To Whom It May Concern

Roger,

On July 26, you wrote:

A choice pertains to an action. So, while it's true that I can choose an action aimed at obtaining a specific object (i.e., a value), it is not true that I can choose to want to have (i.e., value) the object. http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDiscussions/1302_2.shtml#54

That's a pretty clear statement that one cannot change one's wants or desires. Yet in post #4 you write:

I don't say that desires are entirely out of one's control. They are out of one's direct control. If you want to override a strong desire, you must engage in a new thought process and evaluation about an alternative action (vs. acting out the desire), which will hopefully produce a new desire that is stronger.

This is contrary to your earlier claim, for now you say that one has some degree of indirect control of desires. That's the main reason why I said you muddied the waters. Also, you describe how one can change one's desires. In post #17, your attempt at clarification, using the example of Jim and cocaine, you write:

Desire is always subject to choice and deliberation, but it cannot be directly changed. Desitre is the automatic result of cognition and evaluation, so it can only be changed by first doing something about the cognitions and evaluations that led to it. Specifically, one must engage in other cognitions and evaluations that will generate a greater desire for something else than one's original desire. ... We choose actions.

You are arguing in circles again, like you habitually do on this subject. You seem determined to do that! :-) Firstly, why insert the word "automatic"? Secondly, evaluations and desires are not separate. To change one's evaluation is to change one's desires. Lastly, your claim that desire "can be changed by first doing something" (at least) strongly suggests personal initiative, i.e. free will, even if it is conditioned and limited.

You say you believe in conditional free will. So why do you desire labeling yourself as a "value determinist" over, say, "conditional volitionist" or "limited volitionist"? Using one of the latter two would be a lot less confusing to others. On the other hand, maybe you use "value determinist" because you delight in making circles.

Value-determinism (or teleological determinism) is compatible with conditional free will. This is how determinism applies to human action, and this is the way in which the choices of human beings (including the choice to focus) are free. Like Hobbes, Locke, and Hume (see the extended entry on determinism in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy), I view desire or valuing as the teleological determinant (final cause) of human choice.

This creates more verbal confusion -- endorsing final or teleological causation, but using "determinism", which is usually understood as efficient or mechanistic causation.

Dwyer even made the point:

The factors that determine a person's actions are final, not efficient causes. They're teleological, not mechanistic. They don't "make" a person choose an action, which suggests that the person is forced to choose it apart from and against his will. http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/Dissent/0046_2.shtml#48

Post 21

Wednesday, December 14, 2005 - 10:24am

Merlin, in post 20 on this thread, you point out that on July 26, I wrote:

A choice pertains to an action. So, while it's true that I can choose an action aimed at obtaining a specific object (i.e., a value), it is not true that I can choose to want to have (i.e., value) the object. http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDiscussions/1302_2.shtml#54

And you say [brackets and emphasis added]:

That's a pretty clear statement that one cannot [directly] change one's wants or desires. Yet in post #4 you write:
I don't say that desires are entirely out of one's control. They are out of one's direct control. If you want to override a strong desire, you must engage in a new thought process and evaluation about an alternative action (vs. acting out the desire), which will hopefully produce a new desire that is stronger.
This is contrary [???] to your earlier claim, for now you say that one has some degree of indirect [YES!] control of desires. That's the main reason why I said you muddied the waters. Also, you describe how one can change one's desires. In post #17, your attempt at clarification, using the example of Jim and cocaine, you write:

Desire is always subject to choice and deliberation, but it cannot be directly changed. Desire is the automatic result of cognition and evaluation, so it can only be changed by first doing something about the cognitions and evaluations that led to it. Specifically, one must engage in other cognitions and evaluations that will generate a greater desire for something else than one's original desire. ... We choose actions.

There is a real communication problem here, Merlin. If we are to have a discussion rather than a debate, we are going to have to extend the courtesy of rising above the least sympathetic interpretation of our opponent's view. In this case, it would be good if you could see this discussion as an ongoing attempt to clarify, rather than a series of finished products to be attacked on that basis.

Specifically, I am not contradicting myself, I am not making contrary claims, and I am not muddying the waters. I am explaining what I mean more fully. And I would appreciate it if you would not misinterpret my comments in the most uncharitable light. It does not enhance the discussion, nor my feelings of good will toward you!

[end of snit]

All right...what I am saying is that if you want the result of a causal chain (desire), you must initiate the causal chain (think and evaluate). You cannot just wish to have the result, or wish that it weren't there. If I want a tree that has been cut down to be chopped up into logs, I can't just wish for it to be so and have it be so. I have to chop up the tree. The appearance of logs is an automatic causal result of my chopping up the tree. Having logs is not entirely out of my control, but it is not in my direct control. There is no Primacy of Consciousness in regard to having logs, nor in regard to having desires. I have to employ causality; I have to act in such a way as to generate a desire or a felled tree -- or to alter the desire or chop up the tree.

I stress this point because some people talk about "choosing" your values or your desires. You can directly choose to act to gain and/or keep something (and thus to value it); and you will do so, if you want it more than anything else. But you cannot directly choose to want/value something in the sense of desiring to gain and/or keep it. Outside of natural desires, such as hunger, thirst, focusing (yes!), you have to generate or chainge a want/valuing/desire by enacting a causal chain that results in it being generated or changed.

You also said, less than sympathetically, and less than accurately ("circles" --"habitually"??):

You are arguing in circles [???] again, like you habitually [???] do on this subject. You seem determined to do that! :-) Firstly, why insert the word "automatic"? Secondly, evaluations and desires are not separate. To change one's evaluation is to change one's desires. Lastly, your claim that desire "can be changed by first doing something" (at least) strongly suggests personal initiative, i.e. free will, even if it is conditioned and limited.

<sigh> I am unaware of this habit you say I have. Perhaps you are confusing me with Bill Dwyer? Oh, wait, it's Ellen Stuttle who accuses Bill of being circular. <g>

Point one: I use the word "automatic" because desires and wanting are automatic products or results of either body states or (in this context) cognition and evaluation (i.e., thinking about the nature and benefit-relation) of something to us. This is standard Rand-Branden-Peikoff stuff.

Point two: evaluations and desires are not separate, but they are distinct. The latter is not identical to the former. The latter is the causal product and consequence of the former. Naturally, if you change a causal antecedent, you will change the causal consequence. Again, this is standard Rand-Branden-Peikoff stuff.

Point three: I do not deny the fact of personal initiative (conditioned and limited), as long as it is understood to refer to the fact that we have the power to engage in a certain action, if we want to do that more than we want to engage in some other action. This is just another way of saying that free will is conditional, not categorical. Our freedom to act in a certain way depends on our wanting to act in that way more than we want to act in some other way.

I will make the rest of my reply to you in my next post. I think this is a good dividing point for the discussion.

