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Post 60

Wednesday, April 25, 2007 - 9:26pmSanction this postReply
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Sorry I've been away. My position at work has changed once again (a new and better promotion). But I've been swamped. And I'll be off on vacation shortly for awhile, so I can't guarantee timely responses. I'll try not to offend too much in the process.

I want to start with a response to Steve's thoughtful post #20. Thanks for the effort Steve. I have some disagreements, and I'll try to offer them as constructive criticisms.

The first section, "What is our main purpose" seems clear and mostly unobjectionable. Society needs objective rules to resolve disputes to the degree that it's possible. I would tie this to self-interest by pointing out the value of living in society and the value of peaceful conflict resolution. I do want to caution against the second to last sentence. "They need to apply to all humans and under all normal circumstances". We don't want to smuggle in the rights of children. So far, the justification is the goal of a dispute-free society. Newborns can't exactly "dispute" any bad treatment. Certainly there wouldn't be any fear that the resolution would end in violence, for instance.

In the section "Rights are Moral Entities", there's one part of the argument I want to quickly disagreement with, but I don't consider it to be central. You talk about a right having a primary aspect of "rightness of an action as defined by its relation to being proper for man qua man". Do we just have the right to do what's "proper" for us? Or do we have the right to even screw up our own lives? I would argue instead that the rights our derived not only by our need to act, but also in our need to think for ourselves and make our own choices.

In "Natural or Man-made", I start having major disagreements. First, you say that Rand "abstracted the right such that they belong to all humans by virtue of human nature". What part of human nature? You don't say it here, but do end with "...they are acquired as soon as one joins the human race. Conventionally this is birth". If the rights are derived from some aspect of human nature, then "conventionally" doesn't matter. It should be whenever that aspect of human nature becomes sufficient.

The this section you went to an abstracted view of rights belonging to all humans, but moved away from your initial position that the purpose of rights is a dispute-free society.

In other words, I think the argument doesn't work. I think I could rephrase it like this:

1.) Conflict free society is good.
2.) Conflicts occur when force is initiated, as they impede our ability to act (and thus live).
3.) Some entities (for instance, most human adults) have a nature that requires us to recognize "rights" in order to avoid conflicts and resolve disputes in society.
4.) We call these entities human beings.
5.) We also call newborns "human beings".
6.) Therefore, newborns also have rights.

I'm not try to make a caricature of the argument, so if those shortened versions don't seem to fully embody your arguments, try to read it as an abbreviated version.

But the whole point is that it is the argument seems to hinge on first abstracting the moral principle, and then including potentially non-justifiable examples into that abstraction. If we keep it very clear which specific entities have rights by the initial argument, I don't think the argument justifies newborns. It only appears to work because everyone is lumped into a category.

Again, this isn't to say that newborns don't have rights. I just don't think this argument supports it.

Post 61

Wednesday, April 25, 2007 - 10:06pmSanction this postReply
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Jon,

Regarding post 21, I agree that the self-interested reason for treating adults as ends in themselves does not automatically work for newborns. I hope I didn't give the impression I was trying to make that argument. My response about ends in themselves was to show how I think that statement can fit into the Objectivists framework without introducing intrincisim.

I do have a very minor disagreement with one part of that post. You say treating others as ends in themselves is the best way to ensure that they don't treat you as a means. That is true. But I think there's another motive. Since we benefit (indirectly) from others pursuing their own lives, we actually prefer that they are effective at it. So it's not just that we want to be left alone. We also want them to be left alone to pursue their lives.

I also want to point out a few other places where you seem to misinterpret me.

First, you suggest (like in post 18) that I think we have to start all over again to establish rights in every context, or at every stage of existence. That's not exactly the case. What I think we need to do is recognize that when we make an argument for something (like some people having rights), it's based on certain conditions. When those conditions are no longer applicable (like a life-boat situation), we can't simply stick with our old reasoning. This is just contextual knowledge. Similarly, if the conditions for the argument are actually weakened in some contexts, we need to recognize it as such. That means the same principles can apply, but the argument will be much weaker. You don't have re-justify rights in every situation or for every person or anything else. You just need to recognize when the conditions for your argument no longer apply.

