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Post 20

Wednesday, June 15, 2005 - 5:22amSanction this postReply
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Ed,

Talk about Argument by Proxy! ;-P

I know Tibor Machan's work when I see it.  Initiative: Agency and Human Society was a painful book for me to read. Machan always knows his conclusion in advance, so you wonder what the point of the arguments are(sadly, you remind me of him in that regard, Ed).  His rhetoric is great, but his arguments preach to the choir.

Now, there is no reason to regard the mechanistic interactions of physical matter as the only possible manifestation of causation in nature.
One of the problems with Machan's writing is that he rarely ever tries to develop his opponent's positions to arrive at a comprehensive view of the issue being discussed.  Though this is excerpted from an online article, his book did no better.  There are a variety of positions on the mind-body problem as it relates to the free will problem, and this statement doesn't apply to the best ones.

That aside, there is a very good reason to do what Machan clams that there is no reason to do, even if the reason is only tentative and not conclusive in Popperian scheme.  It is that the greatest advances in the biological sciences have been achieved by applying the atomic theory to living things.  You would never learn that from Machan, because Machan is not trying to present a fair argument.

I quote Richard Feynman from Six Easy Pieces:

"Everything is made of atoms.  That is the key hypothesis. The most important hypothesis in all of biology, for example, is that everything that animals do, atoms do.  In other words, there is nothing that living things do that cannot be understod from the point of view that they are made of atoms acting according to the law of physics.  This was not known in the beginning: it took some experimenting and theorizing to suggest this hypothesis, but now it is accepted, and it is the most useful theory for producing new ideas in the field of biology." (Emphasis in original)

Now, I find it hard to believe that there is no reason to accept the theory that has been the most useful for producing new ideas in the field of biology as true.  What would motivate a philosopher who respected science to write such?

The observable, final actions of a living organism originate within that organism; but it would be an unwarranted leap beyond the evidence to assume that they are merely the end result of the interactions of the physical materials involved. So the causative entity in the case of living things must be regarded as the creature itself. This is especially clear when we are talking about the higher animals, who obviously act according to their awareness of the world.
"Unwarranted leap" - notice the nature of the rhetoric.  The claim I seem to get from all this is that awareness is beyond physical explanation, or has no physical causes.  I think that the world's leading neuroscientists would find it hard to agree.If you desire an argument, I will not provide one.  There is no point in arguing with people who are willing to describe the scientific approach to human nature that has yielded the most progress in such terms.


Speaking of awareness, it constitutes another reason why physical interactions cannot be seen as the only valid pattern of causation. For example, something causes us to be aware of the world, and the experience of consciousness is wholly outside the realm of physical interactions as man has conceptualized them thus far. And just as we have no reason to bring in the mechanistic idea from the realm of matter into the realm of consciousness, we have no reason to bring in the idea of determinism either.
"No reason". Given all the good work that has been done on mood enhancing drugs based on addressing chemical imbalances in the brain, or the work done on brain damaged patients or parents with brain tumors, or even the discovery of DNA which is only compatible with a materialist theory of human nature, I cannot politely address such a statement so I will not address it.

At least, the motivation is becoming more explicit.  It is the fear of determinism. 
As far as we know, non-human forms of awareness do not include the ability to control mental operations. So, at this point, it makes sense to look upon the actions of lower animals as “predetermined.” But in the case of man, both every person’s awareness of his own responsibility to think and the fact that anything else leads to logical contradictions forbid us, in the name of science, to apply the idea of determinism to the actions of human beings.
Again, "paradox" vs. "contradiction".  However, I will not discuss this, partly because it is the kind of philosophy I dislike, but mostly because the evidence from research is not tackled head on.  Just general references to philosophical contradictions.

As Spinoza said, our feelings of freedom are fully compatible with the fact that we do not know what causes our behavior. Therefore, we are free,  for reasons both good and bad, to postulate ourselves as first causes. However, there is some good evidence that we are not as exempt from causation as many of us think we are.
The non-deterministic nature of man, when combined with the “butterfly effect” theory that every small motion has far-reaching consequences across the universe, might even be grounds to conclude that determinism does not now exist anywhere at all! That is, no event anywhere at all is preordained, since man exists in the universe.
This is the best part of the quote (combined with the last paragraph). Not because it makes any good arguments, but because it makes explicit the point of all this writing, which is the need for indeterminists to exempt human beings from deterministic causation with intellectual arguments.

Why expend all the ink when you really don't need an argument at all (because you know the conclusion before you start the argument)? Because you need to counter determinists.  That is what drives the need to write this kind of stuff.

