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Post 0

Monday, June 13, 2005 - 11:40pmSanction this postReply
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In response to Laj's defense of Dennett's heterophenomenology of mind (where the 3rd-person view of a mind is assumed to be the objective view of it), I will utilize 4 web-quotes (below) in order to argue against Dennett's view of the mind.

The quotes deal with direct and indirect realism and perception -- but I claim that the logic can be transfered to the 1st-person (direct) / 3rd-person (indirect) views of mind. My main contention is that these 2 things, the mind and the world, are to be treated differently from the outset. Laj seems to disagree with this contention, accepting what Kantian "logic" entails (ie. that we can't even know our own mind -- ie. that we can't even know our own internal impressions of things, but only impressions of our impressions).

Quote 1
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"The psychological experimenter has his apparatus of lamps, tuning forks, and chronoscope, and an observer on whose sensations he is experimenting. Now the experimenter by hypothesis... knows his apparatus immediately, and he manipulates it: whereas the observer... knows only his own 'sensations', is confined... to transactions within his skull."
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Quote 2
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"But after time the two men exchange places: he who was the experimenter is now suddenly shut up within the range of his 'sensations', he has now only [p. 153] 'representative' knowledge of the apparatus; whereas he who was the observer forthwith enjoys a windfall of omniscience. He now has an immediate experience of everything around him, and is no longer confined to the sensations within his skull. Yet, of course, the mere exchange of activities has not altered the knowing process in either person. The representative theory has become ridiculous...."
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Quote 3
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"In plain fact the experience of both experimenter and observer is at all times immediate. The real objects, and no 'sensations' thereof, are their two experiences. When the observer says that he has a 'sensation' of so-and-so, he means merely that it is so-and-so much, certain portion, and not another, of the objects that lie about him at the moment, which is in his experience.... In short, there is no sensation of an object. Experience presents no object once as outer and again as inner fact, and no content of knowledge that is other than its object...."
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Quote 4
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"the psychologist is now juggling with two epistemologies, not one: an indirect realism for the perceiver who cannot know the world directly, and a direct realism for himself who can. This has two important consequences. First, it refutes the thesis that indirect realism is an empirical matter, and second, it shows that the thesis is ultimately paradoxical"
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Source: http://www.comnet.ca/%7Epballan/W&K(1984).htm

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson
on 6/13, 11:43pm)


Post 1

Monday, June 13, 2005 - 11:49pmSanction this postReply
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Quote 4, revisited with relevant revision:

Quote 4
-----------------------
"the psychologist is now juggling with two epistemologies, not one: an indirect realism for the perceiver who cannot know [HIS MIND] directly, and a direct realism for himself who can. This has two important consequences. First, it refutes the thesis that indirect realism is an empirical matter, and second, it shows that the thesis is ultimately paradoxical"
-----------------------

Ed



Post 2

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 6:46amSanction this postReply
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Ed,

I read the source article.

It's exactly the kind of philosophy I'm uninterested in - a philosophy that doesn't give birth to any knowledge with scientific value.

Two main issues, the first of tangential interest to me, the second of real interest.

Direct vs. Indirect Realism

1) There are many interesting experiments and paradoxes that gave birth to indirect realism (or what Lovejoy called epistemic and psychophysical dualism).  I've not seen a theory of direct realism that doesn't incorporate the important aspects of indirect realism (that it makes little sense to speak of sensations apart from judgments/cognition, that hallucinations and distinct perspectives of the same physical object cannot all be invariantly real if reality is objective etc.)  Neither have I seen an indirect realist who denies that perception feels immediate and direct. 

2)  The main beef that your article has with indirect realism is misguided.  The article talks about indirect realism as if indirect realism is an invitation to metaphysical skepticism.  But this foundational approach to philosophy and science lost favor with many philosophers years ago because empirical paradoxes are viewed as stifling contradictions. What is more important is to use the general foundationalist methodology that Aristotle espoused. 

a) Start from where you are.
b) Engage in critical and empirical analysis and criticism of your beliefs.
c) Try to resolve as many contradictions and paradoxes as you can.

