Getting the right Rights right.

Bill,

Like I said in #136 and you noted, I searched for the exact phrase "initiation of force", so the software didn't find what you quoted. What you did quote is 36 pages away from where Galt speaks about man's rights or political rights.

Shortly after the latter is: "The only proper purpose of a government is to protect man's rights, which means: to protect him from physical violence. A proper government is only a policeman, acting as an agent of man's self-defense, and, as such, may resort to force only against those who start the use of force." Note the topic here has moved on to the purpose of government, not defining "rights."

So at this stage, I think my point stands -- the link between "initiation of force" and "man's rights" could have been much stronger.

You didn't address the essay Man's Rights. Number of hits: "initiate" - 1 "initiation" - 0 "start" - 0

(Edited by Merlin Jetton on 11/11, 12:43pm)

Post 141

Sunday, November 11, 2007 - 2:19pm

William Dwyer writes:

By observing that people ought to refrain from interfering with that freedom and that if they do, they forfeit their own freedom.

How do you objectively observe an ought?

Post 142

Sunday, November 11, 2007 - 2:24pm

William Dwyer writes:

We know that it doesn't exist in reality, because it contradicts the right to freedom of action that we know does exist. The right to medical care means that a patient has a right to the labor of doctors and nurses even if they don't choose to provide it, which means that the doctors and nurses are the patient's slaves, and slavery violates the right to freedom of action.

We know that "freedom of action" exists because we can define the condition of freedom of action and objectively observe these conditions. However, we cannot objectively observe the "right" to freedom of action. Again, we cannot observe an "ought."

Post 143

Sunday, November 11, 2007 - 6:07pm

Hmmm - doesn't that phrase from Galt's speach on initiating force kinda snafu the 'pre-emptive strike' notion?

Post 144

Sunday, November 11, 2007 - 6:56pm

Robert (#143):

No, because the initiation of force includes "force, fraud, and coercion" -- the last of which is the threat of force.

You ain't "initiating" force if someone threatens the violation of your rights, or the rights of other innocents, and you act before they do. Nobody has the right to threaten aggression; and if they do, those threatened have the right to believe the threat, and to act accordingly and pre-emptively to neutralize it.

I learned this on playgrounds when I was a kid facing down bullies. You don't wait to get pulverized when bullies saunter up to you in a menacing manner and start to position themselves to hit you. You hit them first.

[edited add-on]

For example, I believe in the current context, threatened with "annihilation" by the dictatorial thug in charge of Iran, Israel is more than in its rights to take out the regime pre-emptively.

Only if you treat "rights" as a metaphysical absolute of nature -- something operating on a separate moral track from rational self-interest -- would you conclude that Israel (or any threatened entity) should wait to be clobbered before responding to the explicit threat of aggression.
(Edited by Robert Bidinotto on 11/11, 7:01pm)

Post 145

Sunday, November 11, 2007 - 9:04pm

In Post 141, Sherman Broder asks, "How do you objectively observe an ought?" And in Post 142, he adds, "We know that 'freedom of action' exists because we can define the condition of freedom of action and objectively observe these conditions. However, we cannot objectively observe the 'right' to freedom of action. Again, we cannot observe an 'ought'."

Yes we can, for all it means to say that we 'ought' to do X is that we ought to do it, if we want Y, which, in turn, simply means that if we want X, then Y is a means to its achievement. This is true for "moral" choices, just as much as it is for anything else that we ought to do.

For example, we say, "You ought to do your homework." Why? Because you want to understand the subject and get a good grade, and doing your homework is a means to that end. For Objectivism, there are no categorical imperatives; only conditional ones.

So, we can observe an "ought," because we can observe our values and what is necessary to achieve them. Similarly, we can observe a right to freedom -- which is simply the moral obligation to respect each other's freedom -- because we can observe that respecting each other's freedom is necessary to achieve our values.

- Bill

Post 146

Monday, November 12, 2007 - 8:48am

No, because the initiation of force includes "force, fraud, and coercion" -- the last of which is the threat of force.

You ain't "initiating" force if someone threatens the violation of your rights, or the rights of other innocents, and you act before they do. Nobody has the right to threaten aggression; and if they do, those threatened have the right to believe the threat, and to act accordingly and pre-emptively to neutralize it.

