The Argument from Intimidation

Roger wrote:

"What Bill did not say is, I think, a crucial additional point: the desire to know and understand is a ~natural~ desire, part of every conscious living organism's drive for efficacy and control over its own life, to promote its survival and to avoid harm."

Casey replied, "No. Every conscious living organism does not have a desire to know and understand."

True. I think Roger may have meant every rational living organism.

Casey continued, "Not even every person has this desire, let alone banana slugs or my pug Caesar."

I think ever person does have it at least some of the time. Children are naturally curious. Recall Rand's statement that "an infant or young child learns to focus his mind in the form of wanting to know something--to understand clearly. That is the beginning from which a fully conscious, rational focus comes."

Roger also wrote:

"But note: the one, over-riding value, that is inborn in ~all~ conscious animals, is the drive to preserve one's survival and well-being. Humans, too, naturally seek to do this, whether by seeking clarity and understanding through focusing or by seeking mental shelter from threatening reality through evading or dropping focus. ~This value~, which pre-exists ~all~ instances of mental focusing, is what the choice to focus is based on. Knowledge (however flawed or misinterpreted) of a situation and the desire to use whatever strategy ~seems~ most likely to enhance survival and well-being and avoid harm. This is how we are built! We cannot ~not~ act in this manner. (Just try not to!)"

Casey replied, "So now there is no such thing as altruism? We 'cannot' be self-sacrificial? Curioser and curioser."

I can't speak for Roger, as I think we can be self-sacrificial, insofar as our natural desire for self-preservation gets corrupted, and we lose sight of the purpose of morality. People can be taught to believe in an ethics of duty. They can be indoctrinated from a very young age to believe that its better to give than receive, that virtue is its own reward, etc. There are certainly no built-in moral values, although there are built-in natural values in the sense that everyone by nature likes pleasure and happiness and dislikes pain and suffering. As for focusing, every choice, including the choice to focus one's mind, is made for some purpose. In the case of focusing, the purpose is to understand something, to grasp it clearly, just as the purpose of focusing one's eyes is to see clearly. The idea that the choice to think is a valueless, purposeless activity does not make sense to me.

Michael Moeller said that he can't seem to convince me that the source of one's value-judgments--the one primary choice--is the choice to think. But as I mentioned, the choice to think must itself be based on a value-judgment, otherwise we wouldn't judge it as desirable. If it were not based on a value-judgment of some sort, then it would simply be a blind, arbitrary choice with no moral significance.

- Bill

Post 381

Sunday, November 13, 2005 - 1:09am

Determinism, evasion and altruism.

I thought it would be obvious to readers of Branden that evading and behaving altruistically are misguided survival strategies. Unless one has totally subverted one's desire to remain alive, and is consistently bent on self-destruction, that is ~all~ that evasion and altruism are used for -- a misguided attempt to enhance one's chances for survival and avoid harm.

Nathaniel Branden wrote in Judgment Day that when he first made love to Patrecia, he knew �whatever the cost, it was worth it.� [Page 327]

However, Branden told Patrecia to lie to her husband as a necessary condition of their affair. Branden also lied to Barbara about the affair. If Branden was seeking his �highest value� what was that value? It seems he implied that Patrecia was his �highest value� and then limited and subordinated his relationship with Patrecia to seek some other value. Is this determinism, evasion or altruism?

What Objectivist value is served by obtaining a value through deceit?

As to Rand, Branden not only lied about the affair but also lied to Rand that he was still sexually attracted to her, although he had no such feelings.

What Objectivist value holds that prolonged lying to people you claim to love, is of benefit to you? �or them? Is this determinism, evasion or altruism?

Branden makes numerous claims in Judgment Day that he lied to Rand because she couldn�t face the truth. Which Objectivist value is it that holds that it is a positive value to lie to someone who can�t face the truth? Is this determinism, evasion or altruism?

Was Rand �better off� not knowing the truth? If so, how? Isn�t a major Objectivist principle that all decisions, and per force all important decisions, must be based on reality.

Why was Branden seeking to help Rand rather than seeking his own highest value; i.e., Patrecia? Is this determinism, evasion or altruism?

Endless threads that virtually never discuss specific entries from Judgment Day in light of Rand�s newly published journal entries from PARC. Is this determinism, evasion or altruism?

Post 382

Sunday, November 13, 2005 - 3:31am

William,

I commend you on that post. A great deal of honesty is obvious in it and should be exemplary for all and I sense a mutual quest for truth despite any irrelevant considerations of rivalry. Thank you for that, and damn good show. It will make me consider all of your future posts with more respect just to know that you respect the actual point of my own words so well.

Steve Carver,

I agree that I would like to see more addressing of the new evidence from Rand's own pen about this issue and you are so right to point this out, especially now, after the huge battles that have gone before without that aspect ever getting a real airing. It's the very thing that is now available and the very thing that every answer seems to obfuscate, minimize and leave unconsidered from the "truth and tolerance" side. Just in the new journal entries of Ayn Rand revealed in PARC there is a spectacular incongruence with the Brandens' stories that simply must be dealt with. The sooner that process starts, the better.

Casey

Post 383

Sunday, November 13, 2005 - 3:36am

BTW, William, I think that there is a continuum of "self" that symbolic logic just can't handle and is, in fact, the achilles heel of your argument.

Post 384

Sunday, November 13, 2005 - 9:37am

Bill:

     As you put it all in the last paragraph, you're correct that I disagree with this analysis.