3) Using this view, there is something called "perception" - I think that by experimenting and some hypothesizing and theorizing, it is possible to show that some of our views of perception (and cognition in general) are naive. Whether whatever view of perception I arrive at will have philosophical contradictions is not as important to me as whether there is experimental knowledge of value to be mined.

Whether I label realism "direct" or "indirect" is a waste of time to quibble over. As long as you agree that limitations of perception and introspection and other things about the nature of perception can be revealed by experiments and introspection, that is all that matters.

Now, it is the empirical data from these experiments and how best to mine, interpret and utilize it that interests me.  A belief can be valuable, even if it is part of a philosophical scheme in which all the paradoxes haven't been resolved. Since I believe knowledge is practical first and intellectual second, I don't place too much weight on arguments that purport to refute this or that - it is easy to seize upon a problematic paradox and use it to deny the validity of anything. It is what experiments show that I find more interesting (and what they can be used to predict, detect and avoid).

Experiments, Theories and Inferences: A 1st Person Science of Consciousness vs. a 3rd Person Science of Consciousness

So what does a third person science of consciousness amount to? It is hardly different from what any psychologist does.  The main thing is this: a person's view of his mind is not given absolute metaphysical and epistemological primacy.

What do I mean by that?  A third person science of consciousness simply postulates that all the first-person claims about a person's internal experience, including and especially the person's verbalized interpretations of that experience, are to be treated as data to be explained.

There is nothing special about this.  We do it all the time as human beings. If someone tells me that he believes in God, I might try to explain why the person believes.  If I accepted the person's belief and the person's explanation for why he believed as being the true belief and explanation, I may have nothing to investigate.  I am free to accept those explanations, OF COURSE, but I also free to investigate others.

What is wrong with that?  There is a limit to which thoughts or verbalizations of others can be treated as data of certain kinds given our knowledge and the limits to which human beings can handle paradox and contradiction, but why should these limits be determined before the experiments?

Ed, let me know.

Cheers,

Laj.

(Edited by Abolaji Ogunshola on 6/14, 6:47am)


Post 3

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 6:55amSanction this postReply
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What hell is going on? You guys, I could sure use some backstory to this thread. Where did Laj launch his defense of Dennett's heterophenomenology of the mind anyway?

Jordan


Post 4

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 7:08amSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

I didn't launch a defense.  There was no criticism really - Ed  was obviously spoiling for a Dennett related debate so he made comments about Dennett's "greedy reductionism" when Dennett discusses the mind (Dennett's heterophenomenology is simply common sense to me).  He posted this on the Animal Empathy thread:



Rand's theory addressed that which was not addressable via strictly 3rd-person empirical methods.

This speaks to the problem that I have with Dennett. He has become guilty of his own notion of "greedy reductionism" in taking the 3rd-person view to be the objective view of consciousness. That is wrong. The 1st-person view is the objective view of consciousness (though it is the subjective view of all else). It's damn counter-intuitive, but correct nonetheless. Nagel and Searle are more "on the money" here.

So I posted this on that thread. 


Really?

Since I don't want to disrupt the thread, anyone interested in understanding why Dennett doesn't accept the infallibility of the first person view of consciousness can read these articles/papers:

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/JCSarticle.pdf

A fine paper in PDF for understanding the whole philosophy behind Dennett's defense of a third person view of consciousness.  In the end, it is the only way we will gain scientific insight into mental processes.


http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/chalmersdeb3dft.htm

"The Fantasy of First Person Science", culled from a debate with Chalmers.  This illuminates some of the problems with Chalmers's criticisms of Dennett. Sadly, Chalmer's speech is not provided.

The question is always the same: how do Searle and Nagel illuminate scientific research?

The papers are only for people who want to get into details and who are, at the very least, serious amateur students of the mind-body problem.

Cheers,

Laj



And Ed opened up his first post on this thread.  It seems to me that Ed likes to have his answers before looking at the research. I guess that sometimes, Objectivism does that to you.

But rest assured, the instant this debate becomes verbalist, I will have much better things to do.

