| | I hope this post is not considered something that should be in the "dissent" section, because I do not intend this post to be any kind of criticism of Objectivism. Rather, once every few years I come across a criticism of Objectivism for which I cannot provide a rebuttal that I am fully satisfied with. Thus, I wanted to ask for everyone's input on a certain criticism of Objectivism that, as of this writing, has me stumped.
Actually, it's a rather original twist on an old critique of Objectivism. The old version is easy to refute, but I cannot disprove the new version. I heard the new version from Douglas B. Rasmussen in the Philosophers of Capitalism anthology Edward W. Younkins put together. I know that Dr. Rasmussen sticks up for Ayn Rand in academia, so I don't want my post to be taken as any kind of accusation that Dr. Rasmussen is consciously hostile to Objectivism. I write this post because I believe that Dr. Rasmussen's argument and Objectivist ethics cannot both be equally correct at the same time.
If I understand Ayn Rand's writings correctly, the field of morality is contingent upon the choice to live. Rasmussen quotes from For the New Intellectual,"My morality, the morality of reason, is contained in a single axiom: existence exists -- and in a single choice: to live." Then he quotes from "Causality Versus Duty,"
Life or death is man's only fundamental alternative. To live is his basic act of choice. If he chooses to live, a rational ethics will tell him what principles of action are required to implement his choice. If he does not choose to live, nature will take its course.
Reality confronts man with a great many "musts," but all of them are conditional: the formula for realistic necessity is: "You must, if--"and "if" stands for man's choice: "--if you want to achieve a certain goal." You must eat, if you want to survive.
Rasmussen interprets this as saying that morality is contingent upon the choice to live. You must be moral if you choose to live.
I agree with that interpretation. Here, people insert the lame argument that this is empty, because, if morality is contingent upon your choice to live, then there is no moral precept telling you that you must choose to live. Wikipedia summarizes it:
Nozick's own libertarian political conclusions are similar to Rand's, but his essay criticizes her foundational argument in ethics, which claims that one's own life is, for each individual, the only ultimate value because it makes all other values possible. To make this argument sound, Nozick argues that Rand still needs to explain why someone could not rationally prefer the state of eventually dying and having no values. Thus, he argues, her attempt to deduce the morality of selfishness is essentially an instance of assuming the conclusion or begging the question and that her solution to David Hume's famous is-ought problem is unsatisfactory.
Basically, Dr. Nozick's argument is: But what if someone does not choose to live? If morality only applies to someone who chooses to perpetuate his or her own life, then suicide is outside the realm of morality, as you cannot offer a rational reason why someone must choose to live in the first place.
I don't buy this, because how many people spontaneously choose suicide? People generally have a bias against hanging oneself, or shooting oneself, or jumping off the roof of a skyscraper.
My answer to the objection from Wikipedia is: Yes, morality is contingent upon the choice to live, and there really is no duty or obligation for someone to live. Morality applies to him of her if he or she chooses to live. If someone wants to kill him- or herself in the privacy of his or her own home, not harming anyone else, then that should be his or her prerogative. In other words: If someone truly believes that life continuance is not worth pursuing, I dare him to drop dead.
So I don't buy the "But Ayn Rand didn't tell you why you should choose life" argument, because I don't believe such a duty is necessary.
However, Rasmussen's essay in Dr. Younkins's book did raise some new questions surrounding this that I do not yet have answers to. Dr. Rasmussen says that, if it is true that morality is contingent upon the choice to live, then a suicidal person has no reason to be moral. This has gotten me wondering about those who kill others while committing suicide, such as suicide-bombers.
I have this hypothetical scenario: a very old, terminally-ill man in constant pain no longer wants to live. As a final "Screw you!" to the rest of the world, he decides that when he dies, he won't go alone. He will set off a bomb killing both himself and his neighbors at a time of his choosing. If morality is contingent upon the choice to live, then what makes his choice morally wrong? He chooses to die, and, once he's dead, reality can no longer inflict any punishment upon him.
I hope that is not an unfair, fantastical David D. Friedman-styled argument that presents a scenario that pretty much defies all known laws of logic. For instance, a lot of silly college students actually pose this as some kind of serious moral question: "What if space aliens landed on Earth on Monday, and told you that, unless you kill and eat your own grandmother by Saturday, they will kill everyone on Earth and let only your grandmother live? Would you then comply with their demand?" Basically, the question says: What if reality were not what it is? Then your Objectivist ethics wouldn't apply! Well, they don't apply because known verifiable reality does not apply in that arbitrarily-constructed scenario.
