Individual Rights - What are they and who has them.

What gives rise to the need for rights?

What is our main purpose?

Let’s start with a hypothetical situation. Two individuals are in serious dispute. They both want to take actions that conflict and both are demanding to be the one that should be allowed to act and not the other. They each have a need for a rule that would resolve this. Society has a need for rules that will resolve all disputes (to the degree that is possible). The very essence of being human is to engage in actions in support of ones life and enjoyment. Each of us benefits to the degree that our society is dispute-free.

But having a set of rules doesn’t complete the answer because there are many possible rules depending upon the method used to formulate rules. Rules can be written by religious authority like the Islam’s Sharia. They could be rules designed to keep a tyrant in power. They could be rules designed to support one group over others (gender, or caste, or income, or sexual orientation, or workers versus owners). They could be whatever hodge-podge of rules is democratically chosen.

We need our rules to be objectively determined. They must not contradict one-another. They need to apply to all humans and under all normal circumstances. They need to be tied to that purpose of people taking whatever action is proper to us by our nature.

Rights are Moral Entities

Our purpose is to have rules that separate what is right from what would be wrong and turning to morality brings us to moral rights. Or you can put it another way. We are going to use the word "wrong" to denote the actions our chosen rules won't permit and those that are permitted we use the word "right." Ethis is about actions. If we choose to use reason rather than faith, or the accidental results of popular vote, how do we determine what moral rights are?

Our purpose and the hierarchical nature of knowledge leads us to see that moral rights must arise out of moral value. All values must be acquired through action. Life itself is a process made of actions.

A baby is breathing – an action. A man is designing a new product to patent – an action.

If the product of those actions are of value for a man qua man, then the actions are morally right for those who value life, then it would be wrong to stop them and it would take the initiation of force to stop them. That is the chain of logic provides what is needed for the definition.

Moral rights are principles describing actions that can not morally be interfered with through the initiation of force or fraud.

They apply to individuals, hence “Individual rights,” not groups or collectives.

They will only apply in a social environment, but that is a secondary aspect of a right. The primary aspect is the rightness of an action as defined by its relation to being proper for man qua man. The action, like breathing, can take place alone on a desert island. The secondary aspect of a right is that it can only be violated by another person. It can only be violated by force. This last aspect acquires its importance from the purpose of our quest for rules – to be able to know in advance what actions are permissible, to avoid conflict, to objectively be able to resolve conflict, to take actions proper to us.

Because they are only are an issue when force is used, they are negative rights. All positive rights will need another explanation or context to justify them – like a contractual arrangement – and I won’t go into that with this post.

Natural or Man-made

Philosophers have taken two different approaches to moral rights. Some have said that they are inherent in the human being – intrinsic. They are there to be identified like a law of gravity or an element on the Periodic Chart or the way our eyes handle light.

Others have said they are social constructs that are man-made and we choose to justify them in different ways. Some call for justification based upon a value system or by contemporary conventions or by pragmatic considerations.

The extreme intrinsic position must be rejected. It would have us looking for those atoms that compose a “right” and would somehow be located somewhere in each person’s body. A less extreme position would still have it existing in some fashion, if not materially, but with each person individually like an archetype or piece of knowledge we were born with. Opponents of this view point out that we are born Tabula Rasa.

The philosophers that provide us with the social construct position leave us with the problem that moral rights are now subjective unless we can have an objective standard to compare them to.

Rand broke the age old false dichotomy of Universals between Aristotle’s concept of intrinsic essences and the Platonists with their essences living in a universe of Ideals. She conceived of the process of conceptualization as an active process and gave relationships a reality while keeping existence primary. She located the essence of an entity in the active cognitive process. She has done the same with her concept of individual rights. They are not violations of tabula rasa and they don’t exist as atoms – they are a relationship between entities.

She has abstracted the rights such that they belong to all humans by virtue of human nature. That is why they can be said to be “inalienable” (from old English law and simply means that rights can't be taken away from someone). That is why they are “Absolute” rather than subjective or arbitrary. Because they are derived, as we would derive a scientific principle, they aren’t gifts. And they are ‘acquired’ as soon as one joins the human race. Conventionally this is birth because it marks the moment of separation and becoming an individual.

