscious beings are animals is arbitrary.

I disagree, for if we have reason to believe that God exists, and is a perfect being, then we have reason to believe that he possesses will, intellection, and love, and thus have reason to believe that he is in some sense conscious by virtue of possessing these.


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Post 184

Sunday, May 6, 2007 - 8:20amSanction this postReply
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I don't know why you folks waste your time with these two.  GWL is going to make (twist?) any argument anybody makes fit into his worldview.  Ditto for Brady.  They aren't here to learn, they're here to troll (and yes, it fits...despite the arguments thrown at these two, not a thing has changed about their worldview.)  One side refuses to learn from the other and is arguing for the sake of argumentation.  Don't feed them any longer.

Post 185

Sunday, May 6, 2007 - 8:44amSanction this postReply
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Steven Druckenmiller wrote: 
I don't know why you folks waste your time with these two.  GWL is going to make (twist?) any argument anybody makes fit into his worldview.  Ditto for Brady.  They aren't here to learn, they're here to troll (and yes, it fits...despite the arguments thrown at these two, not a thing has changed about their worldview.)  One side refuses to learn from the other and is arguing for the sake of argumentation.  Don't feed them any longer.

Steven, judging by your contributions to these debates, you've been unable to appreciate the ongoing discussion, probably because you've been unable to follow it.  But this is a dissent board.  It is a place specifically designated for those who dissent from the Randian philosophy to which this website is devoted.  As such, Brady and I are perfectly entitled to post here, and others are perfectly entitled to ignore our postings if they so please.       

In any case, if Randianism is a credible philosophical worldview, it should not have to shield its adherents from being challenged.  Only cults should have to do that.      


Post 186

Sunday, May 6, 2007 - 11:32amSanction this postReply
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Like I said, no shielding here. You're not going to take down atheism, concept-formation, ethical egoism and libertarianism all on your own.  And anybody who thinks they are is an immeasurable jackass.  I was just advocating that smart people here have better things to do than argue with you two; don't wrestle with pigs, because you'll get dirty and the pig will enjoy it. 

You're not going to change your worldview, so what are you doing here?  Are you here to learn or just show off how much smarter you think you are than everybody else?

"Oh ho ho, those stupid Randians! How foolish they are! Let me descend from my Jesus-given tower and throw my pearls of wisdom before them!"

You already think you have all the answers, so quit wasting everyone's time.


Post 187

Sunday, May 6, 2007 - 11:56amSanction this postReply
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You're not going to change your worldview, so what are you doing here?


I'd imagine he's here to try and change other people's. Criticizing Objectivism would seem to be the entire purpose of this Dissent board - correct me if I'm wrong - so I'm not sure why you object to that. I disagree with GWL on just about everything, but I have no problem with his posting here.

Post 188

Sunday, May 6, 2007 - 12:29pmSanction this postReply
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Steven,

I understand your concerns about trolls and their nefarious motives. However, in my opinion, Brady and Liebniz are not trolls, but sincere discussants. They are not here to disrupt ROR, but simply to challenge certain philosophical precepts of Objectivism. I appreciate their input, as they're helping me to better understand and appreciate my philosophy. If you follow our discussion, your understanding may benefit from it as well.

That said, I'd like to reply to Liebniz's Post #179. Since his and my replies have been quite lengthy and others may, for that reason, be disinclined to follow them, I'm going to break up my reply into three posts.

-----------------

I wrote, "You don't perceive your own mental content; you introspect it. Perception is not introspection; it's extrospection, which is an awareness of the external world." Liebniz replied,
Counterexample: Perceptions can be induced to replicate sensations from the external world by means of direct stimulation of brain tissue. These simulated perceptions do not count as awareness of the external world, yet they are perceptions.
I wouldn't say they're perceptions any more than the events of a dream are perceptions. A "perception" is, by definition, an awareness of the external world.

I wrote, "Moreover, in order to be aware of your own mental content, you would first have to be aware of the external world, from which you acquire the sensory basis for the content. You cannot have any mental content without some sensory input, which always takes the perceptual form of that input (e.g., visual images, auditory impressions, etc)."
This is false on its face. It is logically possible that (given a purely materialistic conception of mind) one could recreate your brain composition, perhaps by cloning the necessary tissue. This twin brain would share all of your mental content without needing any experience of the external world.
Perhaps, but you'd need the original experience to clone it. Besides, I'm not talking about an imaginary science fiction fantasy. I'm talking about the real world. Imagine that! :-)