REB

Post 22

Wednesday, December 14, 2005 - 10:25am

Merlin, in post 20 of this thread you wrote:

You say you believe in conditional free will. So why do you desire labeling yourself as a "value determinist" over, say, "conditional volitionist" or "limited volitionist"? Using one of the latter two would be a lot less confusing to others. On the other hand, maybe you use "value determinist" because you delight in making circles.

Not circles -- waves! Like Rand said in VOS (regarding "selfishness"), I use the term "value determinist" for the reason that people are afraid of it. :-)

Seriously, I'm sure it's no secret to you or others on RoR that Bill Dwyer and I are compatibilists, and that we regard some form of free will as being compatible with some form of determinism. We agree that standard Objectivist categorical free will is not compatible with the idea that human action is mechanistically determined. But we reject the conclusion that one of the alternatives must be true. It is a false alternative! Instead, we advocate conditional free will and the idea that human action is teleologically determined -- and these two ideas are compatible. (So we argue.)

Since we are compatibilists in this fashion, why should we limit ourselves to one term to describe our position? Especially just because someone might be confused because of a narrower way of thinking? "Value determinist" or "teleological determinist" -- either term works acceptably to describe the causality side of the equation. As for the free will or volition side of the equation, there is no good reason to limit the term "volition" to referring to categorical free will (could have done otherwise, period). So, since we advocate conditional free will, there is every reason to embrace the term "conditional volitionist." (But just to clarify: that would be in contrast with the standard Objectivist "categorical volitionist" viewpoint.)

A historical note here: the term "volition" simply meant that humans had a capacity called "volition" or "will" for directing and controlling their actions. There was no claim in the earlier days that volition was free of determining conditions. Indeed, Locke, who held that humans act freely thought it was nonsense to speak of the will as being "free." He was a "psychological determinist," who thought that our desires determine our actions, but that we are free, so long as we could have acted differently than we did, had we desired to do so. Hobbes, from the standpoint of materialistic determinism, had a similar view of human freedom and value-(desire)determinism. Obviously, I'm not going to embrace either of them in toto, just point out that our views are similar, and that they were getting at something like teleological determinism.

Which leads me to your next quoting of me and your comment:

[Roger] Value-determinism (or teleological determinism) is compatible with conditional free will. This is how determinism applies to human action, and this is the way in which the choices of human beings (including the choice to focus) are free. Like Hobbes, Locke, and Hume (see the extended entry on determinism in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy), I view desire or valuing as the teleological determinant (final cause) of human choice.
[Merlin] This creates more verbal confusion -- endorsing final or teleological causation, but using "determinism", which is usually understood as efficient or mechanistic causation.

Merlin, causation is usually understood as efficient or mechanistic causation, too! But Branden and Peikoff and others have convincingly argued that it should be conceived more broadly, to include final or teleological causation. Should we avoid talking about final causality or teleological causation just because some people get it confused with efficient causality or mechanistic causation? Certainly not! (Any more than we should avoid talking about rational selfishness just because some people may confuse it with

But by the same token, similarly, Bill Dwyer and I are arguing (and trying to convince you) that determinism should be conceived more broadly, and that we should not avoid talking about value-determinism or teleological determinism just because it may "create more verbal confusion" just because "determinism" is "usually understood as efficient or mechanistic causation."

You say that "Dwyer even made the point":

[Bill] The factors that determine a person's actions are final, not efficient causes. They're teleological, not mechanistic. They don't "make" a person choose an action, which suggests that the person is forced to choose it apart from and against his will. http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/Dissent/0046_2.shtml#48

Yes, he did say this, but he and I further clarified this point, and it would be good if you would take that into account. Take a look at the later posts on that page, specifically posts 55 and 56. Bill quoted Ellen Stuttle and commented:

[Ellen] A theory of teleological causation is not a theory of determinism."
[Bill] In The Psychology of Self-Esteem, Nathaniel Branden quotes Richard Taylor: "In the case of an action that is free, it must be such that it is caused by the agent who performs it, but such that no antecedent conditions were sufficient for performing just that action." (Emphasis added, pp. 50,51) The thesis I am defending states that if one chose an action, then the antecedent conditions (including one's value judgment) were sufficient for performing just that action. Therefore, according to Nathaniel Branden (and Richard Taylor), I am a determinist--a teleological determinist, to be sure, but a determinist nonetheless.

And he quoted Ellen's chiding, so similar to yours, and commented:

[Ellen] If that's what you're saying, then why not just say it? Why use the term "determinism"? Except for your using the word "necessitated" in your explication -- a word which is out of place if you're speaking of deciding to so something for a reason instead of being mechanistically made by physical causes to do something -- what volitionist (except possibly Leonard Peikoff, in his malapropos "There is no such why" comment in OPAR) would disagree?
[Bill] But the "reason" in this case is the (final) cause of the action; it is the purpose for which the action is chosen. Given that purpose, one had to choose that which one judged as the best means to its achievement. One could not have chosen otherwise under the circumstances, which is to say that one's choice was necessitated by one's value judgment. This is not the same as saying that one was mechanistically made to do something by physical causes.

We are saying that value- or teleological causation operates via antecedent conditions and thus that (per Branden's citing Taylor in his discussion) it qualifies as a form of determinism. We are saying that since the teleological factors governing human action are what an organism wants or values most, then that organism's actions are just as surely determined teleologically as are a rock's actions are mechanistically. Those teleological factors, being projections of a desired future state (and not something really existing in the future and acting backward causally) are thus actually antecedent conditions in relation to the actions governed by those factors. Again, this is why we persist in calling our view a form of determinism, despite its obvious difference from traditional mechanistic determinism.

It would be nice if we could have a discussion about the validity of this model of teleological (or value) determinism, and how it, too, involves causation by antecedent factors (the Branden-Taylor conception of determinism), rather than getting hung up in the supposed semantic problems. If we survived Rand's expansion of "selfishness" and Branden's expansion of "causality," surely we can cope with this. :-)

REB

Post 23

Wednesday, December 14, 2005 - 11:55am

I've finally gotten around to reading posts which have accumulated
since my post 54 on the "Determinism and Free Will" thread.
Something which the latest posts from Roger, and Bill as well,
makes clear to me is something I've suspected for quite awhile:
that there's a basic gulf between my whole way of approach to
volition/causality issues and that of Roger and Bill, a gulf
that results from major differences in our backgrounds.

One factor producing this "gulf" is that Roger and Bill have
developed their views very much in reference to their understanding
of *Objectivist* thinkers (including, importantly, Peikoff's
presentation in OPAR). I on the other hand never have, from the
first time I read *Atlas* (in June '61, when I was 18 and 1/2),
been impressed by the Objectivist theory of mind. Thus the
exact details of Roger and Bill's views in relationship to
Objectivist theory aren't of much concern to me.

