From Younkins' article Immanuel Kant: Ayn Rand's Intellectual Enemy

Doesn't it strike you as a bit contrarian, Robert, that in one post you are asking why Objectivists have so little to say about their relative relation to Kant, and then in the next are alluding to a taped ARI lecture by none other than the Adam Mossoff to show that they do?

Post 21

Wednesday, January 13, 2010 - 8:16pm

Ted,

Objectivists are very selective in their facts - and if it's not part of the official line then it doesn't exist. But yes, the Mossoff lecture is more verbose - yet still selective in its facts, still following the official line.

In my taped lecture version, Mossoff goes into great deal about the method of the transcendental aesthetic, but then states that method of the transcendental analytic follows the same pattern, that the whole Critique follows the same pattern, therefore, he argues, there is no point in carrying on because the Kantian "gimmick" has already been revealed.

(Edited by Robert Keele on 1/13, 8:21pm)

Post 22

Thursday, January 14, 2010 - 5:07am

Robert and Ted: You're right, I should have read further; and I agree the New Advent is objective, which is why I use it. Sometimes we think we've done our homework well, but it wasn't good enough. Thanks for setting me straight.

Post 23

Thursday, January 14, 2010 - 2:31pm

Curtis,

Objective or not, the New Advent site is wrong on Kant.

Post 24

Thursday, January 14, 2010 - 2:39pm

Robert,

Per your posts 13 and 14, it appears to me that your uses of a priori / a posteriori and analytic / synthetic differ from the common philosophical usages of those terms. Your post 14 suggests to me that you might be misinterpreting Kant on this subject.

Jordan

Post 25

Thursday, January 14, 2010 - 5:12pm

Jordan,

What is the difference between "pure a priori" and "impure a priori"?

Post 26

Thursday, January 14, 2010 - 6:10pm

"Objectivists are very selective in their facts." That might approach the truth if you were to preface it with "All too-many self-described, and especially orthodox. . . ." But even then, broad and unsubstantiated accusations are inappropriate.

According to one Objectivist, "you need to study ten years of primary sources and textbooks for every one year of studying philosophy actually to understand reality beyond a floating abstraction."

Post 27

Thursday, January 14, 2010 - 7:25pm

Well, some are capable of getting it, and some..... just have a hard time... ;-)

Post 28

Thursday, January 14, 2010 - 9:43pm

Ted wrote: According to one Objectivist, "you need to study ten years of primary sources and textbooks for every one year of studying philosophy actually to understand reality beyond a floating abstraction."

Of course that Objectivist would be Ted Keer. But why do you quote yourself? Because Rand always quoted herself?

Post 29

Friday, January 15, 2010 - 9:15am

Hi Robert,

What is the difference between "pure a priori" and "impure a priori"?

The former is relevant to the a priori / a posteriori distinction as well as to this discussion. I am not seeing that the latter is.

Jordan

Post 30

Friday, January 15, 2010 - 10:30am

Jordan,

It is relevant. Peikoff's example - 2 qts. of water mixed with 2 qts. of ethyl alcohol yield 3.86 qts. of liquid, at 15.56�C. - is an impure a priori proposition.

The reason is that the example contains "impure" elements from experience - water, ethyl alcohol - yet it is a priori because it reflects some law of chemistry.

A pure a priori proposition, such as "every effect has its cause," will contain no elements from experience, it is the general form of the law of causality applicable to a vast variety of experiences.

Peikoff wrote: The first proposition in each of these pairs, it is said, can be validated...

"It is said." Who said? Cite please.

And what's validation got to do with it? All we're wanting to do is extract the form of propositions, not validate them.
(Edited by Robert Keele on 1/15, 10:31am)

Post 31

Friday, January 15, 2010 - 11:19am

Hi Robert,

I'm still not seeing the relevance. Peikoff's, hence Rand's, argument against the analytic / synthetic and a priori / a posteriori distinctions remain, regardless of whether we identify that chemistry proposition as impure a priori or a posteriori.

Jordan

Post 32

Friday, January 15, 2010 - 11:25am

Jordan,

I wasn't arguing against Rand/Peikoff Inc. in that post, I was simply explaining my viewpoint on the subject versus what you consider the traditional viewpoint.

Rand/Peikoff Inc. are battling against a tradition which I do not characterize as Kantian. Nor do I characterize the present age of philosophy or Western culture as Kantian. Peikoff is, perhaps, doing us a favor in a different sense: he is, at least, battling against a false notion of what the analytic-synthetic distinction consists of.

It is represented by the tradition as a dichotomy, I fully agree with that. Only, it is a tradition supported by the logical positivist school of thought that hails back to Hume, not Kant.

Edit: It occurs to me to add that every time I represent the Kantian view of the distinction I am implicitly arguing against the Leonard Peikoff article in question.

(Edited by Robert Keele on 1/15, 11:30am)

Post 33

Friday, January 15, 2010 - 12:01pm

A sanction for post 28. I have never seen anyone so thoroughly zung. Bravo. Bravo!

Post 34

Friday, January 15, 2010 - 12:28pm

Ted,

Hehe, you're funny. "Zung."

Since you sanctioned my post I'll sanction you with a pic for my profile.

Post 35

Friday, January 15, 2010 - 12:28pm

Hi Robert,

Ok.

Have you somewhere on this site explained your view of how Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction differs from Hume's*, and why Kant's is preferable?

Jordan

*Per Hume's distinction, you're talking about his distinction of relations of ideas / matters of fact, the precursor to Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction, right?

Post 36

Friday, January 15, 2010 - 12:51pm

Jordan,

This post should fit the bill, or if not, I'll try to fill in the details later -

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDiscussions/0581_4.shtml#81

Edit - In case the link doesn't work out, I've pasted my argument here from that post:

There are many websites out there explaining how Kant brought together or synthesized rationalism and empiricism. The synthetic a priori is part of that solution, and it is particularly useful in explaining where Hume went wrong in his critique of causality.

Hume held to a similar distinction in propositions, it has survived in the form of logical positivism which Rand and Peikoff criticized. It was simply necessary for Hume to see the error of his ways using this handy list of the possible forms of judgment:

analytic a priori
synthetic a priori
analytic a posteriori
synthetic a posteriori

Since a posteriori judgments are always synthetic, that eliminates the possibility of analytic a posteriori judgments. So that leaves us with:

analytic a priori
synthetic a priori
synthetic a posteriori

Now if Hume, lacking such a handy chart, miscategorized causal relationships as synthetic a posteriori, which are always contingent, it is only because he failed to conceptualize the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments which are always necessary yet always relate to experience.

And that is exactly the solution to the problem of causality set forth by David Hume.

(Edited by Robert Keele on 1/15, 12:54pm)

Post 37

Friday, January 15, 2010 - 1:02pm

Jordan,

You asked: Per Hume's distinction, you're talking about his distinction of relations of ideas / matters of fact, the precursor to Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction, right?

Right.

Post 38

Friday, January 15, 2010 - 3:28pm

Hi Robert,

I'd thought you were going to tell me how Hume's notion of "analytic" or "synthetic" differed from Kant's. Referencing Kant's quadrants, and Hume's lack thereof, doesn't speak to that. I suppose it doesn't matter. I think what matters to this thread is whether Peikoff's argument can be applied to Kant's treatment of the distinctions. In my post #1, I suggested it can be.

Jordan

Post 39

Friday, January 15, 2010 - 4:06pm