I wrote, "Imagination presupposes perception. In other words, your memories, dreams and mental images are always experienced in the form of one of your five senses, which indicates that they are based on your perceptions of the external world. An immaterial consciousness could have no mental content, because the content would have no sensory form."
Plainly false. Mathematical and basic logical propositions, though they may be grounded in perception, are not conceived in the form of any sense.
Sure they are. The visual-auditory symbols take a sensory form. For instance, the number "3" has a recognized shape and sound, and stands for three separate units, viz., |||; so do the logical symbols "P" and "Q," which stand for propositions, which are themselves composed of visual-auditory symbols.
But I would go even further, and ask how it is that sheer perception can be assimilated and understood without recourse to preexisting, latent mental concepts. Abstraction from perception, for example, presupposes an ability to differentiate properties, since abstraction amounts to isolating certain properties of an empirically given object.
You don't need pre-existing concepts. you can perceive that two objects bear a greater similarity to each other than they do to a third object. You then group the two objects together relative to the third, and thereby "differentiate" them from the third object. It is through the perceptual observation of relative similarities and differences that you build your concepts from the ground up. No pre-existing "innate ideas" are required.

I wrote, "Thoughts are merely 'influenced' by the brain?? In that case, thought could take place independently of the brain. But thought does, in fact, depend on the brain, just as vision depends on the eye; hearing, on the ear, etc."
Thoughts are not completely causally dependent on the brain, for thoughts, like propositions or desires, can actually cause further mental action and hence can elicit a response from the brain. For example, in mathematical proofs, certain conclusions are drawn from prior axioms qua axioms. These axioms themselves, and the analysis of their influence and relationships, cause and determine the nature of the conclusion drawn from them.
If thoughts were not causally dependent on the brain, they could exist independently of the brain, but when brain processes cease, thoughts cease along with them. It is true that thoughts can cause further mental action, but they do so as brain activity, for mental activity is simply the subjective aspect of cerebral activity. To think is to activate the cerebrum, just as to see is to activate the eye, the optic nerve and the visual cortex. One thinks conceptually by means of the brain, just as one sees visually by means of the eye. The mind and the brain are not two separate entities that interact with each other, any more than vision and the eye are two separate entities that interact with each other. Just as one sees through the eye, so one thinks through the brain. When one engages in logical reasoning, one activates a specific physiological process. One's reasoning is simply the subjective aspect of that process. Just as without the relevant optical physiology, seeing is impossible, so without the relevant brain physiology, thinking is impossible.

I wrote, “Then how could it [an immaterial substance or God] be aware of the external world -- by what means and in what form? The answer is, there wouldn't be any means or form of external awareness, in which case, it could have no mental content to be aware of introspectively.”
By virtue of the knowledge of His creative activity. God perceives possibilia (all possible worlds) in himself and thus knows by nature all true propositions--both necessary and contingent truths-- in himself.
How?
God knows things in the actual world insofar as he continually produces them and is aware of all of their activities by merely perceiving their a priori individual concepts, which are instantiated through creation.
First of all, you have zero evidence for any of these claims, which you assert as though they were self-evident truths. Yet when you argue with me, you dispute the most obvious facts, by continually posing imaginary counter-examples, as though they constituted some kind of contrary evidence. I would expect you to demand of yourself the same epistemological standards that you demand of me. Secondly, one doesn't perceive concepts, nor can one form them without a process of abstraction from particulars. Concepts presuppose particular things; particular things don’t presuppose concepts. So without an already existing world of particulars, there could be no concepts for a God to be aware of.

I wrote, “The main point of these examples was simply to illustrate that you cannot have a process without an entity to perform it.”
God, understood atemporally, transcends process, and knows and wills all things immediately, i.e. eternally.
More arbitary assertions! Liebniz, you toss around these floating abstractions like they were self-evident truths, when there is no evidence whatsoever to support them. It’s simply impossible for a consciousness to know and will all things immediately. Knowledge requires a process by which a consciousness acquires information over time.

To be continued . . .

- Bill


Post 189

Sunday, May 6, 2007 - 1:11pmSanction this postReply
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Bill and Jeremy:  I appreciate your recognizing good intentions, and your willingness to allow for and/or engage in discussions which revolve around challenges to the central tenets of your philosophy. 

This will be my last post for at least a week.  I'm in the middle of finals now, and have little time to devote to this discussion.  That being said, I look forward to what Bill has to say in response to my last few posts, and will address his responses in time.

-GWL 


Post 190

Sunday, May 6, 2007 - 8:12pmSanction this postReply
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"perfection is measured according to the standard of being" -GWL

Sorry, either something is or it isn't. Existence doesn't permit of degrees, to say that something is perfectly or imperfectly existent is perfectly silly.

Ted

Post 191

Sunday, May 6, 2007 - 8:57pmSanction this postReply
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Sorry, either something is or it isn't. Existence doesn't permit of degrees, to say that something is perfectly or imperfectly existent is perfectly silly.

This seems intuitively false.  Certainly there is something that makes a human being a more valuable, more capable being than a proton. 

But what I really intended to say in writing that absolute perfection is measured according to the standard of being, is that absolute perfection is unconditioned by a finite standard of being, since it is the greatest possible expression of being. 


