The Mind-Body Problem

Robert Malcolm wrote: "In which case those who are unconscious [comotase even?] still posses a functioning brain, but no mind? the mind 'ceases' when sleeping?"

Yes. If the mind is the brain as we are aware of it introspectively, then while some mental functions of the brain continue from time to time during sleep (e.g., dreams), the mind or mental as a phenomenon of which we are introspectively aware does not. However, introspection is possible even while dreaming, so at those times, the mind does exist; but when we're not aware of our brain's conscious processes, mind "ceases" during that period. Thankfully, brain continues even when mind does not.

REB

P.S. -- Naturally, on the intrinsic view of mind as something that exists even when we're not aware of it, mind continues to exist when we're asleep. What the intrinsic view of the mind is pointing to is the potentiality of our brains to engage in conscious functions of which we can be aware. This is parallel to the intrinsic view of redness, which is the potentiality of an apple to engage in the reflection of certain frequencies of light of which we can be aware. But in the primary sense, mind and redness are actual phenomena, not the potentiality to give rise to such phenomena.

If the brain engages in functions and there's no one conscious to introspect it, does it still make a mind? :-) Like the tree in the forest's falling, what the brain does while one is asleep exists only as the potential to be "perceived" (i.e., introspected). The physical event (tree falling and stirring sound waves, brain functioning and stirring electro-chemical impulses) which can be perceived exists, but the conscious content, i.e., the form of awareness of that event, i.e., the sound or the mind, does not.

Post 21

Friday, December 9, 2005 - 8:21am

Roger:

Yes. If the mind is the brain as we are aware of it introspectively, then while some mental functions of the brain continue from time to time during sleep (e.g., dreams), the mind or mental as a phenomenon of which we are introspectively aware does not. However, introspection is possible even while dreaming, so at those times, the mind does exist; but when we're not aware of our brain's conscious processes, mind "ceases" during that period. Thankfully, brain continues even when mind does not.

There must also be some night watchman function, as we can be woken up for example by hearing someone calling softly our name, while we may sleep on during other conversations. I can demonstrate this nicely with our cat. He may be deep asleep, snoring loudly, but calling softly his name will make him jump up immediately ("What?! Something to eat?!" - just like me). It's also well known that even cessation of a monotonous sound can wake us (the miller when his mill stops, a burglar alarm in the form of crickets and/or grasshoppers silenced by an approaching burglar). That shows that even when we're asleep we can recognize sounds and words and interpret their meaning, so some department of our mind must be still at work, even if the "boss" (self-awareness) is away.

Post 22

Friday, December 9, 2005 - 9:17am

A dragonfly wrote:

Roger:
Yes. If the mind is the brain as we are aware of it introspectively, then while some mental functions of the brain continue from time to time during sleep (e.g., dreams), the mind or mental as a phenomenon of which we are introspectively aware does not. However, introspection is possible even while dreaming, so at those times, the mind does exist; but when we're not aware of our brain's conscious processes, mind "ceases" during that period. Thankfully, brain continues even when mind does not.
There must also be some night watchman function, as we can be woken up for example by hearing someone calling softly our name, while we may sleep on during other conversations. I can demonstrate this nicely with our cat. He may be deep asleep, snoring loudly, but calling softly his name will make him jump up immediately ("What?! Something to eat?!" - just like me). It's also well known that even cessation of a monotonous sound can wake us (the miller when his mill stops, a burglar alarm in the form of crickets and/or grasshoppers silenced by an approaching burglar). That shows that even when we're asleep we can recognize sounds and words and interpret their meaning, so some department of our mind must be still at work, even if the "boss" (self-awareness) is away.

I wouldn't say that "some department of our mind must still be at work" while we are asleep. The brain continues to function while we are asleep, and that is how both cats and humans can be roused out of sleep to perceptual awareness and recognition of something; but cats do not have minds, and perception is not mind. Mind is the human, conceptual, self-aware level of functioning.