Cheers,

Laj.

(Edited by Abolaji Ogunshola on 6/14, 7:11am)


Post 5

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 8:47amSanction this postReply
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Laj,

To treat your perspective fairly in debate, I'll take the time to read through the links that you've provided (though I imagine Nathan shouting at the sidelines: Argument by Proxy!).

In the meantime, here is a teaser: quotes from your response with which I had a modicum of trouble (on which all are invited to comment). Truncations added for specificity ...

--------------------------------
Troublesome Quote 1
It's exactly the kind of philosophy I'm uninterested in - a philosophy that doesn't give birth to any knowledge with scientific value.

Troublesome Quote 2
The article talks about indirect realism as if indirect realism is an invitation to metaphysical skepticism.  But this foundational approach to philosophy and science lost favor with many philosophers years ago because empirical paradoxes are viewed as stifling contradictions.

Troublesome Quote 3
Try to resolve as many contradictions and paradoxes as you can.

Troublesome Quote 4
I think that by experimenting ... it is possible to show that some of our views of perception (and cognition in general) are naive.

Troublesome Quote 5
Whether whatever view of perception I arrive at will have philosophical contradictions is not as important to me as whether there is experimental knowledge of value to be mined.

Troublesome Quote 6
As long as you agree that limitations ... about the nature of perception can be revealed by experiments ... that is all that matters.

Troublesome Quote 7
... it is easy to seize upon a problematic paradox and use it to deny the validity of anything.

Troublesome Quote 8
So what does a third person science of consciousness amount to? It is hardly different from what any psychologist does.

Troublesome Quote 9
There is nothing special about this.  We do it all the time as human beings.

Troublesome Quote 10
There is a limit to which thoughts or verbalizations of others can be treated as data of certain kinds given our knowledge and the limits to which human beings can handle paradox and contradiction, but why should these limits be determined before the experiments?
--------------------------------

Laj, I will have something more to say about this -- after I develop a deeper understanding of your perspective (by understanding what's said in the links you've provided).

Ed

p.s. In the meantime, I would welcome any comments on these quotes (from Laj or others)


Post 6

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 9:37amSanction this postReply
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Ed,

I have a healthy appreciation for paradox and I am able to view issues from a variety of perspectives before choosing the perspective I find most appealing for whatever reason (hopefully because it is true, but more likely because it is testable).

Therefore, I've little respect for linguistic arguments that are designed to refute the results of experimental science by showing this or that philosophical contradiction. Such linguistic arguments are often designed to lean strongly on one intuition that supports a result while rejecting other evidence or intuitions.  The intuitions, for whatever reason, neve invalidate the science - only some interpretations, but that is a matter of ideology.

For example, to show that rationality is uniquely human, I may point to higher mathematical principles as being examples of rationality and ask whether pocket calculators or jabbering apes will ever be capable of such.  I will design the thought experiment to lead to that conclusion exclusively. Just to preserve human uniqueness.(1)

To show the contrary, I might use retards as examples of humans and talk almost exclusively about computers defeating master-strength human beings at chess games, and the higher level behavior of apes.  Just to blur the lines between humanity and machines.(2)

A fair theory should try to account for the evidence as qualitatively and quantitatively as possible - a fair theory can admit that the difference in rationality in machines, humans and apes is a matter of degree and complexity and empirically and theoretically show its usefulness and truth.  This theory might appeal to (2) more than (1), but hey, a theory that makes some cherished ideas less plausible can't make everyone happy.

Any theory might seem wrong, contradictory or paradoxical. This may be because the theory is actually some or all of the above, but the theory might simply be incomplete.  None of the answers about the status of a theory should be completely determined before the inquiry. All answers should be open to revision in the light of new evidence.

I try to see how far a view can be taken before rejecting it (given practical limitations on my time, of course) because what seems to be a contradiction given what I currently know may no longer be one after I've entertained more facts.