But probably an even more important factor is the difference
in terms of scientific background. I've been struck time and
again in Roger's and Bill's descriptions by their accepting
the idea that *there are alternatives* -- they don't deny
that alternatives exist for certain entities (at least for
humans; Roger thinks for at least some other animals also;
I'm not sure what Bill's view is re the action possibilities
for other animals). But the thesis of "determinism," as
that's understood in the context of post-Newton physics,
is that there *aren't* alternatives, that the "alternatives"
experienced by people in decision processes are only
apparent, not real.

Roger said in one of his replies to me (on the other thread)
that he isn't accepting the Laplacean model of determinism.
But that model is the basic model of what "determinism"
means in scientific thought, and it's the basic model I'm
talking about when I use the term "determinism." Roger
indicates that my problem (and Merlin's) with his and Bill's
definition is narrow-mindedness. What I think is that
the whole area of scientific thought versus (and it is "versus")
volition is difficult and complicated enough without using
a definition of "determinism" that scientific types are going
to understand as meaning something other than is being meant.

Anyway...it doesn't seem that either Roger or Bill is in the
market for a change of terminology. For myself, I'll try
to keep in mind in reading their posts that what they're
talking about bears only fuzzy resemblance to my understanding
of "determinism." As to getting into dissecting the details
of their substantive theories, really, I lack motivation for
doing that. What I think is that a revamped scientific
paradigm is needed and that this is a much bigger and more
foundational job than is going to be accomplished in a context
where it's the Objectivist theory which is of primary concern
to most of the participants.

So...good luck, folks, with your debates. (And Happy Holidays
and all that.)

Just one detail: You're right, Roger, about the image of
"pulling" which I used in one post -- that does have a
physics-ish sound. "Enticing" would have been better
in the context.

Ellen

[Edited to change "post-Newtonian physics" to "post-Newton
physics." "Post-Newtonian," which I originally wrote,
might be misinterpreted as meaning after the advent of
quantum mechanics. What I'm referring to is physics from
the time when the laws of motion enunciated and explicated
in the *Principia* became accepted as the bedrock of
mechanics.]

___
(Edited by Ellen Stuttle
on 12/14, 2:15pm)

Post 24

Wednesday, December 14, 2005 - 12:51pm

Roger,

On your points in post #16:

Point #1: What do you consider the essentials of her philosophy to be? The bare bones statements she made while standing on one leg? Jesus, didn't she say that that was bare bones and to look in her books for greater explication?

You are right in one respect, the essentials are what she stated them to be. How on God's green earth can you deny this does not include free will? Here's the rule of thumb I use, if you want to boil down her essentials, look at Galt's speech. This was intended by AR to be a concise statement of her philosophy from which the rest flowed. Look at the amount and emphasis she dedicated to free will. Why does she use volition as a foundation in her argument for rational self-interest (see "Objectivist Ethics" in VOS)? Why in epistemology (see arguments for causation in ITOE, The Objectivist, and Ayn Rand Answers)? Why in her theory of art (see "What is Romanticism" in The Romantic Manifesto)? To claim that this is NOT essential requires a massive blank-out on the degree to which she used free will to justify her positions. For Christ's sake, she stated that man having a volition, rational consciousness is his essential characteristic. Do you honestly think changing this to man's choice to think as being necessitated by antecedent factors (i.e. determinism) will not have a reverberating effect on the rest of the positions? I know your answer is yes, to which I say: Good Grief!!!

Point #2: I suppose it would be one hell of a seminar, although maybe not for the good. Look Roger, I don't think you are maliciously trying to distort Objectivist, but the fact remains, this does distort Objectivism. What is a newbie to think when he comes to a forum allegedly dedicated to Objectivism and reads that it is consistent with determinism? What's next, it is consistent with the Christian ethic of "turning the other cheek"? And that was stated by a man who allegedly has been an Objectivist for 30 years. What else is next, Objectivism is consistent with Intelligent Design?

I have no problem with whatever you endorse or wherever your "independent thinking" leads you--to each his own. But to claim Objectivism is consistent with value determinism and that volition is NOT an essential is just way out of line. Rand's words meant what they meant, and in Objectivism, free will is what she stated it to be. It seems like you want to reduce and compartmentalize her philosophy so that value determinism fits. It does not.

Point #3: I am not sure you entirely meant that as a joke :-) Its ok, I dish out barbs so I can take them. I am also ready and willing to be judged by the quality and clarity of my arguments--I will let them speak for themselves. And the verdict from many Objectivists (some high up on the food chain), including some alleged "neo-Objectivists" who I have had some strong disagreements with, is that I have a deep understanding of the philosophy. So, if you want to label me a "Randroid", I think it says more about you than about me.

Also, Roger, you promoted yourself as an advocate of "benevolence" and admonished others when they did not "keep it about the ideas". Yet, initially you were quick label me a "Randroid" and make authoritarian protestations (see "ARRRGH" and "Now look") that I was deliberately "ducking" issues. So do you only use the "benevolent" approach when it is convenient for you?

Regards,
Michael

Post 25

Wednesday, December 14, 2005 - 1:02pm

Bill,

Well, at least you are on record as stating one can make identifications/evaluations without focusing, i.e. that man is a zoombie pushed forward "antecedent factors". Just fantastic. And how does one evaluate whether being aware is more beneficial than "floating by in a haze"? Perhaps by introspection? And what does introspection require? Perhaps the choice to focus? Yes, that is how one evaluates the "choice that controls all choices and determines your life and your character". If this was "necessitated by antecedent facts", if one merely had to, there is no essential agent causation and is thus exempt from morality. Like AR stated, morality only applies to the realm of free will.

Regards,
Michael

Post 26

Wednesday, December 14, 2005 - 2:14pm

Michael Moeller addressed the points I made in post #16:

Point #1: What do you consider the essentials of her philosophy to be? The bare bones statements she made while standing on one leg? Jesus, didn't she say that that was bare bones and to look in her books for greater explication?

You are right in one respect, the essentials are what she stated them to be. How on God's green earth can you deny this does not include free will? Here's the rule of thumb I use, if you want to boil down her essentials, look at Galt's speech. This was intended by AR to be a concise statement of her philosophy from which the rest flowed. Look at the amount and emphasis she dedicated to free will. Why does she use volition as a foundation in her argument for rational self-interest (see "Objectivist Ethics" in VOS)? Why in epistemology (see arguments for causation in ITOE, The Objectivist, and Ayn Rand Answers)? Why in her theory of art (see "What is Romanticism" in The Romantic Manifesto)? To claim that this is NOT essential requires a massive blank-out on the degree to which she used free will to justify her positions. For Christ's sake, she stated that man having a volition, rational consciousness is his essential characteristic. Do you honestly think changing this to man's choice to think as being necessitated by antecedent factors (i.e. determinism) will not have a reverberating effect on the rest of the positions? I know your answer is yes, to which I say: Good Grief!!!