REB

Post 23

Friday, December 9, 2005 - 9:33am

Roger:

I wouldn't say that "some department of our mind must still be at work" while we are asleep. The brain continues to function while we are asleep, and that is how both cats and humans can be roused out of sleep to perceptual awareness and recognition of something; but cats do not have minds, and perception is not mind. Mind is the human, conceptual, self-aware level of functioning.

Ok, I looked it up and it appears that the definitions of "mind" are not unanimous in the dictionaries. If we follow your definition, then I should perhaps have said "consciousness". My problem with using "brain" here is that it refers to the "hardware" and not to the "software". It is obvious that the brain will always continue to function as long as you aren't dead, if only to keep you alive. But when you're asleep there is still some conscious activity, as the incoming data have to be interpreted.

Post 24

Friday, December 9, 2005 - 9:45am

Thank you, Roger - was just having it clarified, as what was written seemed open to such questioning.........
(Edited by robert malcom on 12/09, 9:47am)

ps - only one 'l' in the name..... ;-)

(Edited by robert malcom on 12/09, 9:49am)

Post 25

Friday, December 9, 2005 - 10:27pm

All measurable attributes of consciousness pertain to information contained in consciousness (which must be there in some measure - because to be conscious, is to be conscious of something.) But information consists of relations among material entities, and not aspects of entities in themselves. Since an existent is its identity, and that identity is the ensemble of the measurements of its attributes, consciousness is not a "thing" made up of some kind of "stuff," but rather a relation, or perhaps a system of relations, between a material entity - a conscious organism - and whatever other material entities or relations this organism is aware of.

The so-called "mind-body problem" is just confusion between relations among material entities (consciousness is a system of such relations) and material entities as such (which consciousness isn't.)

Post 26

Saturday, December 10, 2005 - 12:26am

Adam,

All that's OK until the volition monkey-wrench get thrown into the works. (Birth and death are a couple of others.)

Michael

Post 27

Saturday, December 10, 2005 - 1:21am

Michael:

All that's OK until the volition monkey-wrench get thrown into the works. (Birth and death are a couple of others.)

Volition, birth and death are no problem at all in this regard.

Post 28

Saturday, December 10, 2005 - 6:16am

Michael,

No "monkey wrench," since, as I pointed out in my article on The Ontology of Emergence, emergent attributes (of which free will is one, life probably another) are consequent on relations - so if consciousness is a system of relations, the fact that conscious organisms have emergent attributes is not a surprise (and certainly not a "monkey wrench!")

Post 29

Saturday, December 10, 2005 - 10:57am

Er...

So you guys would consider your own ego as merely a relation?

Sounds funny and very incomplete.

(I do see the emergence of conceptual consciousness through evolution, however. Also, I have quite a problem seeing temporary existence as a relation.)

Michael

(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 12/10, 10:58am)

Post 30

Saturday, December 10, 2005 - 3:45pm

Michael:

So you guys would consider your own ego as merely a relation?

I'd say rather "as zillions of relations", and there's nothing "merely" about it. Neither do I see any problem in the temporary existence of those relations. Those relations are continuously changing, and at a certain moment they will change in such a way that the "ego" that they form will cease to exist, simply while chemical changes in the substrate will make the relations that form the ego impossible (neurons no longer can fire). Just like the relations that form a computer program will disappear when the power is turned off. Now in the latter case the situation is of course reversible, but the chemical changes in our dying brain are not, so once dead, always dead. Perhaps I'm misunderstanding you, but I really can't see what the problem here is.

Post 31

Saturday, December 10, 2005 - 5:20pm

CS,

It's not really a problem. More of a slant. I naturally resist a tendency to "robotize" the human personality that I sometimes perceive others leaning towards. I believe that this is more degree than kind in this discussion, however.

It comes from keeping my mind wide open to trying to understand what actually is in the mind and not cutting off the entry of knowledge with overly heavy-handed speculations.

Essentially, I think we agree on the principles (even with Adam). I just like to emphasize the complexity of the mind a bit to avoid oversimplifying it - and that is really easy to fall into.

I've run into this confusion before and the best I can explain it right now is to say that many times I am thinking psychologically when others are thinking philosophically - and vice versa at other times.