For example, consider visual illusions.  I saw Superman fly in the movie, but I know he wasn't really flying after I've studied physics and learned a lot more about the world. I could always stop at the claim that my initial viewing of the movie was the truth and refuse to listen to other considerations.  However, I try to see how far I can go in resolving contradictions and paradoxes.  Now I understand that Superman didn't fly in the movie in quite the way that I thought that he did.

So, if any of the statements you quoted trouble your version of Objectivist foundationalism, which (might) refuse(s) to accept seeming contradictions in other to grasp the nature and utility of a system on its own terms and see what problems that system answers, that is fine. I just don't have the time or the inclination to sell my system to you and we can agree to disagree and move on.

Cheers,

Laj.


Post 7

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 10:31amSanction this postReply
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Thanks for explaining, Laj. I'm not too familiar with Dennett's theory of mind, but from a glimpse of his papers, isn't he just saying that a guy might fail to identify something going on in his noggin, and might misidentify something else going on in his noggin, so we shouldn't just take his word for what he thinks is going on? If so, that seems pretty clear cut. Where's the controversy?

Jordan


Post 8

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 11:04amSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

Your point is Dennett's exactly.

The controversy stems from (at least) two things:

1) the view that Dennett is using heterophenomenology to dishonestly dismiss the problems with qualia and subjective experience and open the floor for Dennett's materialism. 
2) the fact that some people want to hold on to their view of introspection(in general) as an infallible report of what goes on in the mind (usually because they think that something like this is required to uphold their sovereign view of reason and the will).

In short: some people just don't want consciousness to be explained!


Post 9

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 12:02pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Laj,
1) the view that Dennett is using heterophenomenology to dishonestly dismiss the problems with qualia and subjective experience and open the floor for Dennett's materialism. 
I wonder which problems in particular. I've found most talk of qualia unsatisfactory to begin with.
2) the fact that some people want to hold on to their view of introspection(in general) as an infallible report of what goes on in the mind (usually because they think that something like this is required to uphold their sovereign view of reason and the will).
I see. Does Dennett ever accept that introspection is sometimes important?

Also, I can imagine that some Objectivists will accuse Dennett of concept smuggling. They'll ask how Dennett can rely on a 3d person perspective if that person is subject to the same deficiencies as the 1st person. That is, if the subject's mental process can be doubted, so too can the tester's.

Jordan


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Post 10

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 12:15pmSanction this postReply
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Laj, quit it, you're determining my mental state for me!

You're egging me on with that last aphorism of 'nonexplanation desired!' I can see you laughing now: "See Ed, I told you that your mind is determined by antecedent, external factors -- muwawhahaha!"

Now before I research your links, please comment on the following words from Dennet (The Origins of Selves):

[with capitals substituted for italics]
----------------
And even beavers, unlike professional human engineers, do not consciously and deliberately plan the structures they build. And finally, WE (unlike PROFESSIONAL human storytellers) do not consciously and deliberately figure out what narratives to tell and how to tell them; like spider webs, our tales are SPUN BY US; our human consciousness, and our narrative selfhood, is their PRODUCT, not their SOURCE.
----------------

Laj, when I read this, my 'Spidey-sense' goes off on red alert. I take the above to mean that there is no such thing as conscious agency. I fear that what you might be thinking is: "Don't worry Ed, you're just along for a pre-determined ride, anyway! -- Enjoy the trip!"

If I hypothetically accept Dennett's hypothesis (and attempt a noncontradictory integration/validation of it), then I would have to say that Dennett did not ...

"consciously and deliberately figure out what [hypothesis] to tell and how to tell [it]!"

Laj, I trust you to confirm to me as to whether that is absurd.

Ed

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Post 11

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 12:18pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

----------------
Also, I can imagine that some Objectivists will accuse Dennett of concept smuggling. They'll ask how Dennett can rely on a 3d person perspective if that person is subject to the same deficiencies as the 1st person. That is, if the subject's mental process can be doubted, so too can the tester's.
----------------

Egg-zactly!

Ed



Post 12

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 1:58pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan
,

I wonder which problems in particular. I've found most talk of qualia unsatisfactory to begin with.
Loads of them.  I think his biggest two are that
1) There is no unambiguous definition of qualia.
2) People cannot agree on what constitutes a change in qualia vs. a change in belief about qualia.