     It appears that you consider the concept of 'value' as synonomous with 'desire.' Methinks this is what's causing a lot of confused debating. I see a difference re concern with perceived needs (values) and mere desires (wants). It's perceived-needs that are meaningfully called 'values.' --- True, one can 'want' the perceived need, and, if the priority is stressed on the 'want' part of the perceived-need, rather than the perceived-need part of it, then all is interpretable in terms of 'wants' vs. 'wants' and your analysis fits; but, I find it then irrelevent to any talk about free-will. It's explanatory only for animals (or, those humans Rand would call 'whim-worshippers'.)

     Further, in the 'want' vs 'want' interpretation, there is no cost/benefit to be concerned with analysing about. Any 'want' automatically carries it's own benefit-weight-of-the-moment (which can be different at any later moment) hence no analysis is even necessary for any 'want' vs. 'want'; the strongest one will automatically win. Of course, a 'cost'/threat aspect re either/both wants may be relevent, but, they, in terms of 'want-to-avoid' will also be automatically part of the 'worth' of each want, without analysis being necessary. For humans, any 'thinking' thereby may (or, may not) be secondarily applied re the cost being acceptable or not; but, clearly, this is not the territory (derivative use of 'value'-based 'thinking') we're debating .

     To iterate:
     If all one's talking about is a conflict-choice of desires, (a desire-to-think vs a desire-to-not-bother), I'd agree with your total analysis, given the replacement of 'value' with 'desire/want'. A desire can be the basis for determining (ratiocinating, if you will) it as a 'value,' but, a desire, per se, is not necessarily a value...it's merely a want. It's not a perceived need, which is what a value is.

     My view of  the basic conflict being debated is in terms of a perceived-need vs. a desire.

     Now, back to your cake (good example):

     You see the answer to a question about cake-eating vs dieting, as a conflict between the 'long-range' and the 'short-range.' Ok, no prob. In *my* framework of meaning, we're talking about a perceived-need vs. a want, or, a value vs. a desire. So far so good, I hope.

     Given this (a 'long-range', to be redundant, value as one of the 'choices'), a concern about a cost/benefit analysis can be relevent, ie, that there will, or will not be a cost/benefit analysis done, becomes a new primary 'choice' to make about the worth of which (now having become secondary, derivative choices), the desired cake-eating 'now' vs. the perceived necessity of staying-on-the-diet, alternative to 'choose.'

     That a c/b analysis is done is, itself, a choice against it's alternative (not bother doing one). It's a choice, now, between a perceived need to do-a-c/b-analysis vs. a desire to not-do-one. --- One can guess, if the choice to follow a perceived need to do a c/b analysis is chosen, which next choice-decision (eat or diet) will control the final action of acting on the desire to eat the cake or the action of sticking to the diet. O-t-other-hand, one can guess, if the choice to follow the desire to NOT do the c/b analyis, which final action will be chosen. Though one can debate the guesses, ntl, the subject of doing a c/b analysis is itself, the new 'choice' to now be concerned with, as far as I can see on this. It is a new 'choice' area making the original choice-subject (eat-cake/stay-on-diet) no longer the actual basic choice to discuss.

     Given that the new do-c/b-analysis vs NOT-do-c/b-analysis is the choice to now (since you brought it up as determining the choices originally brought up) be concerned with re competing value-sets affecting IT's outcome, I ask, how does the idea of 'values' (or as I prefer 'value-sets'; I presume that more than 1 value really affects value-decisions, but, really no matter re the subject-context here) affect THIS area of decision-making, without itself raising the identical question on the explanatoriness of itself?

     I mean, it seems as if you presume that c/b analysis is, on it's own, an unquestioned 'bottom-line' explanation for ALL decisions between perceived needs ('long-range' as you put it) and desires ('short-range'). But, there MUST be a value-cause for whether or not this action is performed, n'est pas? Otherwise, it's treated as if it, itself, is THE bottom-line "1st-Cause" of decision-making. --- Yet, if there is a value-cause for doing a c/b analysis, the idea that values are explanatory for ALL decision-making seems to raise the question of how, and where, and especially why does one stop with this...causal-explanation?

     I hope I clarified your concerns re my prob with your explanation of value-caused free-will operation.

LLAP
J:D

Post 385

Sunday, November 13, 2005 - 10:24am

Casey wrote, "William, I commend you on that post. A great deal of honesty is obvious in it and should be exemplary for all and I sense a mutual quest for truth despite any irrelevant considerations of rivalry. Thank you for that, and damn good show. It will make me consider all of your future posts with more respect just to know that you respect the actual point of my own words so well."

Casey, thanks for the kind words. "Just doin' my job." :)

But you also said, "BTW, William, I think that there is a continuum of "self" that symbolic logic just can't handle and is, in fact, the Achilles heel of your argument."

I'm not sure of your point here. Symbolic logic is simply a science of method - of deduction from premises to conclusion, which requires an independent verification of the premises. I am not saying and have never said that symbolic logic is the be-all and end-all of knowledge. I gather that by the "continuum of the self," you are referring to Hume's skepticism regarding the existence of a continuing, unchanging I that persists throughout a succession of different states of awareness. Hume does, of course, commit the fallacy of the stolen concept, for when he refers to himself in the first person as engaging in a process of introspection, he is using the idea of a continuing self in order to deny it. How can he observe a series of disconnected states of awareness, if there is no "he" - no stable, continuing self to identify them?

In any case, I don't see that anything I've said thus far is incompatible with the idea of an enduring self, which persists throughout one's changing states of awareness, or that the latter is somehow my "Achilles heal."

- Bill

Post 386

Sunday, November 13, 2005 - 11:19am

Bill:

Re your 'car' example...

