Objectivism and Atheism

Fruit Flies Show Free Will and Spontaneity, Scientists Say

God is...

Metaphysically, mind and matter are different. But if they are different in every respect, the problem of explaining their interaction appears insuperable. How can mind influence matter and matter influence mind if they have absolutely nothing in common? And yet, that such reciprocal influence exists seems inescapable. This dilemma played a role in the attempt to reduce one of these two to the other.

Without going into details, I will suggest a possible way out. There is nothing inherently illogical -- nothing that contradicts the rest of our knowledge -- in positing some underlying reality of which both matter and consciousness are manifestations. The advantage of such a hypothesis is that it provides a means to resolve a problem that has troubled philosophers for centuries -- "the mind-body problem," the problem of accounting for the interaction of consciousness and physical reality. If they have a common source, then they do have a point of commonality that makes their ability to interact less puzzling. How we would test this hypothesis or provide a justification for it, is another question. However, to call this underlying reality "God" or "Spirit" would clarify nothing and would further obscure what we are trying to understand. (pp. 201, 202)

I'm having a problem trying to create a coherent 'view', or meaning, of matter 'viewing' anything (especially non-matter[?] non-imagery concepts) in anything worth calling an introspective way.

Have there been any studies on matter performing the action of introspecting?

Have specific concepts (not to be confused with image-memories), like 'justice', been identified in 'brain-states'

I swear there's a hidden 'stolen concept' in there somewhere, akin to Anselm's Argument.

Haven't you ever had the experience of suddenly being unable to recall directly a specific fact, name, event, etc.?  And so, what you did was a sort of mental sniffing around the general area, until finally you would hit a connection that bypassed some defective or dead neuron, and the lost information would be there.  Or perhaps you remember something very clearly and someone else recalls it quite differently, but equally clearly.  What has happened is that there are only so many neural pathways and they get shared and rewired a lot to accomodate new information and patterns of current usage.  So, old memories are not especially reliable, particularly regarding perceptual details. 

 

I wouldn't say they [sensations resulting from direct brain stimulation] are perceptions any more than the events of a dream are perceptions. A "perception" is, by definition, an awareness of the external world.

Perhaps, but you'd need the original experience to clone it. Besides, I'm not talking about an imaginary science fiction fantasy. I'm talking about the real world. Imagine that! :-)

The visual-auditory symbols take a sensory form. For instance, the number "3" has a recognized shape and sound, and stands for three separate units, viz., |||; so do the logical symbols "P" and "Q," which stand for propositions, which are themselves composed of visual-auditory symbols.  

You don't need pre-existing concepts. you can perceive that two objects bear a greater similarity to each other than they do to a third object. You then group the two objects together relative to the third, and thereby "differentiate" them from the third object. It is through the perceptual observation of relative similarities and differences that you build your concepts from the ground up. No pre-existing "innate ideas" are required.

If thoughts were not causally dependent on the brain, they could exist independently of the brain, but when brain processes cease, thoughts cease along with them.

It is true that thoughts can cause further mental action, but they do so as brain activity, for mental activity is simply the subjective aspect of cerebral activity.

To think is to activate the cerebrum, just as to see is to activate the eye, the optic nerve and the visual cortex. One thinks conceptually by means of the brain, just as one sees visually by means of the eye. The mind and the brain are not two separate entities that interact with each other, any more than vision and the eye are two separate entities that interact with each other. Just as one sees through the eye, so one thinks through the brain. When one engages in logical reasoning, one activates a specific physiological process. One's reasoning is simply the subjective aspect of that process. Just as without the relevant optical physiology, seeing is impossible, so without the relevant brain physiology, thinking is impossible.

First of all, you have zero evidence for any of these claims [about the knowledge of God, etc.], which you assert as though they were self-evident truths.

Yet when you argue with me, you dispute the most obvious facts, by continually posing imaginary counter-examples, as though they constituted some kind of contrary evidence. I would expect you to demand of yourself the same epistemological standards that you demand of me.

Secondly, one doesn't perceive concepts, nor can one form them without a process of abstraction from particulars. Concepts presuppose particular things; particular things don�t presuppose concepts. So without an already existing world of particulars, there could be no concepts for a God to be aware of.