(Edit note: There is an excellent article, Getting Rights Right–A Reply to Robert Bidinotto by Nikolas Dykes here: http://www.solopassion.com/node/2376 It was recommended by Guy Stanton. I wish I'd read it before doing this post - I'd have done a better job on this section and the definition. But I'm quite pleased that his take on rights is so close to my own).

Self-Interest and Rights

In a way this is like the argument against those that claim reason is flawed, or that the senses don’t bring valid knowledge of reality. By tying rights to the basis for morality they can't be denied without leaving morality itself. Just treat arguments against individual rights as self-defeating. This is a moral argument. No where is it said that a person is physically constrained from violating another’s rights. Look at the nightly news. But they must step out of morality to commit immoral acts. Then you can argue the value of morality - the self-interest of morality.

My argument would go something like this, “You can attempt to take any action you wish – as can anyone else. If you value your life, your freedom and your property you are benefited by others respecting your rights to them. But you can not claim protection from a moral right that you won’t observe for others. A moral right doesn’t reside inside of you or them but as a moral relationship between you and them – violate it for another and it you no longer have it for yourself.

Rights have been derived to maximize the values for all humans – as individuals, but given the nature of our world, that means it will be a benefit for society as well. If you choose to enjoy happiness in life on earth, then recognition and observance of individual rights is practical.

Borderline Questions

Notice that the baby only has to be human to participate in individual rights. They do not have to display any level of intelligence or the ability to make choices. A child is called a rational animal even if the individual child in question is not ever behaving rationally.

The baby’s individual rights are all negative rights. They give the baby the same moral protection as an adult but they don’t impose parental obligations. It would be murder if the mother put the baby out in the cold and the cold became the death weapon. However, if she left the baby in the crib but never provided food or water it would not be a violation of the individual rights we have discussed so far. It is clear that if a baby has a right to positive actions, it must arise out of an obligation the parents take when they choose to bring the baby into the world. They were not forced to take those actions that resulted in the baby being born – it was a choice. Normally a contract requires mental capacity and a meeting of the minds to be present for both parties. In this case the parent can be shown to have intent and presumed self-interest or expected benefit when they formed the intent to have a child and then carried it out. By the time of birth, changing their mind is a contract violation. The state (society) chooses to act to appoint a new guardian to act on behalf of the child. I sometimes view the child-parent rights situation as an exchange of rights. The child implicitly agrees to forego exercise of some rights (e.g., freedom to run away while still just a kid) and the parent agrees to take on specific obligations. It is to be done for mutual benefit. We need to understand that all of the social structures and rules in this area arose out of one of three systems: Tribes satisfying their own needs, Religion, and Evolutionary biology rewarding successful procreation. Man’s self-interest is a new comer to this table.

Also a retarded person still has rights by virtue of being human. If the retardation is severe enough or if a person is sufficiently psychotic to be unable to act in support of their life, we establish guardianship. From this perspective we are aiding in the protection of their rights in a case where a part of the natural mechanism won’t work to do automatically.

There is the question of “What if it is early in man’s history and no one has conceived of rights, doesn’t this mean that there are no rights?” Yes. Just as man suffered before discover of antibiotics, they will suffer until rights are discovered. We continue to suffer this day because the concept hasn’t been widely recognized. But once they have been identified, it is proper to say that early man’s rights were being violated (from our perspective – with our understanding).

Then does a person have rights if that person hasn’t conceived them? Yes, once conceived (once discovered) they exist and it becomes a matter of application. Once antibiotics were conceived it became a matter of distribution. We create these understandings to serve a purpose.

What about animals’ rights? They are alive. Being alive isn’t enough. Rights arise out of a moral context which requires choice. In the chain of reasoning above, is the statement, “Our purpose is to have rules that separate what is right from what would be wrong…” We are using the concept of moral rights to make choices in the pursuit of values. Animals do not have the freedom of will and for that reason cannot have moral rights. It is normal for one animal to prey on another – it makes no sense to say that is normal and which the animal cannot choose to do differently is none-the-less immoral – not right. There can be no such thing as the right to violate a right for the obvious reasons.