Post 192

Sunday, May 6, 2007 - 9:25pmSanction this postReply
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Dubya,

I appreciate the short answer, and I am very familiar with it, given my Scholastic background. But again, a proton either exists or it does not, a person either exists or he does not - existence or being do not permit of degrees. One might equivocate or dissemble and refer to physical magnitude, but this is not the same thing as existence. And certainly claiming that God is BIG is not so exciting as all that. (See Python, Monty; Life, the Meaning of)

(A related fallacy is the idea that the cause must be more perfect or more potent than the effect, and hence God must surpass his creation. But a match can start a forest fire, and a stick of dynamite trigger a nuclear device, and a virus can fell a man. The idea makes sense only if you look at it not too closely.)

Ted

Post 193

Monday, May 7, 2007 - 11:36amSanction this postReply
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This is the second part of my reply to Liebniz's Post #179. It should be noted that, due to finals, he won't be replying for another week or so.

I wrote, “Well, I've already explained why consciousness requires physical organs for its existence and operation.”
You've explained why you think that consciousness requires physical organs for its existence and operation, but you've failed to offer sufficient support for this assertion.
I understand that you don't think my support is sufficient, but I have offered support for it. Do you offer support for your assertions about God and his miraculous powers?

I wrote, “As for its immateriality, a mental phenomenon is called ‘immaterial’ only in the sense that it differs from things that one can see and touch.”
No, a mental phenomenon is non-physical. Propositions qua propositions, for example, are non-physical.
I agree; they are non-physical in the sense that they are properties of consciousness, but consciousness itself is simply the subjective aspect of the physical brain and nervous system. Vision is also non-physical inasmuch as it is a perceptual experience, but that experience is simply the subjective aspect of the operation of a physical sense organ, not something that exists independently of it.

I wrote, “I'm sorry, but I don't understand an immaterial substance. Consciousness is an attribute or property of a material organism, not a stand alone entity.”
If consciousness (or mental phenomena) is causally efficacious on the brain, then it cannot be a mere attribute or property of a material organism. Properties could emerge from the brain, but they could not causally influence it. This is just what epiphenomenon means, viz. an effect arising out of a primary phenomenon.
Consciousness does not "influence" the brain any more than the brain influences consciousness; conscious activity (or thinking) is brain activity initiated and controlled subjectively. To think is the process of activating the cerebral cortex. One doesn't think independently of brain function and then influence the brain as a result of such thinking. If that were what occurs, then consciousness could exist independently of the brain, when in fact the brain is required for mental activity. Although one form of mind-brain activity can certainly influence another (as when a process of reasoning leads to a conclusion), there is no independent influence of the mind on the brain or of the brain on the mind; there is only one cognitive organ -- the brain – whose subjective aspect or appearance is the mind.

Perhaps the following analogy will help. Before the planet Venus was recognized to appear in the Eastern sky before sunrise and in the Western sky after sunset, it was thought to be two different celestial bodies – two different stars. The Greeks called it Hesperus as an evening star and Phosphorus as a morning star. The Romans called it Vesper as an evening star and Lucifer as a morning star. But neither the Greeks nor the Romans recognized it as the same celestial body; neither identified it as the planet Venus. Now we know that it is indeed the same planet viewed from two different perspectives. The organ of thought can be seen in a similar light: as the same thing viewed from two different perspectives. Viewed introspectively, it is called "the mind" or "consciousness"; viewed extrospectively, it is called "the cerebral cortex."

I wrote, “How is [interpreting a thing's action to its nature] question-begging? It is simply a fact; how a thing behaves depends on the kind of thing it is. For example, birds fly, because flying is part of their nature. Horses gallop, because galloping is part of theirs.”
Tisn't always this simple. One can always attribute what appears to issue as an effect from a substance to that substance's nature, even though it is perfectly possible that the effect has a cause outside of that substance, and only appears to issue from it.
Even if one mistakenly attributes an effect to something other than its real cause, it’s still the case that how a thing behaves depends on the kind of thing it is.

I wrote, “No, it's a law, if we assume that all of the relevant conditions remain the same. The law of causality is a corollary of the law of identity.”
Argumentative circularity detected. Did you not just support the law of identity of substances by the notion that all things act according to their nature?
No, I supported the law of causality by the fact all things must act according to their nature.
And is not the notion that all things act according to their nature only established by perceiving what are ostensibly causes and effects?
No, perceiving what are ostensibly causes and effects depends on a recognition of the law of causality, which is established by reference to the law of identity -- i.e., by recognizing that a thing must act according to its nature, because if it didn’t, it wouldn’t be the same thing.
You're trying to establish the law of causality as a corollary to the law of identity, even though the law of identity depends on and presupposes the law of causality.
The law of identity implies the law of causality, but the law of identity is the more fundamental of the two laws. The law of causality is a special case of the law of identity: it is the law of identity applied to action.