"...to say that all our choices are the inevitable result of antecedent factors is not to say that we have no choice. I choose to keep my car on the road rather than drive it over the cliff, because I want to stay alive, but that doesn't mean that I could just as well choose to drive it over the cliff. I could do no such thing, because I have absolutely no reason to. Yet it still makes sense to say that I 'choose' to stay on the road."

"The reason my action constitutes a 'choice,' even though I could not have chosen otherwise given my desire to live, is that there is nothing preventing me from choosing otherwise if I were to value doing so. Staying on the road is a choice, because I could choose otherwise, if I wanted to; it's just that I don't want to.

"...In short, determinism is not incompatible with choice; it is incompatible with a psychologically free choice."

In short, you are arguing that ALL choices are necessarily 'motivated' by one factor or another, such as emotions of desire, fear, etc...and/or...the perception-of need-fullfillments-or-need-threats, etc. Arguing about what 'choice' means therein raises a lot of pointless debate over examples extraneous to THE basic problem-subject...which Roger Bissell calls the "...so-called 'primary choice' of thinking or not thinking." --- (The question Roger needs to ask himself is "Is there any difference between wants/desires and 'values'?")

One can talk in terms of near-infinite examples which this idea of motivation obviously applies to, but the bottom-line prob re determinism and free-will advocates has nothing to do with these examples. They're all irrelevent to the bottom-line prob of the nature of the basic-choice of focusing-or-not re an already perceived-need vs. a desire-to-ignore-it. Rand's answer was: "...you can pick your motivations," with the stress on the "you," rather than an other motivation 'motivating one' to pick a motivation. I pointed this out to you once before (in another forum) and you just shrugged it off as ignorable without giving a solid analysis of the nature of how THAT picking must itself (by your argument) be also 'motivated.' Until you do, your value-causality(-cum-'motivation') explanation of control of choices...well...still very much lacks. It explains everything...except the main subject.

LLAP
J:D

Post 387

Sunday, November 13, 2005 - 11:39am

Roger writes:

Additional comments added 5PM PST 11/12 -- I see now that Michael M. somehow got the idea that I accused him of evasion in my post #365. I challenge him or anyone else to point out even the faintest suggestion that I have made such an accusation. If the shoe fits, he is welcome to wear it, of course, but such a claim was the furthest thing from my mind. <sigh> I am inclined to agree with Michael K's comments (post 372) about Michael K. At the very least, Michael K. seems set on automatic pilot for misunderstanding and misreading what other people say....REB

Ok, Roger. You wrote in post #365:

What's more, he supports it with a quote from Rand -- the very quote that one of his opponents tried to use earlier to ~refute~ him! And yet, there is no concession. The mind boggles...

What are you inferring here Roger? That Bill made a salient, irrefutable point and I refused to make a concession, thus "boggling" your mind. That's not a veiled accusation of evasion? Give me a break.

Since you think I'm misunderstanding your arguments and flying on "auto-pilot" (which is perhaps all that is necessary to refute your arguments), then I will take a sharper scalpel to your last post.

Roger writes: "As for the difference between desire and value, there isn't much."

Hmmm. It seems to me a third grader can tell the difference between his hunger desire and the apple he puts in his mouth. At a higher level, desires, or more appropriately, goals (like becoming a lawyer) are chosen as well. (See AR's quote in my post #375). You still don't see "not much" difference between these, Roger?

Roger writes: "A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep,"

Well, at least you got AR's definition of value correct, which should tell you what is wrong with "built-in value". The key here: that which one acts to gain and/or keep. What choice lies at the bottom of that action?

Roger writes: "...desire is one's response toward that which one values, and which motivates one to act to gain and/or keep it."

You are mixing terms here. If you are speaking about value experiences, which AR integrates into ideas on art (see "Our Cultural Deprivation"), then you are talking about the emotional response to a concretization that one regards as for or against oneself. This, by the way, is the result of one's metaphysical value-judgments, which are the result of what? You got it, the choice to think. Roger, you need to use greater scrutiny on how you define desire.

Also, do I need to rehash the difference between motivator and determinant? I clearly drew out another comparison and how this does not fly in post #375. Do you think these are the same as well, Roger?

Roger writes: "We have a built-in value: to pursue our survival and well-being, and once we believe, rightly or wrongly, that something fulfills the requirements of that value, we naturally desire that thing -- be it focusing or evasion, egoistic behavior or altruistic behavior."

Once we believe (how do those beliefs get there???) what will help us pursue our "built-in value" (i.e. innate), we naturally desire that thing (what are those desires, where do they come from, and how are the satisfied????). Hmmm, another interesting idea. So the suicide bombers and Columbine murderers were pursuing their "built-in" survival value, they just "wrongly" judged about the "requirements" of that "built-in" survival value, and thought killing was the best way to achieve it. Oops, they seem to have made a mistake. (Do you remember AR's quote that man can act as his own destroyer?)

And contrary to what Bill thinks, the opposite of a determined choice (a blatant contradiction in terms) is not an arbitrary one. One choses rationality because it has efficacy in reality, it is his "only absolute"--so much for it being "arbitrary". In AR's words, life is a process of self-generated and self-staining action--and, if man wants to live, he has to exercise his "only absolute"--but that exercise is not automatic, it has to be chosen by man.

How does the "built-in value" jive with the AR quote I provided in post #375? Do you fully realize your position is contrary to AR's? Do you still consider yourself an Objectivist when you are trying to smuggle determinism into Objectivism? Is the implication that AR was wrong about free will, and, therefore, you will correct Objectivism to include determinism?

