What is original to Objectivism

I see that Auberon Herbert's "A Plea for Voluntaryism" was published in 1908 by Oxford University Press.

Post 21

Sunday, January 25, 2009 - 6:45pm

Robert,

You mean Auberon Herbert's works were not known or out of print, right?

Ah, thank you, Mindy. So his writings were available, after all. After checking, I now see that the section I quoted was taken from an essay entitled "The Principles of Voluntaryism and Free Life," edited by E. E. Krott and first published, as a pamphlet, in 1897 by the Free Press Association in Burlington, Vermont.

The book, The Right and Wrong of Compulsion by the State and Other Essays was edited by Eric Mack, a prominent libertarian. Herbert was a well placed member of the British artistocracy, who was educated at Eton and St. John's College, Oxford. He was elected a Fellow of St. John's and lectured occasionally in history and jurisprudence.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer on 1/25, 6:58pm)

Post 22

Monday, January 26, 2009 - 7:12am

I find the verbal resemblance between Herbert's statements and Rand's too strong to be coincidental, subconscious, repressed memory or what have you. According to Barbara Branden, Rand got most of her education in political philosophy, history and law informally from the very erudite Isabel Paterson in the 1940s. That was probably the means of transmission.

Post 23

Monday, January 26, 2009 - 1:05pm

Very true - I can see Isabel Paterson having that and others like it among her possessions...

(Edited by robert malcom on 1/26, 1:07pm)

Post 24

Monday, January 26, 2009 - 3:05pm

Ted,

The "stolen concept" is original, but not *that* original, as it is really just a variant of question begging.

Jordan

Post 25

Monday, January 26, 2009 - 3:07pm

Jordan,

It is more fundamental than question begging and goes to the structure of knowledge - not just the formulation of a proposition.

Post 26

Monday, January 26, 2009 - 4:25pm

Steve, do you have a couple of examples of fallacies that are stolen concepts but not question-bagging?

Post 27

Tuesday, January 27, 2009 - 12:16am

Mindy,

Question begging is assuming the point you want to prove. For example, suppose you say, "God exists." And I ask "Why?" You reply, "Because the Bible says so." I say, "How can you trust the Bible?" You reply, "Because the Bible is the word of God." Question begging involves an argument in which the conclusion is assumed to be true as a basis for concluding that it's true.

The stolen concept consists of using a concept while denying or ignoring the concepts on which it logically depends. For example, if say that objective reality is mere appearance, I'm ignoring the fact that if there were no objective reality, there could be no such concept as "mere appearance." Mere appearance presupposes the concept of objective reality from which it is intended to be distinguished. So I am "stealing" the concept of objective reality (a concept to which I have no logical right), by claiming that everything is mere appearance.

Begging the question: "God exists, because the Bible says so", a statement which assumes that God exists as a basis for concluding that He exists.

The Stolen Concept: "Everything is mere appearance (i.e., there is no objective reality), a statement which presupposes that not everything is mere appearance (for if everything were mere appearance, the concept 'mere appearance' would have no meaning).

In short, begging the question involves a statement which assumes that A is true as a basis for claiming that A is true; the stolen concept involves a statement which presupposes that A is false in claiming that A is true.

- Bill

Post 28

Tuesday, January 27, 2009 - 5:55am

I'd go so far as to say that recognition of the invalidity of the stolen concept is Objectivism in its essence.

Rand's ethics depends upon it - her identification of the concept of value depending upon the concept of life is an example. Attempts to deny her axiomatic concepts based upon more derivative ideas such as doubt are another example of the fallacy. Almost every denial of one of Rand's formulations is based upon the stolen concept.

Post 29

Tuesday, January 27, 2009 - 9:25am

Bill, that's brilliant. A perfectly clear differentia, if ever there was one. Thanks, I owe you one.
Ted, a most interesting analysis, I'll have to think it through--right now, it's pretty crucial. Thanks. Since you owe one or two, I'll take one off your tab. :-)

added: The stolen concept is not a form of fallacious argument; it is a fallacious claim or premise. Right?
Do any other philosophers speak of axiomatic concepts?

It is generally recognized by critics of Kant that his system is self-defeating, since, e.g., if the noumenal/phenomenal distinction were true, we couldn't know of it. This is parallel to your example, Bill. The same error is recognized, but is characterized as a contradiction or incoherence.
(When I casually said "the same error," above, I should, perhaps, have laid that out. Let me try here. Kant's "noumenal" is equivalent to "existence," it is things as they are in themselves (notice the close association here between identity and existence, which association is unrecognized in Kant, I believe.) When he then says that all we can know is the "phenomenal," he is claiming to make a statement of knowledge--of knowing--about the difference between two things, one of which he says we aren't able to know about. That's a contradiction. Kant's claim that we can't know reality steals the concept of reality, right?)