Jesus Johannesburg South Frickin' Africa! (Ha, ha, I can sling Christian lingo better than you! :-)

Now look (benevolent form, not authoritarian) -- if you would kindly read the subsequent posts in this thread, you will see that my position is not as simplistic as you are portraying it. I advocate conditional free will. I am a conditional volitionist. And I hold that this is compatible with man's choices being necessitated by teleological factors, so I am also a teleological determinist. Please try to keep up! (Benevolent form, not authoritarian)

I do not in fact know that my position disagrees with Rand's view of free will. As noted, I too view man's consciousness as volitional. What I am objecting to Peikoff's categorical form of free will (could have done otherwise, period), especially to those who retroactively want to inject it into our understanding of the structure of Rand's philosophy -- or as a means of ostracizing those who disagree with that form of free will.

As for Galt's Speech being "the essentials" of her philosophy, surely you must be joking! It's hardly briefer than many philosophy books. Also, in For the New Intellectual, Rand states not that this is "the essence" or "the essentials" of the philosophy of Objectivism, but "This is the Philosophy of Objectivism." She considered it a statement of the philosophy. And she clearly elsewhere (three or four times) gave succinct statements of what she held to be the essential tenets of her philosophy. Why, oh why would she omit one of the absolutely crucial principles -- volition -- from those statements? Limitations due to space? Badly timed brain farts on those occasions? Give me a break.

And I wouldn't rely too heavily on Galt's Speech as the basis for understanding her philosophy. She couldn't even get her definition of "reason" correct the first time around.

Next:
Point #2: I suppose it would be one hell of a seminar, although maybe not for the good. Look Roger, I don't think you are maliciously trying to distort Objectivist, but the fact remains, this does distort Objectivism. What is a newbie to think when he comes to a forum allegedly dedicated to Objectivism and reads that it is consistent with determinism? What's next, it is consistent with the Christian ethic of "turning the other cheek"? And that was stated by a man who allegedly has been an Objectivist for 30 years. What else is next, Objectivism is consistent with Intelligent Design?

I have no problem with whatever you endorse or wherever your "independent thinking" leads you--to each his own. But to claim Objectivism is consistent with value determinism and that volition is NOT an essential is just way out of line. Rand's words meant what they meant, and in Objectivism, free will is what she stated it to be. It seems like you want to reduce and compartmentalize her philosophy so that value determinism fits. It does not.

For a guy who so vigorously slings around Christian expletives, you ought to be nicer to our brother, Michael Kelly. :-) (Uh...that was a joke.)

Newbies have plenty of places to see what Objectivism really holds. This is a place where people can feel free to discuss and question the philosophy. (Isn't it?) Yet, in many such places, there's always someone who is uncomfortable with the openness, with the freedom to explore and challenge the Objectivist philosophy. Is there any wonder that some people characterize Objectivism as a "cult" or as this kind of behavior of some Objectivists as "cultish"? Just a general observation. If the shoe doesn't fit, feel free not to wear it. :-)

As for whether my views somehow "distort" Objectivism, I don't deny that volition (conditional volition) plays an important role in understanding human choice and action, all the way from epistemology through ethics and politics to aesthetics. I just deny that one is free to choose to do other than what one most wants to do -- which is how Peikoff characterizes volition in OPAR. Branden, back in the early 1960s, wrote a Rand-approved piece in which he acknowledged that "It is a psychological truism -- a tautology -- that all purposeful behavior is motivated...Obviously, in order to act, one has to be moved by some personal motive; one has to "want," in some sense, to perform the action." ["Isn't everyone selfish?" The Objectivist Newsletter, September 1962] This is the basis for my viewing human choice and action as determined/moved by what one most wants, i.e., value-determinism, i.e., teleological determinism. I think that if Branden and Peikoff had followed through on this much-overlooked little insight of Brandens, you and I wouldn't be having this discussion.

As for whether my views somehow threaten Objectivism (not something you claimed, but implied by the level of intensity of your comments), don't you recall Rand's saying that "a boat which cannot stand rocking had better be rocked hard," if it is to regain its course? And if Objectivism is not off course in some important way, then what is wrong with rocking it anyway? Maybe it has some errors. Maybe truth is more important than protectiveness of one's beliefs. If there are no errors, it doesn't take nastiness and intimidation and misrepresentation of the challengers in order to point it out. Which leads me to wonder why there is nonetheless so much of these vices among supposed defenders of Objectivism.
Point #3: I am not sure you entirely meant that as a joke :-) Its ok, I dish out barbs so I can take them. I am also ready and willing to be judged by the quality and clarity of my arguments--I will let them speak for themselves. And the verdict from many Objectivists (some high up on the food chain), including some alleged "neo-Objectivists" who I have had some strong disagreements with, is that I have a deep understanding of the philosophy. So, if you want to label me a "Randroid", I think it says more about you than about me.

Also, Roger, you promoted yourself as an advocate of "benevolence" and admonished others when they did not "keep it about the ideas". Yet, initially you were quick label me a "Randroid" and make authoritarian protestations (see "ARRRGH" and "Now look") that I was deliberately "ducking" issues. So do you only use the "benevolent" approach when it is convenient for you?

"Barbs"?? Man, you need to get some protection for that thin skin of yours! :-) I said I was joking. If you took it as otherwise, that says more about you than about me. You were the one who alleged that I was calling you a "Randroid." I was just tweaking you about it in my point 3. But now, we've gotten off onto a big, unnecessary side-bar, just because you think you're being attacked when someone playfully objects to your mischaracterization of his views (I never said that "many Objectivists are Randroids"). You have a bad habit of doing this. (I was terminally frustrated with how you distorted my and others' views on the crime and punishment thread.)Perhaps this is a wake-up call?

"Authoritarian protestations"?? "ARRRGH" is an expression of exasperation, last time I heard. And "now look" is standard phraseology for trying (when exasperated) to draw someone's focus back to a point they seem to be repeatedly missing. I most assuredly was not trying to divert the discussion of ideas onto some long-winded diatribe about your personal shortcomings. It was all very much in the moment, intended to express frustration and to exhort refocus on what I considered to be the crucial points you were straying from. (And I'm not the only one who noticed your failure to stay on point.) Sorry if that's not "benevolent" enough for you, but it's a hell of a lot better treatment than I've gotten on this web site. (Boo-hoo.)

There. You can have the last word. I won't be replying to any more of this side-bar stuff.