Michael

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 11/13, 11:44am)

Post 388

Sunday, November 13, 2005 - 11:58am

John, in regard to your Post 384,

I would define a desire as a (certain kind of) valuation, the object of which is a value. As Rand defined it, a value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. So a value can be the object of a desire or the object of a need, if on chooses to pursue it.

I think I see what you're saying with respect to the primary choice not involving a cost-benefit analysis. Your point is that there has to be the choice to engage in the cost-benefit analysis to begin with, right? So, every choice cannot itself be subject to a cost-benefit analysis. Okay. I see your objection. Let me if I can answer it.

I would say that every choice presupposes a purpose and the necessity of action in the face of an alternative. As such, every choice must be consciously undertaken and goal-directed. A person chooses one alternative in preference to another for the sake of achieving a goal. The goal is the "value" that he is seeking when he makes the choice. Consequently, there is necessarily a process of evaluation--however subtle, subconscious or implicit--that underlies every choice, a process of deciding which alternative is preferable. The process does not have to involve an explicit "cost-benefit analysis in the way that you're suggesting, but there is a sense in which every evaluation incorporates a consideration of what you're getting in exchange for what you're giving up.

Your argument that initially you must choose to evaluate an alternative before you can know if something is worth choosing, would imply that you could make that initial choice with no reason or purpose for making it and with no estimation of its value. Choice presupposes awareness; awareness (at the most fundamental level) does not presuppose choice; otherwise, one could make an unconscious choice, a choice that one is not even aware of, which is clearly impossible. That does not mean that one cannot choose to raise one's level of awareness, but it does mean that there can be no choice without some awareness and/or estimation of the value of the alternatives.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 11/13, 5:41pm)

Post 389

Sunday, November 13, 2005 - 12:43pm

In Post 387, Michael Moeller wrote, "And contrary to what Bill thinks, the opposite of a determined choice (a blatant contradiction in terms) is not an arbitrary one. One choses rationality because it has efficacy in reality, it is his 'only absolute'--so much for it being 'arbitrary'."

I wouldn't say that a determined choice is a contradiction in terms. Even Rand acknowledges that there is such a thing as a determined choice when she writes that the choice to think "controls all the choices you make and determines your life and your character." Thus, according to Objectivism, there is free choice - the choice to think - and determined choices - those that are controlled by the choice to think. A simple example should suffice: Suppose that an Objectivist candidate were running for office against a socialist candidate. One has a choice to vote for either candidate, but the choice one makes will be determined by one's political values.

The reason I said that a free-will choice is arbitrary (at least under the Objectivist view) is Peikoff's statement:

"There can be no intellectual factor which makes a man decide to become aware or which even partly explains such a decision: to grasp such a factor, he must already be aware. ...In short, it is valid to ask: why did a man choose to focus? There is no such 'why.' There is only the fact that a man chose: he chose the effort of consciousness, or he chose non-effort and unconsciousness."

If there is no intellectual factor that even partly explains the choice to become aware--if the choice is made in the absence of any awareness whatsoever--as Peikoff asserts, then the choice is indeed arbitrary, because it is made blindly with no awareness of the alternative one is choosing.

- Bill

Post 390

Sunday, November 13, 2005 - 7:06pm

Bill:

Get out your machete...high-grassed zebra-tundra ahead.

I'm sorry, but, your post #388 is really insufficient as an explanation.

I would define a desire as a valuation, the object of which is a value. As Rand defined it, a value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. So a value can be the object of a desire or the object of a need, if on chooses to persue it.

    This is side-stepping my distinction, Bill.

     It is true that Rand 'defined' (for her context-purpose in her 'Galt's-speech') the term 'value' similar to what you wrote. To be accurate, however, "'Value' is that which one acts to gain and keep."  Methinks your use of "...and/or..." may be throwing interpretations of her meaning, well, off a bit, allowing the idea that any random desire/want/'whim' is to be considered includable if one wants to merely get it 'or' keep it. --- Even if she added that elsewhere, we all know that this consideration  is definitely NOT true. Right?

     Indeed, this is bolstered by the seemingly never quoted elucidation she gives on her 'definition' of value...merely 2 sentences later: "'Value' presupposes a standard, a purpose and the necessity of action in the face of an alternative." Doesn't sound like we're including any random desire-of-the-moment, does it? A 'standard' for what's merely no more than a desire? No such thing. --- Therefore, when you say "So a value can be the object of a desire or...etc" that may be...for *your* (undefined) idea of 'Value,' but, not for O'ism's. Technically, I'd agree that it 'can' be, but, only incidentally to it's being a 'desire;' definitely not merely because it's a desire.

     Now, you did define your view of 'desire' in terms of value, but, the pertinent prob is not how to view 'desire'; instead, it's the contrary: viewing 'value', and, in terms of MORE than mere desire/want.
      Your argument re *your* meaning of 'value' is clearly contrary to any O'ist view re 'Value' hence your argument about free-will re motivated by, possibly, mere desire, fails quite a bit.

     Then, after putting your meaning onto her term, you put *your* words into *my* mouth merely because I used your words to argue an implication from them.

     You say (in response to me):

Consequently, there is necessarily a process of evaluation--however subtle, subconsious or implicit--that underlies every choice. a process of deciding which alternative is preferable. The process does not have to involve an explicit "cost/benefit analysis in the way that you're suggesting...

