Chewing on ItOE #1

I finally got around to reading Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. I am about half way through the discussion section, so if my question is covered later in the book please say so. I plan to ask a series of questions, this is probably the only provocative one.

In Chapter 7, pages 72-74, Rand gives three examples of "Borderline Cases". These examples are a supposed threat to objective concepts. The examples are:

1. A biological organism that is sorta like a plant and sorta like an animal, sufficient so to give us pause in our classification.

2. Black swans that defy our knowledge that swans are white.

3. A Martian who looks like a spider but is rational.

Her reply:

1. "In the case of existents whose characteristics are equally balanced between the referents of two different concepts-- such as primitive organisms, or the transitional shades of a color continuum-- there is no cognitive necessity to classify them under either (or any) concept. The choice is optional: one may designate them as a sub-category of either concept, or (in the case of a continuum) one may draw approximate dividing lines (on the principle of 'no more than x and no less than y'), or one may identify them descriptively..."

2. "In the case of black swans, it is objectively mandatory to classify them as 'swans,' because virtually all their characteristics are similar to the characteristics of the white swans, and the difference in color is of no cognitive significance. (Concepts are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.)"

3. "In the case of the rational spider from Mars..., the differences between him and man would be so great that the study of one would scarcely apply to the other and, therefore, the formation of a new concept to designate the Martians would be objectively mandatory. (Concepts are not to be integrated in disregard of necessity.)" Also, a revision of the definition would be necessary. Perhaps we would use rational mammal (as apposed to rational arachnid or Martian).

And so the modern philosophers complaints are put to rest in mere paragraphs... or is there more?

She avoids (intentionally?) a Borderline Case that is epistemologically tougher and more relevant to her work: Humans who have no rational capacity, such as the mentally challenged. (also children, comatose patients, etc.)

The black swan example approaches this, except that we are probably not dealing with essential characteristics, and even if we had defined swan as "white bird" it bears little consequence. The 2nd example is more about quantities of characteristics rather than essential ones. The rational spider has the same differentia, but a radically different genus.

There is a relevant quote by Rand concerning the mentally handicapped, children and how rights apply to them. If memory serves, she says we give them rights by virtue of them belonging to our species. (if anyone has the actual quote, please offer it. I couldn't find it).

To be epistemologically consistent you cannot say that man has rights because he is volitional and rational creature, then argue that certain humans without such a capacity have them too. You must resort to a definition by non-essentials to make sense of her statement.

As I understand it, Objectivism holds that a young child and those with great mental limitations, are firmly in the grab bag of exploitation if our best interests demand. And even if not in our interests, no law can forbid a person from certain behaviors. Needless to say, I have an emotional hesitation to accept the direction her theory leads me too. So I've all sorts of icky feelings about this question.

This is not the error of confusing definitions for concepts. O'ist ethical and political premise is contingent on what happens to be the differentia of man. If rationality was a common characteristic of animals, and man's differentia were instead "bald spots", the problem remains.

Another Rand quote I cannot find expresses her disgust towards disfigured people. Specifically toward the idea that normal children should ever know of their existence. Although I shrug off this sentiment as one of those annoying (and disturbing) things about Rand, it seems in a way consistent philosophically.

Please let me know if and how I've misapplied her theory.

(please note: I wrote this on Google Chrome, and the italic and bold buttons are not available, though I'd like to have used them. I hope this doesn't hamper my message.)

Post 1

Friday, September 26, 2008 - 12:05am

Doug,

You referred to Rand, saying, "She avoids (intentionally?) a Borderline Case that is epistemologically tougher and more relevant to her work: Humans who have no rational capacity, such as the mentally challenged. (also children, comatose patients, etc.)"

And then, "There is a relevant quote by Rand concerning the mentally handicapped, children and how rights apply to them. If memory serves, she says we give them rights by virtue of them belonging to our species."

And, "There is a relevant quote by Rand concerning the mentally handicapped, children and how rights apply to them. If memory serves, she says we give them rights by virtue of them belonging to our species."