Well, if you need it, good for you.  I will not deny anyone the convictions that he needs to comfort himself.

Cheers, and unless scientific evidence of some kind is presented, I'm signing out of this.

Laj.


Post 21

Wednesday, June 15, 2005 - 8:55amSanction this postReply
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Laj,

----------------
Talk about Argument by Proxy! ;-P
----------------

Good one, Laj! I didn't see that one coming! By the way, despite poking fun at each other in jest, I'm glad our debate was so civil. Our debate here shows that even, if civil discourse doesn't lead to conflict resolution, debaters can still show equanimity.


----------------
I know Tibor Machan's work when I see it.
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Actually (and ironically) Laj, that's R. Rawlings' work. I had given credit to him in parentheses when I cited it. What's ironic is that you go on to criticize Machan for knowing his "conclusion in advance."

Apparently, you were determined to react one way (and no other way) to a certain style of writing, a certain style to which you had been conditioned in the past. This, of course, appears to strengthen your hypothesis -- though I'd retort that the mere adoption of determinism creates self-fulfilling prophecies for the mind.

Another way to say this is that a mind that has adopted determinism will follow a highly predictable, highly pre-determined course in response to various stimuli -- while other minds do not (though I cannot cite empirical research to support this yet -- I predict that the important empirical work, of testing determinists vs non-, has not even been done).


After addressing Machan, you said ...
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sadly, you remind me of him in that regard, Ed
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Laj, I think Machan's great (thanks for the compliment). ;-)

Oh, and by the way, I would just like to propose a tentative thank you from R. Rawlings, too (as I think that he thinks that Machan's great, also). ;-))

More sincerely though, and as you allude, a milestone for this debate would involve mutual understanding of whether the variables and invariables debated -- entail primarily philosophic or scientific investigation. We both seem to clearly adopt opposite stances here on the judgment (philosophy vs science) -- but I'm not sure if you even accept this dichotomous standard.

Now I'm not arguing for a split between science and philosophy here, I'm arguing that there are some integrated facts that don't require more looking into (via empirical methods). Another way to say this is that the philosophy-science dichotomy is epistemological (not metaphysical).

There is a time in each rational agent's development when ALL SUPPOSED FACTS required "looking into." And there comes a time, as long as knowledge has always been integrated, when some facts don't. Yeah Laj, you pegged me. I'm contradiction-averse.

Thanks for the debate, Laj.

Ed


Post 22

Wednesday, June 15, 2005 - 11:53amSanction this postReply
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Ed,

Actually (and ironically) Laj, that's R. Rawlings' work. I had given credit to him in parentheses when I cited it. What's ironic is that you go on to criticize Machan for knowing his "conclusion in advance."
I was wrong, but not in the way you think.  I thought you were citing Rawlings citing Machan.  I'm fairly surprised that Machan's approach to agent causation is so similar to Rawlings (or vice versa).

I wouldn't be surprised to find out there is a network of influences that makes me look better than I currently do, but I was wrong.  That I admit.

A link to the original article would be helpful....?

Apparently, you were determined to react one way (and no other way) to a certain style of writing, a certain style to which you had been conditioned in the past. This, of course, appears to strengthen your hypothesis -- though I'd retort that the mere adoption of determinism creates self-fulfilling prophecies for the mind.
Nice jab.

I think that everyone on this website, including you, has similar regular tendencies which are independent of whatever answer we each individually give to questions about determinism's veracity.  I could discuss some of yours, but that's besides the point.

I'm not just "conditioned" to think determinism is true, if condition is meant to connote a simple reflex.  The complexity of causation doesn't make causation magic.  I can explain why I think determinism is true, and the limitations and paradoxes of my thoughts.  That I was determined to be that way is not much different from saying that there are people determined to be retards, the only difference being that neuroscientists have better insight into the physical causes of retardation than the physical causes of knowledge.

  
Laj, I think Machan's great (thanks for the compliment). ;-)

Oh, and by the way, I would just like to propose a tentative thank you from R. Rawlings, too (as I think that he thinks that Machan's great, also). ;-))
I'm not against your calling them great.  I'm against the conclusion of an argument being slanted mostly by refusing to deal with the hard questions or the opposing evidence.  Some great philosophers do this too.