Harmony of interests: This is given as a justification for the concept of rights. Usually for the use of “No initiation of force or fraud” as a social rule. In practice it works fine but we run into problems with borderline cases. And there is a reason for that. We have taken an aspect of a rule and treated it as if it were the source of the rights. It isn’t, it relates to one of the purposes. We want to have harmony. A rule that gives that is seen as good. But logically you can’t get from that point to a moral justification for the rule. One problem is that “harmony” is subjective. Harmony in a camp of sadists would have a different meaning – it would be no one interfering with their pleasure in inflicting pain or unwilling victims. To work out borderline cases we need to always go back to the intellectual roots of our concept. Our purpose can be examined periodically to see if we are on course, but not to tell us where to start or what the basic premises are.

Some Issues Not Covered

- Delegation of rights

- Self-defense

- Property rights

- Relation of fraud to force

(Edited by Steve Wolfer on 4/13, 7:52pm)

Post 21

Saturday, April 14, 2007 - 9:37am

Joe,

I wrote, “Some variant of treating babies as ends-in-themselves is required.”

You remarked, “I don't have a problem with treating people as ends in themselves, per se. I think that's justified on the premise of rational self-interest.”

Either unwanted infants are covered in the Objectivist derivation of rights, or they are not. If they are not, and a separate derivation must be made for them, then you are not allowed to smuggle-in conclusions from the adult derivation that do not apply in the unwanted infant context. The self-interest that justifies treating other adults as end-in-themselves is one such conclusion.

In the adult context, it is in my self-interest to treat other ADULTS that way, because it’s the best way to ensure that they don’t treat me as a means to their ends.

But unwanted infants cannot treat me as a means to their ends, and therefore the self-interest of treating them as ends-in-themselves evaporates.

Post 22

Sunday, April 15, 2007 - 7:35pm

Joe,

Let me start by saying that I have read your posts again, carefully, and I seem to be mistaken in my previous belief that you regard Rand’s rights theory inadequate for the task of establishing rights for unwanted infants. I’ll find out soon enough. I do think it is inadequate for that task.

And I think Rand herself thought the same thing. Look at how she answers the question: Do severely retarded individuals have rights? (Ford Hall Forum, 1973, from Ayn Rand Answers, pg 4.):

Not actual rights—not the same rights possessed by normal individuals. In effect, they have the right to be protected as perennial children. Like children, retarded people are entitled to protection because, as humans, they may improve and become partly able to stand on their own. The protection of their rights is A COURTESY EXTENDED TO THEM FOR BEING HUMAN, even if not properly formed ones. But you could not extend the actual exercise of individual rights to a retarded person, because he’s unable to function rationally. Since all rights rest on human nature, a being that cannot exercise his rights cannot have full human rights. [Caps mine.]

This is an implicit acknowledgement that her formal theory fails at establishing rights for some types of humans, such as retarded persons and children—otherwise, why the appeal to courtesy?

“Not actual rights,” meaning, not established in her theory, but nevertheless they should be extended the courtesy of pulling them into the tent “for being human.”

I too have argued that children, even unwanted infants, have rights. I should pony-up and say why.

For me, it is a sense-of-life thing. I have internalized the message that man is a heroic being. Why can’t we use unwanted infants for organ transplantation or retards as crash test dummies? Because they are fucking human beings! I wish I was smart enough to provide something more philosophical and self-interest-centered than that, but I’m not, or maybe it just can’t be done. However, I do not consider it irrational, as you do. I could appeal to empathy—what if I had been born retarded? But you have already indicated your rejection of appeals to empathy.

At the end of the day, a person either has this type of sense-of-life and a sense of courtesy, or they do not.

I suspect that all of this will be immensely unsatisfying to you. We do share a belief that rights for unwanted infants is warranted, and I sincerely look forward to seeing more of your version, which so far has failed.

Post 23

Sunday, April 15, 2007 - 8:25pm

Jon,

But unwanted infants cannot treat me as a means to their ends, and therefore the self-interest of treating them as ends-in-themselves evaporates.

Incorrect.