Rights arise out of the human characteristics of rationality and volition. But these characteristics are not derived on a person by person basis. The characteristics are properties of human nature and human nature is a concept that subsumes all humans, past, present and future. A retarded child has rights, not by having met some measure of rationality, but by being human. Similarly a person that has chosen to be irrational for a bulk of their life, is not cashiered out of the human race and is still presumed to have rights. It is the process of creating the philosophy that sets the hierarchy of the ideas. We have to understand what humans, in general, need to survive and from there to determine what rights are required to satisfy those survival needs. This has to be done at the level of human nature, since the alternative you imply would be to examine every single person and every single instance of that person's existence to determine what that person's survival needs are in his particular circumstances and that would make rights unknown till examined and potentially differnet for each person.
-----

My understanding of a proper application of Objectivist ethics to a retarded child would be like this: The child has rights - identical to any other human, because they are human. As with all children, the rights are under the care of their guardian who are presumed to advocate for the child as needed. A child may have the right to life, but isn't yet capable of fully providing for or defending that life. At this point I see no difference, in general terms, between the rights or the guardianship responsibilies for a child with or without mental disabilities. The problem is less clear cut when an adult looses the ability to care for themselves - like someone in a coma. Here the law attempts to protect their rights by appointing or recognizing a guardian who advocates for them and takes the responsibility for looking after their rights. There isn't a natural guardian who is obligated by a responsibility the way a parent is for a child - that is no one who brought the child into the world and is therefore responsible for getting to a point of effective independence. That makes it tougher and there can be situations where a person's rights can be overrun - that doesn't mean that they don't have rights, but that they aren't playing a part in self-defense. And because a badly disabled adult can't provide for themselves it would be a violation of someone else's rights to force them to care for the disabled person.

(Edited by Steve Wolfer on 9/26, 12:10am)

Post 2

Friday, September 26, 2008 - 11:41am

I disagree with both of these first two posts. The first one is a complaint that Ayn Rand did not address every possible question that could arise in connection with the borderline case issue. This is a common objection to new ideas, especially in epistemology, and it is an invalid one--that to solve any problem requires that one address every single ramification or form of the problem, and every single question that anyone ever brought up--that to claim to know anything one must know everything. If I ever thought this, I would never have gotten off the ground with my reasoning about the nature of numbers that led to my independent discovery of hypercomplex numbers. But I have always regarded knowledge as a growing tree, with trunks and boughs and roots. One's mind can go in a straight line to a conclusion without ever considering possible objections.

The second post is, in my opinion, simply wrong. The fact is that the question of retarded humans is an issue that needs more thinking and more precise definitions.

Post 3

Friday, September 26, 2008 - 11:50am

Rodney,

I have no problem with disagreement, but it helps if you are specific.

Did you understand the point I made? Either retarded children are human or they aren't. You notice that I didn't get into the area of definitions or the relation between definition of human being and the concept of human nature.

Post 4

Friday, September 26, 2008 - 12:51pm

Doug,

She avoids (intentionally?) a Borderline Case that is epistemologically tougher and more relevant to her work: Humans who have no rational capacity, such as the mentally challenged. (also children, comatose patients, etc.)

First off, I appreciate your interest in the arguments that either support or refute ideas. Before I address your specific points, please take note of how "support" is something that is incremental -- and how "refutation" (done by drawing conclusions as to an argument's truth or validity) is something that is, was (and always will be) final.

It appears that you set up a case which isn't a Borderline one (and only mistakenly assumed it was a Borderline Case). Let me show so by getting more extreme.

If a member of homo sapiens were born without an arm -- we'd still call her a human (because "rational capacity" is the differentia we use for differentiating humans from non-human beings). Also, if a member of homo sapiens were born without a leg -- we'd still call her a human. However, if a member of homo sapiens were born without a brain -- we wouldn't call her a human, because she would entirely lack the differentiating factor (rational capacity).

Humans are those things which have to have some capacity for rationality -- rather than no capacity for rationality. The amount (the "quantity") of someone's capacity for rationality isn't important, only that it exists in some amount or quantity. Rand talked about omitting the measurements of differentiating characteristics when forming concepts of things -- but that doesn't ever mean that the measurements don't exist at all (ITOE, 14):

... the term �measurements omitted� does not mean, in this context, that measurements are regarded as non-existent; it means that measurements exist, but are not specified. That measurements must exist is an essential part of the process. The principle is: the relevant measurements must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity.