I wrote, “Since there is no Lockean "substratum" underlying and uniting its characteristics, a thing just is all of its characteristics. If it exists under the same conditions, it will possess the same characteristics, including the same action.”
False. How could you ever prove this? You've just never experienced an instance to the contrary. But that hardly amounts to establishing it as a necessary truth that the same thing in the same conditions will undertake the same action, since necessary truths are only those truths whose contraries entail contradictions.
Well, it follows from the law of identity, such that to deny it is a contradiction. Joseph explains the relationship as follows:
Uniformity of action is not indeed the fundamental element in the causal relation, for it depends on repetition of the action; the causal relation has nothing to do with the number of instances, so far as its existence -- though much so far as its detection -- is concerned; it is bound up altogether with the nature or character of things, and the nature of anything is not a question of the number of such things that may be or have been fashioned. Yet if a thing is to have any determinate nature and character at all, there must be uniformity of action in different things of that character, or of the same thing on different like occasions. If a thing a under conditions c produces a change x in a subject s -- if, for example, light of certain wave-lengths, passing through the lens of a camera, produces a certain chemical change (which we call the taking of a photograph of Mount Everest) upon a photographic film – the way in which it acts must be regarded as a partial expression of what it is. It could only act differently, if it were different. As long therefore as it is a, and stands related under conditions c to a subject that is s, no other effect than x can be produced; and to say that the same thing acting on the same thing under the same conditions may yet produce a different effect, is to say that a thing need not be what it is. But this is in flat conflict with the Law of Identity. A thing, to be at all, must be something, and can only be what it is. To assert a causal connexion between a and x implies that a acts as it does because it is what it is; because, in fact, it is a. So long therefore as it is a, it must act thus; and to assert that it may act otherwise on a subsequent occasion is to assert that what is a is something else than the a which it is declared to be. (H.W.B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, pp. 407-409)
In short, to deny the law of causality is to deny the law of identity, and to deny the law of identity is to affirm a contradiction.

To be continued . . .

- Bill


Post 194

Tuesday, May 8, 2007 - 10:02amSanction this postReply
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This is the third and final part of my reply to Liebniz's Post #179.

I wrote, “When the organism dies, its consciousness ceases to exist, just like all of its other bodily processes.”
This is actually false. Certain bodily processes (like the pumping of the heart) can continue for a time even after the person is dead. But this is beside the point.
Okay, good point. I think the fingernails continue to grow as well.
I would take issue with the idea that it is necessarily true that death amounts to a cessation of consciousness. Perhaps God immediately provides the soul with a new hylomorphic compound after its bodily host dies out, but this hylomorph exists in a parallel universe, such that we assume that consciousness ceases since in our universe, empirically speaking, it does.
First of all, you have no evidence of a hylomorphic transformation, which is just sheer, arbitrary speculation on your part. Second, and more important, such an hypothesis misconceives the nature of consciousness. Consciousness is not an independent entity; it is simply an aspect or a manifestation of physiological processes (specifically of the brain and sensory nervous system), not an entity that co-exists alongside those processes. So once those processes cease, no consciousness remains to be provided with a hylomophic compound.

I wrote, “To call consciousness ‘immaterial’ is, therefore, a bit misleading, because it suggests that consciousness has a non-physical existence -- an existence independent of a physical organism. Granted, the idea of a stone is not the same as a stone itself, which is why we call an idea "immaterial," but there is no such thing as an immaterial substance.
You've not shown that there is no such thing as an immaterial substance, though you admittedly have become quite adept at tirelessly repeating this assertion, as if its cogency might accrue from mere repetition.
By “substance” I meant an independent entity. There is no evidence that consciousness exists as a separate, independent entity.

I wrote, “Consciousness is a property or a faculty of a physical organism. It is a subjective manifestation of the function of the brain in the same way that vision is the subjective manifestation of the function of the eye.”
You've not shown that conscious is merely a property or faculty of a physical organism, though you admittedly have become quite adept at tirelessly repeating this assertion, as if its cogency might accrue from mere repetition.
Once again, if I said that there is a consciousness in the next room, you’d want to know who or what it is that’s conscious wouldn’t you? And if I said that it’s not anything that is conscious; it’s just pure consciousness, you most assuredly would balk at that reply. Why? Because you’d recognize that consciousness is an attribute of an entity, not an entity in its own right.
Adducing vision as a subjective manifestation of the function of the eye does not work as an analogy to understanding mental activity as a subjective manifestation of the function of the brain. Why? For the simple reason that vision itself is a form of mental activity, which is precisely what you were attempting to provide an analogy for.
You mean you honestly think that vision can exist apart from and independently of an organ of vision. I assumed that, at the very least, you wouldn’t question that.

