Law of Causality & Uncertainty Principle

Bill:

It's only a problem if you want to understand why they act that way.

There is no essential difference between "what" and "why" questions. Any "why" question is an attempt to put the current knowledge (the answer to the "what" question) into a wider context, to find a more comprehensive theory. If such a new theory becomes accepted, the "explanation" (answer to the "why" question) in its turn becomes a "fact" (answer to the "what" question), and now we want to look deeper again, for an explanation of this fact (a new "why" question), and so on. In general, looking for more fundamental explanations means looking at increasingly smaller scales (from macroscopic bodies via molecules and atoms to elementary particles). In a sense every theory is an explanation, even what we would call a simple description of the facts. For example: the observation that if I drop a stone it will always fall to the ground. The theory that dropped stones always fall to the ground is in fact an explanation, it is a simple theory of gravitation. Perhaps not a very satisfactory one, as it can only make one single prediction: if you drop a stone, it falls to the ground. We'd like to know if there is more to say about it, so we measure for example the time it takes to fall to the ground. After enough experiments we find a certain pattern in the data which we can formulate as a physical law. Now we have a more detailed theory of gravitation, which we can use to make more accurate predictions about falling stones. Surely we now have a real explanation of what happens with falling stones! But after some time we're not satisfied with that answer, we want to know why the velocity of the stone follows that pattern, which brings us to Newton's laws, etc. You see what happens: in a different sense no theory is an explanation, as we always can (and will) ask what the explanation of the latest explanation is. The whole notion of "explanation" (answer to the "why" question) is therefore a relative notion, we'd better speak in neutral terms about more specific and more general theories.

Okay. Then what is your definition of the law of causality? And under what circumstances would you say that a causal explanation is required for some ostensibly random event?

The term "causality" is used in many different meanings in many different contexts (see for example wikipedia about "causality"), and I have no special preference as long as you clearly define the meaning you use. Further is physical science not about asking for causal explanations, it is about building working models of phenomena in the physical world that can be used to make succesful predictions of the behavior of those phenomena. It turns out that in the macroscopic world these phenomena can be described by deterministic models ("deterministic" meaning that for any state of a model at time t1 there is exactly one possible state at a later time t2), while the phenomena in the subatomic world can only be described by non-deterministic models. Trying to fit those microscopic models to our macroscopic intuition is like trying to fit the geometry of a sphere (the earth) onto a plane (a map). It cannot be done without distortions and it's useless to ask the cartographers to look for a projection method that makes no distortions at all.

Clearly, a central issue here concerns the general nature of causality. As against determinism, I will argue that causality is not to be equated with necessity and that the form of causality applicable to man is fully compatible with the existence of volitional choice. And, as against indeterminism, I hold that there can be no sheer accidents, that every action is necessitated or chosen, but none are causeless, none "just happen."

Binswanger's text is so vague and contradictory that it's practically meaningless. He says that "causality is not to be equated with necessity". This is in direct contradiction to Rand's definition of causality: The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act; a thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature. [emphasis added] Well, if that isn't necessity, I don't know what is. If I understand correctly his position (which is the official Objectivist position, I assume), the whole world is a deterministic system except human beings. And why are human beings not deterministic systems? Blankout. (Sorry, I couldn't resist using that Randism, I've heard it too often...) I found on the Internet an article that exactly says what I'm trying to convey here: http://members.aol.com/kiekeben/rand.html

Post 21

Friday, February 17, 2006 - 4:29pm

Cal, I read the essay which you linked to your post, in which the author writes,

[Rand's definition of 'causality'] does not...rule out the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics: all one needs to say is that it is in an electron's nature (for example) to behave unpredictably. Nor would it be contradicted by a helium-filled balloon that fell. If a balloon ever acted this way, then that would merely show that such behavior is part of its nature. Or, in other words, no matter how anything acts, it is by definition acting in accordance with its nature.

I don't think so. If a balloon ever acted this way, we would not simply conclude that that is part of its nature and go on about our business. We would seek an explanation for its odd behavior. Was the balloon really filled with helium gas? Was there some other very heavy object in the balloon weighing it down? Etc. That, after all, is the purpose of a causal explanation--to explain what doesn't make sense in light of what we know about something.

Now, as to the behavior of subatomic particles, what we know about them is that they are mechanical entities without the capacity for cognitive self-regulation. In other words, they are the sorts of things that behave in a strictly reactive manner in response to changing conditions, or so the Objectivist would argue. (I'm just trying to get you to see the argument here.) So, now we come to these material particles that don't act in a predictable manner--kind of like the helium balloon that descends inexplicably when it should be rising. So, we want to know why? We want to know what's behind this strange behavior? What's "causing" it? We don't just conclude, "Well, that's the way it acts; so what else is new?"