That being the case,where does one draw the line between a real threat, or 'he doesn't really mean it' - or is the stricture being that one means what one says or pays the penalty for 'fraudulant stating'?

Post 147

Monday, November 12, 2007 - 10:36am

Robert Malcom is right on in his ideas about how to distinguish between just and unjust wars. Incidentally, I think this even though I don't view rights as a floating metaphysical essence disconnected from rational self interest and what is naturally good for man.

This quote from Rand.."The only proper purpose of a government is to protect man's rights, which means: to protect him from physical violence. A proper government is only a policeman, acting as an agent of man's self-defense, and, as such, may resort to force only against those who start the use of force.", as Robert Malcom points out, bears directly on the issue of what properly constituted government should--and should not--do.

As Rand correctly explained, proper government acts as "an agent" of man's self-defense "to protect him from physical violence"..."against those who start the use of force."

If government is properly "an agent", then government cannot be properly installed by force, just as a real estate broker from say, Century 21, cannot properly force you to enagage his services as "your agent". Agency is voluntary; if it is forced, then the term loses all meaning--even if one resorts to justification by reference to floating metaphysical essences, such as "social contract." Since proper government acts as an agent in defending its citizen clients from violence and coercion initiated by other people, it cannot properly engage in foreign "wars of liberation" to pursue "cosmic justice", or "secure oil supplies", or toppling foreign bad guys who pose little or no real threat to its citizen-clients. Our government has repeatedly and violently meddled with other countries, with next to no concern for the safety of its own citizens, precisely because it is not acting as their agent. If it were, most Americans would long ago ahve severed their agency relationaship with the Federal government! Our government is capable of repeatedly waging non-defensive wars because it relies on taxation, the military draft, and other forms of ccoercion and intimidation against its citizens, to do what politicians want it to do.

When Rand pointed out that government may properly use force only against those who "start the use of force", she clearly upheld the norm that a just war is a defensive or retaliatory exercise. Political operators and spinmeisters can create a Hitler-of- the-Week 52 weeks a year, with little regard for hard evidence and realism. Those who are infatuated with the "romance" of militarism--with its colorful episodes of mass killings, spectacular bombings, and "glorious triumphs" don't much care about identifying and implementing the conditions that minimize the need for military confrontation. They enjoy it.....from the safety of their living rooms. Any reasonable and sober observer ought to view with great skepticism claims by politicians of looming military threat posed by whatever regime the US political class has in its gun sights.

Post 148

Monday, November 12, 2007 - 2:49pm

"That being the case,where does one draw the line between a real threat, or 'he doesn't really mean it' - or is the stricture being that one means what one says or pays the penalty for 'fraudulant stating'? Robert Malcolm

The same way one distinguishes between a genuine compliment and an insincere one, or a real value and an illusory one, etc. In principle, the same way one knows anything: by observation and reasoning.

In particular, by observation (and reasoning based on it) of the character, history, and capabilities of the person or country in question.

Has the person or the country's leaders lied repeatedly? Have they made threats in the past that were carried out in action? Do they presently have the means to actually inflict harm?, Are they allied with or expressing favorable views of known enemies?, etc.

Post 149

Monday, November 12, 2007 - 5:08pm

Mr. Dwyer,

Re: Your Post #145

I'm confused. You write:

Yes we can, for all it means to say that we 'ought' to do X is that we ought to do it, if we want Y, which, in turn, simply means that if we want X, then Y is a means to its achievement. This is true for "moral" choices, just as much as it is for anything else that we ought to do.

For example, we say, "You ought to do your homework." Why? Because you want to understand the subject and get a good grade, and doing your homework is a means to that end. For Objectivism, there are no categorical imperatives; only conditional ones.

We can scientifically and logically reason out which means are required to achieve specific ends. Can we scientifically and logically reason out which specific ends we ought to want, we ought to achieve?

In your example, yes, diligent study is a means of achieving excellence in a particular subject. We can work this relationship out by means of observation and logical reasoning. But can we work out by means of observation and logical reasoning which particular subject we should want to achieve excellence in?

I realize that from the point of view of the philosophy of Objectivism certain ends ("oughts") are necessary if we are to live as men rather than animals. However, it is the philosophy of Objectivism that supplies this if, not our raw observations or the scientific method.

