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Post 0

Thursday, February 9, 2006 - 12:48pmSanction this postReply
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 How does Objectivism deal with the Objectivist Law of Causality in the face of the uncertainty principle which establishes that nothing can be predicted with certainty, at the quantum-mechanical level?

Post 1

Thursday, February 9, 2006 - 6:15pmSanction this postReply
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From Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand:

Many commentators on Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle claim that, because we cannot at the same time specify fully the position and momentum of subatomic particles, their action is not entirely predictable, and that the law of causality therefore breaks down. This is a non sequitur, a switch from epistemology to metaphysics, or from knowledge to reality. Even if it were true that owing to a lack of information we could never exactly predict a subatomic event--and this is highly debatable--it would not show that, in reality, the event was causeless. The law of causality is an abstract principle; it does not by itself enable us to predict specific occurrences; it does not provide us with a knowledge of particular causes or measurements. Our ignorance of certain measurements, however, does not affect their reality or the consequent operation of nature. (pp. 16 ,27)

Remember that, according to Objectivism, the law of causality is the law of identity applied to action, and that existence is identity. With this in mind, consider what Heisenberg had to say in his 1927 paper on the uncertainty principle: "I believe that the existence of the classical 'path' can be pregnantly formulated as follows: The 'path' comes into existence only when we observe it. "

As one commentator put it, "Heisenberg realized that the uncertainty relations had profound implications. First, if we accept Heisenberg's argument that every concept has a meaning only in terms of the experiments used to measure it, we must agree that things that cannot be measured really have no meaning in physics. Thus, for instance, the path of a particle has no meaning beyond the precision with which it is observed. But a basic assumption of physics since Newton has been that a "real world" exists independently of us, regardless of whether or not we observe it. (This assumption did not go unchallenged, however, by some philosophers.) Heisenberg now argued that such concepts as orbits of electrons do not exist in nature unless and until we observe them."

In light of the above, it is obvious that Heisenberg's view is in flat contradiction with the Objectivist metaphysics and with the primacy of existence. His uncertainty principle, as he construed it, is as clear and unqualified a statement of the primacy of consciousness as one can get! However, quite apart from the corrupt philosophical construction that Heisenberg placed on his "uncertainty principle," that principle nevertheless does describe something real. As Glenn Fletcher put it in a previous post:

Heisenberg states that you can only measure (in the usual meaning of measure; i.e. with instruments) the position and the momentum of a subatomic particle to accuracies that satisfy his uncertainty relation. The classical reason for this is found in most Modern Physics books.

In order to measure the position of something, you have to probe it with, for example, light with a wavelength smaller than the position accuracy desired. Now, the momentum of light is inversely proportional to its wavelength, so the smaller the wavelength (and so the more accurate a position measurement) the greater the momentum of the probe. This will affect the subatomic particle’s momentum, due to the collision of the light and the particle. So, if the particle’s momentum was known prior to the probe, it is now uncertain by an amount given by the momentum exchange during the collision. So, basically, the measurement disturbs that which is being measured. It can be shown that the product of the uncertainty of the momentum and the uncertainty of the position of the particle cannot be less than h/4pi.

What I think Peikoff is saying, and what I think is true, is that this problem of measuring something extremely small is an epistemological problem. That is, it says nothing about whether the subatomic particle has a precise trajectory and obeys causality when not being measured. That would be a metaphysical statement and Heisenberg had no justification for saying that based on his uncertainty relation. Hence Peikoff’s statement... “Our ignorance of certain measurements, however, does not affect their reality or the consequent operation of nature.”



- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 2/09, 6:20pm)


Post 2

Thursday, February 9, 2006 - 7:29pmSanction this postReply
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Warren:

      Bill's analysis is right on re Heisenberg's 'interpretation' of his own discovered limits-of-measurement.

     Another way of looking at it is...accepting that we have empirical-cum-('ontological'? 'metaphysical'?)-existential Limits-of-Measurement (or knowledge-acquisition) may determine our epistemological limits; but, it really implies nothing metaphysically (contrary to Heisenberg's view) beyond that.

     I think Heisenberg, in his off hours, must've read too much Berkeley. I mean, what does 'observe' actually mean in that metaphysics other than 'create-ex-nihilo'? It sure doesn't mean 'discover.'

