| | This question was addressed by Nathaniel Branden in The Objectivist Newsletter (January 1963), wherein he wrote:
The concept of the 'unknowable' does not mean: that which is unknown at present. It means: that which, by its nature, cannot be known. To claim that a thing is unknowable entails a logical contradiction.
To claim that a thing is unknowable, one must first know that it exists--but then one already has knowledge of it, to that extent. Further, to pronounce a thing unknowable, one would have to know enough about it to justify one pronouncement--but then the pronouncement and the justification would be in contradiction. If one makes such a pronouncement, or any pronouncement, without knowledge to justify it, then this is plain irrationalism.
The assertion that a thing is unknowable carries the necessary epistemological implication that the speaker is omniscient--that he has total knowledge of everything in the universe and, from his unique vantage point, is able to proclaim that certain things are inherently beyond the reach of man's knowledge and understanding.
The idea of the 'unknowable' is indefensible--and its spokesmen can have no other purpose than to permit themselves flights into mysticism: to permit themselves beliefs for which, they have no justification."
In his post on the "Benefits and Hazards" thread, Robert Malcom stated: "To exist presupposes perceivability - to claim that something might exist without means of perceiving it is fantasy." This may seem to be essentially the same as Branden's position, but it is not.
Branden argues that it is irrational to claim that some particular thing is unknowable because you would first have to know enough about it to make that claim, in which case, it would no longer be unknowable. But does this mean that to exist presupposes being knowable? Does it mean that to claim that something might exist without a means of knowing it is fantasy? No, all it means is that one cannot claim that some particular thing is unknowable, because one would have to possess enough knowledge to make the claim. It certainly does not follow that something cannot exist which by its nature (and the nature of our cognition) is inherently beyond our ability to grasp and identify. A thing's existence does not require that it be knowable, even if the claim that it is unknowable requires it. Still less does Branden's position imply that to exist presupposes perceivability--that to claim that something might exist without a means of perceiving it is fantasy--for something can be known inferentially without being perceivable such as, for example, quanta or photons.
Moreover, even Branden's claim that it is irrational to claim that something is unknowable cannot be justified, for one can know that something is unknowable by inference. For example, I can know that I'll never be able to know every word that Napolean uttered during his lifetime. I can know that I cannot know this, because it is the kind of thing that is unknowable.
- Bill
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