So you have to have some capacity for rationality to be called human -- but not necessarily any specified amount or quantity of it.

So, when you claim that there exists a group of folks with no capacity for rationality, you are begging the question. Both the mentally-challenged and the temporarily comatose have been shown to have a capacity for rationality:

(1) some of the mentally-challenged still learn and still speak (just not at the level or the quantity that we do)

(2) some of the formerly-comatose have come out of it and have been able to actualize their potential -- their inherent capacity -- for rationality

The upshot is that there isn't any group of people anywhere who have absolutely no capacity for rationality.

There is a relevant quote by Rand concerning the mentally handicapped, children and how rights apply to them. If memory serves, she says we give them rights by virtue of them belonging to our species. (if anyone has the actual quote, please offer it. I couldn't find it).

That quote is in the book: Ayn Rand Answers: The Best of her Q and A. I don't have my copy on hand, but she said that the mentally-challenged have the right to be treated as perennial children due to their still having the capacity for rationality (even if that capacity is not actualized anywhere near the rest of us).

To be epistemologically consistent you cannot say that man has rights because he is volitional and rational creature, then argue that certain humans without such a capacity have them too.

Right, but -- as I showed above -- Rand doesn't say that there exists this hypothetical group of people who have absolutely no capacity for rationality. Instead, that premise is false -- so reasoning based on that premise is de facto unsound.

Do you see how you can't start off with the spurious notion that there exists a group of people somewhere with absolutely no capacity for rationality?

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 9/26, 12:53pm)

Post 5

Friday, September 26, 2008 - 1:14pm

Doug,

Another Rand quote I cannot find expresses her disgust towards disfigured people. Specifically toward the idea that normal children should ever know of their existence.

I understand how you may revolt at Rand saying such a thing but keep in mind how impressionable kids often are -- and how important it is for mankind to grow up and embrace a hero-worship. Here's a quote from Rand -- railing against statistical Naturalists as writers (and artists who paint a cold-sore on a beautiful woman) -- which illuminates this last point well:

The obvious question, to which the heirs of statistical Naturalism have no answer, is: if heroes and geniuses are not to be regarded as representative of mankind, by reason of their numerical rarity, why are freaks and monsters to be regarded as representative? Why are the problems of a bearded lady of greater universal significance than the problems of a genius? Why is the soul of a murderer worth studying, but not the soul of a hero?

The answer lies in the basic metaphysical premise of Naturalism, whether its practitioners ever chose it consciously or not: as an outgrowth of modern philosophy, that basic premise is anti-man, anti-mind, anti-life; and, as an outgrowth of the altruist morality, Naturalism is a frantic escape from moral judgment�a long, wailing plea for pity, for tolerance, for the forgiveness of anything.

Do you see how a focus on human disfigurement -- a focus which doesn't include any attempt to fix or prevent it, but to just focus on it for the mere fact that it is there -- is immoral?

Ed

Post 6

Friday, September 26, 2008 - 3:43pm

Human versus Person

A human without rational capacity is not a test case for the biological concept human. The species Homo sapiens can be differentiated from other species by having rationality as a typical trait. That any one member of that species might be without that trait does not invalidate the fact that that trait is typical of the species, and differentiates the species from other species. There is also a failure here to remember that a species, as a biological entity, is a population of individuals, not a concept.

It does not help to make naive philosophical statements about a biological entity (a species) without knowing what a species is in a biological context.

If necessary, one can always say that an individual is a member of the species Homo sapiens, but does not have the philosophically (psychologically, ethically) distinctive trait typical of members of that species. Biological entities are defined by common descent, not by possession of some single trait. Indeed, were we to discover an intelligent alien species, we would not call them human because they were rational animals. This should make it clear that common descent overrides any specific individual trait in a biological context.

Legal or ethical contexts are different, and Rand acknowledves that definitions are contextual. In such contexts we may deny that an individual Homo sapiens possesses the trait of rationality. We then deny, perhaps, their personhood, but not their biological humanity.