LLAP
J:D


Post 3

Friday, February 10, 2006 - 10:05amSanction this postReply
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Peikoff is wrong. The uncertainty principle is not just some practical obstacle for obtaining accurate trajectories of particles, no, it implies that it is in principle impossible to determine such a "classical" trajectory (like the trajectories of classical mechanics) in the subatomic realm. That means that the whole notion of a classical trajectory for such particles is meaningless, and you don't give it meaning by saying that you can imagine it even if you can't measure it; or to use Peikoff's own words in a different context: this argument confuses Walt Disney with metaphysics. That a man can project an image or draw an animated cartoon at variance with the facts of reality, does not alter the facts. We may well imagine the particle secretly following such a classical trajectory, but that doesn't mean that it really exists. There is no way to determine such a trajectory, therefore the whole notion of such a classical trajectory at subatomic scales is incoherent, this is therefore a floating abstraction that has no physical meaning.

The problem in this case is that we have evolved as species and have grown up as individuals in a world in which such quantummechanical effects are not directly observable, so our whole psychological make-up, our perceptions and our intuďtions are formed by what I call "the macroscopic world", the world of classical (Newtonian) mechanics with its well-behaved causality. Therefore it seems to us that this is the only correct interpretation with which we can deal with the world, and it is - as long as we're dealing with this macroscopic world. The difficult point for many people is to accept that this interpretation is no longer correct when we're dealing with events at subatomic scales. Even if our experiments and our measurements leave no doubt at all that the subatomic world behaves differently from the macroscopic world, the psychological urge to fit this strange subatomic world view into the procrustean bed of our classical world view is almost irresistible. We want to keep thinking of a classical trajectory, even in a context where this hasn't any meaning. This psychological urge has also given rise to countless different "interpretations" of QM, each of them trying to make it more palatable to our intuitions. But as long as all these interpretations are consistent with the formalism of QM, there is no means to distinguish them by any scientific experiment, which means there isn't any real difference between them. The modern view is therefore that they are irrelevant, and that we should ignore them. So be a man and take your medicine. Or to use Feynman's dictum: shut up and calculate!

Post 4

Friday, February 10, 2006 - 11:37amSanction this postReply
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Causality is a identifying fields change through a continuum of space and time in a definite, rather than arbitrary manner.

What do Zeno's Achilles-tortoise paradox, "renormalization", and Heisenberg have to do with each other? There are limits to physical theory, how well we know the substrate of space and time which manifests changing fields we observe as "matter".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeno_paradox
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renormalization#Running_constants
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/renormalization.html

Scott

Post 5

Friday, February 10, 2006 - 12:28pmSanction this postReply
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Cal, let's say that I must, per suggestion, simply accept that there exists such a metaphysical phenomenon. Does this render the Law of Causality invalid on all accounts? Well, certainly not, for it most certainly is irrefutable on the macroscopic context. In essence, what I can take from this, is that the LoC is contextual - much like many existential laws and conditions. Very well then, perfectly acceptable.

Post 6

Friday, February 10, 2006 - 12:59pmSanction this postReply
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So Cal, earlier you argued for determinism being mandated by physics, now it is impossible to determin anything because of QM - which is it?  Do we yet have QM working for everything?  How does gravity integrate then?  We as of yet have no unified field theory, and until we do the door is open to a number of possibilities.

Heisenberg's principal applies within its context only so far as current facts show - therefore it may not have anything (yet) to say about metaphysics. 

Here we have a number of workable theories which have opposing metaphysical implications, maybe... or maybe, not having the full picture yet, adding such metaphysical implications to such specific theories is premature and unjustified. 


Post 7

Friday, February 10, 2006 - 3:08pmSanction this postReply
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Kurt:
So Cal, earlier you argued for determinism being mandated by physics, now it is impossible to determin anything because of QM - which is it? Do we yet have QM working for everything?
Not so fast... I nowhere said that "you can't determine anything", only that at a subatomic scale the notion of a classical trajectory breaks down. But it is for example possible to measure the position of a particle with unlimited accuracy. It's only not possible to determine at the same time the momentum of that particle with unlimited accuracy, and you need both to be able to determine a trajectory. Another point is that this fundamental uncertainty in general doesn't play a role in the macroscopic world. Take for example a computer, a deterministic system par excellence. Why doesn't is suffer from random quantum effects? That is while the functioning of the logic gates is not dependent on the behavior of a single electron, but of the behavior of zillions of electrons. It is the statistical average of the behavior of all those electrons that makes it so reliable. That is not to say that such a gate will never fail in its task due to some chance event, but there built-in are error-correcting mechanisms which make it a very reliable building block. And that is true for macroscopic systems in general, which is the reason that they can be described so well as deterministic systems. Even if they're not deterministic at an atomic scale, this non-determinism is averaged out (in most cases) at the macroscopic scale.
Do we yet have QM working for everything? How does gravity integrate then? We as of yet have no unified field theory, and until we do the door is open to a number of possibilities.
QM doesn't work for everything, but it does work for a lot of things. Don't forget that all of classical physics is implied in the QM formalism (as the classical limit). Ultimately it will probably be superseded by a more complete theory. But this more complete theory won't invalidate QM, just as QM doesn't invalidate classical mechanics (it only limits CM to the macroscopic domain). The effects of a theory of quantum gravity for example will probably only be observed in extreme circumstances (black holes, cosmology) and not in the low-gravity world we live in. The enormous success of its predictions in nearly all domains of physics are an indicator that it is a very good theory, the best verified scientific theory ever.