More sincerely though, and as you allude, a milestone for this debate would involve mutual understanding of whether the variables and invariables debated -- entail primarily philosophic or scientific investigation. We both seem to clearly adopt opposite stances here on the judgment (philosophy vs science) -- but I'm not sure if you even accept this dichotomous standard.
I don't accept a dichotomy between good philosophy and good science and neither would you.  I see myself as being more empirically motivated than you are in framing philosophical questions.  More often than not, I find the differences that matter to be testable differences.
 
Now I'm not arguing for a split between science and philosophy here, I'm arguing that there are some integrated facts that don't require more looking into (via empirical methods). Another way to say this is that the philosophy-science dichotomy is epistemological (not metaphysical).
And I'm arguing that you (Ed) attempt to decide which integrated facts don't require "more looking into" mostly by introspection.  The problems with this approach is that it fosters a conservative rationalism.  I agree that logic should not be disrespected, but your approach to philosophy has often led to people confusing their lack of imagination or limited perspective with a contradiction.

There is a time in each rational agent's development when ALL SUPPOSED FACTS required "looking into." And there comes a time, as long as knowledge has always been integrated, when some facts don't. Yeah Laj, you pegged me. I'm contradiction-averse.

You're not just contradiction-averse, you're paradox-averse, a far more dangerous condition for a truly intelligent mind.  You will not look into facts that do not support your view of events and you will have a hard time seeing weaknesses in your own position. In your case, I think it is an honest flaw, and it is not the kind of flaw that has any serious repercussions for everyday living. However, for understanding cutting edge science or philosophy, such a flaw is a huge impediment.

I seriously wish you would take some time to engage as empathetically as you can a world view which you heard was scientifically respectable, but to which you were philosophically opposed.  Reconciling the apparent contradictions in your thought, especially when the experimental evidence favored the science you disliked, would do a lot for you.

Cheers, Ed.

Laj.


Post 23

Wednesday, June 15, 2005 - 1:50pmSanction this postReply
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Laj, the following is sincere (no sarcasm meant).

Thanks for the reasoned advice. I can see that you are not simply 'in it to win it' in this debate (as you'd be if the very health of your ego depended on 'converting' the opposition). With your closing words (on advice for me to clear my clouded head), you show sincerity and respect for me as a thinker and 'manager' of an enormous potentiality (due to uniqueness, we are all 'managers of unprecedented potentiality'). What great tact!

On paradox
Laj, paradox is nothing but apparent contradiction (real contradictions don't exist). So paradox (like that of a bent-looking stick in water) is an agent-relative phenomenon. It will always be agent-relative. This relativity between rational agents depends on the personal expansion of each agent's zone of 'a priori knowledge.' One man's meat is another man's paradox.

Think Thales here: He thought everything was ultimately water (ie. nonwater entities don't exist). 2600 years later however, we no longer need to employ empirical investigation into this claim. We've come into possession of an absolute certainty (a 'new' a priori truth) on this matter: nonwater things exist, period. Armed with this new 'true-by-validly-expanded-definition truth,' science can now march forward, utilitizing this now-incorrigible "assumption" that some things won't be water. Valid expanse of definitions (a heavily philosophic matter) are what it is that fertilize the ground -- so that the garden of science can increasingly grow taller (or grow at all).

Transferring this theme to the bent-looking stick, rational agents have gained a mechanistic understanding of property attribution (ie. refraction) and thereby solved the paradox for ALL rational agents (who're willing to examine the reasoning), everywhere, and for all time.

I'll look into the links Laj (and comment later), but I admit that my knee-jerk reaction (already much belabored here) is to claim that you want 'increasingly taller plants' without the required 'fertilizer.'

Ed


Post 24

Wednesday, June 15, 2005 - 2:00pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Laj,
Consider a song you initially didn't like but which you now like.  Did your sensations about the song change and change your view of the song, or did your beliefs about the song's quality change and change your view of the song?  How would you tell the difference?
I still don't understand. :/ You and I must use the term "sensations" differently because I'm not accustomed to the view that one can have sensations about a thing. Rather, I think one has sensations of a thing, and in contrast, I think that one has judgments about but not of a thing. Also, you seem to be suggesting that a change in musical preference results either from sensory change or belief change. Neither sounds right to me.  We could always leave this till later if you like.
Certain views of individual autonomy. The idea that your mind is not transparent to itself isn't the strongest case for the self-creating man.  Here is a paper that makes some of the issues clear:
Ok. Makes sense.

Jordan


Post 25

Wednesday, June 15, 2005 - 3:47pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

I still don't understand. :/ You and I must use the term "sensations" differently because I'm not accustomed to the view that one can have sensations about a thing. Rather, I think one has sensations of a thing, and in contrast, I think that one has judgments about but not of a thing.
:)

I'm  not the most careful writer and I often happy my intended meaning gets communicated, even with my mangling of the English language. You are right.