(Edited by Ted Keer on 9/26, 10:05pm)

Post 7

Friday, September 26, 2008 - 4:41pm

Ted,

We've harried around these parts before. I, you say, need to read more Ernst Mayr (to better understand "species"). You, I say, need to read more Aristotle (to better understand "differentia").

Perhaps this will turn into a thread-hijack, as we butt heads over ... wait a second, it sounds like ... no ... I didn't just call us both butt-heads! ... as we butt heads over the issue of genus-species vs. the so-called or so-thought separate issue of genus-differentia.

In order to think about humans, we need concepts. In order to form them, we need Conceptual Common Denominators (CCDs). A Conceptual Common Denominator is just that -- something that is common to all the referents in question.

And "capacity for rationality" is the CCD for humans (until it proves itself objectively insufficient for our objective purposes).

Ed

Post 8

Friday, September 26, 2008 - 6:24pm

The species Homo sapiens and the Philosophical Concept of Man

No. Species as in genus/differentia and species as in biologically isolated population are two different and equally valid concepts. A biological species is a population of individuals which can interbreed with each other but not outside the group. You keep conflating, or thinking, that a biological species should act as a concept. But a biological species is simply not a concept. I do understand both biology and Aristotle, and understand that there are two separate notions. You are confused by the fact that there is one word, and you want the two concepts, glossed by the same word, in English, to mean the same thing. The biological concept is not a mistaken notion of the philosophical concept - it is a different thing all together.

You can define the concept man as an aristotelian species of the aristotelean genus animal which is differentiated from that aristotelean genus by the differentiating property of rationality. That is perfectly legitimate in a philosophical context. But the biological species Homo sapiens is differentiated from the biological species Homo floresiensis, Homo neanderthalensis, and Homo erectus in being unable to interbreed with those species, which now happen to be extinct. (The Neanderthal, which, due to its late occurence and physiolovical similarity to us, was once considered a subspecies of Homo sapiens is now considered distinct because there is no trace of Neanderthal DNA found in modern humans.) Each of those species may have been rational. The Flores islanders report that ebu gogo had a form of speech. Rationality had nothing to do with differentiating our biological species from the other species of the biological genus Homo.

This is not a question of one notion being better than another. At worst, it is a failure on your part to acknowledge that biology is a separate discipline from philosophy, with its own definitions and its own perfectly valid notions which cannot be criticized from an armchair in the philosophy department.

Biology, law, cosmology, all the special sciences have their own notions - biological species, joint liability, the curvature of space time, which must be studied and understood in full by any who would be taken seriously in both fields. If you want to eschew biology entirely, and talk only of the aristotelean concept of man, (or the concept of person - which is different) and never of the human species Homo sapiens, that is fine with me.

The fact that humans are so devoid of close living relatives abets this failure to distinguish between the biological and the aristotelean notions of species, since in our case, the extensions of those concepts is nearly identical. Every normal adult human is both a person and a member of Homo sapiens. Only when you get to the borderline case of a fetus or a braindead adult is there a tension between man as person and man as Homo sapiens. The Bible thumper will call all children of men fully human and fully persons. The unsophisticated philosopher will deny the humanity of the fetus or the vegetable. The biologist will say that it depends on your context. The biologically human being and the legal person are tow different, often overlapping, but non-identical entities. This is all I expect you to acknowledve. And if you fully want to understand it, then you have to read someone like Mayr, without mocking his biological species definition - which you plainly (from other threads) have not yet understood. You do not need to become a professional biological evolutionist to be an amateur philosopher. But you should refrain from mocking concepts which you cannot say you fully grasp.

One last analogy. Try thinking of Homo sapiens as analogous to triangular and not to triangle proper. Then when you come upon a human with a missing "corner" or a broken brain you will not be tempted to question his "Homo sapien-ness" while you will remain free to debate the applicability of the philosophical concept person to every extant and perhaps aberrant child of man.

Top, Floresiensis; Center, Neanderthal; Bottom, Murder Victim?

(Edited by Ted Keer on 9/26, 9:58pm)

Post 9

Friday, September 26, 2008 - 8:51pm

Ed,

You said, "...if a member of homo sapiens were born without a brain -- we wouldn't call her a human, because she would entirely lack the differentiating factor (rational capacity). Humans are those things which have to have some capacity for rationality -- rather than no capacity for rationality."