Post 8

Friday, February 10, 2006 - 4:00pmSanction this postReply
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Cal - Fair enough - but I don't think it invalidates Objectivist Philosophy.

Actually - is it not true that subatomic "particles" are not even, truly, particles?  After all, they have characteristics of energy and wave functions, and our naming these as "particles" is not entirely accurate in the sense that we normally think of a particle (say, a speck of dust) on a macro scale to begin with.  Therefore it should not be surprising that they don't follow the same laws, because they are not the same thing as a macro object, but components of such things. 

So, they are not "unknowable" because assigning them macro-derived values is not a valid measurement of their true nature.  We simply use these measurements as ways to define things, and QM is the better way to define reality at that level than macro measurements of physics.

So, saying that we don't completely know how to pinpoint the momentum and position of this "entity" is like saying that we don't understand "consciousness" because we cannot pinpoint its position or momentum.  Neither is a valid unit of measurement for this aspect of reality.

So - I would conclude that Peikoff's statement is indeed wrong, as stated - he not being a physicist and rather close minded at times, but that it has no metaphysical bearing on Objectivism and the concept that everything is potentially knowable - the fact is that we DO know of this aspect of reality and have described it accurately using QM.


Post 9

Saturday, February 11, 2006 - 2:39amSanction this postReply
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Some quotes by Rand from her journal are interesting in this regard:

"Cosmology" has to be thrown out of philosophy
(About the idea that philosophy has to discover the nature of the universe in cosmological terms:)
If so, then philosophy is worse than a useless science, because it usurps the domain of physics and proposes to solve the problems of physics by some nonscientific, and therefore mystical, means. On this kind of view of philosophy, it is logical that philosophy has dangled on the strings of physics ever since the Renaissance and that every new discovery of physics has blasted philosophy sky-high, such as, for instance, the discovery of the nature of color giving a traumatic shock to philosophers, from which they have not yet recovered.

In fact, this kind of view merely means: rationalizing from an arrested state of knowledge.
She hits the nail on the head here. Why don't Peikoff and other Objectivists follow Rand's advice?


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Post 10

Saturday, February 11, 2006 - 5:57amSanction this postReply
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And once you have thrown out all the topics upon which philosophy cannot presume to pronounce, what do you have left? The part that can and must guide the whole progress of science.

Post 11

Saturday, February 11, 2006 - 4:13pmSanction this postReply
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To dany a physical or cosmological basis for epistemology is to endorse Platonism. If epistemology and metaphysical deductions aren't based on the identity of existents (such as the brain doing our reasoning), then some kind of objective but abstract, un-material world is necessary.

Its very easy to draw wrong philosophical abstractions, mis-applying abstractions based on existents such as color, QM Uncertainty, or abusing process-concepts like infinity.

Scott

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Post 12

Sunday, February 12, 2006 - 1:12pmSanction this postReply
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Rodney Rawlings wrote:
And once you have thrown out all the topics upon which philosophy cannot presume to pronounce, what do you have left? The part that can and must guide the whole progress of science.
Exactly! If physical science is based on certain principles of inference, then what discipline lays down the criteria for inferential reasoning and causal explanation? Philosophy! A scientist's "explanations" are only as good as his theory of what constitutes a valid explanation. The law of causality is the law of identity applied to action, and the law of identity governs all reasoning, inductive as well as deductive. Any physical theory, any explanation of physical phenomena, that ignores and/or contradicts the law of causality is worthless as an explanation--just as worthless as any deduction that violates the principles of formal logic. In order for a theory to serve as an explanation, it has to make sense in terms of our current understanding. If it does not, then it does not serve the purpose for which it was intended, which is to explain what would otherwise be incomprehensible.