I wrote, “Just as vision does not exist in isolation from the organ of perception which makes it possible -- the eye -- so thought does not exist in isolation from the organ of cognition which makes it possible -- the brain.”
It's still a failed analogy. Visual sensations can be created without the eye by directly stimulating the brain.
Certain visual sensations may be created by stimulating the brain, but not vision itself. I can have visual sensations in a dream, but there is no actual vision occurring in a dream. A true visual experience means that I actually see an object in the external world, not simply experience an hallucination.

I wrote, “We know from evolutionary science that sentient forms of life emerged from a new and more complex arrangement of non-sentient forms, just as living entities emerged from a new and more complex arrangement of non-living entities.”
Of course we do. But this says nothing conclusively about the mechanism responsible for the emergence of sentience.
I would assume it’s the same mechanism that accounts for other forms of evolutionary development, i.e., mutation, after which natural selection would explain its continuance and survival. But the point was simply that consciousness emerges at the end of a process of evolutionary development; it does not exist at the beginning, which it would have to if God were the origin of the universe.

I wrote, “What I'm saying is that just as the sphere in Binswanger's example comprises two hemispheres that lack the ability to roll while the sphere itself possesses that ability, so an animal comprises constituents that lack the faculty of awareness, while the animal itself possesses that faculty.”
Yet another poor analogy. We know that a sphere is made of two hemispheres and can roll. Similarly, we know that animals possess consciousness, but we do not know whether animals are wholly material substances.

This is the definition of an emergent property -- a property possessed by the whole that none of the parts possesses.
Well, according to the evolutionary record, animals evolved from lower, non-sentient forms of life, so before their emergence, there was no consciousness. The latter emerged as a biological mutation that conferred a survival advantage to the organisms that acquired it. Since it did not exist prior to the evolution of animal life, its appearance had to be due to a biological mutation resulting from a unique configuration of material constituents. Besides, to say that there were immaterial substances (conscious “monads,” to use Liebniz’s term) that pre-existed the evolution of animal life would again imply that consciousness does not require physical organs of perception and cognition as a form and means of awareness. But as I have shown, without these organs of awareness, consciousness is impossible.

I wrote, “Of course, but the issue is whether consciousness is an emergent property. Besides, my point was not that conscious organisms are bound to follow the laws of physics (such as Newton's first law of motion); clearly, they are not.
If conscious organisms are wholly material substances then they must follow the laws of physics.
Not as conscious organisms. You’re ignoring the emergence of goal-directed action and purposive behavior.

I wrote, “All I was saying is that conscious organisms are bound to follow the laws of nature that apply to them, which are biological and psychological. Not all laws of nature are laws of physics.”
In a wholly materialistic universe, all laws--including biological or psychological laws--reduce to physics. Cf. grand unification and string theories.
I don’t know what you mean when you say “reduce” to physics. The parts – i.e., the constituent elements – can themselves be subject to the laws of physics, but the integration of the parts are subject to altogether different laws. Newton’s First Law of Motion does not apply to the action of conscious organisms.

I wrote (to Brady), "You don't need evidence that it's possible for a non-animal to be conscious? Well, if you have no evidence that it's possible for a non-animal to be conscious, then on what grounds do you deny that all conscious beings are animals? Suppose I said that all rocks are inanimate and all inanimate objects are non-sentient, implying that all rocks are non-sentient. Would you challenge my statement in the same way, by replying: "The fact is all you can really say is 'all rocks that I have experienced are inanimate"?? It is your view that I cannot say that all rocks are inanimate, because I just might discover an animate rock under the next bush?" Liebniz replied,
A swift refutation of the rock analogy:

Given that you define a rock as a material object having a certain set of properties--among them the privative property 'lack of consciousness'-- the conclusion does follow that all rocks are inanimate.
The conclusion is not that all rocks are inanimate; it is that all rocks are non-sentient. The premise is that all rocks are inanimate.
However, the rational structure of the above argument is not followed in making the following argument: A conscious being (based on exceptionless empirical evidence) is an animal, i.e. a physical organism. Hence, (by induction) all conscious beings must be physical organisms.
Let’s be very clear what the argument is:

All animals are physical organisms.
All conscious beings are animals (because consciousness requires a brain and sense organs).
Therefore, all conscious beings are physical organisms.

This exactly parallels the rock example:

All inanimate objects are non-sentient.
All rocks are inanimate.
Therefore, all rocks are non-sentient.

- Bill



Post 195

Tuesday, May 8, 2007 - 10:12amSanction this postReply
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Bill wrote:

In short, to deny the law of causality is to deny the law of identity, and to deny the law of identity is to affirm a contradiction.
Wait a second Bill, isn't your view of consciousness a direct denial of the law of causality?

What do we mean by causality or cause and effect? Don't we mean that given named causes, certain effects must follow?