Infants (whether wanted, or unwanted) always "treat" their caretakers as a means to their ends -- and never as 'ends-in-themselves.' This is true because of their inherent neediness (of our care). They aren't in a position to treat their caregivers as ends-in-themselves -- as they haven't developed the mental ability to do that just yet. The self-interest of treating them as ends-in-themselves usually stems from the love of parent to child. It's a hope and pride of nurturing and fostering human potential, and it's a natural value (rather than a rationally-promulgated one) to our species.

It's the reason that there is a universal human sentiment regarding laughing or smiling babies (rather than disinterest in such).

Ed

Post 24

Sunday, April 15, 2007 - 9:24pm

Ed,

“Infants (whether wanted, or unwanted) always "treat" their caretakers as a means to their ends.”

Not from a trashcan. Not with both kidneys removed.

“They aren't in a position to treat their caregivers as ends-in-themselves -- as they haven't developed the mental ability to do that just yet.”

Nor will they.

Get totally involved, read the whole thread, make an effort to understand the complete context—or you might find yourself plucking individual sentences to make points that are false for the context and have NOTHING to do with the subject at hand.

Post 25

Sunday, April 15, 2007 - 10:05pm

Jon,

Like a couple of alpha males, you and I have been at each other's throats recently. Heck, even our avatars are intimidating. I sure as hell wouldn't want to meet the likes of you in a dark alley (nor the likes of me). Hell, I even scare myself sometimes. And you, with your smug look of rancorous derision, aren't exactly someone you'd bring home to meet mom -- if you know what I mean. You look like a criminal with attitude. But I digress.

I can appreciate your call for a more global (or more concrete?) understanding of the situation. You say I'm not getting things -- that I need to re-phrase issues in a more appropriate context to this discussion (one that tracks more closely what it is that has been said in this thread). As if this very discussion had some special importance to what it is that is true of the morality of man.

You want me to be thinking about babies in trash cans -- when I make propositions about human rights. There's a fallacy in that, though. Perhaps we could call it the "Life-Boat" Fallacy -- in keeping with Rand's derision of folks who take such scenarios to define the context of the morality of man. Another term, of course, is concrete-bound mentality -- where folks only look to the details, without ever understanding the over-arching dynamics involved.

So, when you say of the potentially moral actions of growing infants ...

Not from a trashcan. Not with both kidneys removed.

... you're referring to a situation that is not just rare, but necessarily so (as it clashes with the very continuance of our race). And, taking this necessarily rare situation as a starting point, you then challenge others to find the logic of where human rights would fit in with it. This is like looking at the actions of savage cannibals and saying: "So where's our rights in THAT situation?" As if rights were things that would have had to be respected everywhere -- in order for them to even exist at all. This is a mistake in reasoning. In fact, it is perfectly possible for rights to be disrespected everywhere on this planet, and still exist with the same moral force that they do.

Rights aren't something circumstantial, even if their exercise is.

Ed

Post 26

Sunday, April 15, 2007 - 11:31pm

Ed,

I just wanted to make clear that your objection to my ends-means argument is worthless. My point to Joe stands. The self-interest involved in treating others as end-in-themselves, as it is the best way to ensure not having my rights violated in a scheme to treat me as a means-to-someone’s-ends evaporates in the infant context, since infants are incapable of violating my rights by treating me as a means-to-the-infant’s-ends.

You wrote, “You want me to be thinking about babies in trash cans -- when I make propositions about human rights.”

OK. The propositions about human rights I can find in your post are:

1) “The self-interest of treating them as ends-in-themselves usually stems from the love of parent to child.”

2) “It's a hope and pride of nurturing and fostering human potential, and it's a natural value (rather than a rationally-promulgated one) to our species.”

3) “It's the reason that there is a universal human sentiment regarding laughing or smiling babies (rather than disinterest in such).

As you know, I am an at-home-Dad and I know all about love and hope and pride. My oldest has been accepted in her district’s gifted program for advanced kindergarten for the fall. I’m all over the love, hope and pride!

Your points work for me—but I didn’t need them!

The love most parents feel for their children does not prove that unwanted infants have rights. And when parents have no love, but put their newborn in a trashcan, we don’t just say, ‘Too bad there was no love (1), hope and pride (2), or universal human sentiment (3)’ instead we say, “That’s murder.” To substantiate this, the right to life for the newborn must be demonstrated.