- Bill


Post 13

Monday, February 13, 2006 - 5:27amSanction this postReply
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Bill:
The law of causality is the law of identity applied to action, and the law of identity governs all reasoning, inductive as well as deductive. Any physical theory, any explanation of physical phenomena, that ignores and/or contradicts the law of causality is worthless as an explanation--just as worthless as any deduction that violates the principles of formal logic.
And what is this law of causality? I found the following definition by Rand:

All actions are caused by entities. The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act; a thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature.

However, this is an empty statement. "A thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature". And how do we know what "its nature" is? Blankout, to say it in Objectivist style. In fact, we can only determine the nature of a thing by observing what its actions are, so the whole statement is a tautology. How could a physical theory contradict this tautology? For example, subatomic particles behave according to their nature, and their nature is that there is a random element in that behavior.


Post 14

Monday, February 13, 2006 - 8:03amSanction this postReply
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That appears random - the complexity may be an order beyond present ability to see, far less to understand...

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Post 15

Monday, February 13, 2006 - 9:41pmSanction this postReply
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The law of causality is the law of identity applied to action


What is "identity"? An observation of difference *with-respect-to* (WRT) space.

And what is action? An observation of difference WRT time.

the law of identity governs all reasoning, inductive as well as deductive.


Primary principles (physics) can hardly be explained in terms of the secondary (reason). Reasoning is a consequence of mind, which is the action of the brain. Our logic true, and reason effective, because the matter and its action energy, is of the same character as the universe it navigates.

We create abstractions, such as Fourier transforms or Tyler series, from what we observe. In context of space and time.

"A thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature". And how do we know what "its nature" is? Blankout


Nyet, a Thing can neither be different in the context of time, as well as space.

we can only determine the nature of a thing by observing what its actions are, so the whole statement is a tautology.


You created the tautology by dropping context. Time and space are different, whether you think in infantile terms, or the terms of modern physics.

How could a physical theory contradict this tautology? For example, subatomic particles behave according to their nature, and their nature is that there is a random element in that behavior.


Or we can't probe the quantum "vacuum" at high enough energy, or enough resolution, to understand its nature.

This bores me.

Scott

Post 16

Monday, February 13, 2006 - 10:55pmSanction this postReply
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I wrote, "The law of causality is the law of identity applied to action, and the law of identity governs all reasoning, inductive as well as deductive. Any physical theory, any explanation of physical phenomena, that ignores and/or contradicts the law of causality is worthless as an explanation--just as worthless as any deduction that violates the principles of formal logic."

Cal replied,
And what is this law of causality? I found the following definition by Rand:

All actions are caused by entities. The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act; a thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature.

However, this is an empty statement. "A thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature". And how do we know what "its nature" is? Blankout, to say it in Objectivist style. In fact, we can only determine the nature of a thing by observing what its actions are, so the whole statement is a tautology. How could a physical theory contradict this tautology? For example, subatomic particles behave according to their nature, and their nature is that there is a random element in that behavior.
It is true that we can only determine the nature of something by observing it, including an observation of its actions. But a presupposition of induction is that a thing must act the same way under the same conditions. To say that the nature of subatomic particles is that there is a random element in their behavior is an oxymoron. It is to say that the nature of the entity is such that it has no nature--no identity--because it need not act the same way under the same conditions. Quoting H.W.B. Joseph, in his book, An Introduction to Logic:

[T]o say that the same thing acting on the same thing under the same conditions may yet produce a different effect, is to say that a thing need not be what it is. But this is in flat conflict with the Law of Identity. A thing, to be at all, must be something, and can only be what it is. To assert a causal connexion between a and x implies that a acts as it does because it is what it is; because, in fact, it is a. So long therefore as it is a, it must act thus; and to assert that it may act otherwise on a subsequent occasion is to assert that what is a is something else than the a which it is declared to be... What holds for the relation of subject and attribute holds in this respect eo ipso for that of cause and effect. To suppose that the same cause--other things being equal--can have different effects on two occasions is as much as to suppose that two things can be the same, and yet so far their attributes different. (pp. 408, 409)

If random behavior were consistent with the nature of the acting entity, then no causal explanations would ever be required, for what requires explanation is precisely the observation that the same thing appears to be acting differently under ostensibly the same conditions, such that there is some as yet undiscovered factor or unobserved difference in the conditions that accounts for the difference in behavior. To reject such a requirement is to abandon the law of causality and the law of identity on which it is based.

