Getting the right Rights right.

...every right is a survival requirement, whose existence does not depend on human identification. I can see now that I wasn't clear about this -- that I didn't distinguish adequately between a right as a requirement of human survival which we are morally obligated to respect, and a right as a moral principle which defines and sanctions that survival requirement.

The only point I was making is that that moral principle refers to a moral obligation which exists independently of our recognition of it,...

The fact that Newton's First Law of Motion is a principle of physical behavior does not mean that it has no existential referent independent of human identification. Similarly, the fact that Rand's concept of a 'right" is a principle of moral conduct does not mean that it has no existential referent independent of human identification.

...a right is an existent. Of course, "a right" (in quotes) is a concept, just as "existent" is a concept, but an existent (without quotes) is a concrete. Is a right (without quotes) a concrete if it refers to a particular right, like the right to the pursuit of happiness? Well, if a right is an existent and an existent is a concrete, then a right is a concrete; it is one of the units subsumed under the concept of "a right." "Concrete" in this context simply means particular (instead of general).

I find it problematic to speak in terms of "a moral obligation which exists independently of our recognition of it." Morality without consciousness makes no sense to me; neither do moral obligations of which one is unaware. For example, if some primitive savage with no conception of civilized morality, let alone "rights," physically attacks me due to some mystical belief, I would regard him as pre-moral, not necessarily immoral -- i.e., operating at an animal level. (I'd try to kill him first, in any case.)...having an "existential referent independent of human identification" does not mean that a "moral obligation" arises "independent of human identification." You cannot be obligated or judged morally for something about which you are unaware.

Rights are concepts. Concepts are abstractions. Abstractions are not metaphysical existents.

It is that which properly defines "a right," because rights exist independently of our recognition of them.

Recognizing that rights exist independently of our thought about them -- is what it is that justifies our current actions in the Middle East, for example.

And, being metaphysical, they allow us to judge governing bodies (as to whether and how much they respect rights).

When people eventually did recognize rights, what is it that they were recognizing? It couldn't have been a "moral principle defining and sanction man's freedom of action in a social context" (Rand's definition), because the principle wasn't formulated until after the recognition. It had to be that to which the principle was referring, namely, the fact that one ought to respect the freedom of others. It is that which properly defines "a right," because rights exist independently of our recognition of them. They have to; otherwise, they would never have been recognized in the first place.

This is so true and important. Rights are metaphysical things. And, being metaphysical, they allow us to judge governing bodies (as to whether and how much they respect rights). This is the main difference point between Bidinotto's and Rowlands' view -- from yours and mine. Recognizing that rights exist independently of our thought about them -- is what it is that justifies our current actions in the Middle East, for example.

First, I was wondering what you thought about technology. Take for instance the internal combustion engine. Would you say that before it was invented, it just "existed" out there. That the technology "just was", and the inventor just recognized this already existing fact? Certainly it's easy to show that the technology is based on certain facts of reality. I'm curious whether you'd treat this the same way you seem to be treating moral principles.

you want to use the term "rights" to refer to these general requirements for living, which corners you into the position of saying murderers still have these rights.

There's another way to approach this, which I also disagree with. This other method points to these requirements for living, makes a generalization that it's appropriate to always respect the freedom of others, and sets up a moral rule. In this approach, it is argued that you are required or obligated to act that way. Of course, the rule is justified by pointing to the obvious benefits of respecting the freedom of those living harmoniously with you. But from there, a simple rule is created. It becomes a context-free rule that you follow.

Now I'm not saying you're taking this approach, but your use of terminology and the way you phrase things fits perfectly with this approach. Take this statement: "If you want to achieve a certain end, e.g., freedom of action in a social context, then you "must" respect the freedom of others."
The most obvious problem with it is that you don't have to respect the freedom of those people who aren't respecting yours.

A second counter-example would be the human shield who a murderer is using to defend against you. But the "moral principle", if you will, is simply a rule with a justification. The only context it allows is the "if you want to achieve a certain end", allowing for actions if you don't want that end.

And of course, you keep talking about "moral requirements" or "moral obligations". Yo also said earlier in post 48: "The grasp of a moral principle is the recognition of a causal connection; the moral principle itself -- that you ought to behave in a certain way -- is not."The moral principle, according to this, is that you should behave in a particular way.

I highlighted my own view of moral principles earlier. And the fact that they aren't simply demands to act in a particular way. They're recognitions of causal connections, and how certain means leads to certain ends.

But you always have to apply this understanding to specific contexts. You don't get to just remember to behave a certain way. The moral principles give you an understanding of what your actions will lead to, or what actions are required to get to a result. But you still have to pick the values, apply this principle to whatever context comes up, and decide on an informed course of action.

The rule approach may start off with a recognition of a general principle. But then it over-generalizes in order to come up with a "moral requirement" that you can act upon unthinkingly.

In the case of rights, we can hold the intrinsic view of rights that says we must never violate the freedom of other people, ever. Except murderers. And except dictators. And except when there are human shields. And except when your in a lifeboat scenario. And except when the world is coming to an end and you need to steal someone's death ray to stop the asteroid from colliding. Or whatever.

Or you can understand why we should respect the freedom of others and apply that knowledge.

So it's a simple application that tells us we shouldn't respect the freedom of murderers or dictators. And it's a straightforward application to recognize that if a bystander died in an act of self-defense, that the person who pulled the trigger is not some rights-violator that needs to be locked up, but that it was the one who initiated force that created the situation and should be blamed. And so on. Simple applications.

"Simple applications" of what? What are your principles?

When there is confusion, we don't need a list of exceptions to remember. We just solidify our understanding of the underlying principle.

I'll say one thing however, I view rights as real relations. I don't view them as "entities" (my literary fumblings not withstanding). Everybody's got them because of being human. Not everyone can or even ought to exercise them. Criminals should have some of the free exercise of their rights taken away. Slave societies should be granted more free exercise of their rights. It's because they're human beings.