You used the genus "homo sapiens" and that brought Ted into it - and he is correct about a biological definition. Any definition that is correct in the context of the science of biology isn't going to be purposed correctly to handle the needs (the context) of philosophy.

The other thing I wanted to say was that a person born without a brain is still a human being. Rationality isn't present in that person because of, say, a birth defect - but what that means is that rationality would have been the property of that person. Maybe in the future technology would let us transplant a brain from someone to that person and they would then have rationality, but the key here is that that person would NORMALLY have a brain and this case represents a defect, an exception.

If we found a group of human-looking creatures on another planet and we wondered if they are "human" we would look for rationality - but if the first one we looked at wasn't rational, we would look at another, not just one.

I certainly agree that the capacity for rationality is the proper CCD for the definition of man, but it is defined at the level of human nature, not on each individual. Each individual is a unit subsumed under the definition. We don't have to measure each one of us to know that we are humans. Going to biology for a minute, imagine that scientists discovered that there was a group of people who were genetically incapable of volition and instead had a remarkable ability to mimic those who can choose. So these people don't have the capacity for rationality, but they can interbreed and the biologists remain comfortable their understanding of homo sapiens. But the philosophers would have to go back to the drawing boards (maybe coming up with a definition for quasi-man).

Post 10

Friday, September 26, 2008 - 9:48pm

Steve, such quasi-humans are defined as Democrats.

Post 11

Friday, September 26, 2008 - 10:16pm

Doug, you said:

"To be epistemologically consistent you cannot say that man has rights because he is volitional and rational creature, then argue that certain humans without such a capacity have them too. You must resort to a definition by non-essentials to make sense of her statement."

But your statement is simply ambiguous. The term man is equivocal (susceptible of many meanings) and has to be carfully qualified. Had you said "each individual [hu]man has potential rights because he is an individual of a species with a volitionally ration al nature" then the problems are nearly eliminated. There is no question then of definition by non-essentials. Just a question of how best in a political system to treat humans who may not be able to act as persons.

Sanction for reading ItOE.

Post 12

Saturday, September 27, 2008 - 9:31am

Ted,

Try thinking of Homo sapiens as analogous to triangular and not to triangle proper. Then when you come upon a human with a missing "corner" or a broken brain you will not be tempted to question his "Homo sapien-ness" while you will remain free to debate the applicability of the philosophical concept person to every extant and perhaps aberrant child of man.

But the adjective triangular is genetically dependent on the existence of a definite and certain thing, a triangle. So, in this analogy, Homo sapiens is something genetically dependent on a definite and certain thing, a man. You can't just skip to adjectives without nouns. Adjectives depend on there being some nouns to modify.

I have a degree in biology, too. But this whole idea of a species being some sort of amorphous flux -- i.e., something only adjectives would apply to, but not nouns -- gets me irked for reasons I cannot currently elucidate. Kept in that dark place where I cannot fully understand my dissatisfaction, I am left with one of two options:

(1) agreement by default -- remaining silent while you defend the ("somewhat unrealistic") species definition of the "behavioral" biologist Mayr
(2) mockery -- in the desperate attempt to get you, or others, to react (and to thereby either implicate yourself in error, or to, alternatively, to pin me down to a refinement in my own criticisms)

That said, here's my response:

Species as in genus/differentia and species as in biologically isolated population are two different and equally valid concepts.

But they're not equally-valid in the context of Doug's question about "human" rights, which requires a generalization.

A biological species is a population of individuals which can interbreed with each other but not outside the group.

But that's not an effective generalization here, because it differentiates humans (who have rights) from animals (who don't) by a merely superficial difference in kind (common descent) -- which is reducible to a difference in degree. In doing so, "man" becomes a proper noun -- a bare particular (a floating abstraction separate from animals only in name). Man becomes merely the animal that came from Mitochondrial Eve, but Doug's question about rights requires more generality than that.

The difference between water and ice is merely a superficial difference in kind that is reducible to a difference in the degree of molecular velocity of particles. Likewise, the difference between the biologic species of man and that of animals would be merely a superficial difference in kind that is reducible to a difference in the degree of "Who's your mama?" Animals descending from Mitochondrial Eve will be what we would take as "man" -- and animals not descending from that specific woman would be "non-human."