But in your view of consciousness, even if you know all the causes (the physical organs and their states), the effect (the conscious decision) can be different each time. You deny that knowledge, consciousness and free thought are mechanistic and necessarily determined, but the law of causality says just that: it says that ALL effects are mechanistic and necessarily determined by the antecedent causes.

At last we agree on atheism's blatant contradiction.

Regards,

Brady


Post 196

Wednesday, May 9, 2007 - 12:56amSanction this postReply
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This is a reply to Brady's Posts #181 and 195.

I wrote, “A consciousness is purely material only in the sense that the organs of consciousness, the brain and sensory nervous system, are themselves purely material. However, because consciousness is an experiential manifestation of the operation of these organs, it is often identified as "non-material," which I think is a mistake, or at the very least misleading. Consciousness is no less material than any other attribute, which doesn't mean that it doesn't exist qua consciousness. But as a consciousness, it is simply the subjective manifestation of the action of the brain and sensory nervous system, whose biological function is the satisfaction of the organism's survival needs.” Brady replied,
The problem is that organs don't "experience," they are simply matter in motion passively responding to antecedent causes.
No, of course, the organs themselves don’t experience anything; it is the person himself through his organs of perception and awareness that experiences things. But man can initiate actions in response to his value judgments, so his behavior is not passive in the way that the actions of inanimate objects are. (Please see my latest replies to Liebniz for further elaboration.)
You admit that consciousness is material. Therefore, it is nothing more than an effect of matter in motion, it is necessarily determined by antecedent causes, as is everything else (according to the basic propositions of your worldview).
No, your missing the point. When I say that consciousness is material, I mean that it is a property of a material organism. If you want to say that this property is non-material qua property, fine. The key point is that it does not and cannot exist independently of a material organism, any more than the property of “redness” can exist independently of a material entity.
But, you also want to say that there is something that is not necessarily determined, so you introduce, Ad Hoc, phrases that are meaningless to the material, such as "qua conscious," "experiential manifestation" and "subjective manifestation."
Not at all. Conscious behavior can be determined by the values of the organism. You seem to think that all determined behavior must be mechanistic, but it can also be goal-directed or teleological -- a product of final, rather than efficient, causation. Goal-directed behavior isn’t governed by the laws of physics, but that does not mean that it isn’t determined by antecedent causes.
Are you saying that any "manifestation" is something other than an effect necessarily determined by material antecedent causes?
No, consciousness, which is an aspect or a manifestation of the operation of the brain and sensory nervous system is determined by the physical nature of the organism, including the organs of perception and cognition, but the actions of consciousness such as thinking, planning, and reasoning are determined by the person himself in response to the values motivating his choices.

I wrote, “But if by ‘purely material,’ you mean lacking awareness, then no, a conscious organism is not purely material in that sense. Still a conscious organism is nothing more than the combination of its material parts, even though the combination produces a property that none of the parts by itself possesses. Just as it is the combination of hydrogen and oxygen (H2O) that produces the emergent property of wetness, a property which hydrogen and oxygen by themselves do not possess,* so it is the combination of a conscious organism's material constituents that produces the emergent property of awareness, a property which the material constituents by themselves do not possess.”
Here is another meaningless term to the material, "awareness." Is not "a property" just another word for "effect?"
It’s not just another word for it. A property is an attribute of an entity; an effect, the result of a cause.
And is not "combination of parts" just another phrase for "antecedent causes?"
It’s not just another phrase for it, although a combination of parts can be the effect of antecedent causes.
If so, then is not "awareness" just the necessarily determined effect of antecedent causes?
Yes, awareness is the necessarily determined effect of antecedent causes. So?
Your example of water as an emergent property fails the test. The wetness of water is necessarily determined by its antecedent causes. It could be no other than it is. It is completely mechanistic, and necessarily determined by antecedent causes. Is that what you mean by "consciousness?"

By "emergent property" you want to imply that there is something in consciousness that is not mechanistic and not necessarily determined, yet all the examples of emergent properties you give are mechanistic and are necessarily determined. I fail to see their value.