You also write:

So, we can observe an "ought," because we can observe our values and what is necessary to achieve them. Similarly, we can observe a right to freedom -- which is simply the moral obligation to respect each other's freedom -- because we can observe that respecting each other's freedom is necessary to achieve our values.

I agree we can know our own values and choose means to achieve them. However, can we know ("observe") what the values of others should ("ought to") be? If so, I'd like to hear your explanation of how.

As far as the "right" to freedom goes...I disagree with your statement that "we can observe that respecting each other's freedom is necessary to achieve our values." I don't think you can describe the observable connection between "respecting each other's freedom" and "achiev[ing] our values." Again, if you can, I'd be interested in hearing your description.

You may be able to describe a theoretical connection. But is it possible to "observe" a theoretical connection? If so, how?

Post 150

Monday, November 12, 2007 - 10:21pm

Sherman,

Of course, there has to be an ultimate end, which for any human being, is his own happiness. It is that which, by its nature, he values for its own sake, as an end in itself. The purpose of morality is to identify the means to that end.

We can scientifically and logically reason out which means are required to achieve specific ends. Can we scientifically and logically reason out which specific ends we ought to want, we ought to achieve?

One cannot prescribe an ultimate end, only the means to an ultimate end. The end itself is what we value for its own sake. It is simply a given, and cannot be prescribed. To prescribe a course of action -- to say that we "ought" to pursue it -- one has to show that it leads to a desired end. The end itself is beyond moral prescription.

We can address what view of morality one "ought" to accept (e.g., egoism rather than altruism), and in that sense identify what end is appropriate, but this is an epistemological not an ethical 'ought.' It pertains to what view of morality one ought to accept, not to what actions one ought to perform. So, in this latter sense, we can say that one 'ought' to hold one's own happiness as one's highest moral purpose and in that sense "prescribe" an ultimate end. But again, this is an epistemological, not a moral prescription. Moral principles themselves simply identify the means to a desired end.

There is a sense in which even this epistemological prescription is but a means to an end -- the end being a correct identification of reality. I.e., If you want to identify the correct ethical theory, then you "ought" to identify it as egoism, which holds the moral agent's own happiness as his ultimate end or highest value.

- Bill

Post 151

Tuesday, November 13, 2007 - 9:53am

Jeff, assuming that you value realism and objectivity, you ought to view claims made by our intelligence services with skepticism. Why? "In particular, by observation (and reasoning based on it) of the character, history, and capabilities of the person or country in question".

Our intelligence agencies have established a long record of lies, political pandering, purposeful deceit, and unethical practices--violence, threats, intimidation--in achieving its "intelligence" objectives. Specific instances of these behaviors include the non-surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, proven conclusively in the 20001 book Day of Deceit; false flag operations conducted by the US government in the Gulf of Tonkin incident during LBJs term as President; the non-existent "weapons of mass destruction" "proven to exist" by our CIA and other nation's intelligence services; the Bush administration claim, often repeated but refuted by good evidence, that Saddam Hussein was somehow actively engaged in setting up the murders of 911; the vast web of lies and deceit perpetrated by high levels of the US government, including the CIA, about the events of 911 proven by David Griffin in his books, including Debunking 911 Debunking; and much more than I have the time or inclination to dig up today.

More generally, you apparently accept as truthful virtually any claim made by our intelligence or military agencies, uncritically and without regard to a long disreputable history of official mendacity. But the culture that dominates our government today seeks power over our lives through the use of lies and deceit, not occassionally but routinely and sytematically. Jean Francois Revel, a French political philosopher, wrote a great book entitled The Flight From Truth, in which he explained why all authoritarian governments sytematically must rely on deception to rule.

We can see evidence of such deception all around us, and not only in the conduct of foreign policy: in the "science" of global warming and of environmentalism; in the stampede to "consensus" in medical research, most of which is heavily influenced by state funding; in medical psychology, funded and directed by the state, in which young boys are drugged for "hyperactivity" and middle aged women for anxiety and depression; in the conduct of monetary policy through the state central bank that officially is enagaged in "fighting inflation" that it creates through its existence; in asset forfeiture, which is simply undisguised offcial banditry. In fact, single out any activity our federal government conducts today, and you can find lies and deception routinely employed to further its aims.