REB

(Edited by Roger Bissell on 12/14, 2:58pm)

(Edited by Roger Bissell on 12/14, 5:00pm)

(Edited by Roger Bissell on 12/14, 5:06pm)

(Edited by Roger Bissell on 12/14, 5:08pm)

Post 27

Wednesday, December 14, 2005 - 3:17pm

Roger,

I believe that "literal" better describes my interpretation than "least sympathetic." The word "directly" was not in what you wrote on July 26, and I'm not a mind-reader. In post #4 you "clarify" or "rewrite" your claim of July 26, adding the word "direct." Does being sympathetic mean that I should overlook the significant difference? By the way, why did you insert "[directly]" in my words rather than your own?

I believe a big part of our debate, as you call it, boils down to the need for the "if clause" in "you can choose X, if you want X." You believe it's important; it adds nothing for me. I invited your response to the Jim and cocaine scenario, hoping that it would be clearer than "he chooses to use cocaine when he wants to and chooses not to use cocaine when he doesn't want to." It wasn't and avoided the issue of Jim choosing to change his desires. I regard choosing X over alternatives as reducible to preferring X over alternatives, which is equivalent to wanting X more than the alternatives.

Merlin, causation is usually understood as efficient or mechanistic causation, too!

When the context is physics, yes. When the context is human action, no.

Indeed, Locke, who held that humans act freely thought it was nonsense to speak of the will as being "free." He was a "psychological determinist," who thought that our desires determine our actions, but that we are free, so long as we could have acted differently than we did, had we desired to do so.

Locke writes about free will in Book II, Chapter XXI, which is online here:
http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/johnlocke/BOOKIIChapterXXI.html
Please cite where Locke spoke of "free will" as nonsense. Please cite where he says "you can choose to do X, if you want to do X" or anything similar. Please cite the places from which you conclude that he was a "psychological determinist."

(Edited by Merlin Jetton on 12/14, 3:54pm)

Post 28

Wednesday, December 14, 2005 - 4:38pm

Merlin, you wrote:

I believe that "literal" better describes my interpretation than "least sympathetic." The word "directly" was not in what you wrote on July 26, and I'm not a mind-reader. In post #4 you "clarify" or "rewrite" your claim of July 26, adding the word "direct." Does being sympathetic mean that I should overlook the significant difference? By the way, why did you insert "[directly]" in my words rather than your own?

If your interpretation of my post was "literal," someone's been screwing around with the dictionary again! No, you're not a mind reader, but you surely must know that I am a long-time Objectivist. (I'd better say "independent neo-Objectivist," because you seem to tend toward the literal :-) And isn't it a very well known premise in Objectivism that you do not directly change your emotions, but instead can only do so by changing the thoughts and values that generate them?

But forget about what you might reasonably presume I remember from Objectivism 101. You'd know that your interpretation of what you quoted from my July 26 post was not a literal one, if you had bothered to double-check what you read. You'd have never made that false interpretation, if you had included the very next sentence I wrote in what you quoted! Here is the fuller context of what I wrote on July 26:

A choice pertains to an action. So, while it's true that I can choose an action aimed at obtaining a specific object (i.e., a value), it is not true that I can choose to want to have (i.e., value) the object. A want or desire (and in that sense a "value") is not an action, but the product of an action, specifically, an evaluation, and while I can choose to engage in an act of evaluation, the want or desire that results is not itself a choice.

Got it? You cannot choose desires, because they are the unchosen product of chosen actions (evaluations). The only thing you directly control is what you can choose, for instance, your evaluations. Thus, you cannot directly control your desires. However, it is crystal clear from the above quote that you nonetheless can indirectly control your desires, by changing your evaluations. Which is why I later clarified by saying that our desires are not completely out of our control. We don't choose them, but we can indirectly control them by choosing what is in our direct control.

I resent your saying I "re-wrote" my claim of July 26. I did indeed clarify it, and if you would apply your literal mind-set to the entire passage, you would have arrived at a more sympathetic interpretation of what I wrote. But between you and Michael Moeller (who managed to misread and misrepresent my views on capital punishment at least four times on that thread), I'm not getting a lot of consideration these days.

And by the way, the reason I inserted ["directly"] in your words was the same reason I made other inserts in your words. I was indignantly trying to correct you in the course of your comments, where it might have some impact, so that I wouldn't have to rely on my end comments to do all the work. And I was not trying to pull a fast one, if that is your concern. I announced that I was making bracketed remarks.

<deep breath>

Merlin:

I believe a big part of our debate, as you call it, boils down to the need for the "if clause" in "you can choose X, if you want X." You believe it's important; it adds nothing for me. I invited your response to the Jim and cocaine scenario, hoping that it would be clearer than "he chooses to use cocaine when he wants to and chooses not to use cocaine when he doesn't want to." It wasn't and avoided the issue of Jim *choosing* to change his desires. I regard choosing X over alternatives is reducible to prefering X over alternatives, which is equivalent to wanting X more than the alternatives.

Well, then, I went to a lot of work for nothing, trying to apply my perspective and your T0, T1 terminology. I specifically remember addressing the problem of how Jim might change his desires by if he preferred to deliberate and rethink more than plunge on ahead and take the cocaine. You can't change your desires even indirectly, if you don't want to engage in the rethinking and deliberating that it takes to change them.

You quoted me and remarked:

Merlin, causation is usually understood as efficient or mechanistic causation, too!
When the context is physics, yes. When the context is human action, no.

Only because we have had the benefit of Rand's and Branden's and Peikoff's thinking on the matter! Do you not recall Branden's rigorous discussion of the overly narrow conventional understanding of causation as the billiard ball, efficient causation model in his self-esteem articles in The Objectivist and later in The Psychology of Self-Esteem? I don't think he was going to such lengths just to hear himself talk! I think he was addressing a very real inadequacy and narrowness in the mainstream conception of causality. Now Bill Dwyer and I am fighting the same battle in regard to the concept of determinism. Someday we (or our grandchildren) may read a similar exchange:

A: Determinism is usually understood as mechanistic determinism.
B. When the context is physics, yes. When the context is human action, no.

Finaly, you quoted me and commented:

Indeed, Locke, who held that humans act freely thought it was nonsense to speak of the will as being "free." He was a "psychological determinist," who thought that our desires determine our actions, but that we are free, so long as we could have acted differently than we did, had we desired to do so.
Locke writes about free will in Book II, Chapter XXI, which is online here:
http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/johnlocke/BOOKIIChapterXXI.html
Please cite where Locke spoke of "free will" as nonsense. Please cite where he says "you can choose to do X, if you want to do X" or anything similar. Please cite the places from which you conclude that he was a "psychological determinist."

Gladly. Richard Taylor's article "Determinism" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Macmillan, 1967) has a section on "Locke's theory of liberty" (p. 366, volume 2). Taylor does not cite specific pages in Locke, so I will quote (with added emphasis) what Taylor says, and you can decide for yourself whether Locke says what I claim he does and/or whether Taylor is faithfully presenting his views. (Just bear in mind that this is the same Taylor that Branden and Rand trusted to define "determinism" for them, when Branden wrote on volition in The Objectivist.)