However, the kind of generalization that Doug's question requires is a generalization of members who have the same distinguishing trait but that possess it in different measure or degree. By treating "man" as a proper noun (these over here, who descended from Mitochondrial Eve -- not those over there, who didn't) -- a bare particular among many other bare particulars -- you turn "him" into a floating abstraction who doesn't possess a distinguishing trait in different measure or degree, but, instead, possesses it in exactly the same measure or degree.

By doing that, it makes the difference between humans and animals a merely-superficial difference in kind -- reducible to a difference in the "degree" of lineage (which is the same for all animals). It says that beings come from beings, and so we'll separate some from the others because they came from beings over here (not necessarily because they came from beings of a different kind).

These troubles aren't present when the differentiating factor between humans and animals is held down to a capacity for rationality -- where the same kind of thing is found in one group, but not in the others. Lineage is a kind of thing found in all groups, and, from there, we could only talk about proper nouns or bare particulars (though "particulars" are nominally-specified groups) -- this particular group here, not that group there.

Do you see how Mayr's definition is problematic for the discussion of rights?

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 9/27, 9:35am)

Post 13

Saturday, September 27, 2008 - 9:50am

Steve,

The other thing I wanted to say was that a person born without a brain is still a human being.

Here's the trouble I have with that. Say that it's the future and you're having coffee with three dudes at the Ayn Rand Coffee Shop (in the future, Ayn Rand's significance was finally realized).

While talking to dude #1 he reveals that his left arm is bionic. His left arm merely appears to be a human arm, but is only a sophisticated counterfeit. You say to yourself, "Well, it's just an arm, and so he's still a human being, so I am going to continue my discussion with him to seek the mutual psychologic visibility that that kind of behavior affords."

Dude #2 says, "Hey! That's such a coincidence! My right leg is bionic!" You say to yourself, "Well, it's just a leg, and so he's still a human being, so I am going to continue my discussion with him to seek the mutual psychologic visibility that that kind of behavior affords."

Dude #3 stands up and says, "You're not going to believe this, but my "brain" is bionic! That's right! All of my actions, all of my mannerisms, are the mere product of a computer program created by [such and such robot manufacturers]! The flesh of my body is human, but all of the executive functioning of my "mind" is artificial -- a pre-written program designed with the express purpose of being a sophisticated counterfeit!"

Do you continue your discussion with Dude #3 -- to seek the mutual psychologic visibility that that kind of behavior affords? No. You begin to treat him as something other than human. If nothing else, you begin to treat him as a curious novelty. You would not necessarily fight for his "rights."

And that is "the difference of man and the difference it makes."

Ed

Post 14

Saturday, September 27, 2008 - 9:56am

Steve,

Maybe in the future technology would let us transplant a brain from someone to that person and they would then have rationality, but the key here is that that person would NORMALLY have a brain and this case represents a defect, an exception.

That's a very intriguing notion that calls into question myriad mind-brain-self-"soul" issues! I'm curious as to whether you think that the transplanted brain gets to be the identity of the person, the brainless body gets the identity, or neither or both.

Back in '97 I had a brain transplant. But I haven't felt the same since. It's like I'm a whole different person!

;-)

Ed

Post 15

Saturday, September 27, 2008 - 10:04am

Steve,

If we found a group of human-looking creatures on another planet and we wondered if they are "human" we would look for rationality - but if the first one we looked at wasn't rational, we would look at another, not just one.

But, in that existential context, there is also the chance that we couldn't find what what, indeed, was there -- leading to what researchers might disparagingly call a false-negative. The very methodology of logically looking for something requires that you don't give up upon your first failed attempt. This doesn't necessarily have anything to do with whether the creatures are rational or not. It has to do with the way that looking has got to be performed.

If we're checking horses to see if they're unicorns, we don't stop at the first one and then just proclaim that no unicorns exist among them -- but that's merely the bad methodology of hasty generalization; it doesn't necessarily have anything to do with unicorns. In order to conclusively differentiate mere horses from unicorns, we have to find something all unicorns have, but that all horses don't -- something all horses don't have in any measure or degree.