So any reasonable person ought to regard claims by our intelligence and military agencies with the same critical judgement one ought to apply to Al Gore's claims about a crises in global warming.

Post 152

Tuesday, November 13, 2007 - 12:39pm

Mark,

Though we've veered from the topic of discussion considerably, I'll respond briefly.

I'm not sure on what evidence you conclude that I trust the U.S. government's intelligence services as an objective source of information. If you're referring to my belief that Iran and North Korea, and possibly Syria, are pursuing the development of nuclear weapons -- and I acknowledge that I'm guessing here, since you don't specify what it is I'm supposed to be so gullible about -- one hardly needs pronouncements from the CIA, or any other branch of the U.S. government -- to have a sound basis for that belief.

As for the members of the present administration, and past ones, being frequently liars, that too hardly needs much examination. It's obviously true. But, like the mythical Christian devil, they mix lies with the truth, making them all the more difficult to evaluate in a particular case. And, regrettably, it's those particular cases we have to judge, since this is the government we have at present.

We're aided in that task, happily, by a number of other sources, such as journalists of all political stripe on the ground, personal contacts with individuals from foreign countries, immigrants, etc.

Post 153

Tuesday, November 13, 2007 - 5:52pm

Bill,

I think I understand the distinction you're drawing between an epistemological "ought" and an ethical "ought." I'm still trying to figure out how either type of "ought" bears on "rights" and whether or not "rights" are observable existents.

You seem to be well-versed in economics and I detect a hint of Austrian economics in your comments regarding ends and means. If I'm correct, I'd be curious to know how you reconcile Austrian subjectivism with Rand's Objectivism. I have never been able to do so. In fact, since becoming acquainted with von Mises and the Austrians I have not been able, in good conscience, to call myself an Objectivist, though I began the liberty "journey" with Rand and still to this day agree with virtually the entire Objectivist political philosophy. It's the Objectivist view of "rights" and "morality" in absolutist terms that I have the hardest time with.

Regards,
Sherman

Post 154

Tuesday, November 13, 2007 - 7:33pm

Funny you should ask Sherman, I too began my journey with Rand before discovering the Austrians. For my money, Rothbard's For A New Liberty is the book on the ethics of liberty, but I draw alot from Rand too (their ideas were not that different, just fleshed out in different ways and to different extents). I spend more time at the Mises Institute's website than ARI's (actually I stopped visiting the Ayn Rand Institute's website some time ago, got tired of the cult-like secrecy, and oh yeah, the advocacy of intentionally, almost gleefully, slaughtering civilians). I know ARI has some good stuff to offer, but it's all I can do to keep up with the content on RoR. Anyways, getting to the point, I don't see how the Austrian theory of subjective values is really at odds with Objectivism, but hey what do I know. If I'm correct, the Objective thing refers mainly to the primacy of existence (didn't Rand say she would have preferred to call her philosophy Existentialism, but it was already taken?). Really if you think about it, the Austrians theory is simply a recognition of individualism.

Post 155

Wednesday, November 14, 2007 - 8:27am

Jeff, obviously I don't know exactly what you think about alleged threats to our lives and property posed by thug states in the Middle East. It's not easy, for any of us, to sort the truth from the distortions and omissions purposefully commited by both right wing hawks and left wing doves in this debate about foreign policy.

On one hand, it seems plausible that Iran is struggling to build nuclear weapons, both because they're thugs and because they don't want to be bullied by the US. On the other hand, Iran offered meaningful assistance immediately after 911, and made serious overtures to the US about reconizing Israel and getting rid of WMDs, which was immediately rebuffed by the higher Bush people (I posted an interview- article with two high intelligence operatives who have gone public about all this, on this site a couple weeks back.) Recently, I read, from a source that I think is credible, that Iran is not anywhere close to being capable of building a nuke, its "thousands of spinning centrifuges" notwithstanding.

My broader point is that we all ought to try hard to be realistic about this important issue. Of course, we all agree about this formally, but I worry that realism gets neglected when feelings run high. We need to strive to be objective and brave about history, about proper ethical norms applied to war-making, about distinguishing between fact and political tall tales. So I really want to stress the importance of thinking carefully, which requires, in this time of official mendacity about lots of stuff, a sort of intellectual wariness and highly critical judgement.