I see. Does Dennett ever accept that introspection is sometimes important?
Of course. If a person reports anything as part of their internal experience, it is part of the data to be explained.

Also, I can imagine that some Objectivists will accuse Dennett of concept smuggling. They'll ask how Dennett can rely on a 3d person perspective if that person is subject to the same deficiencies as the 1st person. That is, if the subject's mental process can be doubted, so too can the tester's.
Exactly.  This is exactly what I was preempting with my statements that Ed found so troubling. And it is the kind of philosophical argument that I have no use for if it is proposed as a wide reason why the whole project of a third person science of consciousness is rubbish.  I used to propose such rationalistic arguments myself to refute materialism when I held a dualistic view of consciousness.  I think that these kinds of arguments are good ways for one to destroy one's philosophical education.

This kind of wide philosophical argument can be leveled against just about any psychological practice.  I think that the empirical value of the scientific results, when interpreted according to the competing scientific paradigms, should be allowed to speak for itself to some degree.  Self-referential paradoxes exist for all kinds of empirical phenomena if looked at from a purely philosophical standpoint.  I think that the relevance of the paradox is an empirical question, while Ed tends to treat it a priori, or from narrow foundations.

Note that when the heterophenomenologist doesn't accept (instead of remaining neutral on the question of correctness of )  the intended explanation of the test subject for the speech act, the heterophenomenologist has to be motivated by a desire to check some phenomenon empirically.  There are limits to what a heterophenomenologist can be neutral about, but they should't be determined a priori.


Post 13

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 2:14pmSanction this postReply
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Ed,

OK, you get Atlas Points for this attempt at humor.

Laj, quit it, you're determining my mental state for me!

You're egging me on with that last aphorism of 'nonexplanation desired!' I can see you laughing now: "See Ed, I told you that your mind is determined by antecedent, external factors -- muwawhahaha


Seriously, isn't the whole point of an argument to determine or influence another person's mental states?

Now before I research your links, please comment on the following words from Dennet (The Origins of Selves):

[with capitals substituted for italics]
----------------
And even beavers, unlike professional human engineers, do not consciously and deliberately plan the structures they build. And finally, WE (unlike PROFESSIONAL human storytellers) do not consciously and deliberately figure out what narratives to tell and how to tell them; like spider webs, our tales are SPUN BY US; our human consciousness, and our narrative selfhood, is their PRODUCT, not their SOURCE.
----------------

Laj, when I read this, my 'Spidey-sense' goes off on red alert. I take the above to mean that there is no such thing as conscious agency. I fear that what you might be thinking is: "Don't worry Ed, you're just along for a pre-determined ride, anyway! -- Enjoy the trip!"

If I hypothetically accept Dennett's hypothesis (and attempt a noncontradictory integration/validation of it), then I would have to say that Dennett did not ...

"consciously and deliberately figure out what [hypothesis] to tell and how to tell [it]!"

Laj, I trust you to confirm to me as to whether that is absurd.
I'm not really interested in expanding deeply upon Dennett's notion of the self, a view heavily influenced by scientific research on the brain/mind.  I'd probably do an awful job of it, and since I've already posted links that you haven't read/researched, but to which you have posted arguments which were supposed to be refutations, I'm already becoming wary of the point of this discussion.

If you consider the mind as being a function of the brain, the rest of what he is saying about the self isn't too far off (for example, if the brain is a physically distributed organ, then mental operations are distributed in space and time, a view heavily supported by experiments). Whatever paradoxes are inherent are for you to resolve however you choose.

Cheers,

Laj.


Post 14

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 3:06pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Laj,
1) There is no unambiguous definition of qualia.
2) People cannot agree on what constitutes a change in qualia vs. a change in belief about qualia.
I can identify with the first one. The second is just weird, and I don't get it.