My purpose here is to see if Rand has noticed an entirely new fallacy (a huge, huge, beyond huge achievement) or if her insight into its roots has given a new formulation for a fallacy that is generally recognized (I mean generally recognized by logically astute critics,) but goes under other terminology.

Praise to RoR for being the kind of place it is!!!!!

(Edited by Mindy Newton on 1/27, 10:01am)

Post 30

Tuesday, January 27, 2009 - 10:07am

Mindy,

Thank you. I hope that didn't sound patronizing. I knew that you understood clearly the meaning of question begging; I wasn't too sure about your understanding of the stolen concept. But I wanted to make the explanation as simple and clear as I could for everyone that might be interested.

Here's a question for you. What is the difference between the fallacy of self-exclusion and that of the stolen concept? An example of the fallacy of self-exclusion is the claim, "I know I know nothing," or "It's absolutely true that there are no absolutes." Harry Binswanger thinks there's a difference between these two fallacies. Do you agree? And if you think there is a difference, what do you think it is?

--------------

Ah, I see our posts crossed. Yes, Kant's "phenomenal" world is similar to the "Everything is mere appearance" claim," except that, of course, he grants the existence of a "noumenal" (real) world, which he says we can never actually know. Is he guilty of the fallacy of self-exclusion? Yes, for as you point out, his argument is "self-defeating." But you also say that he commits the fallacy of the stolen concept, stealing the concept of 'reality'. Yes, I think that's also true. So is there a difference between the fallacy of self-exclusion and that of the stolen concept? And if so, what is it?

Of course, if there isn't one, then, as you suggest, Rand's stolen concept is not an entirely new fallacy, but simply the well-recognized fallacy of self-exclusion in new clothes. I suspect there is a difference, and that it lies in the recognition that all of our concepts have a hierarchical structure with its foundation in sensory perception.

But we should be able to explain the difference concisely, as I did with question-begging and the stolen concept.

Any ideas?

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer on 1/27, 10:33am)

Post 31

Tuesday, January 27, 2009 - 10:57am

This is a minor point, but perhaps does explain some of our problem.

Critics, philosophers who are discussing and analyzing a system of thought, or even a specific claim or argument, are in a different position from their stance when they are urging their own views. It would be useless for a critic to simply describe how, e.g., Kant's system is contradicted by his own system or beliefs.

What we must do when we criticize others' ideas is to apply only logical considerations. What I'm thinking is that that rules out references to axiomatic concepts, and thus, maybe, to the fallacy of a stolen concept per se.

To avoid confusion: critics and commentators do not merely state what is illogical when they review philosophy. They also summarize it, compare it, make explicit some of its ramifications and implications, etc. Logical errors are immediate, decisive judgments about a system of thought as such.

Do you agree that to use the term, "stolen concept," puts one in the position of advocating for a given system of thought, and thus can't serve as a tool in the general logical work of criticism?

Post 32

Tuesday, January 27, 2009 - 2:57pm

No, this is not a minor point at all. The essence of the dispute is not logical, not if one takes logic to be merely about the formal higher level structure of propositions and arguments, as opposed to being about the nature of the concepts those propositional forms serve to connect.

You cannot take the concepts that words stand for for granted.

To accept concepts as if they were givens, as if one could simply refer to a dictionary as an authority, is to treat concepts as frozen abstractions, not as cognitive tools for which each of us is fully and personally responsible, but as supernatural revelations given from on high, whether that be from the voice of the priest or the vox populi.

This is a terrible mistake. Each of us must do the work on our own and fully integrate each of our concepts, from the perceptual level upward, preferably as we learn them. We must also be willing to make and deal with new conceptual distinctions beyond those for which our ready-made vocabulary is pre-formulated. It is a mistake to think that logic deals only with formulas in which words are mere blocks where each is a solid irreducible primary and where the choice of words is either arbitrary or to be determined by appeal to the authority of the OED.