Unlike Descartes, however, Locke did not suppose that anything within the mind is causally undetermined, nor did he think it necessary to suppose this in order to preserve the belief in human freedom, which he thought misleading to label "freedom of the will."

Locke defined liberty or freedom as "a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to this determination or that of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other." One acts freely, then, provided he is acting according to the preference of his own mind, and this is perfectly consistent with his action's being causally determined. It might, for instance, be determined by that very preference. Locke also defined freedom as "being able to act or not, according as we shall choose or will," and this again, far from implying that free actions are uncaused, implies that they are caused by the agent's choice or will. In the light of this, Locke, like Hobbes, dismissed the question of whether men's wills are free as "improper" or meaningless, like asking whether a man's sleep is swift or whether virtue is square. Liberty, he said, is something that can be possessed only by agents, not by their wills.

Locke (or Taylor's Locke?) is my kind of guy. He probably would have appreciated my concept of the "causal inefficacy of mind," that mind is not the kind of thing that has the power to do something, but instead is the power of a human being to do a certain kind of thing. Or, to paraphrase Taylor, causal efficacy is something that can be possessed only by agents, not by their minds.

OK, Merlin, I've probably done enough damage to the hot-house flower that is the Objectivist philosophy for today. If I have time this evening, I'll try to find the original sources of Taylor's quotes from Locke. But I think our discussion has gone as far as it can, and that we will have to agree to disagree. Perhaps more sympathetically in the future, and with authentic literality...

REB

Post 29

Wednesday, December 14, 2005 - 6:42pm

I wrote to Merlin: "Why this dichotomy? Why must choices that do not pertain to focusing be controlled by our values, but not choices that do pertain to it? Why can't one value focusing one's mind just as much as one values telling the truth or respecting other people's rights?"

He replied,

What did I write that led you to think that I hold such a dichotomy? I do value focusing.

My apologies for not being clear. I meant "value focusing in preference to the alternative." You see, it is my position that if you were to value focusing in preference to the alternative, then you could not choose the alternative, both because you wouldn't value choosing it and because you cannot choose what you do not value. The reason that if you value focusing, you cannot simultaneously value non-focusing is that a value is a preference, which necessarily precludes valuing the alternative. And the reason that if you value focusing, you cannot simultaneously choose what you do not value (namely, non-focusing) is that in order to choose it, you must have a motive for choosing it, which would imply that you value it.

- Bill

Post 30

Wednesday, December 14, 2005 - 8:52pm

Michael wrote,

Well, at least you are on record as stating one can make identifications/evaluations without focusing, i.e. that man is a zoombie pushed forward [by] "antecedent factors". Just fantastic.

Why is it fantastic? It doesn't follow even according to Objectivism that to evaluate the choice to focus as desirable, one must already have chosen to focus. Quoting Nathaniel Branden in the January 1966 issue of The Objectivist:

"[T]he choice to focus (or to think) does not consist of moving from a state of literal unconsciousness to a state of consciousness. (This, clearly, would be impossible. When one is asleep, one cannot suddenly choose to start thinking.) To focus is to move from a lower level of awareness to a higher level--to move from (relative) mental passivity to purposeful mental activity--to initiate a process of directed cognitive integration. In a state of passive (or relatively passive) awareness, a man can apprehend the need to be in full mental focus. His choice is to evade that knowledge or to exert the effort of raising the level of his awareness."

It simply does not follow that to adhere to the above position is to hold that man is a zombie pushed forward by antecedent factors. Nor does it follow that if man's choices are determined, he is therefore a zombie. Where you got this argument I haven't a clue. But you offer nothing to support it.

You continue,

And how does one evaluate whether being aware is more beneficial than "floating by in a haze"? Perhaps by introspection? And what does introspection require? Perhaps the choice to focus?

Again, the choice to focus is the choice to raise one's level of conscious awareness, not the choice to move from a state of unconsciousness to one of consciousness.

Yes, that is how one evaluates the "choice that controls all choices and determines your life and your character". If this was "necessitated by antecedent facts", if one merely had to, there is no essential agent causation and [one] is thus exempt from morality.'

This is precisely what I have argued that your position commits you to and you have simply ignored my argument. Don't you think I deserve an answer?

As for determinism implying an exemption from morality, it is one's moral values that determine one's actions, and one's ethical philosophy that determines one's moral values. A moral agent whose actions are determined by his values must make choices in the face of alternatives, and in order to do that, he must know what he should and shouldn't do. He must know which alternatives are worth choosing and which are not. It is moral philosophy that provides that kind of knowledge. There is nothing in the nature of determinism that implies an exemption from morality. On the contrary, moral values are themselves an important determinant of human action.

Like AR stated, morality only applies to the realm of free will.

If by "free will" is meant the ability to have acted otherwise, then this is not true. For example, an official in the Justice Department who is morally committed to jailing business people for violating the antitrust laws could not have acted otherwise, since he had no reason to. Yet we can still condemn him morally for his action, because all it means to condemn him is to recognize that what he is doing is wrong (even if he himself doesn't recognize it).

- Bill

Post 31

Thursday, December 15, 2005 - 5:19am

Roger,

I apologize for overlooking the next sentence in what you wrote on July 26. It wasn't intentional. Said sentence follows:

A want or desire (and in that sense a "value") is not an action, but the product of an action, specifically, an evaluation, and while I can choose to engage in an act of evaluation, the want or desire that results is not itself a choice.

This doesn't help. It is another attempt to drive a wedge between choice and desire, which doesn't work. Desire isn't simply the product or result of evaluation like you portray it. Evaluation includes evaluating the means and consequences of a possible act and their desirability. Thus desire is an important part of choosing, which you deny.

I'll comment briefy on the Taylor quote about Locke. "Misleading" is hardly the equivalent of "nonsense." Locke did not say free will is meaningless. There is no need to rely on Taylor's interpretation of Locke when the original is readily available.

Like you and Ellen S., I believe I've had enough for now. Continuing would probably introduce more of your "clarifications" that I'd disagree with.

Post 32

Thursday, December 15, 2005 - 9:02am

Roger writes:

I do not in fact know that my position disagrees with Rand's view of free will.