I see. Does Dennett ever accept that introspection is sometimes important?
Of course. If a person reports anything as part of their internal experience, it is part of the data to be explained.
Hmm. This makes the report important, but it says nothing of the actual introspection.
And it is the kind of philosophical argument that I have no use for if it is proposed as a wide reason why the whole project of a third person science of consciousness is rubbish.
I see. To be sure, if the Objectivist's criticism is valid that we can doubt the tester's self-knowledge as much as the subject's self-knowledge, and thus doubt the experiment altogether, it still doesn't follow that the Objectivist should scrap 3d-person science of conciousness. Rather, Objectivists should scrap that rationale for 3d-person science. I can see two reasonable paths they could take to retain 3-d person science.

(1) They could simply replace the above "fallible subject" rationale with an appeal to utility. 3d-person science has clearly gotten us quite far, and I'm not sure that "introspection science" can say the same. Ed is welcome to argue for it though.

(2) They could limit the "fallible subject" rationale. They could argue that we should doubt some 1st-person accounts of the mind, but not necessarily all 1st-person accounts. They should be particularly keen to save the 1st-person accounts of the testers, so as to preserve the experiment's integrity. In my view, how someone chooses which 1st person account to accept or reject should depend on utility informed by empirics. That is, we should weigh the costs and benefits of accepting or rejecting a 1st-person account, and we should inform this cost-benefit analysis with whether such a 1st-person account has been (or can be?) falsified and whether similar 1st-person accounts have been observed under similar circumstances.

Just in case, please note that when I offer arguments for utility, I do not mean to imply that Objectivists (or I) think that truth is that merely that which we find useful. However, I do think Objectivists (and everybody else, including me) should think that better theories are those that we find more useful.

Jordan


Post 15

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 4:02pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

I can identify with the first one. The second is just weird, and I don't get it.
Consider the first time you ever drank beer.  Beer tasted bitter. However, you grow to enjoy the taste of beer. As people say, "Beer doesn't taste to an experienced drinker the way it did the first time."  Did the taste of beer change (if taste is a quale) or did your belief that beer was bitter change (the quale is invariant, but beliefs about the quale change)? 

The separation of sensation from judgment is rife with problems.

Hmm. This makes the report important, but it says nothing of the actual introspection.
"Says nothing"?  I get the gist of you point, but I think that you take it too far.  There are common sense limits to what we can admit as evidence and what we can study, regardless of whatever we believe about the material or immaterial nature of consciousness.  There must be some level of immunity from claims about winged pink elephants flying behind our heads when we are not looking.  From the report, we can infer something that needs to be explained.

I think that what you might be driving at is whether the feelings or experiences that we seem to have that we consider immaterial get serious metaphysical weight in Dennett's scheme.  My guess is that Dennett is either agnostic or antagonistic about that: he admits that we feel that way, but because he considers dualism as currently framed a scientific dead end (the immaterial soul can never be studied), he is willing to bite the bullet and see how far analysis can get without it. He has other reasons of course, but that is the biggest one.

However, Dennett believes that there is no way to study the mind or complex rational behavior, even in computer software, without accepting that it has intentions and goals.  Whether that allows for the spiritual soul that many identify with consciousness is another story. His proposal for studying the mind is to see how well the brain's functions can be understood in terms of stupider and stupider elements with their own functions until you get to the physical level.    This is why he is not a greedy reductionist. He doesn't propose that culture be understood at the level of physics.  He does propose that complex phenomena be studied in terms of simpler parts which can be reduced into simpler parts and so on.

I see. To be sure, if the Objectivist's criticism is valid that we can doubt the tester's self-knowledge as much as the subject's self-knowledge, and thus doubt the experiment altogether, it still doesn't follow that the Objectivist should scrap 3d-person science of conciousness. Rather, Objectivists should scrap that rationale for 3d-person science. I can see two reasonable paths they could take to retain 3-d person science.

I agree with the spirit of this, but given the common tendency in Objectivist circles to deal harshly with what sounds paradoxical or complex ("I don't care - what you are really saying is that I'm a robot ..."), your nuanced reasoning would be a major breakthrough for most Objectivists that I'm familiar with. And the Objectivist objections, in my opinion, are not without justification either, because I do not see how to reconcile some aspects of Objectivism with the view of man that is in part the result of a 3rd person science of consciousness.

