Logic of the Afterlife

Much of this argument appears centered on the meanings of key terms like "certain" and "know."

Eh... I thought that was precisely what it was about (at least this latest offshoot).

Post 81

Wednesday, November 19, 2008 - 5:03pm

I would say "pretty sure" in the first case and "certain" in the second one.

But the use of "pretty sure" lands us in a bit of hot water, doesn't it? Isn't "sure" an absolute the same way that "certain" is? (Even so, I freely admit to having used the phrase myself not long ago. Mea culpa.)

(Edited by Linda Velasquez on 11/19, 5:06pm)

Post 82

Wednesday, November 19, 2008 - 5:05pm

But the use of "pretty sure" lands us in a bit of hot water, doesn't it? Isn't "sure" an absolute the same way that "certain" is?

Ah but ye be a sharp one, lass... ;-)

Post 83

Wednesday, November 19, 2008 - 5:06pm

Many thanks, kind sir. :-)

Post 84

Wednesday, November 19, 2008 - 11:33pm

"If I am saying that I'm certain, I'm claiming to know. Whether I actually do know or not, the claim to knowledge is there simply by virtue of my assertion of certainty."

Nnnnnnnah. I just can't go with it. It ignores a key difference between saying that one is certain and saying that one knows. The difference is that saying that one is certain is making a statement about one's own state of mind alone. Saying that one knows is making a statement about one's own state of mind plus making a statement about the way things are.

Yes, but one wouldn't say that one is certain, if one didn't think that one had knowledge. Granted, one can be certain that X is the case and not know that it is, if one is wrong. So, you're quite right that in that respect, there is a difference between being certain and having knowledge. But my point is that if you're certain, then you're (implicitly) claiming knowledge, even if you don't in fact possess it. You cannot say that you're certain that X is the case, but that you don't know that it is. If you didn't think you knew it, then you wouldn't say that you're certain of it.

To be sure, I can say of someone else, he's certain that X is the case, but he doesn't know it, if I think he's wrong. But I can't say that I am certain that X is the case, but I don't know it. If I didn't think I knew it, then I wouldn't say I'm certain.

When I say that I'm certain, I'm not saying that I couldn't be mistaken, but when I say that I know, I am.

Would you say you're certain, if you thought you could be mistaken? To say that you could be mistaken is to entertain some doubt as to the accuracy of your judgment, and if you have any doubts about it, then you aren't certain.

- Bill

Post 85

Thursday, November 20, 2008 - 4:51am

Thursday, November 20, 2008 - 8:52am

"Would you say you're certain, if you thought you could be mistaken?"

Many people will, of course. Arguments, debates, are much like playing poker. "I'm sure" is analogous to "All in", meaning "I bet I'm right". In the case of argument often you don't even have to turn over your cards (check your premises) and all manner of evasions, rationalizations and fallacies can cover up the fact you might have bet wrong. It's all a game. Philosophers and objectivists can't get away with this, right?

Post 87

Thursday, November 20, 2008 - 5:16pm

Hello, Bill :-)

Would you say you're certain, if you thought you could be mistaken? To say that you could be mistaken is to entertain some doubt as to the accuracy of your judgment, and if you have any doubts about it, then you aren't certain.

I understand your point. It's the same one you've been making all along. And it's a good one for your definition of "certain". We simply don't agree on that. I think we are putting such fine shadings of meaning on the word at this point that we're being silly. Even a dictionary, after all, allows wiggle room. Why else would there be definitions 1a, 1b, etc.? My "certain" has the flavor Mike spoke of, more like "fixed" or "decided" than like "correct". And I think that such a use is defensible considering the many and varied dictionary definitions one can find for "certain" and its relatives.

Another very fine shade here is the one about doubt. I think that I can have no doubt and yet admit that I might be wrong because I make no claim to perfection. When I say that I have no doubt, I'm saying that my brain has processed things in such a way that I have come to a sure conclusion about something. But why can't I also admit that my brain isn't perfect? I could have thought I saw something that wasn't, in fact, there. I could have forgotten something. I could have done any number of foolish things -- believe me! :-D

Linda
(Edited by Linda Velasquez on 11/20, 5:27pm)

Post 88

Friday, November 21, 2008 - 10:15am

Mike wrote,

Many people will, of course. Arguments, debates, are much like playing poker. "I'm sure" is analogous to "All in", meaning "I bet I'm right". In the case of argument often you don't even have to turn over your cards (check your premises) and all manner of evasions, rationalizations and fallacies can cover up the fact you might have bet wrong. It's all a game. Philosophers and objectivists can't get away with this, right?