But why don't we draw this kind of conclusion? It's because we accept certain implicit premises, one of which is that things have a certain nature--a certain identity, which entails certain characteristics, including a definite way of acting under a given set of conditions. A thing's action is one of its characteristics, along with it's size, shape, color, etc. We no more accept the fact that a thing can exhibit a different action under the same conditions than that it can exhibit a different size, shape or color under the same conditions and still be the same thing. This is why Rand says that the law of causality is the law of identity applied to action. She could just as well have said that the law of extension is the law of identity applied to size. In other words, just as the same thing must possess the same dimensions under the same conditions, so it must act the same way under the same conditions. Do you see the argument? You don't have to agree with it, but it's important to see the logic behind the meaning of a thing's "nature" in this context, which is not simply a trivial and vacuous concept in the way that Kiekeben is suggesting.

Does this idea contradict libertarian free will, as Keikeben alleges? Unfortunately, I think it does, but that doesn't alter the validity of a thing's "nature"; it does not make it vacuous and irrelevant in this context.

- Bill

Post 22

Friday, February 17, 2006 - 11:31pm

     A side point re the essay's quote that Bill spells out: "...all one needs to say is that it is in an electron's nature (for example) to behave unpredictably."

     "Unpredictably" is a term meaningful ONLY epistemologically. An epistemological framework is necessary for an understanding of the metaphysical place of any entity, true, but this framework-of-our-thinking about it cannot be considered any kind of actual part of the 'nature'/existential-characteristics/'metaphysics' of the entity itself. --- Talk about mixing up metaphysics with epistemology ! At least Berkeley was clear about his view on the two (they were two words for the same thing: it 'is' what one believes one perceives of 'it'). However, this quoted view seems to be almost a purposeful confusion of the two.

     "Unpredictability" is not a meaningful part of the inherent 'nature' of any entity anymore than comedy is.

LLAP
J:D

Post 23

Saturday, February 18, 2006 - 10:31pm

I was perusing Diana Hsieh's blog, when I came across a post by Betsy Speicher that included a nice illustration of why the law of causality is the law of identity applied to action. Consider a ball. The characteristic that makes it a ball -- its round shape -- is the SAME thing that makes it roll. The ball does what it does because it is what it is. :-)

- Bill

Post 24

Sunday, February 19, 2006 - 12:00am

Bill:

     I hate to sound, well, 'picayune', but...a ball's characteristic of being 'round' is, true, what allows it to 'roll'...but, only on a stable-surface influenced by a gravitational field. In the center of a space-station, uh, maybe 'rebound' may be more apropos in describing it's 'characteristics'.

     Indeed, this 'hair-splitting' I brought up may point out an epistemological avenue re determining the metaphysics/existentials of entities: making epistemological clarifications for metaphysics-determinations in terms of distinguishing an 'entity's characteristics that are 'inherent' from those (relatable to such) involved in its environment-relations (ie: its 'relational' characteristics.)

     Just thinking off the top-o'-me-head. (Maybe I better go back to DOOM-3).

LLAP
J:D

Post 25

Sunday, February 19, 2006 - 2:50am

Bill:

A thing's action is one of its characteristics, along with it's size, shape, color, etc. We no more accept the fact that a thing can exhibit a different action under the same conditions than that it can exhibit a different size, shape or color under the same conditions and still be the same thing.

Why shouldn't we be able to accept it? Is it while we in the macroscopic world are used to the idea that things behave in a predictable deterministic way, so that it has become our gut feeling that this is the only possible way things can behave and that therefore elementary particles should behave in an equally deterministic way? Gut feelings are no substitute for empirical evidence, however. Nature is not that what we wish, it is what it is.

You don't have to agree with it, but it's important to see the logic behind the meaning of a thing's "nature" in this context, which is not simply a trivial and vacuous concept in the way that Kiekeben is suggesting.

What Kiekeben says (and that's what I've been trying to say all along and apparently John Hospers as well) is that Rand cannot have her cake and eat it too: either her definition of causality implies determinism, but then it also implies determinism for living beings, or it does not imply determinism, but then "acting according to its nature" becomes an empty tautology. You can't have it both ways.

Post 26

Sunday, February 19, 2006 - 5:05am

Calop:

I swear, you are one hell of a 'seducer' of others into your arguments.

...but then "acting according to its nature" becomes an empty tautology. You can't have it both ways.

Uh-h-h..."...can't have it both ways"? --- Isn't that a re-phrasing of an, ummm..."empty tautology"? You know, like, A is A...ergo, A is NOT not-A...or (here it comes->) Either A or not-A, but, not both (ie: "one or the other").