Bill, I agree with your whole 1st sentence there, but, the last term 'preferable', raises a lot of sticky, though relevent questions. I'll not go into them here (given all the rest of this stuff!) other than point out that the term 'preference' should be carefully used in this whole subject. Can we say that there's ambiguity here where being 'rational' in the use of free-will becomes...strange...in the context of 'preference'? Well, apart from all that, my real issue is your next sentence.

I SUGGESTED using the cost/benefit idea in no way OTHER THAN how *you* posited it as a throw-away answer to my original question. *I* didn't bring the idea of c/b up. *You* brought it up, remember? *I* only argued it's implications according to how *you* argued it's primary use. Now, you take it away to replace it with something else. What else? To wit...

"...but there is a sense in which every evaluation incorporates a consideration of what you're getting in exchange for what you're giving up."

     Bill, technically, I do agree with that. Unfortunately, I do not see how it relates to any meaning of Rand's (though, *yours*, maybe) re the term 'Value,' nor do I see how it is any kind of replacement of *your* "c/b" response re your original answer to my original question. Nor, therefore, do I see how it relates at all to the prob of 'free-will.' There's seems to be a lot of 'slip-sliding away' here.

     If one's going to loosely use the term 'evaluation' re ALL choices made on anything, the term 'value' must also be considered to be as loosely meant, rather than as precisely as Rand talked in terms of. I think, re this statement, the term 'worth' is probably better used. But then, 'worth' doesn't necessarily mean 'evaluated/measured.' It can mean nothing more than mere 'desired/wanted-this-moment.' Properly, 'evaluation' requires some slight degree of effort in a process of comparing the...well, you know where I'm going with that, by now, right?

     Now, you had said:

"I would say that every choice presupposes a purpose and the necessity of action in the face of an alternative."

If the choice is about a 'Value', I agree, definitionally from earlier, above. But not all 'choices' are about 'values,' now, are they? Sometimes they're about mere whims and nothing else, right? So, I disagree with this starting premise of your argument, hence, next subject.

Finally, you end with:

"Your argument that initially you must choose to evaluate an alternative before you can know if something is worth choosing, would imply that you could make that initial choice with no reason or purpose for making it and with no estimation of it's value."

     Uh, Bill, I wish you'd QUOTE *my* arguments rather than paraphrase them, before you draw implications from your interpretations rather than my words.

     My argument is that your main clause (before your added "...would imply...") is an implied consequence of *your* argument that ALL 'choices' must be motivated by a 'value.' How does one have a value determining a choice if the value was not 'evaluated'? How does one 'evaluate' without choosing one value over an alternative one? --- What you call *my* argument is not something concocted out of thin air. I repeat: it's an implied consequence of accepting your argument.

     Further, I implied nothing about what could be done or not by a decision/choice-maker; What I argued (and implied) was that your argument resulted in a problem you've yet to overtly deal with: infinite regression regarding a value ALWAYS being necessary (ergo in conflict with a never-mentioned alternative 'value') for the choice to make choices, thereby necessitating consideration of a choice about THAT choice, ad infinatum.

     You continue the ending, arguing the impossibility of making an unconscious 'choice'; strictly speaking, I'm not sure about that (I'm thinking mobile somnambulism), but, I see no point in debating it in this context. However, then you get to:

That does not mean that one cannot choose to raise one's level of awareness, but it does mean that there can be no choice without some awareness and/or estimation of the value of the alternatives.

     Hmmm...now we bring into the argument value-'estimation.' To a point, I'm tempted to agree, but, only if we really mean value-estimation in terms of 'Value' as Rand delineated it above, beyond the, so far, Rorschach-interpreted "...acts to gain and keep." A 'Value', as delineated, DOES, AGREED, by virtue of a standard being relevent, thence give a 'value-estimation' of that side of the alternatives! But, a 'want' on the other side, may...'feel'...lots stronger, with an apparent, illusory 'value-estimation' (if 'estimate' is the right word here; which I doubt. I'd only say 'feeling-of-worth-at-the-moment'.) But, to also call any desire/want a 'value' in this context is to approach the fallacy of equivocation.

     And, therein is the crux of the whole 'choice' thingy which we disagree about it's source residing at:: If 'value' precedes the decisive 'choice' to focus or not, what determines what that value is, but also the unmentioned 'value' operating for the opposite? Plus, what ('value' again?) determines which of those affects the final choice?

     My same questions...about your argument...remain :::::: ALL 'choices' are determined by values, and the over-riding 'value' wins out, while the unmentioned losing one loses. Where'd they come from? What determines their priority-of-the-moment? A 'value'-based choice? This implies another, deeper, set of opposing 'win-lose' values. On-and-on.

While we're on the subject of Rand-quotes...

You argue (back at) Michael (not sure which;I think Moeller re his post #239) in your post #331...

"You [Michael] wrote, 'AR called the choice to think or not (i.e. free-will) *the choice that controls all the choices you make*, which includes one's value judgments.' I would agree that it is one of the factors influencing one's subsequent value judgments, but, again, that choice is itself a reflection of one's prior value judgments. Value judgments precede and control all of one's choices, including the choice to think or not to think."

     Though Roger Bissell commends you as though you re-analyzed Rand's quote in a way that showed some surprisingly unusual logical implication that no one thought of...I find it as merely a long-winded way of saying "No; I disagree.Value judgements are not necessarily included in all the choices controlled by free will." --- Your asserted disagreement is straightforward; but, as I've argued, your reasons for it (argued many other places) just don't make it with all the phrase and terminology changings and examples that refer to everything EXCEPT what Rand's referring to.