Right. You have to be intellectually honest about it. Of course, as you point out, one can say, I'm "sure" I'm right, meaning simply that I "bet" I'm right. But that's a different sense of "certain" than we've been using here. One can also say, I "know" I'm right, in the same way, which is a different sense of "know" than we've been using here.

Linda wrote,

I understand your point. It's the same one you've been making all along. And it's a good one for your definition of "certain". We simply don't agree on that. I think we are putting such fine shadings of meaning on the word at this point that we're being silly. Even a dictionary, after all, allows wiggle room. Why else would there be definitions 1a, 1b, etc.? My "certain" has the flavor Mike spoke of, more like "fixed" or "decided" than like "correct". And I think that such a use is defensible considering the many and varied dictionary definitions one can find for "certain" and its relatives.

Certainly! ;-)

But, if you acknowledge these different senses of "certain," then I take it that you're acknowledging the sense in which I'm using it, which is the strong epistemological sense. Do you not agree that, in this strong sense, to say "I'm certain" is analogous to saying "I know"? After all, you could make the same argument with respect to the term "know" that you're making with respect to the term "certain." The term "know" can also refer simply to a view that is "fixed" or "decided." Viz., I "know" the Lakers are going to beat the Pistons. Of course, I don't "know" it in the strong sense; nor am I "certain" of it in the strong sense, since I realize that I could be mistaken. The Lakers could conceivably lose to the Pistons.

But if I say that I'm 'certain' that the earth is round or that I 'know' that two plus two equal four, I'm using these terms in the strong sense, in which I don't believe that I could be mistaken. I thought it was this latter sense in which you were using these terms in your original argument.

In your previous post, you wrote,

The difference is that saying that one is certain is making a statement about one's own state of mind alone. Saying that one knows is making a statement about one's own state of mind plus making a statement about the way things are.

If saying "I'm certain that the earth is round" is not a statement about the way things are, then neither is saying "I know that the earth is round" a statement about the way things are. Certainty and knowledge refer only to one's state of mind. Or, as we say in philosophy, both are epistemological, not metaphysical. If one wanted to make a statement about the way things are, instead of about one's state of mind, one would say simply, "The earth is round," which says nothing about one's knowledge or belief. Of course, if one says it sincerely, then it constitutes an implicit claim to knowledge. If one didn't think that one knew the earth is round, one wouldn't say that it is round. One would say something less certain, such as that it is probably round.

So, I would say that if we are using the terms "certain" and "know" in their strong, epistemological sense, then they both imply a belief that one could not be mistaken.

Another very fine shade here is the one about doubt. I think that I can have no doubt and yet admit that I might be wrong because I make no claim to perfection. When I say that I have no doubt, I'm saying that my brain has processed things in such a way that I have come to a sure conclusion about something. But why can't I also admit that my brain isn't perfect? I could have thought I saw something that wasn't, in fact, there. I could have forgotten something. I could have done any number of foolish things -- believe me! :-D

To say your brain isn't perfect simply means that you can make mistakes under certain conditions -- that you're not infallible. But it doesn't mean that you can't acquire knowledge -- that you can't come to conclusions that aren't mistaken. It just means that you have to employ the proper validating process in order to ensure that your conclusions are correct. After all, you only know that you've made a mistake in judgment, because you were able to correct it -- because you were able to arrive at a true conclusion. It is only the recognition of a truth that can enable you to identify a falsehood.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/21, 10:36am)

(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/21, 10:44am)

Post 89

Friday, November 21, 2008 - 11:29am

I read a lot of the posts on here, but I haven't had much reason to commit until now because usually someone else brings up the points that I would normally make. I haven't seen this in the discussion yet, but maybe I missed it. Anyways, based on my understanding of knowledge, there are three criteria that must be met for you to know something:

1) Belief - You can't know something if you don't believe it. You also can't force yourself to believe something. That is done on a subconscious level.
2) Truth - You can't know something that isn't true.
3) Justification - Your belief has to be justified, but it can't have any justification. Your justification has to actually correspond to the truth. Your justification has to actually fit with why that is true. Just because someone tells you they voted for someone doesn't mean that you know they did regardless of how trustworthy they are because the justification for your belief, that they told you they did, is not the reason that it is true.