I mean, like, is there any other kind (besides 'empty') of tautology for those who innuend that statements like "X is Y" as supposedly logically-equivalent to a merely symbolic repetitiveness of "Q is Q"?

     I've argued this before: apart from agreeing with Piekoff's argument in The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy where he points out how ALL 'facts', once discovered/identified, formulated, conceptualized, stated, etc, are 'tautologous' ('definitionally' or not), I must also further argue that once 'analyzed' properly, ANY 'logical-argument' is inherently, even by 'tautology'-dismissers, automatically 'tautologous'...including the argument that someone else's 'argument-"X"' is supposedly tautologous.

     Please try to do some self-referentialling validation-checks before throwing out innuended-accusations of linguistic/logic/empirical-irrelevence to others.

     Lemme spell it out:

     A: "The proposition/statement 'X' is true."
     B: " Well, sure it is. No argument. B-u-t, it's merely tautologically 'true'."
     A: "Huh? You mean, as opposed to 'empirically'?"
     B: "Yes. You've stated a 'truth', sure; but, it's only a tautology. It's merely 'definitionally' true."
     A: "Say wha'?"
     B: "Your statement 'X is true' is agreeably so only because of your definitions about 'X' and 'true'. Information-wise, it's really empty, therefore meaningless, because all your doing is repeating yourself within the same sentence"
     A: "Really?"
     B: "Yes!"
     A: "Uh-h-h, but, therefore, what you just argued applies just as well to your own argument about mine, just as well, right?"
     B: "Ummm...yeah...but..."
     A: "...but...what?"

     I'll leave readers to think up a...rational(?) ['logical'?/'empirical'?]...answer for "B".

     My 1st point is: any 'argument' that someone's statement 'X' is tautologous...is itself a tautologous argument as well. It, by it's own required terms, definitionally, cannot be 'empirically' establishable. --- An argument that an argument is a tautology...is...inherently tautologous.

     My 2nd point is: rethink one's meaning and 'arguments' about the very nature of one's ideas re what is a 'tautology' (suggestion: read Piekoff's The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy) to get around this problem...and learn the worthlessness of accusing others of using 'tautologies.'

     Other than that, thought-provoking post, Cal.

     (But, I think you gotta back up on your argument to Bill...like, back up a way-y-y back.)

LLAP
J:D

Post 27

Sunday, February 19, 2006 - 7:21am

My 1st point is: any 'argument' that someone's statement 'X' is tautologous...is itself a tautologous argument as well. It, by it's own required terms, definitionally, cannot be 'empirically' establishable. --- An argument that an argument is a tautology...is...inherently tautologous.

I find such sophistry tiring... I'm not saying that someone's statement is tautologous, I'm saying that the expression for the Law of Causality "it behaves according to its nature" is a tautology if you use it in a certain sense (and not a tautology if you use it in a different sense). That is an important conclusion, as this law is supposed to tell us something about the behavior of things in the real world. If it is a mere tautology, it doesn't tell us anything about the world (a thing behaves as it behaves, well... very interesting...).

My 2nd point is: rethink one's meaning and 'arguments' about the very nature of one's ideas re what is a 'tautology' (suggestion: read Piekoff's The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy) to get around this problem...and learn the worthlessness of accusing others of using 'tautologies.'

I've refuted Peikoff's argument elsewhere: http://wheelerdesignworks.netfirms.com/Objectivism/nfphpbb/viewtopic.php?t=241

Post 28

Sunday, February 19, 2006 - 12:07pm

Calop:

     Ok...you've made yourself as clear as could be (pretty well akin to the last time we discussed an issue) with your argument against my criticisms of your earlier posted points.

     I'm a 'sophist'. Ok; gottit. And, you're a...?

     But I think that most readers will find *my* arguments 'logically' tighter than yours. If I've indulged in 'sophistry', your arbitrary accusation did nothing to show how or where (beyond mere asserted accusation) it supposedly occurred.

     This is the best way you find to deal with criticism/disagreement? You're establishing a 'reputation' thereby, you know.

J-D

Post 29

Sunday, February 19, 2006 - 2:00pm

I think the concept of the law of causality "as the law of identity applied to action" has relevance as a reply to the claim that events can occur without causes, as in the idea that miracles are possible, or as a reply to Hume who argued that you can't prove causality, because you don't "see" it manifested in the world; all you see are conjunction and contiguity; you see things spacially and temporally associated, but you don't see any necessity.

If I say that A "causes" B, I'm saying that A necessitates B -- that given A, B must happen. But Hume argued that we don't see any such necessity. We see B following A, but we don't see A producing B, or A making B happen. The Objectivist answer to Hume is that the necessity lies in the identity of the acting entity(s). To say that given A, B must happen is to say that B is part of A's identity, that the effect (B) is tied to the cause (A) in virtue of the nature of A (and of the conditions under which it acts).