True differences in kind always lack a mutuality in at least one differentiating feature.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 9/27, 10:08am)

Post 16

Saturday, September 27, 2008 - 11:34am

Ed,

When Dude #3 announces his bionic brain, my question is, does this new mechanism still produce that emergent behavior we refer to as rationality with its concomitant property, volition? If so, changes in the physical properties haven't changed my expectations. But if we decide that his bionic brain doesn't allow for those properties, then he is a former human who has been converted into a robot. He is a different kind of entity. The person born without a brain is a human but one that isn't functioning at that point in time.
-------

If you have been told that planet Alpha has unicorns on it, and you know that unicorns are a lot like horses but with a horn, you look for horse-like things with horns. So, you see this horse and you look carefully and see no horn. But you don't immediately decide this is NOT a unicorn, instead you have to find a way to rule out the horn not being there naturally. That is, you have to be sure that this isn't a unicorn that shed it's horn during mating season, or a unicorn to young to have a horn, or a unicorn that lost his horn because of a vitamin deficiency. As we have already shown, the CCD is the CCD because of it's importance but nothing says that there can't be accidental (out of norm) reasons for a portion of the population not possessing the particular attribute. Like someone who's IQ is low enough following a trauma that one can say, "Yes, they have a capacity for reasoning, but in practice it is of little effect."

When I read your post (the unicorn one) my thought is that we agree here. My point was that there can be individual units subsumed under a definition even though they don't meet a strict interpretation of the definition - they must meet it in principle as opposed to failing it in principle. If Dude #3 reasons and has choice, he is human because he started that way and had equipment changed that kept him in line with human-ness. If he lost those qualities, yet is now clearly functional as something that mimics humans, he is something else - a robot that works a human body. If we run into aliens that have radically different natures in every single way, but still reason and choice... then we have to go back to the drawing board and see what aspects of philosophy would need to be changed. What parts would work for a wider definition of 'rational beings' and what aspects would need to have two different descriptions, one for man and the other for alien.

Post 17

Saturday, September 27, 2008 - 11:48am

Ed,

On the hypothetical about a brain transplant, you said, "That's a very intriguing notion that calls into question myriad mind-brain-self-"soul" issues! I'm curious as to whether you think that the transplanted brain gets to be the identity of the person, the brainless body gets the identity, or neither or both."

I believe that the identity would go with the brain, but one of the major complications has to do with the very free-wheeling way the brain stores some things. People have complex muscle tension patterns that work as memory. There are strange moves that you can be guided through by a therapist that will evoke powerful emotional reactions - moving your arms and legs in certain ways will bring about tears and a flood of unconnected feelings. We make tension in a given muscle an 'on-off' switch as we go about the process of reacting to a situation. The complications of doing a brain transplant are more complex than just getting it hooked up (and I understand that is considered near impossible). Software in a computer has to be written for the hardware - there are layers and layers of software that encapsulate the layer that actually interfaces with the hardware. Each body is different and I assume that layers of mirrored interactions exist and would not be functional if you swap out an entire body. I think the person would go crazy when you tried to reboot them. Evolution has not held that interchangeability of parts is of any value - only results, functioning. If I can grasp reality accurately it doesn't matter how differently the mechanism works internally - like different kinds of calculators, abacus, using fingers and toes, etc. will come up with 2 + 2 = 4.

Post 18

Saturday, September 27, 2008 - 12:16pm

Steve,

I'll have more to say later but I do have a knee-jerk response to the "man" with the "new" brain. Considering how you answered -- that the identity goes with the brain over the body -- then isn't it a violation of the "rights" of the body to put a foreign brain into it? Doesn't that contradict sovereignty?

And, if it isn't a violation of the rights of a brainless body, then is it not such because the brainless body never had rights in the first place?

Now, this is admittedly a rhetorical rib-jab, but -- in a more open and transparent effort than rhetoric provides -- I have to come flat out and tell you, Steve, that I'm deeply skeptical about the brain-transplant idea and the seemingly-necessary consequences that go along with it.

Ed

Post 19

Saturday, September 27, 2008 - 1:17pm