Maybe, if I knew a particular scheme you had studied or subscribed to, then maybe I could explain where the differences and similarities

The big point is this: sensations always give rise to percepts, percepts being forms of judgment (perceptions can be true or false, but sensations can't).  At some point, sensations must lead to judgments of some kind for them to play any role in epistemology.  In fact, some have argued whether sensation plays any serious role in epistemology since sensations are not beliefs and it is not clear how to say what sensations do to cause beliefs that makes the sensations epistemically valuable.

Also, you seem to be suggesting that a change in musical preference results either from sensory change or belief change. Neither sounds right to me.  We could always leave this till later if you like.

You are free to leave this for later, but one of the problems with discussing the terms "sensation:", "perception" and "judgment" is that there are a variety of schemes with different definitions for the first two terms. 

On the other hand, I would appreciate your explanation of how a person's attitude to a particular song might change without a change in something about the person's experience of or beliefs about that song.

Cheers,

 Laj.


Post 26

Wednesday, June 15, 2005 - 4:01pmSanction this postReply
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I'll look into the links Laj (and comment later), but I admit that my knee-jerk reaction (already much belabored here) is to claim that you want 'increasingly taller plants' without the required 'fertilizer.'
That's quite possible.  It's also possible that you don't have a wide enough conception of 'fertilizer' or 'taller plants'.  If we can agree on what "increasingly taller plants' are, and I do have them, the claims about my 'fertilizer' dissolve into semantics.  On the other hand, if your 'taller plants' bear no fruit, then we might just as well not have them.

That's the beauty of testable differences.  We set standards for  "increasingly taller plants", and we try to see whose approach to issues produced those plants - yours or mine.

Laj.



Post 27

Thursday, June 16, 2005 - 9:22amSanction this postReply
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Hi Laj,

Here I offer briefly an explanation for why a person's musical preference changes. I could back this explanation with some nifty science, but I'll ask you for now to humor me, as I'm pressed for time. 

How a song is judged good or bad
I think people store a musical repertoire in their brains, a repertoire not just of songs, but of musical rules, of anticipations of musical tensions and releases. These rules emanate from the individual's musical listening experience. If a song is too far from a person's mental repertoire, then he will reject it as bad (often think of it as non-music). If the song is to settled within that repertoire -- that is, if it accords with the basic tensions and releases -- then it will also be rejected as bad (often think of it as trite and boring). To be good, a song should either play on those less basic and more (for lack of better word) sophisticated rules, or the song should push the envelope ever so slightly to add a new pocket of rules to the repertoire.

To be sure, a song can also be good or bad for associative reasons -- like the song someone hears upon breaking up with her/his first true love -- but let's ignore that for now.

How a bad song becomes good
Our musical repertoire changes as our musical experience grows. An example: for about 3 months, I performed a Hindemith piece that I couldn't stand. It was too far beyong my musical repertoire. But the more I played it, the more it invaded me. Eventually, it popped out a new pocket of rules for my repertoire, and now I like it quite a bit.

My "senses" didn't change. The sames notes and rhythms played out with every listening. My "beliefs" about whether the piece was bad or good of course changed, but that hardly illuminates a cause for the change.  The cause was largely that my repertoire grew via my experience -- that more music memories were stored in the brain -- which lead to me forming a "good" relationship between the Hindemith and my musical memories. In other words, more musical sensory input of the Hindemith combined with how that input related to prior musical sensory input and caused me, in response, to form a judgment, a belief.

(If you think this view is actually an illustration of one of your two options, please let me know.)

Jordan 


Post 28

Thursday, June 16, 2005 - 11:42amSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

It illustrates my second option, but Dennett's point is that the concept of qualia has not been fleshed out well enough to differentiate the first from the second in any scientifically meaningful way.

Laj.


Post 29

Thursday, June 16, 2005 - 12:06pmSanction this postReply
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Oh, so Dennett would file my view under "change in belief"? Guess I don't know what he means by "belief" then. But more importantly, no one really has decent definition of "qualia," so I guess it doesn't matter.

Jordan


Post 30

Thursday, June 16, 2005 - 1:44pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan,

I'm the one using the word "belief". The term as I use it simply means judgments or propositions with truth-values held about some subject(s).

Your position on qualia is what Dennett argues for - until someone gets their hands on a testable definition of qualia, which Dennett never expects to happen, we should let it rest.