Certainty, on the other hand, is basically knowledge of your belief. It doesn't have to be true and doesn't have to be rationally justified.

These are just my thoughts on the subject. As to the "Logic of the Afterlife," I think the question is irrelevant. Most justifications or arguments that try to support an afterlife are setup to imply a justification for their certain type of morality, but as Socrates pointed out to Euthyphro, morality is not dependent on a god or afterlife because it isn't subjective in nature. The purpose of knowledge is to connect yourself to the reality of the external world in order to make choices and in order to survive. An afterlife is separate from the external world, it is "after" life, and so it doesn't matter either way since morality is not dependent of it. Based on these ideas, I believe discussing and worrying about an afterlife is illogical.

Post 90

Friday, November 21, 2008 - 1:22pm

Hi Jeffrey,

Good post, and welcome aboard!

What you are expressing here is the "classical" definition of knowledge -- "justified, true belief" -- which is a definition that is generally accepted by philosophers, albeit with certain key exceptions, notably Edmund Gettier, who wrote a famous paper in 1963 criticizing it. See http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html. However, the classical definition is not the one that Rand uses, perhaps because knowledge is not belief, but identification. The objects of knowledge are facts, and one does not "believe in" facts; one believes in propositions or ideas, whereas one knows facts.

In her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Rand refers to "knowledge" as "a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation." (P. 35) The Glossary of Objectivist Definitions published by Second Renaissance Books, an ARI affiliate, refers to this statement as her "definition" of knowledge, although I don't think it was intended as a technical definition, since it includes only the distinguishing characteristics of the concept of knowledge, whereas a proper definition requires both genus and differentia.

However, since Rand regards knowledge as a product of a psychological process (ITOE, 35), a good definition using both genus and differentia, would be something like the following: "knowledge is a product of a psychological process involving a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation."

This is not to suggest that all belief is irrational or a matter of blind faith, for one can believe in true propositions for eminently rational reasons, nor is it to suggest that a belief that is both justified and true does not represent knowledge. But it is still propositions that one "believes" and facts that one "knows."

- Bill

Post 91

Friday, November 21, 2008 - 3:08pm

I haven't eaten all day, and my brain is a bit shaky, so I don't want to do much thinking just now. So I'll just ask you one question, Bill. Please forgive my laziness. :-)

We've been going round and round, mostly about the distinctions I believe there are between certainty and knowledge. You've said all along that you think a person stating that they're certain is implying knowledge. So I just want to ask you what you see as the key distinction(s) between certainty and knowledge.

And I'll go get a bite to eat... :-)

L

Post 92

Friday, November 21, 2008 - 5:11pm

Linda, you wrote:

You've said all along that you think a person stating that they're certain is implying knowledge. So I just want to ask you what you see as the key distinction(s) between certainty and knowledge.

I don't think I said that a person who states that he's certain implies knowledge. I said that a person who states that he's certain implicitly claims knowledge. As I mentioned, one can be certain that one is correct, and be wrong, just as one can claim to know something and be wrong, but he can't actually know something and be wrong. So certainty is a belief that one has knowledge, although the belief itself may not constitute knowledge. But, again, one cannot be certain that one's belief is correct without implicitly claiming to know that it's correct. So although certainty does not imply knowledge, it does imply a claim to knowledge.

- Bill

Post 93

Friday, November 21, 2008 - 6:47pm

Look, all this is a bit academic, and misses the point that words have several senses, and that ambiguity is addressed contextually when it arises, not beforehand. If I ask a stranger to give me directions, and he says "I don't know, but I am certain that..." I can ask him then what he means by what he is saying. It's a bit pedantic to insist on a definition ahead of time.