Likewise, Dr. Friedman makes up ridiculous scenarios like: What if a giant asteroid is heading to earth and might kill everyone? The only way to save Earth is by using a machine. Only one copy of it exists on Earth, and that copy costs $1 trillion. And you cannot afford it and cannot afford building another copy, nor can any coalition of people on Earth. And the owner won't let you borrow it. Wouldn't you steal it from him then, if you could? Again, that defies reality. It's also silly to ask, "What if you were hanging on a ledge, and the only way to survive was to swing into the open window of an apartment without the apartment owner's permission? Would you do it?" How did I get on that ledge anyway; am I Spider-Man? I hope that my "old man" scenario isn't like that.
Here, I would ordinarily reply that it is still wrong for the old man to commit suicide by setting off this bomb because it impinges upon other people's right to life. This old man may want to die, but his neighbors want to live, and, by setting off this bomb, he deprives other people of their rationally self-interested desire to live, so he had better expect those other people to take action to preserve their own lives if they find out what he's doing. However, if the old man's primary life goal has always been a good quality of life, and that is now medically impossible, what reasons would he not have to use the bomb to kill himself and his neighbors simultaneously?
I suppose that one rational reply could be: "How did the old man get into this situation in the first place? If he wishes to murder his neighbors while committing suicide, then he more than likely was already a really immoral person long before he found himself incapacitated by terminal illness. It's not very plausible that this old man lived a very moral, kind-hearted, compassionate Objectivist life for so many decades and then, at this very last minute, decides to switch gears and become a vindictive murderer. The question is far wider than just what this man should do or not do when so close to his death. The bigger question is: why he couldn't have taken a more Objectivist, pro-life approach many years before he came into this position?"
I cannot dispute that. So let's concede that this guy has consistently been a huge jerk his whole life. But since he's squandered his healthy years already and cannot get them back, then why, in this last instant, should he choose the moral route of not killing his neighbors? If he kills his neighbors and himself in the bomb blast, he receives no more punishment from Metaphysical Nature than he would if he killed himself alone. Since social metaphysics does not determine morality, I do not see how his gaining a bad reputation afterward constitutes punishment from Nature.
Dr. Rasmussen does not use such an example in his essay, but he says that suicidal behavior can only be rationally judged as immoral if we believe that there is some duty to seek life. And Dr. Rasmussen then says that if is true that morality is contingent upon the choice to live, then it cannot be true that it is immoral for someone to not choose life. Dr. Rasmussen holds that it is a contradiction to first say: (a) morality only becomes applicable upon your choice to sustain your life, and (b) it is immoral for you to reject the choice to live.
In Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, Leonard Peikoff sounds like he may have found a reconciliation for this by saying that the emphasis is on the quality of life, not the mere absence of physical death:
...I want to mention first that suicide is sometimes justified, according to Objectivism. Suicide is justified when man's life, owing to circumstances outside of a person's control, is no longer possible; an example might be a person with a painful terminal illness, or a prisoner in a concentration camp who sees no chance of escape. In cases such as these, suicide is not necessarily a philosophic rejection of life or of reality. On the contrary, it may very well be their tragic reaffirmation. Self-destruction in such contexts may amount to the tortured cry: "Man's life means so much to me that I will not settle for anything less, I will not accept a living death as a substitute."
The professors I just quoted, however, have an entirely different case in mind. They seek to prove that values are arbitrary by citing a person who would commit suicide, not because of any tragic cause, but as a primary and an end-in-itself.
I mostly buy that, except that the "living death" of being in constant pain or in a concentration camp, as horrible as it is, is not metaphysical, literal, biological death. Dr. Peikoff's argument makes sense if "life" is taken to refer to quality of life and not the mere absence of biological death.
And Dr. Peikoff is also correct that a philosopher engages in the utmost hypocrisy when he first says that you cannot prove that life is valuable and then goes on living his life. In order for an anti-Randian philosopher to tell you that life is a non-value, he must implicitly regard life as worth holding onto, since he hasn't killed himself yet. That's a stolen concept. If such a philosopher practiced what he preached, he really wouldn't be eating or working or doing anything to further his life.
However, this again raises the issue of those who try to kill themselves and others at the same time, such as the 9/11 hijackers. It is true that every suicide-bomber was immoral long before deciding to commit murder-suicide. However, if morality is contingent upon the choice to have a quality life, I do not see how Metaphysical Reality can punish someone for choosing to commit a murder-suicide intead of just suicide. If a fatally ill man, wracked with pain, decides to kill himself and others with a bomb, I don't see how Metaphysical Reality would punish him any worse than a man who just kills himself alone.
I don't think that this case against Objectivism is fully convincing, but I do not yet know how to answer it. Can anyone help me out with this?
Update minutes later: Okay, now I see that this relates to the "Prerational and Premoral Choice to Live" thread Jason Quintana started. However, if my post adds some new intellectual material to the discussion, some replies would be greatly appreciated. :-)
(Edited by Mr. Stuart K. Hayashi
on 3/05, 1:35am)
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