Another place where you seem to misinterpret me is when I discuss the need to justify this in terms of rational self-interest. In post 4, you talk about not gainfully trading with a baby born today, or maybe even in the future. My argument wasn't actually based on the need to trade with these people. While we do benefit directly when we trade with them, the harmony of interests is more indirect and beneficial. Even though I've never traded with billions of people on this earth, I benefit enormously by most of them living their own lives. This isn't an argument for newborn's rights, but I do want to clarify that direct trading and immediate benefits was not part of my argument for rights.

As far as your "sense-of-life thing", I think the same argument could be made for dogs. I certainly don't want dogs tortured or abused, even by their owners. I don't consider it irrational to want children to be taken care of an not abused or killed. But I think declaring it an intrinsic value (like saying "they just do!" is). It's not an argument for anyone who doesn't agree, and if we pretended it was an argument, we'd simply be deluding ourselves.

For me, I think the biggest obstacle to further discussion on this is our respective views of what success would be. For me, the argument for newborn's rights will always be significantly weaker than the argument for adults, as it is certainly a borderline case. If I understand you, you would only accept rights on par with adults, and maybe even absolute and context-free. I think I can make my case for newborn's rights stronger, but I don't think it'll ever come close to what you're hoping for. So even if I made a stronger case, you would still consider it a failure.

Finally, let me say that I very much like that quote from Rand. Extending a courtesy seems like an apt description.

Post 62

Wednesday, April 25, 2007 - 10:25pmSanction this postReply
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Joe, good to see that you're back (for a moment). What do you think of my dictum? ...

all humans have a right to anything and everything which happens to be absolutely required for humanity to exist
Ed


Post 63

Wednesday, April 25, 2007 - 10:27pmSanction this postReply
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Last one. On the topic of contracts.

I have some problems with this. The first, of course, is that it hasn't been established that any "contract" was made, or should be implied.

The second comes from a statement Steve made (and I didn't follow the whole thread, so feel free to correct me if I'm wrong). He suggested that contracts establish positive rights. In post 42, for instance, he talks about a contract establishing a positive right to payments each month.

I think there needs to be a lot more clarity on this topic. Maybe it can be another thread, but let me explain.

First, a contract is not one-sided. It's a trade, like most other trades. This trade happens to be over a period of time. Both sides are giving something up. So the payments each month example only works if the receiver has provided some value in return. At that point, there's no need for an assertion of positive rights. I think it fits quite well into a negative rights framework. If one side reneges on the deal, he has in fact violated the rights of the other.

Now the trade doesn't have to be a trade of physical property. It can be services now or in the future.

You might ask what happens if you the payer of the services decides to give the money back. No harm done, right? Not exactly. Just as with physical property, when the trade is made, we make assumptions based on it. If I buy a house from you (with cash), and end my current lease and move everything there, you can't suddenly change your mind. The trade is made. If you try taking the house back (even if you offer me the money back or more), it's still theft.

Contracts work almost the same. Since the exchange hasn't necessarily happened yet, one side may find that they can't actually complete it. But they can't simply cancel the contract. They have made the trade and owe the results to the other party. If they fail, it's a violation of rights.

So I consider contracts to be just another aspect of property rights. Nothing really different there. I can go into more detail if there are questions (maybe when I get back from the vacation, so send me RoRMail if I miss it).

Bring it back to the newborn and "contracts", I don't see any way to argue for contracts in this way. As long as contracts are vague and undefined, it may seem like a convenient method for trying to assert these positive rights. But when we look at it in some detail, it becomes very inconvenient.



Post 64

Friday, April 27, 2007 - 10:00amSanction this postReply
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As Joe is too busy to comment, perhaps others would take the bait. Can anyone find something wrong with the following, seemingly-profound proposition? ...

all humans have a right to anything and everything which happens to be absolutely required for humanity to exist
I can't, so can you prove me wrong about this rational justification of what it is that human rights are? I'd be interested to see if anyone anywhere can do that.

;-)

Ed


Post 65

Friday, April 27, 2007 - 10:22amSanction this postReply
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If I understand you correctly, "People should be able to have things and do things that are necessary for humanity to exist. These "things" are rights."