Michael

(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 12/10, 5:22pm)

Post 32

Friday, December 16, 2005 - 2:02pm

So regarding software and hardware, will there come a time when software can become conscious? As to a computer being a brain in a bottle, that can be solved by giving it "senses" which is already being done. Is self-replication necessary or could it be considered conscious without that ability? If so, is it "alive" or not? I think self-replication will be much harder to achieve than consciousness, exclusive of a biological basis. On the other hand, what about mixes where technology and biology interact in such a way as to create a new conscious entity of some kind? Then there is the idea of downloading your "consciousness" into another substance so as to achieve immortality (or at least to continue past your brain's death).

Post 33

Friday, December 16, 2005 - 3:19pm

Self replication is not necessary - but once conscious, would presume back-up a wanted, and therefore achieved...
As for downloading, The Silicon Man is a good tale on that...

Post 34

Friday, January 27, 2006 - 8:14am

I have only *1* question re this subject, given the opening commentary:

In terms of 'physicalism'....what does 'subjective' mean?

LLAP
J:D

Post 35

Saturday, January 28, 2006 - 1:50am

John,

===========
In terms of 'physicalism'....what does 'subjective' mean?
===========

Good one, John! If there is no (Cartesian?) "I" -- then there is no subjectivism! Brilliant!

Ed

Post 36

Saturday, January 28, 2006 - 8:25am

I don't see what the problem is. If the mind arrives at a conclusion that is not backed up by independent observation, this conclusion is subjective. What has 'physicalism' to do with it? There are no "objective/subjective" neurons or atoms.

Post 37

Saturday, January 28, 2006 - 7:26pm

Cal, put up your dukes, pal ...

====================
If the mind arrives at a conclusion that is not backed up by independent observation, this conclusion is subjective.
====================

That's not correct (accurate). Take Descartes cogito (er sum), for example. It's arrived at by a single mind, and it's an objective conclusion, from the very moment that you run the noncontradictory reasoning on it (as its negation is, always & everywhere, impossible).

====================
What has 'physicalism' to do with it? There are no "objective/subjective" neurons or atoms.
====================

You've answered this yourself. If it's all just neurons, then there is no such thing as "objective/subjective" -- as these concepts must presume individual "I"s out in the world.

Ed

Post 38

Sunday, January 29, 2006 - 8:59am

Ed:

That's not correct (accurate). Take Descartes cogito (er sum), for example. It's arrived at by a single mind, and it's an objective conclusion, from the very moment that you run the noncontradictory reasoning on it (as its negation is, always & everywhere, impossible).

It may be an inescapable conclusion to that particular mind, but that doesn't make it an objective fact: other people can't deduce from that thought in that particular mind that that particular person does exist, independent evidence is needed.

You've answered this yourself. If it's all just neurons, then there is no such thing as "objective/subjective" -- as these concepts must presume individual "I"s out in the world.

No, that's not what I said. I didn't say there is no such thing as "objective/subjective", I said there is no such thing as "objective/subjective neurons". "Objective/subjective" is not some intrinsic property of the building blocks of the brain, it is a concept that is only meaningful at a higher level of abstraction, just as in a chess computer the concept "check" does not refer to some intrinsic property of its electronic gates. It is the special organization of those hardware parts with their interactions that makes such abstract notions possible. The question now is: is this organization, this structure, something apart from its constituents? Let's take a very simple example: suppose you have three similar things (atoms, marbles, whatever) that are arranged in a neat equilateral triangle. The total of those three things has the interesting property of equilateraltriangleness. This is a concept that only can refer to the complete structure, not to the individual parts. Does that mean that the physical description is incomplete? No! The concept of equilateraltriangleness is implied in the complete physical description. Now it may seem silly to introduce such an abstraction for something as simple as a special configuration of three things. But if the configuration consists of billions of interacting parts, such abstractions (in this case at a much higher level) are necessary to make any sense of the staggering amount of data. But still they are not something that isn't already contained in the purely physical description of the system. The "I" is one of those useful abstractions, without any need for dualism.

Post 39

Sunday, January 29, 2006 - 9:30am