There seems to be a black box here. You stuff purely mechanical and necessarily determined matter in one side of the box, and you magically get non-mechanistic and non-deterministic "consciousness" out of the other side.
Not exactly. Conscious organisms didn't evolve directly from inanimate matter, but from non-conscious organisms.
And just as a magician offers the phrase "Alakazam" as the magic phrase that does the job, you offer the equally meaningless phrase, "emergent property" as the phrase that does the magic. When pressed for the meaning, all you can come up with is completely mechanistic and totally determined examples.
But the examples make the essential point, don't they? I.e., we stuff the purely dry gases of hydrogen and oxygen in one side of the black box, and get liquid water out of the other side. How is that any different? Granted, they're both matter, but the effect doesn't resemble the cause. The cause has the property of being dry and gaseous; the effect, the property of being wet and liquid. How is that any less "miraculous" than stuffing non-conscious matter in one side of the box and getting conscious matter out of the other side? Besides, we know from the evolutionary record that life emerged from inanimate matter, and consciousness from non-conscious organisms. Their emergence is a fact. What’s magical about it?
You recognize and experience independence in yourself. The basic propositions of your worldview necessarily implies the denial of that independence.
Independence from what? I don’t exist independently of antecedent causes, if that’s what you’re implying.
So, you keep jumping back and forth between your experience and your worldview. Since you believe in atheism and you believe in independent thought, therefore, you believe they both must be true and compatible. But they are not.
You say that my thought is “independent.” Independent of what? It’s certainly not independent of my reasoning and understanding, which determine my conclusions.
The jumping back and forth is an attempt to avoid admitting the necessary contradiction between the two. So, you are forced to have a consciousness that is purely material in one paragraph and not purely material in another paragraph.
I thought I explained what I meant by "purely material." Consciousness doesn't exist by itself; it is an attribute of a living organism. What exists are conscious organisms which are themselves material. If you don’t want to call the attribute of consciousness "immaterial," fine. What you call it is to me immaterial. :-) What matters for my argument is that it can't exist independently of a material organism.
You may want to say that is not in the same sense. But then why bring it up? I don't care about equivocations, if you mean something else, simply use different words.
What words would you have me use? Consciousness is material in the sense that it is a function, a manifestation or an aspect of material organs of perception and cognition; it is immaterial in the sense that a thought is not something you can see or touch like a physical object.
All your causes are mechanistic
Not true.
and necessarily determined,
True.
and your worldview tells us that all mechanistic and necessarily determined causes yield mechanistic and necessarily determined effects.
Not true.
Yet when it comes to consciousness, you insist it is an effect that is not mechanistic
True.
or [not] necessarily determined,
Not true.
even though all its antecedent causes are mechanistic and necessarily determining. A real contradiction does in fact exist.
There is no contradiction. You are ignoring emergent properties – life from inanimate matter, and consciousness from non-conscious organisms.

I wrote, "In short, to deny the law of causality is to deny the law of identity, and to deny the law of identity is to affirm a contradiction." In Post #195, Bradey replied,
Wait a second Bill, isn't your view of consciousness a direct denial of the law of causality?

What do we mean by causality or cause and effect? Don't we mean that given named causes, certain effects must follow?
Yes, but, according to Objectivism, those effects needn't be deterministic. In Ayn Rand's view, the law of causality is the law of identity applied to action. So if the identity of a human being is such that he has free will, then the law of causality simply says that he must act accordingly: he must choose his actions freely and independently of antecedent causes. In the Objectivist metaphysics, the law of causality does not, therefore, imply determinism.

However, as I indicated above, I disagree with Objectivism on this issue, because I don't think that free will is compatible with the law of identity nor, therefore, with the law of causality. See the passage from H.W.B. Joseph that I quoted at the end of Post #193, and you'll see what I mean.
But in your view of consciousness, even if you know all the causes (the physical organs and their states), the effect (the conscious decision) can be different each time.
According to Objectivism, yes, but not according to my own view of causality.
You deny that knowledge, consciousness and free thought are mechanistic and necessarily determined, but the law of causality says just that: it says that ALL effects are mechanistic and necessarily determined by the antecedent causes.
In my view, it says that all effects are necessarily determined by antecedent causes, but it doesn't say that all effects are mechanistic, because some effects can be determined teleologically, by the values of the acting entity (when it is a living organism).

-Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 5/09, 1:03am)

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 5/09, 1:37am)


Post 197

Wednesday, May 9, 2007 - 8:45pmSanction this postReply
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First things first.

Ted Keer wrote:
I appreciate the short answer, and I am very familiar with it, given my Scholastic background. But again, a proton either exists or it does not, a person either exists or he does not - existence or being do not permit of degrees. One might equivocate or dissemble and refer to physical magnitude, but this is not the same thing as existence. And certainly claiming that God is BIG is not so exciting as all that. (See Python, Monty; Life, the Meaning of)
Of course it is the case that existence or being do not permit of degrees insofar as they include their opposites, non-existence and non-being.  For these opposites--non-existence and non-being-- are in themselves absolute states, and hence can admit no degrees. 

But my assertion was only that being or existence permits of degrees-- in other words, that there are degrees of perfections associated with existent things.  For instance, a man possesses a kind of existence greater than a rock insofar as a man possesses desirable properties which a rock does not have, e.g. consciousness, knowledge, intention, and the capacity to act in the world according to ends. 

As for physical magnitude, I'm not exactly sure it can qualify as a perfection, since it always implies a limitation of some sort.  This is where I think Spinoza goes wrong in his Ethics, for here he attributes unlimited extension to God, as if God's being infinitely big could amount to a perfection.