Oh boy, that's what I was afraid of. Roger, clearly when you state that the choice to think is NOT the *first cause* you do explicitly disagree with her formulations (i.e. "the choice that controls all choices"). Clearly, when you state that the choice to focus is necessitated by antecedent factors, you are disagreeing with what she said. This was all laid out in NB's article in The Objectivist (which she sanctioned), hers in Galt's speech and elsewhere, and Peikoff's in ITOE (which she sanctioned) and OPAR (from lectures which she sanctioned). To give just ONE example:

AR in "The Objectivist Ethics":

When man unfocuses his mind, he may said to be conscious in a subhuman sense of the word, since he experiences sensations and perceptions. But in the sense of the word applicable to man--in the sense of a consciousness which is aware of reality and able to deal with it, a consciousness able to direct the actions and provide for the survival of a human being--an unfocused mind is not conscious.

Now, how well does that mesh with your claim (and Bill's) that one identifies/evaluates without the choice to focus? Answer: not at all. While I am here, I will provide one more quote from the same essay:

Nothing is given to man on earth except a potential and material on which to actualize it. The potential is a superlative machine: his consciousness; but it is a machine without a spark plug, a machine of which his own will has to be the spark plug, the self-starter, and the driver; he has to discover how to use it and he has to keep it in constant action....But everything he needs or desires has to be learned, discovered and produced by him---by his own choice, by his own effort, by his own mind...

How well does this mesh with the idea that the choice to focus is necessitated by antecedent factors? Answer: not at all.

Roger writes:

As for Galt's Speech being "the essentials" of her philosophy, surely you must be joking! It's hardly briefer than many philosophy books.

Surely you must be joking. It is only just over 60 pages, that's the entire philosophy? Entire books are written just on specific aspects, and still don't cover the subject adequately; yet, you regard 60+ pages as the entire philosophy? This was her way of boiling down the philosophy to essentials, art by its nature is selective; therefore, she had to be selective on what she included in Galt's speech, i.e. what she absolutely considered essential to Objectivism. What was AR's purpose in writing all the other books, sheer redundancy? Of course they were used to further lay out the arguments in ethics, politics, epistemology, etc., which flowed from what she wrote in the speech. And from those brief statements while standing ON ONE LEG, she laid it out simply according the fundamental branches of philosophy. And you are going to use THIS as the essentials? Good Lord, it boggles the mind...

I think I grasp your method: reduce and compartmentalize, reduce and compartmentalize, reduce and compartmentalize, then build it back up again with all sorts on things she explicitly disagreed with thrown in. If you don't mind a little constructive criticism, it has been clear to me from the beginning (and after "keeping up" with your continual reformulations and definitional wrangling) that you don't grasp essentials too well--that you need a refresher course in applying the rule of fundamentality.

Newbies have plenty of places to see what Objectivism really holds. This is a place where people can feel free to discuss and question the philosophy. (Isn't it?) Yet, in many such places, there's always someone who is uncomfortable with the openness, with the freedom to explore and challenge the Objectivist philosophy. Is there any wonder that some people characterize Objectivism as a "cult" or as this kind of behavior of some Objectivists as "cultish"? Just a general observation. If the shoe doesn't fit, feel free not to wear it. :-)

C'mon Roger, you're better than stooping to MSK tactics. Because somebody believes that AR said what she said and Objectivist essentials are what they are does NOT mean they are "cultish". Roger, I would fight for your right to question whatever the hell you want, including Objectivism. That's not the point!!!! I am not the least bit threatened nor is my "boat being rocked" by your value determinism. As a matter of fact, if that is the stiffest challenge, I will ride of into the sunset completely confident in AR's concept of free will.

Thomas Jefferson said: "the price of liberty is eternal vigilance". The same goes for the philosophy that underlies liberty. What that means is being vigilant against what is and is NOT Objectivism, i.e. acknowledging what AR said and what contradicts what she said. This includes free will, which is clearly differentiated from your value determinism or whatever you are calling it these days.

The problem is this: it turns my stomach (and many other Objectivists) when they see some people promoting their *pet ideas* as if they are consistent with Objectivism when they clearly conflict with what AR said. The bar is set so low by some people. While standing on one leg, AR did NOT state that conceptualization involved differentiation and integration, does that mean we can make Chomsky's theory of language "consistent" with Objectivist epistemology? No way!! But I am sure Robert Campbell would be right on-board with that one.

Roger, just think how AR used her concept of free will in for her arguments in ethics....in epistemology....in art....and when she stated that man's essential characteristic is..........uh, hell, I give up. God bless you Roger Bissell, God bless you for being perfectly predictable in this matter. (How's that for "benevolent" Christianspeak!). If you were a racehorse, I would bet on you every time because you would finish in the exact same spot each time. Although you would never win, place, or show, but I would bet on you anyway because I like you. Actually, I thought I might be able to reach you on this one out of respect for what AR said and did not say, but now I realize I am fighting a losing battle. You seem set in your ways and hopeless on this particular point.

As to the rest, didn't I say explicitly that I am not offended by barbs? If they include substantive arguments, I don't mind them, they may even get a chuckle from me. My point was, maybe, just maybe, on the Crime and Punishment thread what you saw as "circular" was the result of you not getting the point. And maybe it was not "benevolent" to harangue me with charges of deliberately "ducking" issues and...nevermind, I give up here too. The arguments on that thread speak for themselves.

Regards,
Michael

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 12/15, 11:47am)

Post 33

Thursday, December 15, 2005 - 10:42pm

Michael Moeller quotes Ayn Rand in "The Objectivist Ethics":

When man unfocuses his mind, he may said to be conscious in a subhuman sense of the word, since he experiences sensations and perceptions. But in the sense of the word applicable to man--in the sense of a consciousness which is aware of reality and able to deal with it, a consciousness able to direct the actions and provide for the survival of a human being--an unfocused mind is not conscious.

He then asks, "Now, how well does that mesh with your claim (and Bill's) that one identifies/evaluates without the choice to focus? Answer: not at all."

Michael, I quoted a passage from Nathaniel Branden's article in The Objectivist, which makes clear that, according to Rand there is a sense in which one can be said to identify the value of focusing before making that choice, to wit: "In a state of passive (or relatively passive) awareness, a man can apprehend the need to be in full mental focus." (emphasis added)

Question: How well does that passage mesh with your interpretation of Rand's quoted statement? Answer: not at all!

In the statement you quoted, Rand is talking about a focused awareness of reality. There is no implication in her statement that she disagrees with Branden's discussion in The Objectivist, nor could there be, since she approved everything that was written in that journal. You have neglected to respond to the post in which I quoted that passage initially, just as you have neglected to respond to my previous post. No doubt you have your reasons, but it's become increasingly clear that you're simply evading my arguments. That's up to you, of course, but if you're going to do that, then you should avoid taking potshots at me which express views that I've already addressed and answered.

- Bill

Post 34

Friday, December 16, 2005 - 2:20am

Bill,

First, please calm down. Secondly, I am not evading anything. On the issues of free will and morality and the primary choice to think, I went through long, extensive posts on the Free Will and Determinism thread--that constitutes evasion? Thanks a lot, Bill.