     As an aside, trying to tie up a loose string, I shan't argue your 'argument-in-a-nutshell' that you gave to Casey, precisely because of all the new phraesology you prefer "Control over one's action", "Ability [!] to choose otherwise" (usually added with some "if...") --- I mean, so much to debate over 'meanings' about THOSE. "IF I won the lottery, then I could..." means nothing about what I could do now. "IF I chose otherwise, then I wouldn't have chosen what I did," really doesn't clarify much re the subject of 'choice.' Then the term 'ability' raises more implicit "if"s itself. "Control" has been used by you in ways irrelevent to making 'choices', hence discussing it is an irrelevent concern.

     Otherwise, quite thought-provoking, Bill

MTFBWY
LLAP
J:D

Post 391

Sunday, November 13, 2005 - 10:34pm

I earlier wrote:

Additional comments added 5PM PST 11/12 -- I see now that Michael M. somehow got the idea that I accused him of evasion in my post #365. I challenge him or anyone else to point out even the faintest suggestion that I have made such an accusation. If the shoe fits, he is welcome to wear it, of course, but such a claim was the furthest thing from my mind. <sigh> I am inclined to agree with Michael K's comments (post 372) about Michael K. At the very least, Michael K. seems set on automatic pilot for misunderstanding and misreading what other people say....REB

First of all, I'm sorry for mixing up Michael M. and Michael K. My humble apologies to Michael K. My last two sentences should have read:

I am inclined to agree with Michael K's comments (post 372) about Michael M. At the very least, Michael M. seems set on automatic pilot for misunderstanding and misreading what other people say.

After much tap-dancing and out-right misrepresentation, Michael M. manages to verify what I hesitantly said above. Rather than exhaust my and the reader's patience with a detailed analysis of all his errors, I will focus on two or three main points.

First, Michael M. wrote:

Ok, Roger. You wrote in post #365:
What's more, he supports it with a quote from Rand -- the very quote that one of his opponents tried to use earlier to ~refute~ him! And yet, there is no concession. The mind boggles...

What are you inferring here Roger? That Bill made a salient, irrefutable point and I refused to make a concession, thus "boggling" your mind. That's not a veiled accusation of evasion? Give me a break.

OK, take 10 minutes. You've earned it. And while you're taking a break, reflect on this: No, goddammit, I was NOT making a "veiled accusation of evasion." What I was doing was trying, rather politely, to point out how clueless you were being. Leave it to a Randian to react to a criticism of his intelligence as though it were an accusation of moral evasion. Sheesh. Try to get some counseling for this bad habit of yours, and spare us your knee-jerk paranoia.

I wrote:

We have a built-in value: to pursue our survival and well-being, and once we believe, rightly or wrongly, that something fulfills the requirements of that value, we naturally desire that thing -- be it focusing or evasion, egoistic behavior or altruistic behavior.

Michael M. commented:

So the suicide bombers and Columbine murderers were pursuing their "built-in" survival value, they just "wrongly" judged about the "requirements" of that "built-in" survival value, and thought killing was the best way to achieve it. Oops, they seem to have made a mistake. (Do you remember AR's quote that man can act as his own destroyer?)

Jesus Johannesburg, South Fricking Africa, must I put every relevant point in capital letters so you don't miss them, Michael?? The very second sentence in the post you just quoted me from reads:

Unless one has totally subverted one's desire to remain alive, and is consistently bent on self-destruction, that is ~all~ that evasion and altruism are used for -- a misguided attempt to enhance one's chances for survival and avoid harm.

I would say that the Columbine killers were "bent on self-destruction," wouldn't you? Like suicide bombers, they had abandoned survival as a value.

Michael M. again:

Do you fully realize your position is contrary to AR's? Do you still consider yourself an Objectivist when you are trying to smuggle determinism into Objectivism? Is the implication that AR was wrong about free will, and, therefore, you will correct Objectivism to include determinism?

Who said anything about smuggling determinism into Objectivism? Or even injecting determinism into Objectivism? Or that I am implying Objectivism is wrong about free will, and that my aim is to correct Objectivism?

Objectivism is Ayn Rand's philosophy. I agree with a great deal of it, but not all of it. So that makes me not an Objectivist, and that's fine. It remains a fact that Objectivism is closer, by far, to my own personal view of things than any other philosophy, so I consider myself to be thinking, writing, and living within the Objectivist tradition and to be sympathetic to the most fundamental tenets of Objectivism.

Objectivism is not mine to "correct." Not in the sense of forcing a change in the official Objectivist party line. But I damn well will speak up and say what I think is wrong about Objectivism, and how some of its views (e.g., free will vs. determinism) are not consistent with its basic principles -- which means how some of Rand's views (e.g., volition) were not consistent with her core premises. I know that enrages the Loyalists and True Believers, and that they would like me to just shut up, but they will just have to scratch their mad places. This is not an ARI list, and it is not Diana Hsieh's blog.

We do not exist to serve Objectivism. Objectivism exists to serve us. I intend to use it, making alterations where necessary, so that it can best serve my life and my purposes, according to my best understanding and thinking. And I will continue to share these insights with others who might benefit from a different perspective than mainstream, lockstep Objectivism. I encourage all readers on SOLO to do the same. Independent thinking is not a crime that deserves censorship. Failure to think independently, however, is a moral crime. (And no, I am not making a "veiled accusation" that you do not think independently, Michael M. For that, you would first have to learn how to think -- which requires that you first learn to read accurately. I am through replying to your frenetic misrepresentations of my views. You can have the last word.)