(1) They could simply replace the above "fallible subject" rationale with an appeal to utility. 3d-person science has clearly gotten us quite far, and I'm not sure that "introspection science" can say the same. Ed is welcome to argue for it though.
Yes, but all the philosophical implications of the success of 3rd person science of consciousness point to a scientific view of the self that Objectivists cannot embrace because of their refusal to accept paradoxes even temporarily ("Integration... integration...").


(2) They could limit the "fallible subject" rationale. They could argue that we should doubt some 1st-person accounts of the mind, but not necessarily all 1st-person accounts. They should be particularly keen to save the 1st-person accounts of the testers, so as to preserve the experiment's integrity. In my view, how someone chooses which 1st person account to accept or reject should depend on utility informed by empirics. That is, we should weigh the costs and benefits of accepting or rejecting a 1st-person account, and we should inform this cost-benefit analysis with whether such a 1st-person account has been (or can be?) falsified and whether similar 1st-person accounts have been observed under similar circumstances.
Think about the way many Objectivists react to skepticism about the evidence of sense perception (an example of a refusal to deal empirically with paradox run amok).  Do I need to say much more?

Just in case, please note that when I offer arguments for utility, I do not mean to imply that Objectivists (or I) think that truth is that merely that which we find useful. However, I do think Objectivists (and everybody else, including me) should think that better theories are those that we find more useful.
Oh, my approach to philosophy is not about nitpicking complex ideas like truth (unless of course, the person I'm taking to is arrogantly displaying his ignorance with the history of philosophy and parading his ignorance as wisdom).  Like George Santayana, I believe that some questions in philosophy are best answered by not being raised.

I agree with what you wrote.

Cheers,

Laj.

(Edited by Abolaji Ogunshola on 6/14, 4:03pm)


Post 16

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 4:23pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan writes:
>Hmm. This makes the report important, but it says nothing of the actual introspection.

My perspective - from Critical Rationalism - says that the internal state is important obviously, but it is by definition *subjective*. We try to make it objective - that is, outside ourselves - by producing a report of it. Something that other people can consider objectively, and by extension, *critically*. For until we actually develop the Vulcan mind meld, the report (in whatever form it takes) is the best we can do.

Jordan:
>3d-person science has clearly gotten us quite far, and I'm not sure that "introspection science" can say the same.

Now, I just want to make an important point here. To see it, let's de-jargonise a bit. With "3rd person science" what we're really talking about here is *objective science* - science that can be examined by *other people* outside of us. In contrast, "introspection science" could be called "1st person science" - in other words this "science" is *subjective*.

If the only way we can find truth about our mind's workings is by examining our own internal states - and not the reports of and experiments with the internal states of others - then this type of 'science', even if it is nominally Objectivist, is actually *subjectivist*.

- Daniel



(Edited by Daniel Barnes
on 6/14, 4:29pm)


Post 17

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 4:40pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Laj,

Funny. I never drank beer for reasons I won't get into here. Doesn't matter, though, because even though I can entertain your post, I still don't understand when you write:
The separation of sensation from judgment is rife with problems.
Qualia-related problems right? If it's not too much trouble, would you mind giving me a few more examples?
Dennett believes that there is no way to study the mind or complex rational behavior, even in computer software, without accepting that it has intentions and goals. 
Weird. This seems to go against his physicalist tendencies, unless he accepts intentions and goals as physical (which I should hope he does). 
He does propose that complex phenomena be studied in terms of simpler parts which can be reduced into simpler parts and so on.
There're utility problems with this. Sometimes it's just more useful to analyze stuff in terms of the macro, wouldn't you say?  
but all the philosophical implications of the success of 3rd person science of consciousness point to a scientific view of the self that Objectivists cannot embrace
Which aspects of that view of the self do Objectivists resist? It's not clear to me.