- Bill

Post 30

Tuesday, February 21, 2006 - 7:51pm

Very well said, John (post 26), and Bill (post 29).

Ed

Post 31

Wednesday, February 22, 2006 - 6:14am

Bill wrote:

If I say that A "causes" B, I'm saying that A necessitates B -- that given A, B must happen. But Hume argued that we don't see any such necessity. We see B following A, but we don't see A producing B, or A making B happen. The Objectivist answer to Hume is that the necessity lies in the identity of the acting entity(s). To say that given A, B must happen is to say that B is part of A's identity, that the effect (B) is tied to the cause (A) in virtue of the nature of A (and of the conditions under which it acts).

Returning this arguement to concretes, "identities" are field values like quantum-phase or electromagnetic charge. "Necessities" are principles of physics. Principles which are statistical, rather than exact.

*Faith* that principles govern existence cause physicists to search for them, and remain unsatisfied with approximations.

Scott

Post 32

Wednesday, February 22, 2006 - 6:30am

*Faith* that principles govern existence cause physicists to search for them, and remain unsatisfied with approximations.

No - Recognition that principles govern existence...... a difference.......

Post 33

Wednesday, February 22, 2006 - 8:55am

=====================
*Faith* that principles govern existence cause physicists to search for them, and remain unsatisfied with approximations.
=====================

Philosophically-bankrupt physicists. Philosophy can provide exact knowledge of exact truth, while the Special Sciences can only provide one, or the other, of the following ...

1) the approximation of an exact truth (the measurement of reality -- which happens to be, exactly, what it is)
2) the exactitude of an approximate truth (the unique margin of error in measuring reality, inherent to the unique method of measurement -- which provides, exactly, a hierarchy of the various measurement precisions of which man is currently -- or historically! -- capable)

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 2/22, 8:56am)

Post 34

Wednesday, February 22, 2006 - 10:18pm

Reason is volitional, and volition a consequence of faith at some point. Theory is an art that can be truth and/or fiction.

One can see random weather or one's fate, and believe capricious gods govern it, and sacrifice to change it. Or like most, decide its too complex at some point and give up.

Or otherwise brilliant scientist can make all kinds of outrageous philosophical conclusions and back them up with the latest theories.

If you're right, you hopefully get positive reinforcement and not burned at the stake. Or our politicians, trained by their brilliant philosophers, don't use disasters as excuses to waste more time, money and lives than they aid.

Men of "good faith" fix their sick reasoning. Men of corrupt faith degrade it.

Scott

Post 35

Thursday, February 23, 2006 - 11:38pm

Scott,

In all honesty, that response of yours was too deep for me to understand. It's either awfully profound, or merely perceived by myself as awfully profound (and even incoherently so!). Could you bring it down a notch, for this mortal's understanding? I'd like to debate you -- but currently find that avenue blocked off by a failure to understand.

Ed

Post 36

Friday, February 24, 2006 - 6:44am

I second Ed - Scott, have no idea what you are talking about.

Post 37

Friday, February 24, 2006 - 8:01am

Ed Wrote:

Philosophically-bankrupt physicists. Philosophy can provide exact knowledge of exact truth, while the Special Sciences can only provide one, or the other, of the following ...

1) the approximation of an exact truth (the measurement of reality -- which happens to be, exactly, what it is)
2) the exactitude of an approximate truth (the unique margin of error in measuring reality, inherent to the unique method of measurement -- which provides, exactly, a hierarchy of the various measurement precisions of which man is currently -- or historically! -- capable)

No way.

I'm not qualified to comment on some of Cal's points and how it might relate to Objectivism, but some points I am. This above is not correct at all.

First of all, physics is much more than measurement. It seeks "explanation", and often acheives this. Just because it often seems like peeling an onion where each level leads to another level of understanding does not relegate it to "a hierarchy of the various measurement precisions of which man is currently -- or historically! -- capable" .

If one studies physics beyond the high school level, you'll quickly see that very often the macroscopic bias or even "common sense" experiencial logic/intuition, or however you want to describe it, works AGAINST further understanding and must be disregarded. The special theory of relativity defies this "common" sense view of how the world works but is a particularly good example of how you can replace your "flawed" perception with a new, more correct one, that ALSO makes sense - but only if you understand why your original perception was wrong. QM is a little "whackier" in this regard for lack of a better term.

Cal is absolutely correct about his macroscopic bias argument.

Bob

Post 38

Friday, February 24, 2006 - 10:56am

Sorry Ed, Kurt. I should have just employed the cheap bromide: "figures don't lie, and liars figure".

Scott

Post 39

Friday, February 24, 2006 - 11:07am