REB

Post 392

Sunday, November 13, 2005 - 10:58pm

I wrote, �I would define a desire as a valuation, the object of which is a value. As Rand defined it, a value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. So a value can be the object of a desire or the object of a need, if on chooses to pursue it.�

John replied, �This is side-stepping my distinction, Bill. It is true that Rand 'defined' (for her context-purpose in her 'Galt's-speech') the term 'value' similar to what you wrote. To be accurate, however, "'Value' is that which one acts to gain and keep." Methinks your use of "...and/or..." may be throwing interpretations of her meaning, well, off a bit, allowing the idea that any random desire/want/'whim' is to be considered includable if one wants to merely get it 'or' keep it.�

She defined it as I did, with the �and/or,� in her essay �The Objectivist Ethics,� The Virtue of Selfishness (p. 15, pb) and also in her monograph, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (p. 34) �-probably for the sake of greater precision.

John continued, �--- Even if she added that elsewhere, we all know that this consideration is definitely NOT true. Right?�

Well, if you read Who is Ayn Rand, Nathaniel Branden quotes her definition from �The Objectivist Ethics,� and adds, �A value is the object of an action.� (p. 21) Rand was well aware of that essay, and if Branden had misrepresented her meaning, I�m sure we would have heard it by now. Moreover, I discussed this issue with Branden himself and he told me that Rand had used the term �value� in at least two different senses: as that which someone actually values��an object of an action��and as that which one ought to value�i.e., an objectively correct value.

John continued, �Indeed, this is bolstered by the seemingly never quoted elucidation she gives on her 'definition' of value...merely 2 sentences later: '"Value" presupposes a standard, a purpose and the necessity of action in the face of an alternative.' Doesn't sound like we're including any random desire-of-the-moment, does it? A 'standard' for what's merely no more than a desire? No such thing."

I'd say that these criteria would apply to any value�any object of an action. The standard doesn�t have to be rational in order for it to be a value in this particular sense. The pursuit of a random desire would also presuppose a standard, even if it�s only hedonistic.

You continue, --- Therefore, when you say "So a value can be the object of a desire or...etc" that may be...for *your* (undefined) idea of 'Value,' but, not for O'ism's. Technically, I'd agree that it 'can' be, but, only incidentally to it's being a 'desire;' definitely not merely because it's a desire.�

Remember, I said, �if one chooses to pursue it.�

You ask, in essence, whence comes a value, if it doesn�t proceed from the choice to think? It comes from one�s nature and from one�s relationship to one�s environment. We are born valuing creatures. We are born with certain needs and desires, which we must learn to satisfy, but we are also born with a natural curiosity and inquisitiveness�a desire to understand and make sense out of the world. It is this desire that motivates us to focus our minds in order to grasp reality. However, we don�t have to focus our minds in order to evaluate the worth of focusing our minds. Focusing your mind means choosing to raise your level of awareness. It doesn�t mean choosing to go from a literal state of unconsciousness to a state of consciousness, which is clearly impossible. So, at a lower level of awareness, you can be aware of the importance of raising your level of awareness, and value doing so. There is no vicious regress.

- Bill

Post 393

Monday, November 14, 2005 - 5:22am

One must remember that as far as 'values' go, there are values and then there are viable values, the ones which are in fact what constitute pro-human requirements for flourishing...

Post 394

Monday, November 14, 2005 - 5:27am

Roger writes: "What I was doing was trying, rather politely, to point out how clueless you were being. Leave it to a Randian to react to a criticism of his intelligence as though it were an accusation of moral evasion. Sheesh. Try to get some counseling for this bad habit of yours, and spare us your knee-jerk paranoia."

Politely? Sure, Roger, whatever you say. Your teeth are showing and you seem a little punch-drunk, maybe you should sit in the corner for a little while and take a few deep breaths into the paper bag.

Roger writes:

Jesus Johannesburg, South Fricking Africa, must I put every relevant point in capital letters so you don't miss them, Michael?? The very second sentence in the post you just quoted me from reads:
Unless one has totally subverted one's desire to remain alive, and is consistently bent on self-destruction, that is ~all~ that evasion and altruism are used for -- a misguided attempt to enhance one's chances for survival and avoid harm.
I would say that the Columbine killers were "bent on self-destruction," wouldn't you? Like suicide bombers, they had abandoned survival as a value.
Jesus Johannesburg, South Fricking Africa, must I put every relevant point in capital letters so you don't miss them, Michael?? The very second sentence in the post you just quoted me from reads:

Listen Roger, I did a line-by-line dissection of one of your paragraphs to show that I was not "misreading". Then you throw yourself back on an earlier contradiction and cling to it for dear life. My, my, my. What do you want me to do Roger, rectify your own contradictions for you? Earth to Roger, did you fall asleep at the wheel or what? One is able to subvert (deterministically???????????) one's "built-in value" (which was never chosen in the first place!!!!!!!!). Fine piece of work Roger, when you have to cling to contradictions to save later statements in the same post that should tell you something.

Roger writes: "Who said anything about smuggling determinism into Objectivism? Or even injecting determinism into Objectivism? Or that I am implying Objectivism is wrong about free will, and that my aim is to correct Objectivism?"

Uh, Roger, do you know what question marks are? Your description says you have been an Objectivist since 1966, so I asked the questions. Get it? DO you still consider yourself an Objectivist when your determinism stands in opposition to the Objectivist fundamental of free will??? ARE you trying to smuggle determinism into Objectivism???? You see, I ask the question, and you get to answer. You are free to answer 'yes' or 'no' or in your typical equivocating manner.