Thanks,
Jordan


Post 18

Tuesday, June 14, 2005 - 5:25pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

Qualia-related problems right? If it's not too much trouble, would you mind giving me a few more examples?
Consider a song you initially didn't like but which you now like.  Did your sensations about the song change and change your view of the song, or did your beliefs about the song's quality change and change your view of the song?  How would you tell the difference? 

There is no sensation without judgment.  Judgment is the beginning of epistemology. Sensations are inferred as a kind of lower limit on what experience.  So the question has always been whether the metaphysical status of sensations (in any scheme, including those that try to make sensations qualia) is unproblematic.

One of the reasons why some Objectivists get so riled up about the "evidence of the senses" (which many philosophers have argued is properly called the "evidence of sense perception", where perception is a form of judgment ) is that Objectivists separate sensation from judgment in a way that appeals to common sense, but that is ultimately untenable in science.  Cognition is one function of the nervous system as a whole, so you can't say really separate the sensation from the judgments it gave rise to. 

What Objectivists think is "sensation gives unchanging, unmediated access to reality, brain does the interpretation" while the current models all argue that "the brain makes assumptions, and even modifies how the 'senses' search for data". The cognitive system, if we want to understand the nature of knowledge, must be treated as a system where judgment is the key, not sensation. 

Weird. This seems to go against his physicalist tendencies, unless he accepts intentions and goals as physical (which I should hope he does). 
Of course he does. The point is that we need some kind of functionalism to explain design or perceived examples of it.  We must just be cautious and studious before postulating functions.

There're utility problems with this. Sometimes it's just more useful to analyze stuff in terms of the macro, wouldn't you say?  
Of course,you're right.  Dennett's reductionist approach is tied to his functionalism, evolutionary philosophy and physicalism.  If you want to explain things ultimately at the physical level, then you have to get closer to it and explain how complex design gives rise to intentionality.  And to get closer to the physical level, the functions performed by the components have to get less intelligent (or at least, so he currently thinks).

Which aspects of that view of the self do Objectivists resist? It's not clear to me.
Certain views of individual autonomy. The idea that your mind is not transparent to itself isn't the strongest case for the self-creating man.  Here is a paper that makes some of the issues clear:

http://www.objectivistcenter.org/events/advsem01/RobinsonAdvSeminar2001.pdf

The paper is also indirectly relevant to my earlier paragraphs about the brain influencing perception.

(Edited by Abolaji Ogunshola on 6/14, 5:29pm)


Post 19

Wednesday, June 15, 2005 - 1:23amSanction this postReply
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Laj, in light of your comments above (re: inherent "deficiencies" of objectivists) I merely agree to disagree with you here. Here's an old SOLO article excerpt (courtesy of R. Rawlings) which, more or less, expresses my sentiments:

--------------------
Now, there is no reason to regard the mechanistic interactions of physical matter as the only possible manifestation of causation in nature. The observable, final actions of a living organism originate within that organism; but it would be an unwarranted leap beyond the evidence to assume that they are merely the end result of the interactions of the physical materials involved. So the causative entity in the case of living things must be regarded as the creature itself. This is especially clear when we are talking about the higher animals, who obviously act according to their awareness of the world.

Speaking of awareness, it constitutes another reason why physical interactions cannot be seen as the only valid pattern of causation. For example, something causes us to be aware of the world, and the experience of consciousness is wholly outside the realm of physical interactions as man has conceptualized them thus far. And just as we have no reason to bring in the mechanistic idea from the realm of matter into the realm of consciousness, we have no reason to bring in the idea of determinism either.

As far as we know, non-human forms of awareness do not include the ability to control mental operations. So, at this point, it makes sense to look upon the actions of lower animals as “predetermined.” But in the case of man, both every person’s awareness of his own responsibility to think and the fact that anything else leads to logical contradictions forbid us, in the name of science, to apply the idea of determinism to the actions of human beings.

The non-deterministic nature of man, when combined with the “butterfly effect” theory that every small motion has far-reaching consequences across the universe, might even be grounds to conclude that determinism does not now exist anywhere at all! That is, no event anywhere at all is preordained, since man exists in the universe.
--------------------

Ed

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