Joe insists that such a demonstration must be based on self-interest—no emotions or soppy “human sentiments,” which are “irrational,” are allowed. Joe says he may yet persuade Dean into recognizing rights for unwanted infants all while Dean orients everything towards Dean’s life. My interest at this point is in seeing him do all that.

Post 27

Monday, April 16, 2007 - 12:59am

Jon,

What is wrong with it simply being a responsibility of the parents?

It seems, in general a natural law of being human, in the sense that its observable that humans are pre-disposed to take care of their young.

It also has similarities with taking out a mortgage; no one is forcing you to do that, but once you do it, you are responsible for it, and for many years to come.

It’s a calculated risk in having sex.

I like Hong’s view that it is like a contract.

---

I am not sure that rights are driven by a harmony of interests, nor based on self-interest. Those seem to come down the road later in hierarchy. There can be selfless people, anti-social, non-productive people, they would still have rights (of course if they leave other people alone.)

I would guess that rights have to do with the nature human survival; with the nature of how the mind works and the freedom to act. Being a slave to an irrational master, with no hope of escape would shut down the facility for problem solving.

The freedom to act, would not mean the freedom to do anything you want, all actions have consequences–and one is responsible for their actions–for example, having babies.

That’s my 2 cents. My apologies, if I repeated points already made.

Guy

Post 28

Monday, April 16, 2007 - 3:42am

I have to express gratitude to Jon for keeping the issue clear.

With that in mind, I'm wondering if disallowing an infant its own abilities, the things that nature gave it to survive, was in fact a violation of its rights?

Does a newborn have the "right" to cry out loud? Its what they do. Its the only thing they do that makes their existence known.

I agree completely with Ed, infants have universal appeal. So to keep an infant from making its case for survival (crying, simply being seen by others, etc.) to others who may be more than willing to help, seems like a real violation of the abilities of a newborn. This may be too primitive a view of "end in itself," I don't know. Is keeping a newborn away from willing surrogates a violation of rights to the surrogate, or the infant, or both?

I'm off to work. This is a very interesting discussion.

Post 29

Monday, April 16, 2007 - 8:11am

This discussion has come up in one form or another several times. Thanks to Jon and Joe I think this (this thread and Dean's thread) is the best iteration yet, as far a real progress goes.

I agree with Teresa, and stated it before, an infant is not "helpless" but has the ability to cry out for help, in effect asking for aid now in exchange for it's future potential.

The "aid" that an infant gets, both as an infant and as a child, very much effects it's future potential. In the abstract, some infants have a far greater potential than others and therefore could be valued differently. For instance, a child raised in a horrific environment, beaten, underfed, subjected to verbal, physical, emotional abuse, and irrationality is likely to be destructive rather than productive as an adult and very likely to pass this on to his/her offspring if he/she has any. Or, a child raised in an islamist family who grows up to be a suicide bomber has little value to his fellow human beings. Any child raised in an irrational environment may be more likely to be destructive as an adult.

Is it okay to contemplate infants in the abstract, to consider the path their lives are likely to take or inevitably will take and value them accordingly? If it were possible to snatch an infant away and provide the ideal upbringing, well that's a different story, but that provides a whole other set of ethical considerations.

I hope to find or take the time to read all of these posts in both threads and participate further before the discussion ends.

Post 30

Monday, April 16, 2007 - 11:56am

Mike: "... and participate further before the discussion ends."

You think this discussion will end?

G

Post 31

Monday, April 16, 2007 - 1:00pm

What justifies rights is actualized potentiality (rather than an actualized actuality). If actualized actuality were what it was that justified rights, then folks would only have rights when being perfect (or at least indistinguishably so). This is not the case. Folks don't have to exercise perfect rationality, for instance, in order to be in the moral possession of rights.

E. Mack talked about this when he brought up the interpretation of Rand which basically says folks only have the right to do what's right. But this is wrong. Folks have the right to do what's wrong (given they don't infringe on another's rights) -- such as chopping off their fingers or toes, or gouging out their eyes. It's within their moral sphere of action. This is so because of the non-infringement of others' rights.

Infants have rights due to their potentiality (rather than due to any actualized rationality on their part). Whether adults take care of them well is unintuitively a side issue. When folks respect others' rights, then those others are allowed to exercise the rights they have (and have always had, because of being human). When folks don't respect others' rights -- like when mothers put babies in trash cans -- then we call it injustice.