Laj

(Edited by Abolaji Ogunshola on 6/16, 1:50pm)


Post 31

Thursday, June 16, 2005 - 4:55pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Laj,

Your position on qualia is what Dennett argues for - until someone gets their hands on a testable definition of qualia, which Dennett never expects to happen, we should let it rest.
Clever man, that Dennett. :-)

Jordan


Post 32

Thursday, June 30, 2005 - 9:07pmSanction this postReply
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Belated response ...

-------------
Your position on qualia is what Dennett argues for - until someone gets their hands on a testable definition of qualia, which Dennett never expects to happen, we should let it rest.
-------------

Only if we are vulgar empiricists. There are 2 ways to justify things in this world: by experience and by reasoning. Though admixtures of both (experience and reasoning) pervade all that is known by all beings on this planet, a primary focus on one -- to the exclusion of the other -- is where otherwise intelligent folk go wrong.

As I've stated before (and will likely state again), the objective view of mind is the 1st-person view -- those opposed are guilty of a scope violation (like trying to measure "length" by "weight").

Ed



Post 33

Thursday, June 30, 2005 - 9:42pmSanction this postReply
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Ed:
>As I've stated before (and will likely state again), the objective view of mind is the 1st-person view

Ed, using the 'X-person view' descriptor, how then would you define the *subjective* view of mind?

- Daniel
(Edited by Daniel Barnes
on 6/30, 9:44pm)


Post 34

Thursday, June 30, 2005 - 9:55pmSanction this postReply
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Daniel,

[taking the bait] The subjective view of the mind is the 3rd-person view of it.

Ed

Post 35

Thursday, June 30, 2005 - 11:20pmSanction this postReply
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Ed:
[taking the bait] The subjective view of the mind is the 3rd-person view of it.

Could you just briefly describe the actual procedures for studying the mind that you consider the '3rd person view' and the 'first person' view?

- Daniel,

Post 36

Thursday, June 30, 2005 - 11:55pmSanction this postReply
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Daniel,

The 3rd person view of studying the mind involves videotapes of interrogation (ala Dennett) -- where, not only answers to questions such as: What are you thinking? What are you feeling?; but reaction time, facial expression, posture, etc. while answering said questions is noted (in other words, heterophenomenology is a 3rd person view of the mind).

1st person views of studying the mind come from introspection. Daniel, I believe that you don't hold introspection in a very good light. And, in predicting your response, I fear the worst, as far as this 'introspection' answer goes -- BUT BRING IT ON, BABY!

Introspection rocks (as far as the objective view of the mind goes)!

Ed

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Post 37

Friday, July 1, 2005 - 1:21amSanction this postReply
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Ed writes:
>The objective view of mind is the 1st-person view...1st person views of studying the mind come from introspection

Ed, Dictionary.com defines 'subjective' as:
1.Proceeding from or taking place in a person's mind rather than the external world: a subjective decision.
2.Particular to a given person; personal: subjective experience.
Moodily introspective.
3.Existing only in the mind; illusory.
4.Psychology. Existing only within the experiencer's mind.

But that's ok. If you want to use 'objective' in the opposite way to the usual usage, I'm not going to quarrel. Ayn Rand herself does exactly the same thing with various words, as I've pointed out before. Just pays to get it clear from the outset: *by 'objective' you mean in this context what most people mean by 'subjective'*.

- Daniel



Post 38

Friday, July 1, 2005 - 7:59amSanction this postReply
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Daniel, yes.

When the subject matter is the external world, then introspective (internal) accounts of it are the subjective accounts of it. However, when the subject matter is the mind (individual consciousness), then external accounts become the subjective accounts.

What is so funny is that I hold you as one who would go along with that stale reasoning of solipsism (the Problem of Other Minds) where the existence of other minds is questioned because of a lack of direct (read: objective) experience of other minds.

Daniel, what do you say about this? Do you think that the Solipsists have a point in questioning the existence of other minds -- or do they not even have a point in doing so?

Ed

Post 39

Friday, July 1, 2005 - 11:56amSanction this postReply
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Ed writes:
>What is so funny is that I hold you as one who would go along with that stale reasoning of solipsism...Daniel, what do you say about this?

I cannot explain why you might consider me a solipsist. I have yet to see any evidence that might suggest other minds do not exist! Nor could I imagine how such a believe might be fruitful in any way, shape, or form. Nor have I ever expressed any such belief.

That is what I have to say about it...;-)

- Daniel



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