Roger writes: "But I damn well will speak up and say what I think is wrong about Objectivism, and how some of its views (e.g., free will vs. determinism) are not consistent with its basic principles -- which means how some of Rand's views (e.g., volition) were not consistent with her core premises. I know that enrages the Loyalists and True Believers, and that they would like me to just shut up, but they will just have to scratch their mad places. This is not an ARI list, and it is not Diana Hsieh's blog. "

Roger, obviously you can believe whatever you want and you are free to question whatever you want, I could really care less. Nobody is standing in your way. But maybe its time you recognized that free will is a basic principle (just think of the implications in morality!!!!!!!!) and maybe its not appropriate to call yourself an Objectivist (or in the "Objectivist tradition" or however you want to whitewash it) if you disagree with it. Food for thought.

Roger writes: "Independent thinking is not a crime that deserves censorship. Failure to think independently, however, is a moral crime. (And no, I am not making a "veiled accusation" that you do not think independently, Michael M. For that, you would first have to learn how to think -- which requires that you first learn to read accurately. I am through replying to your frenetic misrepresentations of my views. You can have the last word.)"

Sigh. Who was trying to shut you up Roger? I DON'T CARE about your deterministic nonsense. Again, don't you think its high time you realized that putting the Objectivist label on yourself (are you "misreading" your own description?) is not appropriate when you reject a fundamental like free will.

How can I learn how to think, it has been determined from suckling as an infant!!! And since one's choices are determined, how are you able to pronounce "moral crimes" on anybody? More food for thought.

Michael

EDIT: Roger, next time I will do a line-by-line analysis of your whole post instead of your critical paragraph, will that make you happy?

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 11/14, 6:24am)

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 11/14, 6:38am)

Post 395

Monday, November 14, 2005 - 8:06am

Bill,

You wrote:

Well, if you read Who is Ayn Rand, Nathaniel Branden quotes her definition from �The Objectivist Ethics,� and adds, �A value is the object of an action.� (p. 21) Rand was well aware of that essay, and if Branden had misrepresented her meaning, I�m sure we would have heard it by now. Moreover, I discussed this issue with Branden himself and he told me that Rand had used the term �value� in at least two different senses: as that which someone actually values��an object of an action��and as that which one ought to value�i.e., an objectively correct value.

What a wonderful example of the cognitive and the normative expressed by the same word. Thank you.

Rand used several words in two different senses like that - often in the same essay. I believe that this is one reason for much confusion and bickering among Objectivists.

Michael

Post 396

Monday, November 14, 2005 - 8:11am

Roger,

I was going to say something in your defense, but I abandoned the idea. Too many exclamations points, question marks and personal insults.

Yap.

//;-)

Michael

Post 397

Monday, November 14, 2005 - 11:15am

I've decided to take the discussion on determinism and free will to the Dissent forum, where it properly belongs, not only because determinism dissents from Objectivism, but also because the current discussion has departed significantly from the original topic - The Argument from Intimidation. Accordingly, I have started a new thread entitled "Determinism and Free Will" in which I reply to a comment by Michael Moeller from his most recent reply to Roger Bissell (Post 394).

See you there, if you are interested in continuing the discussion.

- Bill

Post 398

Monday, November 14, 2005 - 12:03pm

Bill writes: "A simple example should suffice: Suppose that an Objectivist candidate were running for office against a socialist candidate. One has a choice to vote for either candidate, but the choice one makes will be determined by one's political values."

Bill, what do you want in order to have free will? If a person approached a situation like a blank-slate, without any other knowledge or values, then he might have free will? In each of your examples you try to smuggle in one's preexisting values (with no regard to how one arrived those values) to make a "downstream" choice seem like fait accompli. What are those political values a result of? Do you deny that the Objectivist could evade obtaining knowledge about the respective candidates? Would deny that he could not chose to exercise his capacity to think when investigating the possible candidates? Does reality put us in situations that seem like that have fallen out of the heavens, without any requirement on the part of our capacity to think--in effect saying: "Ohh look, an Objectivist and a Socialist, please choose--from whatever values you have without regard to how you arrive at those values."

That's the whole ballgame, that life is process of self-generated and self-sustaining actions. It is not a static pool where one can automatically rely on his past judgments, he is constantly confronted with making that choice to think, with achieving new values and sustaining others. Granted, there can be motivators, but these are not guarantees. The fact that one has chosen to exercise his choice to think in the past is no guarantee that he will do it in the future.

The quote from AR ("choice that controls all others...") is merely underscoring the choices "downstream", that they are the result of the primary choice to think--i.e. part of a continuum that begins with the primary choice to think (which do determine his character). AR refers to the choice to focus as a "set". She analogizes it to starting the motor of a car where the direction and destination are later choices, but those still depend on first turning on the car.

You leave out some relevant information from LP's quote (same area--pg 59):

   "Primary" here means: presupposed by all other choices and itself irreducible. The choice to throw the swith is the "root" choice on which all others depend.
   Nor can a primary choice be explained by anything more fundamental. By its nature, it is the first cause within a consciousness, not an effect produced by antecedent factors. It is not a product of parents or teachers, anatomy or conditioning, heredity or environment....(Bill's quote)
   For the same reason there can be no motive or value judgment which precedes consciousness and which induces a man to become conscious. The decision to perceive reality must precede value-judgments. Otherwise, values have no source in one's cognition of reality and thus become delusions. Values do not lead to consciousness; consciousness is what what leads to values.

This underscores the point, to be able to evaluate and make value-judgments, one must first flick the switch. To use man's "only absolute", his means of cognition, is arbitrary? Bill, it seems like you are trying to look for a way to make the irreducible reducible.

Regards,
Michael

Post 399

Monday, November 14, 2005 - 12:08pm