- Bill

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Post 17

Wednesday, February 15, 2006 - 11:41amSanction this postReply
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Bill:
It is true that we can only determine the nature of something by observing it, including an observation of its actions. But a presupposition of induction is that a thing must act the same way under the same conditions. To say that the nature of subatomic particles is that there is a random element in their behavior is an oxymoron.
Not at all, it is an observed fact. We may wish that those particles would behave according to deterministic Newtonian laws, but the fact is that they don't. And why should that be a problem? In spite of the essential randomness of QM, its predictions are far more accurate than those of any other physical theory.
If random behavior were consistent with the nature of the acting entity, then no causal explanations would ever be required, for what requires explanation is precisely the observation that the same thing appears to be acting differently under ostensibly the same conditions, such that there is some as yet undiscovered factor or unobserved difference in the conditions that accounts for the difference in behavior. To reject such a requirement is to abandon the law of causality and the law of identity on which it is based.
If the law of causality implies that the same thing can't act differently under ostensibly the same conditions, then that law is incorrect. Now you seem to claim that that Rand's definition of causality automatically implies this last formulation, but that is not true. That the "behavior" of a particle is not uniquely determined, doesn't mean that it is completely random, that "anything" can happen, far from it! Take two uranium 238 atoms: we know that both will decay into thorium 234 atoms (which will decay in their turn to other elements). Only we don't know when a particular uranium atom will decay, it may happen the next second, but it may also happen in 10 billion years. However, for a large number of uranium atoms and for a suitable time interval we can statistically predict very accurately what percentage will have decayed at the end of that time interval, so even if we can't tell when a particular atom will decay, we can very well predict what a large ensemble of them will do.

I think Rand's formulation of the law of causality was purposely vague ("its nature") while she would run into problems with a definition which is explicitly based on determinism when she applied it to human beings. In that case she does not object to multiple possible actions in the same circumstances. So why would it be taboo for elementary particles?

Post 18

Wednesday, February 15, 2006 - 3:30pmSanction this postReply
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I wrote:

It is true that we can only determine the nature of something by observing it, including an observation of its actions. But a presupposition of induction is that a thing must act the same way under the same conditions. To say that the nature of subatomic particles is that there is a random element in their behavior is an oxymoron. Cal replied,
Not at all, it is an observed fact. We may wish that those particles would behave according to deterministic Newtonian laws, but the fact is that they don't. And why should that be a problem? In spite of the essential randomness of QM, its predictions are far more accurate than those of any other physical theory.
It's only a problem if you want to understand why they act that way. I wrote,

If random behavior were consistent with the nature of the acting entity, then no causal explanations would ever be required, for what requires explanation is precisely the observation that the same thing appears to be acting differently under ostensibly the same conditions, such that there is some as yet undiscovered factor or unobserved difference in the conditions that accounts for the difference in behavior. To reject such a requirement is to abandon the law of causality and the law of identity on which it is based.
If the law of causality implies that the same thing can't act differently under ostensibly the same conditions, then that law is incorrect.
Okay. Then what is your definition of the law of causality? And under what circumstances would you say that a causal explanation is required for some ostensibly random event?
Now you seem to claim that that Rand's definition of causality automatically implies this last formulation, but that is not true. That the "behavior" of a particle is not uniquely determined, doesn't mean that it is completely random, that "anything" can happen, far from it! Take two uranium 238 atoms: we know that both will decay into thorium 234 atoms (which will decay in their turn to other elements). Only we don't know when a particular uranium atom will decay, it may happen the next second, but it may also happen in 10 billion years. However, for a large number of uranium atoms and for a suitable time interval we can statistically predict very accurately what percentage will have decayed at the end of that time interval, so even if we can't tell when a particular atom will decay, we can very well predict what a large ensemble of them will do.
That could simply mean that we have some knowledge of the causal processes underlying their behavior, but not enough to allow us any greater degree of precision. We still don't know some of the causes affecting their behavior. That's what "random" means in this context; it means that we can't "explain" the behavior. If we could, we wouldn't call it "random."
I think Rand's formulation of the law of causality was purposely vague ("its nature") while she would run into problems with a definition which is explicitly based on determinism when she applied it to human beings. In that case she does not object to multiple possible actions in the same circumstances. So why would it be taboo for elementary particles?
Good question. However, Objectivists see a fundamental difference between free will and indeterminism. As Harry Binswanger puts it,


According to indeterminism, in certain cases it is just a sheer, causeless accident which of two actions a man performs. Although they seem to be opposites, determinism and indeterminism are fundamentally similar in that both theories deny the possibility of choice and self-control. Whether one's life is ruled by iron necessity or by a necessity interrupted by freak accidents, one is not in control of oneself.

