| | I wrote:
It is true that we can only determine the nature of something by observing it, including an observation of its actions. But a presupposition of induction is that a thing must act the same way under the same conditions. To say that the nature of subatomic particles is that there is a random element in their behavior is an oxymoron. Cal replied,
Not at all, it is an observed fact. We may wish that those particles would behave according to deterministic Newtonian laws, but the fact is that they don't. And why should that be a problem? In spite of the essential randomness of QM, its predictions are far more accurate than those of any other physical theory. It's only a problem if you want to understand why they act that way. I wrote,
If random behavior were consistent with the nature of the acting entity, then no causal explanations would ever be required, for what requires explanation is precisely the observation that the same thing appears to be acting differently under ostensibly the same conditions, such that there is some as yet undiscovered factor or unobserved difference in the conditions that accounts for the difference in behavior. To reject such a requirement is to abandon the law of causality and the law of identity on which it is based. If the law of causality implies that the same thing can't act differently under ostensibly the same conditions, then that law is incorrect. Okay. Then what is your definition of the law of causality? And under what circumstances would you say that a causal explanation is required for some ostensibly random event? Now you seem to claim that that Rand's definition of causality automatically implies this last formulation, but that is not true. That the "behavior" of a particle is not uniquely determined, doesn't mean that it is completely random, that "anything" can happen, far from it! Take two uranium 238 atoms: we know that both will decay into thorium 234 atoms (which will decay in their turn to other elements). Only we don't know when a particular uranium atom will decay, it may happen the next second, but it may also happen in 10 billion years. However, for a large number of uranium atoms and for a suitable time interval we can statistically predict very accurately what percentage will have decayed at the end of that time interval, so even if we can't tell when a particular atom will decay, we can very well predict what a large ensemble of them will do. That could simply mean that we have some knowledge of the causal processes underlying their behavior, but not enough to allow us any greater degree of precision. We still don't know some of the causes affecting their behavior. That's what "random" means in this context; it means that we can't "explain" the behavior. If we could, we wouldn't call it "random." I think Rand's formulation of the law of causality was purposely vague ("its nature") while she would run into problems with a definition which is explicitly based on determinism when she applied it to human beings. In that case she does not object to multiple possible actions in the same circumstances. So why would it be taboo for elementary particles? Good question. However, Objectivists see a fundamental difference between free will and indeterminism. As Harry Binswanger puts it,
According to indeterminism, in certain cases it is just a sheer, causeless accident which of two actions a man performs. Although they seem to be opposites, determinism and indeterminism are fundamentally similar in that both theories deny the possibility of choice and self-control. Whether one's life is ruled by iron necessity or by a necessity interrupted by freak accidents, one is not in control of oneself.
Clearly, a central issue here concerns the general nature of causality. As against determinism, I will argue that causality is not to be equated with necessity and that the form of causality applicable to man is fully compatible with the existence of volitional choice. And, as against indeterminism, I hold that there can be no sheer accidents, that every action is necessitated or chosen, but none are causeless, none "just happen." ("Volition as Cognitive Self-Regulation," pp. 5, 6)
You don't have to agree with this, of course, but at least understand the rationale behind their view. I don't think Rand was being purposely vague. As far as I understand their position, Objectivists would say that insofar as the behavior of subatomic particles is "random," it requires a causal explanation. Since these particles don't "decide" to behave differently under the same conditions, the differences in their behavior must be necessitated by causal antecedents, which have yet to be isolated and identified. Question: How do you decide between the idea that the observation of the random behavior of subatomic particles is sufficient to establish that there is no causal explanation required to account for it, and the idea that it does require a causal explanation which we have yet to identify? It would seem that there is no way to do it, and that if you are willing to conclude that their randomness is to be accepted as a brute fact requiring no further explanation, you have no basis on which to demand causal explanations for other kinds of behavior that, on the surface, appear to be random. Of course, there is nothing wrong with just accepting what you don't have an explanation for and dealing with it as best you can. But do you continue to search for an explanation or simply declare that none is required because random behavior is part of the "nature" of subatomic particles?
- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer on 2/15, 3:35pm)
(Edited by William Dwyer on 2/15, 3:39pm)
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