Food, shelter, water? What else is necessary for "humanity to exist"? I don't see how this supports negative rights. Humanity exists even in North Korea or Cuba.

Post 66

Friday, April 27, 2007 - 12:21pmSanction this postReply
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Dean, thanks for the response. You query ...

Food, shelter, water? What else is necessary for "humanity to exist"? I don't see how this supports negative rights.
But food, shelter, and water aren't "absolutely" necessary for humanity to exist -- only their potential, independent acquisition is. As an example, there needn't be some ready-made cave or hut -- in order for folks to be here and now on earth. All there need be is the mere -- or sheer -- possibility of acquiring such a cave or hut. When I said "absolutely" I meant it. I'm talking about those things which, if denied, lead -- inevitably -- to humanity's extinction. I'm talking about things that are absolutely necessary for us to even be here (or continue being here).

You bring up the truth that ...

Humanity exists even in North Korea or Cuba.
But what I'm talking about involves that subtle distinction. That distinction of what is absolutely necessary for continued humanity on earth. If humanity on earth were totally lost -- we'd be done. And all I'm saying is that, because this is true, there are human rights knowable objectively -- because we couldn't continue existing without them.

Ed


Post 67

Friday, April 27, 2007 - 1:29pmSanction this postReply
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Define humanity - as opposed  to the human...

Post 68

Friday, April 27, 2007 - 2:19pmSanction this postReply
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Joe,

Congratulations on the promotion!

I'll in the middle of something and won't get to your post for a few days or so.  I take breaks now and then for quick posts on other threads, but I want to take my time on this one. 

Steve


Post 69

Friday, April 27, 2007 - 2:41pmSanction this postReply
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Rev',

Define humanity - as opposed  to the human...
human = a potentially-rational individual
humanity = a special kind of existence in reality which is absolutely dependent on a very special (i.e., a human) potential

Would you like me to elaborate?

Ed


Post 70

Friday, April 27, 2007 - 4:55pmSanction this postReply
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I consider your definition of 'humanity' as being very vague - and thus vulnerable to many interpretations, which of themselves would be on wide divergencies, and inimical conflicts among them....

Post 71

Monday, April 30, 2007 - 10:41amSanction this postReply
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Rev', I agree with your criticism of my definition of humanity (e.g., "pro-lifers" could use it to defend an embryo). Consider it changed to the following ...

humanity = 
1) a special kind of existence in reality which is absolutely dependent on a very special (i.e., a human) actuality
2) the unique (not found in the animal world) way in which humans thrive

Are either one of these sufficient? Am I still too vague for an effective differentiation of humanity from every thing that it is not?

Ed



Post 72

Monday, April 30, 2007 - 1:00pmSanction this postReply
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Consider the Random House definition - 1] the human race... 2] the condition or quality of being human or humane...

In what way, if any, would you say it is better than yours'? and why?


Post 73

Monday, April 30, 2007 - 8:08pmSanction this postReply
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I'd say that the 2nd Random House definition can be viewed as being better than my definitions because of being less vague (or more precise). It accomplishes this by offering 2 possible, but narrow, explanations of what "humanity" could mean.

Precision is usually a good thing, but one ought remember that one can also be too precise. An example of accidentally being too precise is when you estimate without an adequate margin for error (thereby making your estimate "wrong" -- when it didn't have to be). A proper definition of a thing will be precise enough to differentiate it from all other things (which is the purpose of defining) -- but not so precise that it begins to lose accuracy (by an unecessary hyperfocus).

The 2nd Random House definition gives the reader a choice between the quality of being human, or that of being humane. The kicker is that "human" has a rational (reason) connotation to it while "humane" has a compassion (emotion) connotation to it. While Objectivists decry a reason/emotion dichotomy, these connotations do still exist and they may affect the efficacy of a definition of something like humanity.

My 2nd definition is more vague because I utilize the word "thrive" (and several things, including both reason and emotion, are absolutely required for a human being to thrive). I was being purposely vague in order to capture what might be considered the "essence" of humanity -- while still effectively differentiating it from every other known thing.