Post 156

Wednesday, November 14, 2007 - 10:18am

Sherman, you wrote,

I think I understand the distinction you're drawing between an epistemological "ought" and an ethical "ought." I'm still trying to figure out how either type of "ought" bears on "rights" and whether or not "rights" are observable existents.

In Post 145, I wrote that "we can observe an 'ought,' because we can observe our values and what is necessary to achieve them. Similarly, we can observe a right to freedom -- which is simply the moral obligation to respect each other's freedom -- because we can observe that respecting each other's freedom is necessary to achieve our values. In post 149, you replied,

I agree we can know our own values and choose means to achieve them. However, can we know ("observe") what the values of others should ("ought to") be? If so, I'd like to hear your explanation of how.
We can identify that other people value happiness as an end in itself, by observing that they are members of the same species as we are. We can know that happiness is experienced by them as self-evidently valuable, just as it is experienced by us as self-evidently valuable. You're not disputing that, are you?
As far as the "right" to freedom goes...I disagree with your statement that "we can observe that respecting each other's freedom is necessary to achieve our values." I don't think you can describe the observable connection between "respecting each other's freedom" and "achiev[ing] our values." Again, if you can, I'd be interested in hearing your description.

Well, without the freedom to act on your judgment, you can't act on your value judgments, right?

You may be able to describe a theoretical connection. But is it possible to "observe" a theoretical connection? If so, how?

You can't "observe" it in the sense that you can perceive it directly on a sensory-perceptual level, but you can certainly identify it by observing that certain conditions are required for man to achieve his values.

You seem to be well-versed in economics and I detect a hint of Austrian economics in your comments regarding ends and means. If I'm correct, I'd be curious to know how you reconcile Austrian subjectivism with Rand's Objectivism. I have never been able to do so. In fact, since becoming acquainted with von Mises and the Austrians I have not been able, in good conscience, to call myself an Objectivist, though I began the liberty "journey" with Rand and still to this day agree with virtually the entire Objectivist political philosophy. It's the Objectivist view of "rights" and "morality" in absolutist terms that I have the hardest time with.

I think that Rand and Mises were on the same page regarding the conditional nature of means and ends as they relate to human action, but Mises didn't go any further than that; Rand did. Rand identified that without the recognition of a 'right' to freedom of action, the choice to act on one's value judgments cannot be preserved. Now this may have been implicit in Mises, but it wasn't made explicit. Also, Mises didn't relate human values to man's biological needs -- to the fact that man is being of a specific nature, who requires certain objective conditions for the achievement of his happiness. Mises left it entirely subjective. According to the Austrians, no voluntary choice can be criticized, because values are subjective, but if values are subjective, then on what grounds do the Austrians criticize the subjective values of the socialists and interventionists? While advocating subjectivism, the Austrians smuggle objectivist ethics in the back door. This is also the problem with the economics profession in general. They approach economics as if it were a value-free science ('Wertfreiheit'), and disdain any attempt to 'moralize' about economic values. Galt forbid that an economist should ever endorse the "right" to the pursuit of happiness. Austrian economics could use a good dose of Objectivism!

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/14, 4:56pm)

Post 157

Wednesday, November 14, 2007 - 11:05am

Now this may have been implicit in Mises, but it wasn't made explicit.

It was by Rothbard, who disagreed w/ Mises on that point.

Post 158

Wednesday, November 14, 2007 - 12:21pm

Jonathan:

(actually I stopped visiting the Ayn Rand Institute's website some time ago, got tired of the cult-like secrecy, and oh yeah, the advocacy of intentionally, almost gleefully, slaughtering civilians)

As far as their cult like secrecy, I have no idea what gossip is thrown around about various Objectivist organizations. I rarely comment on those things because it surprises me people get that interested in rumor-mills. But I wasn't aware they gleefully support the slaughter of civilians? I do know they advocate self-defense, and if bombing civilians of an aggressor nations means saving the lives of American soldiers (that is if the facts do reveal this)then they support such an action. What do you make Jonathan of the bombing of Hiroshima? Was that immoral? If so what would you have proposed America do to Imperial Japan? Are you saying you'd rather intentionally allow the slaughter of far more Japanese civilians and American soldiers and prolong the war rather than end it quickly?

Post 159

Wednesday, November 14, 2007 - 1:08pm