The injustice of mothers throwing away babies says nothing about the moral justification for the rights of babies (it only speaks to the potential exercise of said rights). Babies have philosophically-justifiable rights due to their human potential. And it is merely up to us to determine whether we will act justly toward them -- or not (i.e., whether we'll act as rights-respecting creatures or not).

We merely need to ask ourselves if justice is a selfish virtue (rather than to delve into the specifics of some horrific case).

Ed

Post 32

Monday, April 16, 2007 - 2:13pm

Ed,

I see things just a little differently. See if this works for you.

Because our rights are logically derived from man's life, from our concept of human nature, they are not coming from our the rationality of a particular individual but from the fact that man, as a species, has the this faculty. Man, as a species, is a rational being - that is why the issue of actual versus potential never arises. Because of this individual rights belong to people that behave irrationally, or are retarded, or are insane people, or are babies or children. I have individual rights because I was born a human being. And human beings possess a rational faculty. If you try to make the case with actual or potential you run in to problems. And then when you get to applying rights to children you end up having to include the fetus since it too is potential. Besides, we don't create our concept of rationality based upon an individual, we create a concept that subsumes all units. And that means the rights exist everywhere there is an individual - past, present, or future - young, old, - male, female, etc.

This faculty is also not fully understood in this context. It is about the capacity to choose - to think or not to think - because that is the real source of morality (no choice, no morality). Understanding that keeps you free from the complications of trying to assess a degree of reasoning clarity or intensity before you grant rights. The capacity to make an informed decision is often the basis for rationality under the law and in determining if someone needs a guardian.

If someone is clearly unable to exercise choice or act on their behalf, we can appoint a guardian - a delegate to help exercise their rights on their behalf.

And a baby has the same faculty you and I have, just with less understanding of how to use it and less experience in using it and with less knowledge in general. But the baby is very busy processing information, making choices in how to focus and what actions to take within its developmental range.

Then there is the issue of a baby having positive rights in addition to their individual rights. The baby's individual rights make it immoral to harm the baby through an action. But they don't stop a parent from letting the baby die from neglect. If the baby is to have the right to support by the parent, we are talking about a positive action in addition to the individual rights that we all have.

I see this as coming from an implied contract. I wrote about it in my long post above - I'll quote that section here:

It is clear that if a baby has a right to positive actions, it must arise out of an obligation the parents take when they choose to bring the baby into the world. They were not forced to take those actions that resulted in the baby being born – it was a choice. Normally a contract requires mental capacity and a meeting of the minds to be present for both parties. In this case the parent can be shown to have intent and presumed self-interest or expected benefit when they formed the intent to have a child and then carried it out. By the time of birth, changing their mind is a contract violation. The state (society) chooses to act to appoint a new guardian to act on behalf of the child. I sometimes view the child-parent rights situation as an exchange of rights. The child implicitly agrees to forego exercise of some rights (e.g., freedom to run away while still just a kid) and the parent agrees to take on specific obligations. It is to be done for mutual benefit. We need to understand that all of the social structures and rules in this area arose out of one of three systems: Tribes satisfying their own needs, Religion, and Evolutionary biology rewarding successful procreation. Man’s self-interest is a new comer to this table.

Some parents I have talked to say, "Never, ever have a kid! Big mistake." Others have told me that it was the single best thing that they have ever done. So, clearly there is a full range of opinions on whether or not that is a good contract to enter into from the point of healthy self-interest. And the people who go into rarely have a full understanding of what they are getting into and it is a complex agreement and things change over 18 years, but it still seems like the best way to view parental obligations. And the reason that we should look at anyone that fails to do their best (which is what that contract calls for) should be seen as morally deficient.

Post 33

Monday, April 16, 2007 - 2:41pm

Steve, we seem to be at odds, but will perhaps find common ground.

In regard to the possibility of fetal rights, my wording (where I said an "actualized potentiality") effectively prevents that issue from coming up in rational discourse -- as a fetus isn't merely a potential, but a 'potential potential', or a 'potential with potential'; if you will). A fetus isn't actualized (read: "individualized") in any sense of the term.