(A related fallacy is the idea that the cause must be more perfect or more potent than the effect, and hence God must surpass his creation. But a match can start a forest fire, and a stick of dynamite trigger a nuclear device, and a virus can fell a man. The idea makes sense only if you look at it not too closely.)

 
I'm not sure the Scholastic maxim, that the effect cannot surpass the cause, is a fallacy, so long as it is properly interpreted.  Indeed, the first law of thermodynamics would seem to confirm this maxim, in that it states that the amount of heat released by a system (effect) cannot surpass the amount of potential energy initially in the system (cause).

As for the examples you cite with the intention of overthrowing this maxim, let me show how each does not properly apply it. 

1.  "a match can start a forest fire"- But it is not an immediate or sufficient cause of the forest fire.  Rather, it begins a causal process involving a number of other intermediary causes.  The initial dry leaves or grass which receive the heat cause the fire to spread to more leaves or grass, which in turn cause the fire to spread to trees, which in turn cause the fire to spread to even more trees, which in turn cause the fire to spread to an entire forest.   

2.  "a stick of dynamite can trigger a nuclear device" - I'm not sure if this is true, but, even if it were, the stick of dynamite would not be the sole cause of the nuclear reaction insofar as uranium or some elemental equivalent would be part of the antecedent causal conditions for the reaction.

3.  "a virus can fell a man" - True, but it is not as though an effect is greater than its cause merely because it is tinier.  The atoms divided in a chain reaction occupy much less space than that which is covered by the explosion effected by their divisions, even though these atoms contain all of the energy released in the explosion.

More to come (finals still underway)...


Post 198

Thursday, May 10, 2007 - 1:16pmSanction this postReply
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Dubya,

(1) Even in regards to a rock, it might not be as complex as a human, or of value to a human, but since perfection is measured in regard to some standard or goal, there would be no reason to compare the perfection of a purposeless rock to the relative perfection of a goal-seeking human.  You have to beg the question of a pre-existent valuer who finds, say, consciousness more exciting than, say, crystalline structure.  In and of themselves, neither rocks nor people have any intrinsic perfection.  Neither could God, unless there were some pre-existing standard for him to be measured against.

(2) Your analysis of the match & the forest-fire is cogent, but was not available to the Scholastics, and was not what they intended in any case.  They wished to show that an entity which causes an effect external to itself must be as potent as the effect itself.  Their idea was incoherent, for reasons which we now understand, and which you have addressed.  But if you are advocating a personal God (who suffers joy, for existence) then are you placing him inside or outside the laws of thermodynamics?  Either a creator is unnecessary or inexplicable. 

I repeat, having what we might view as excellences in ourselves - a vast intellect, e.g.,  - are not perfections when attributed to any being which has no need for them.  Having arbitrary useless qualities is like decorating your Frank Lloyd Wright house with Doric columns; a mistake and an imperfection.

Ted


Post 199

Thursday, May 10, 2007 - 6:41pmSanction this postReply
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A few comments on the ongoing discussion:

Let us imagine either that I ate the universe, that I am God, or that I seceded from the universe into some pocket fractal universe insulated from any further causal influences from anywhere else.

The point being, at the point when only "I" exist, from the standpoint of causality, does it make sense to speak of my atoms determining my thoughts, behavior, etc.?  If we are talking about any specific atom, then its behavior is determined by its nature and how that nature interacts with the environment of all the combinations of trillions of atoms that make up my physical body.

However, why give an atom any particular metaphysical priority?  Why not drop down to the level of protons, neutrons, neutrinos, quarks, or whatever components constitute those entities?

Or, since I have no good reason to choose on the basis of size or complexity, why not choose molecules, cells, tissues, organs or, finally, my self as the starting point of causality?

Point me out an atom.  Phil, are you the determinent or is it that atom?  The atom can certainly interact with me, just as a rock or wrong lane driver in our more complex universe.  But in PhilVerse, "I" certainly have a lot more power over any particular atom than any atom has over me.  "I" can choose among alternatives.  Poor atom cannot.

If you were to somehow ask our poor beset atom, "just who is in charge here?" , then would the atom point to adjoining atoms, which may certainly have had the most immediate influence, or, granting our atom some kind of animistic intelligence for a moment, would it not think upon the matter and finally say, "Phil did it.  It wouldn't have happened the way that it did unless there was a mind of a particular type choosing the action and a physically unified body carrying it out."

Similar to trying to predict the next point in the Mandelbrot set, it may be that to predict my actions from an atomistic causality standpoint would require modeling the entire universe back to the big bang, and, in the process, recreating "me."

On perhaps another front altogether, if you are going to try to eliminate "me" as a causal factor, then why stop there?  Each atom is itself "determined" by its subatomic components, in an endless regression.  Perhaps we need to clarify our notion of causality here.


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