The "reason" I did not answer your posts is because your modus operandi seems to be this: ask a question, have it answered, rephrase and ask it again, have it answered again, and on and on until one becomes so tired that one no longer feels like answering it anymore. To which you to respond: "why are you 'evading' my questions"? If you don't like the answer, then register your objection and move on. No need for the charges of "evasion". The exact same thing happened on the Crime and Punishment thread. Did you ever stop to think that maybe, just maybe, you're not "getting it"? Please, Bill, get over yourself.

Now, on to your arguments, you write:

Again, the choice to focus is the choice to raise one's level of conscious awareness, not the choice to move from a state of unconsciousness to one of consciousness.

Where, oh where, did I state that it is the process of moving from "unconsciousness to one of consciousness"? Did I not say "float by in a haze"? The only unconsciousness states I can think of are death and anesthesia; and I can assure you, particularly in the former case, there is no possibility of raising one's level of awareness. The essential issue is this: passive awareness vs. active awareness. I am talking about active integration in a focused state, I am talking about on a conceptual level of identification/evaluation. Get that, Bill? That reason, you know, the faculty that identifies and integrates the evidence of the senses, is NOT done in a passive/unfocused state like you claim--one raises to that level by choice. So please dispense with the absurd characterization of my position. How do the "moral values" you claim get into man's consciousness and determine his choice to think? Blank out.

Now, on the issue of Branden's 2 articles on this topic in The Objectivist (January and March of 1966), you and Roger seem to be engaging in some seriously selective reading and blanking out all the points that refute your other statements. Ah, but you seem to like the statements that you think support your points. Let me give a fuller explication from the same articles (and YES, AR did sanction these articles, which was my point to Roger):

To engage in an active process of thinking--to abstract, conceptualize, relate, infer, to reason--man must focus his mind: he must set it to the task of active integration. The choice to focus, in any given situation, is made by choosing to make awareness one's goal--awareness of that which is relevant in the given context.

Get that? Its not done in an unfocused state, which you claim. It is choosing awareness as a goal. I wonder if you, like Roger, "do not in fact know that it disagrees with Rand's position"? And there is more where that came from, let's take a look:

Man must choose to focus his mind; he must choose to think. On the conceptual level, the responsibility of self-regulation is his....To sustain that focus with regard to a specific issue or problem, is to think....To let one's mind drift in will-less passivity, directed only by random impressions, emotions, or associations--or to consider an issue genuinely seeking to understand it--or to engage in an action without a concern to know what one is doing--is to be out of focus.

I think that takes care of the focus issue; and if you had read the paragraph before my previous AR quote in "The Objectivist Ethics" and the quote itself, you would realize she is saying the same thing. Let's move onto the "necessitated by antecedent facts":

The premise that every action is only a reaction to an antecedent action, rules out, arbitrarily and a priori, the existence of self-generated, goal-directed action...What is directly pertinent here is the disastrous consequences of this premise of psychology: it is this premise that forbids men to grasp the possibility of a volitional consequence.

You can dress it up with as many "complex factors" as you like, but determinism is still determinism. And the "final causation" that you endorse, does not follow from the premises you hold. Here's some more on the choice to think as primary:

The choice to think and the process of focusing the his mind are an indivisible action, of which man is the causal agent. To ask: "what made one man choose to focus and another to evade?" is to have failed to understand the meaning of choice in the primary sense. Neither motives nor desires nor context are causal imperatives without regard to this choice....By themselves, the do not and cannot constitute a causal explanation.

That basically says the same thing as Peikoff did in OPAR, which I extensively analyzed on the other thread. This does NOT conflict with what AR said, as Roger seems to think. Here's one of my favorites, which I had forgotten about until you made me review this article:

It [determinism] holds that, in any given situation or moment, only one "choice" is psychologically possible to man, the inevitable result of all the antecedent determining forces impinging on him, just as only one action is possible to a speck of dust; that man has no actual power of choice, no actual freedom or self-responsibility. Man, according to this view, has no more volition than a stone: he is merely confronted with more complex alternatives and is manipulated by more complex forces.

That hits the nail on the head. Also, when I called your position one that amounted to treating man like a "zombie", I gave you an upgrade, NB thinks it treats man like "a stone"--why are you angry at me for the elevation of your position? From that, you can also see the link to morality, which amounts to the denial of actual self-responsibility. Ok, only one more, so there can be no more debate about what was said:

"Free will"--in the widest meaning of the term--is the doctrine that man is capable of performing actions which are not determined by forces outside his control; that man is capable of making choices which are first causes within his consciousness, i.e., not necessitated by antecedent factors.

And Roger says that he does not know it conflicts with AR's position when it clearly states the choice to focus as a *first cause*, and it NOT necessitated by antecedent factors? That is one of the most curious cases of selective reading I have ever come across. Ok, Bill, repeat after me: "The choice to focus is the first cause of one's conceptual knowledge". Ok, one more time, and this time with feeling...

Again, Bill, I will restate that my "reason" for not engaging your further was that I said all I needed to say and now I am going to leave it at that. I am not going to be your beast of burden. Get a grip.

Regards,
Michael

Post 35

Friday, December 16, 2005 - 9:52am

I wrote, "Again, the choice to focus is the choice to raise one's level of conscious awareness, not the choice to move from a state of unconsciousness to one of consciousness." Michael replied,

Where, oh where, did I state that it is the process of moving from "unconsciousness to one of consciousness"?

You implied as much when you argued that one couldn't recognize the value of focusing without first being in focus. Are you now saying, along with Branden, that one can recognize that value--that, prior to focusing, one can apprehend the need to be in full, mental focus? If you are, then you and I are on the same page, and we can carry the argument to another level. You see, it is my position, and has been all along, that focusing is not required in order to value, for it is not required in order value the choice to focus. If you agree with this, as you now seem to, then we have made a significant step forward in mutual understanding and agreement.

You continued,

The essential issue is this: passive awareness vs. active awareness. I am talking about active integration in a focused state, I am talking about on a conceptual level of identification/evaluation. Get that, Bill? That reason, you know, the faculty that identifies and integrates the evidence of the senses, is NOT done in a passive/unfocused state like you claim--one raises to that level by choice. So please dispense with the absurd characterization of my position. How do the "moral values" you claim get into man's consciousness and determine his choice to think? Blank out.

What we have here is evidently a failure to communicate. I'm not denying that active indentification and integration require that one raise one's level of awareness--that one choose to focus. All I'm saying is that one can--and must--be aware of the value of focusing before one can make that choice. Do you agree with this or not? If you do not, then please explain to me how one can choose to focus without valuing that choice--without, as Branden says, apprehending the need to be in full, mental focus.

- Bill

Post 36

Friday, December 16, 2005 - 1:09pm