Clearly, a central issue here concerns the general nature of causality. As against determinism, I will argue that causality is not to be equated with necessity and that the form of causality applicable to man is fully compatible with the existence of volitional choice. And, as against indeterminism, I hold that there can be no sheer accidents, that every action is necessitated or chosen, but none are causeless, none "just happen."
("Volition as Cognitive Self-Regulation," pp. 5, 6)


You don't have to agree with this, of course, but at least understand the rationale behind their view. I don't think Rand was being purposely vague. As far as I understand their position, Objectivists would say that insofar as the behavior of subatomic particles is "random," it requires a causal explanation. Since these particles don't "decide" to behave differently under the same conditions, the differences in their behavior must be necessitated by causal antecedents, which have yet to be isolated and identified. Question: How do you decide between the idea that the observation of the random behavior of subatomic particles is sufficient to establish that there is no causal explanation required to account for it, and the idea that it does require a causal explanation which we have yet to identify? It would seem that there is no way to do it, and that if you are willing to conclude that their randomness is to be accepted as a brute fact requiring no further explanation, you have no basis on which to demand causal explanations for other kinds of behavior that, on the surface, appear to be random. Of course, there is nothing wrong with just accepting what you don't have an explanation for and dealing with it as best you can. But do you continue to search for an explanation or simply declare that none is required because random behavior is part of the "nature" of subatomic particles?

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 2/15, 3:35pm)

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 2/15, 3:39pm)


Post 19

Wednesday, February 15, 2006 - 11:53pmSanction this postReply
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     I've found that I usually do not agree with Calopteryx in most arguments put forth by Calop.

     However, re Calop's post #10, I'm in TOTAL agreement.

     To be sure, Rand, in explicating her philosophy, within such, never showed her philosophy as demarcating its own limits re other 'sciences' (empirical OR theoretical), unfortunately.

      Rand's comment re Cosmology (as also re what has been called Philosophical Psychology) HAS to be taken/interpreted as 'meta-' philosophical...unfortunately; ergo, 'debatable.'

     I totally agree with her on this view, that Cosmology is irrelevent, per se, to any 'philosophical truths'. But, that's just *my* 'opinion', in agreement with hers. It has no necessarily 'philosophical' connection to O'ism, as far as I can see.

      (As an 'aside': Unfortunately, this type of 'problem' re questions that seem 'philosophical', but, officially, within O'ism, are not only not clarified, but not even brought up [such as 'gender' motivations and their metaphysically-relational perspectives], seem to bespeak an "O'ism" territory properly called 'Meta-O'ism'.  --- But, that's an other subject unto itself.)

     Anyhoo, ergo, whatever Piekoff (not to be confused, as so many others seem to wish to do, with what Rand actually wrote) says nwst, (and I don't mean to imply his views are ignorable!) re any 'arguments' about the Cosmological nature of our universe, all statements at least have to be consonant/consistent with O'ism, IF they're to be acceptable as 'reality-oriented'.

     One can picayune Piekoff's (or one's interpretation of 'his') view of 'measurability'-probs  re Heisenberg's limits, Bell's theorem, etc, but...so what? So he's advertising that he's not Einstein's and Hawking's successor. Big Deal! He's clearly merely trying to keep a consonantly consistent Cosmology perspective of the universe with the 'metaphysics' ('ontology'? Is there a diff?) of O'ism. And, all the 'pro-' O'ist debaters are really helping here, huh? Yeah; they're all really clarifying things for non-O'ist readers, fer sure.

     Like, all-said-and-done: that's really a necessity, a satisfactorily-explained 'Cosmology'...for the philosophy? R-i-g-h-t!  ---  Piekoff should, when challenged re Cosmology, point out the irrelevency of the subject's 'details' to philosophy as much as he should re the irrelevency of Archeology 'details' to philosophy-proper.

     In short: Philosophy sets the limits of 'science'-investigation...not the content.

     Anyone's got a 'content' (empirical [supposedly alleged!] or theoretical [macro-evolution has NOT been 'proven' yet]) prob with any ideology/philosophy (O'ism or Numerology) has a prob with their own interpretation of said...life-view...with their self-accepted 'facts'.

     Any Cosmology does imply a metaphysics of some 'Philosophy'; NO 'Philosophy' implies any specific Cosmology...anymore than Archeology implies it's own content that's yet to be empirically discovered.

LLAP
J:D


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