"Colorless green ideas sleep furiously" is a perfectly acceptable sentence if one deals merely with formal structure, and ignores the fact that words are not irreducibles, but that they stand for concepts which are entities which should be but which may not be properly integrated and properly differentiated. I refer you back to the predator thread, where you (Mindy) refused to differentiate between a criminal and a predator. You dealt with words and propositions, and refused to examine the underlying concepts which must be both differentiated and integrated. You took the word predator and equated it with the word criminal. When asked then to provide a name for the concept which refers to a person who seeks to take value while providing none without initiating force you could not provide an answer other than to repeat the words which you took as unquestionable givens. You were reduced to insult and pointing at the dictionary.

Rand's unique value lies not in the fact that her sentences and arguments are more logical in the formal sense than those of others, but that she properly differentiates and integrates her concepts. When necessary, we can distinguish new concepts or finer distinctions such as non-criminal predator or non-egotist egoist to differentiate ourselves from prior fallacies and previous equivocations. Rand's usage of selfishness is not superior because her sentences lack grammatical and syntactical errors. Her usage is superior because the concept that she means by selfish differs from the conventional package deal. Her concept excludes the sacrifice of others to self, while others simply take the word as given, and are unable to incorporate her sense into their frozen conceptual structures.

Concepts are prior to propositions. To accept your enemy's concepts and to quibble over the structure of sentences is already to have lost the battle.

Post 33

Tuesday, January 27, 2009 - 4:56pm

Hi Bill,

Question begging assumes a conclusion one is trying to prove. The stolen concept fallacy assumes a conclusion one is trying to disprove. To that end, the identifying a stolen concept resembles arguing by reductio ad absurdum. Reductios expose an assumed premise that results in a contradictory conclusion. I don't know what you'd call an argument that is subject to reductios, but I think "stolen concept" would foot the bill?

Jordan

Post 34

Tuesday, January 27, 2009 - 4:56pm

I think you misunderstand specifically what I was referring to, Ted.
I was referring to Bill's point about how self-exclusion differs, if it does, from a stolen concept. Just that. Does that make a difference to your post?

Post 35

Tuesday, January 27, 2009 - 9:20pm

Bill,

I think the self-exclusion fallacy assumes or incorporates the very thing it's trying to refute, whereas the stolen concept fallacy assumes something incidental but nevertheless vital to the thing being refuted. For example, "there is no such thing as knowledge," or "you should not tell people what to do," or "words are meaningless" incorporate the very thing they attempt to cast out: knowledge, judging others, and verbiage, respectively.

Next example, "you can't prove you exist." This statement *presupposes* existence but does not itself aim to refute existence. It entails the stolen concept but not self exclusion.

It might be useful to view self exclusion as a subset of the stolen concept fallacy in that both smuggle in a premise in contradiction with their conclusion.

Jordan

Post 36

Tuesday, January 27, 2009 - 9:57pm

Mindy,

Pointing out formal logical fallacies is indeed immediate and decisive, but *informal* logical fallacies are fine tools to add to the quiver. The stolen concept is onesuch informal logical fallacy. And we needn't appeal to axioms, much less Objectivism, for the stolen concept fallacy to apply. The fallacy applies to *any* conclusions that genetically depend upon a concept to which they stand in contradiction.

Jordan

Post 37

Tuesday, January 27, 2009 - 10:09pm

Jordan,
I didn't say formal fallacies were decisive, just fallacies.
I don't think your formulation will stand up. If a theory can be shown to deny a concept it also relies on, it is self-contradictory or incoherent.
In "You can't prove you exist," there is no claim made about existence. The claim is about proving something. I would say it *presupposes* the "you," as the statement is an address to the entity, the proof of whose existence is being challenged! But in that sense, it does indeed incorporate what it challenges. Address is a kind of indexing, so the statement is a sort of ostensive self-contradiction.
I'm still suspicious that the direct "stolen concept" format of fallacy depends on "axiomatic concepts," which will be specific to a system of thought.
I trust I don't need to elaborate how this in no way invalidates the validity or usefulness of Rand's formulation...

(Edited by Mindy Newton on 1/27, 10:18pm)

Post 38

Wednesday, January 28, 2009 - 9:41am

Hi Mindy,

If a theory can be shown to deny a concept it also relies on, it is self-contradictory or incoherent.

I agree. Both self exclusion and stolen concept entail contradictions. I was suggesting that self exclusion entails a contradiction of the very point to be disproved while stolen concept entails a contradiction incidental to the point to be disproved. That help?

Aside, lots of philosophers espouse axioms, more or less; they just call them by different names: maxims, first principles, primaries, basic assumptions.

Jordan

Post 39

Wednesday, January 28, 2009 - 11:41pm