| | Robert wrote, Ed - Bill's confused with presuming that if the universe is all knowable, one has to be omniscient. No, I wasn't saying that. I was saying that if the universe were all knowable, then we would have the potential to be omniscient, and it is that potential that I was saying we do not possess. We do not possess it, because at any particular time, there will always be something that is beyond our ability to identify. Now you can say that we have the potential to identify it in the future, but even if we did, there would always be something else that we could not then identify. No matter how much knowledge we acquire, there will always be more to know. In other words, no matter how long we live and how advanced we become, there will always be something that we cannot know. We will never reach a time when we know everything that exists.
I take it that Ed would agree with this, but argue that the potential still exists to identify in the future what we cannot presently identify. Even here, I don't think that one can make that kind of definitive statement. It doesn't follow, simply from the nature of an existent, that it is accessible to human knowledge. It may not be accessible to us, owing to the physical limitations on our means and methods of identification. Does man have the potential to run a mile in under three and half minutes? Maybe not, owing to his inherent physical limitations. Since our means of knowledge are also physical, there may be inherent limitations on the acquisition of certain kinds of knowledge.
Calopteryx writes, By definition. That something is an existent means that we can in principle become aware of it, otherwise the concept "existent" would be meaningless. To include things [in existence] that are in principle unknowable would mean that the supernatural is an existent. I don't follow this. What's meaningless about an existent which, due to the limitations on our physical means of knowledge, we are incapable of identifying? Calopteryx argues, in effect, that if something that exists is unknowable, then that which is unknowable (e.g., the supernatural) must therefore exist, which is the fallacy of affirming the consequent. It is true, of course, that if something doesn't exist, then it isn't knowable, but that doesn't mean that if something isn't knowable, then it doesn't exist. All it means is that if something is knowable, then it does exist. Hence, it does not follow that if something that exists is unknowable, whatever is unknowable must therefore exist.
- Bill
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