My 1st definition is indeed too vague to accomplish the necessary differentiation. The 2nd Random House definition overcomes this error by stating that humanity could mean one of 2 precise things (but there is a built-in ambiguity, as shown above, to that method of defining humanity). The trade-off in gaining precision then, was to introduce an ambiguity. Some folks would prefer ambiguity over vagueness and, like I said above, this would make the Random House definition superior to my own.

Ed


Post 74

Monday, April 30, 2007 - 8:21pmSanction this postReply
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Note am not making any judgment on this as yet - just pulled the definition from the book at my pc - and inquired, and showed - with the intent of hopefully provoking something better ---------- if that need be the case...;-)
(Edited by robert malcom on 4/30, 8:22pm)


Post 75

Tuesday, May 1, 2007 - 12:28amSanction this postReply
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My personal preference -- when choosing between vagueness and ambiguity -- is to choose vagueness (as the lesser evil). My reason for choosing vagueness over ambiguity is that there's but one standard then (and future investigation can be held to that same standard).

My definition of humanity is more vague than Random House's, but at the same time less ambiguous -- and that intellectually appeals to me.

Ed


Post 76

Thursday, May 3, 2007 - 8:45pmSanction this postReply
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Sent to the opinion editor of the UCI campus newspaper tonight:

I and apparently at least several other local SoCal residents were sadly mislead this past week by advertising posted in venues such as the local libraries concerning the UCI series of public lectures on human rights issues.
I specifically reference the May 2nd talk given by Sally Engle Merry entitled "Human Rights in the Vernacular, Plural Legalities and Traveling Rights in India, China and the USA."
Just reading the title would give the average educated layman the impression that this lecture would be concerned with issues such as how to protect one's rights from predatory government agents, speed traps, greedy, corrupt officials of all kinds, etc., all of which might have both intrinsic interest and practical value.  The actual talk, naturally, had nothing whatsoever to do with any of these.
In fact, the other thing that several of us got out of the talk was that it could basically have been restated completely without losing anything in five minutes.  The rest of the time, struggling to stay awake, was a blindingly boring rendition of gross generalities.
Unless I completely missed the point - if that is the correct image here - the entire talk could be boiled down to the idea that the concepts of rights engendered on high by various governmental agencies, starting with the United Nations, are subject to all kinds of re-interpretations and odd local implementations as they shred down to the village level.
Duh! Is this a new idea?  Did we need to listen to an hour of generalities to get there?  If the hard sciences people had performed equivalently with their marvelous series of public lectures on the human genome a couple years ago, their department would have been the laughingstock of the university.
Forget slides, videos, powerpoint graphs, statistics (which would have been EXCITING in this case).
The questions at the end were a lot more interesting than the lecture, but it didn't require a huge effort to accomplish that.  I asked two of them, which themselves illustrate the vast gulf between where the people who must somehow think that this talk was cutting-edge brilliant intellectual adventure reside spiritually versus the rest of homo sapiens.
First, how was it that Sally Merry's entire focus was upon "rights" as something determined by states or organizations of states, as diametrically opposed to the concept of "rights" put forth in the Declaration of Independence and rigorously defended from the Enlightenment onward.
To wit, that rights are inherent in being human, that they constitute the underpinnings of the implicit social contract, that they are no more arbitrary than our need for oxygen to breathe or water to drink, but rather are the basic claims against interference with our actions without which civil society is provably impossible. 
Rights, in the essential meaning that has dominated most of Western thought and especially that of legal philosophers in the U.S., are not handed down from on high by philosopher kings in the U.N. or the White House.  Rather, governments are instituted to protect those pre-existing rights, and only derive their legitimacy from that very source.
However, to give Ms. Merry credit, she did appear to at least superficially understand my question.  Her answer, however, was essentially to reiterate that this version of "rights" was old hat.  A "right," now, by her conception, is whatever a ruling body hands down. 
Instead of a right to the fruits of ones labor, we have a "right" to food, clothing, housing, transportation, etc., etc., all of which have to be created by someone's labor, BTW, which means - if a right is in fact an enforcable moral claim - that each of us has a "right" to enslave our fellows to provide us with whatever our political authorities feel is necessary to keep them in power. 
I.e., rights are now the cutting edge concept of the Hobbesian war of all against all, a complete reversal of the original concept.
How embarrassing for UCI, to actually sponsor such a travesty.



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