More arbitary assertions! Liebniz, you toss around these floating abstractions like they were self-evident truths, when there is no evidence whatsoever to support them. It�s simply impossible for a consciousness to know and will all things immediately. Knowledge requires a process by which a consciousness acquires information over time. 

(1) Even in regards to a rock, it might not be as complex as a human, or of value to a human, but since perfection is measured in regard to some standard or goal, there would be no reason to compare the perfection of a purposeless rock to the relative perfection of a goal-seeking human.  You have to beg the question of a pre-existent valuer who finds, say, consciousness more exciting than, say, crystalline structure.  In and of themselves, neither rocks nor people have any intrinsic perfection.  Neither could God, unless there were some pre-existing standard for him to be measured against.

2) Your analysis of the match & the forest-fire is cogent, but was not available to the Scholastics, and was not what they intended in any case.  They wished to show that an entity which causes an effect external to itself must be as potent as the effect itself.  Their idea was incoherent, for reasons which we now understand, and which you have addressed. 

But if you are advocating a personal God (who suffers joy, for existence) then are you placing him inside or outside the laws of thermodynamics?  Either a creator is unnecessary or inexplicable. 

I repeat, having what we might view as excellences in ourselves - a vast intellect, e.g.,  - are not perfections when attributed to any being which has no need for them.  Having arbitrary useless qualities is like decorating your Frank Lloyd Wright house with Doric columns; a mistake and an imperfection.

This has become a dispute over words. My original point was simply that the difficulty with perception is that its content does not require a referent in reality, which is supported in light of the fact that perceptions can be created by a kind of faux-reality induced by direct stimulation of the brain.

If we have reason to believe that there is no possibility of discerning the difference between reality-based perception and directly stimulated perception, from the perspective of the perceiver, then it follows that we have no guarantee that our apparent perceptions are real perceptions--where real perceptions are those which are representative of reality.

That one would need original experience to clone it is beside the point. You stated earlier that, "in order to be aware of your own mental content, you would first have to be aware of the external world, from which you acquire the sensory basis for the content. You cannot have any mental content without some sensory input, which always takes the perceptual form of that input (e.g., visual images, auditory impressions, etc)." Notice your explicit statement that in order to be aware of one's own mental content, one must first have to be aware of the external world. You do not say that it is merely a requirement that some third party experience the external world in order for any particular subject to be aware of his or her own mental content. You're original assertion is thus clearly false, and your defense of it amounts to a defense of a strawman.

This is false. Perhaps thoughts are not causally dependent on the brain, but the mental activity which is a necessary condition for them is.

This cannot be. Otherwise, it would be the case that brain activity is responsible for the derivative of 7 to be 0, whereas it is actually the case that what is responsible is the fact that 7 lacks a variable responsible for a changing functional value.

This is all assertion followed by an attempted analogy between the brain and the eye which I have already refuted elsewhere.

I must have missed that. Where did you refute it?

The only reason one sees through the eye is because a brain is connected to the optic nerve as opposed to a ball of wax. But the causal efficacy of the mind transcends the causal power of the brain--as can be supported by numerous examples of how mental content in the form of will determines action, and how the analysis of ideas determines the nature of the conclusions based upon them. And this is enough to show that there is not only an analytical distinction between the mind and the brain, but also an ontological one.

Well, this is plainly false, and can be translated as "I believe you have zero evidence for any of these claims." In actual fact, William has not entertained the evidence to which I have referred countless times--especially as found in Swinburne's book The Existence of God.

These 'facts' are only obvious to you and your ilk. If they were categorically obvious, then no one would dispute them. But many very intelligent people have.

Only if God were a material being, but He is not. And only if logical and mathematical truths depend on particulars, which they do not.

An omniscient, omnipotent being is not subject to such limitations, and does not require a process by which to acquire information, since all information is possessed by Him connaturally.

I understand that you don't think my support [for thinking that the mind just is the operation of the brain considered under the aspect of subjectivity] is sufficient, but I have offered support for it.

Do you offer support for your assertions about God and his miraculous powers?

I agree; they [i.e. propositions] are non-physical in the sense that they are properties of consciousness, but consciousness itself is simply the subjective aspect of the physical brain and nervous system.

Vision is also non-physical inasmuch as it is a perceptual experience, but that experience is simply the subjective aspect of the o