Also, I'm having trouble with the idea of making a contract with a baby (someone not in their capacity to provide their own willful assent). Now, you might argue for a one-sided contract -- from parent to child -- and you might do that successfully. But it seems to me that that wouldn't be a contract, not in the hard sense of the term. This is true because contracts are typically entered into by 2 willful and mentally-competent parties (i.e., they are mutual "agreements" at their very root).

Maybe we need a new word for a one-sided (unilateral) contract ...

;-)

Ed

Post 34

Monday, April 16, 2007 - 2:41pm

Steve wrote: "Man, as a species, is a rational being - that is why the issue of actual versus potential never arises. Because of this individual rights belong to people that behave irrationally, or are retarded, or are insane people, or are babies or children."

"It is clear that if a baby has a right to positive actions, it must arise out of an obligation the parents take when they choose to bring the baby into the world. They were not forced to take those actions that resulted in the baby being born – it was a choice."

Excellent recent and past points.

G

Post 35

Monday, April 16, 2007 - 6:35pm

You are all completely missing the point. Rand absolutely nailed the concept of rights.

Post 36

Monday, April 16, 2007 - 6:36pm

Ed,

You are right about it looking like a one-sided contract - but maybe it's not.

Without a moral claim on the mother's time and effort, she could neglect her child to death and say, "No one has a right to force me to be a slave to that thing." And if the baby has no positive rights there is no injustice that can attach for neglect. I don't see how a "potential" that is in the baby can compel a mother to give up rights she had before birth. I chose 'contract' because she has to voluntarily give up rights she has that are inalienable (can't be taken away).

We have other "contracts" that are put in place without consent - Guardianship for example. And it is done because a party doesn't have capacity to consent. One could say that a baby has no alternative since to not be born or not to be supported is death. Obviously, the mother's consent is implied and can't be denied. That should handle the consent part.

Is that enough of an improvement?

Post 37

Monday, April 16, 2007 - 9:15pm

Steve, it appears we've reached a hurdle and will now have to especially exert ourselves (if we value mutual understanding -- and I believe that we do and we will). You see, now I find myself taking over Jon L.'s Devil's Advocate position on this matter ...

Without a moral claim on the mother's time and effort, she could neglect her child to death ...

I'm having trouble recognizing the philosophical force that might be behind this argument (rather than just merely the emotional sentiment that is all too naturally behind it, and behind it for the vast majority of the members of our great species).

And if the baby has no positive rights there is no injustice ...

My response to this must be the same as it was for the above.

I don't see how a "potential" that is in the baby can compel a mother to give up rights she had before birth.

I'm pretty sure that we disagree then, because I can see how this potential 'compels' a human being. I can see how it is that mothers routinely -- almost universally -- take care of their offspring. I can see them valuing that. I have seen mothers who'd willfully die for the potential life and growth that their children might have.

I chose 'contract' because she has to voluntarily give up rights she has that are inalienable (can't be taken away).

A pretty good point, actually -- as it does appear to succeed in justifying your use of the word: 'contract' here.

That should handle the consent part.

Is that enough of an improvement?

No, as my first 3 responses to you here show.

Ed

Post 38

Monday, April 16, 2007 - 10:28pm

Ed,

I said,

"Without a moral claim on the mother's time and effort, she could neglect her child to death ..."

And you replied,

I'm having trouble recognizing the philosophical force that might be behind this argument (rather than just merely the emotional sentiment that is all too naturally behind it, and behind it for the vast majority of the members of our great species).

I thought that was clear. You aren't guilty of a death unless you acted to cause the death. If we don't have a moral reason for the mother to act, then the baby doesn't have a moral claim.

We both believe that the baby has a right to the positive actions that are required to live. We are trying to figure out what it is.

A person could say that the baby is born with positive rights - but just saying it is no explanation. Or they could say a contract is formed by the birth - but then that has to make sense. Or they could say the there are some kind of social contract - but there is no moral force behind a social contract and they are often violations of moral rights.

But if we don't do posit some kind right then their is no moral claim on the mother's actions. My statement was only about moral claims - not about emotional sentiment. Does this answer that question?

Post 39

Monday, April 16, 2007 - 10:59pm