In any case, what would I mean if I said that "I am certain that the sun will rise tomorrow"? Does that mean that I know or am claiming to know that the sun will rise tomorrow? I would say that I don't know it, now, since it is not yet fact, but that I do expect it, to the point of certainty. No, don't answer me. I just want to point out that the senses of the words being used here are multiple.

Post 94

Saturday, November 22, 2008 - 12:54am

Ted,

Thanks for your input, but that issue (the different senses of "certain") has already been addressed in previous posts by me and Linda. See Posts 87 and 88.

- Bill

Post 95

Monday, November 24, 2008 - 9:41am

What I'm going to say will probably cause more than a few people to roll their eyes, but here goes anyway. While we've concentrated most of our time here on the different shades of meaning of "certain" and related words, we haven't focused nearly as much time on "know". Perhaps we should have. I was looking at this whole thing yesterday from a different angle. I still don't agree with the statement

If I am saying that I'm certain, I'm claiming to know. Whether I actually do know or not, the claim to knowledge is there simply by virtue of my assertion of certainty.

but I asked myself how I could agree with it. I decided that I could agree with it if the knowledge being spoken of were a different sort than the one that, to me, the sentence structure implies.

Back to my father-in-law Bill -- not to be confused with Mr. Dwyer :-) -- and his voting... I will say that I'm certain that Bill voted for McCain although I don't know who he voted for because I know Bill. It's an entirely different sense of "know", and it has never seemed to me to be the one Mr. Dwyer was using, but I could easily have been misunderstanding him. For me, it makes the difference between a notion that I cannot agree with and one that I can agree with. In other words... when I say that I'm certain that Bill voted for McCain, I am claiming to have knowledge, not knowledge of the vote that he cast, but knowledge of Bill's past behavior and stated inclinations, evidence that was strong enough to make me certain.

So Bill, is that the sort of knowledge you've been talking about all along? :-)

Post 96

Tuesday, November 25, 2008 - 12:24pm

Linda,

What I'm going to say will probably cause more than a few people to roll their eyes, but here goes anyway. While we've concentrated most of our time here on the different shades of meaning of "certain" and related words, we haven't focused nearly as much time on "know".

Did you read the essay I linked to in post 53 of this thread? It helps somewhat by differentiating knowledge from psychological certainty.

Also, I think you could say that having a belief is having an opinion rather than a logical conclusion. It's best to have beliefs on matters of opinion and to "try not to have" beliefs -- but to be in possession of the truth -- on matters of fact.

Ed

Post 97

Tuesday, November 25, 2008 - 9:14am

Thanks for the welcome Bill,

I read Edmund Gettier's paper and it wasn't very convincing in regards to justified true belief not being knowledge. His justifications seemed too causal to be actual justifications. On the other hand, I really liked your definition of knowledge:

"knowledge is a product of a psychological process involving a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation."

It seems complete and I think it still fits with the idea of justified true belief. Unlike Gettier's justifications, justification must be rationally related to the actual facts. I like Robert Nozick's idea of truth tracking where to know something means you have followed a process like what you describe in your definition. In fact, the only aspect that would be dependent on an active consciousness is the justification criteria since truth is not subjective and belief is done on a subconscious level. As to belief, can someone claim to know something and not believe it? I guess the real question would be what justification is. Then again, your definition covers that.

I think knowledge and certainty has to be taken in the context that exists at the time the "psychological process" is done, and when new facts of reality present themselves, you must be able to integrate them into the "psychological process," which might change your knowledge.

Please point out where I'm off on this. I'm aware my knowledge in philosophy is limited. I've recently realized that these forums can be a tool where I can iron out my understanding, but only if I post and question what is posted.

Jeffrey
(Edited by Jeffrey D Keller on 11/25, 5:23pm)

Post 98

Tuesday, November 25, 2008 - 3:21pm

Jeffery, Welcome to the forum.

I think you would enjoy Ayn Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. Be sure to get the 2nd edition for the transcripts of a Q and A session following a seminar Rand gave - most of the students are philosophy teachers, but the language is accessible to the layperson.

Post 99

Tuesday, November 25, 2008 - 4:02pm