Logic of the Afterlife

Thanks Steve. I will check out the book.

Post 101

Tuesday, November 25, 2008 - 10:22pm

Hi Jeffrey,

You wrote,

I read Edmund Gettier's paper and it wasn't very convincing in regards to justified true belief not being knowledge. His justifications seemed too causal to be actual justifications.

I didn't find Gettier's criticism convincing either. He presents a case in which (a) a proposition is true, (b) we believe it to be true, and (c) we're justified in believing it to be true -- which, according to the classical definition, are enough to give us knowledge. Yet it turns out that the proposition is true for altogether different reasons than we supposed, which means that it really doesn't qualify as knowledge, after all, even though it supposedly fulfills the conditions listed under the classical definition -- which, in turn, means that the classical definition is false. But if the proposition that we believe turns out to be true for altogether different reasons than we supposed, then, contrary to Gettier, we really aren't justified in believing it to be true -- not in the sense of "justified" that is relevant to the classical definition. "Justified," in that definition, means "based on sound reasons." so, I don't think that his criticism of the classical definition succeeds.

On the other hand, I really liked your definition of knowledge:

"knowledge is a product of a psychological process involving a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation."

It seems complete and I think it still fits with the idea of justified true belief. Unlike Gettier's justifications, justification must be rationally related to the actual facts.

Exactly!

I like Robert Nozick's idea of truth tracking where to know something means you have followed a process like what you describe in your definition. In fact, the only aspect that would be dependent on an active consciousness is the justification criteria since truth is not subjective and belief is done on a subconscious level. As to belief, can someone claim to know something and not believe it?

I don't think so. If I claim to know something, then I consider it true, in which case, I believe it. To "believe" in this case simply means to assent.

I guess the real question would be what justification is. Then again, your definition covers that.

I think knowledge and certainty has to be taken in the context that exists at the time the "psychological process" is done, and when new facts of reality present themselves, you must be able to integrate them into the "psychological process," which might change your knowledge.

I wouldn't say it would change your knowledge. If it changes your belief -- i.e., what you consider true -- then you would no longer recognize your previous belief as knowledge, because you would no longer recognize it as true, in which case, it wouldn't be your knowledge that has changed, but only your (previous) claim to knowledge, a claim which you have since rejected as false.

- Bill

Post 102

Tuesday, November 25, 2008 - 10:38pm

Hi Linda,

You wrote,

I still don't agree with the statement,

"I am saying that I'm certain, I'm claiming to know. Whether I actually do know or not, the claim to knowledge is there simply by virtue of my assertion of certainty."

but I asked myself how I could agree with it. I decided that I could agree with it if the knowledge being spoken of were a different sort than the one that, to me, the sentence structure implies.

Back to my father-in-law Bill -- not to be confused with Mr. Dwyer :-) -- and his voting... I will say that I'm certain that Bill voted for McCain although I don't know who he voted for because I know Bill. It's an entirely different sense of "know", and it has never seemed to me to be the one Mr. Dwyer was using, but I could easily have been misunderstanding him. For me, it makes the difference between a notion that I cannot agree with and one that I can agree with. In other words... when I say that I'm certain that Bill voted for McCain, I am claiming to have knowledge, not knowledge of the vote that he cast, but knowledge of Bill's past behavior and stated inclinations, evidence that was strong enough to make me certain.

I would say that what you're referring to here in saying that you're "certain" that your father-in-law voted for McCain is not certainty in the strong, literal sense, but simply a high degree of probability. You are virtually certain that he voted for McCain, but you don't know for a fact that he did. This is not the kind of certainty I was referring to. I meant absolute certainty (certainty beyond a shadow of a doubt), which is equivalent to a knowledge claim. I am absolutely certain that two plus two equal four, which means I'm claiming to know that two plus two equal four. No one would say, "I'm absolutely certain that two plus two equal four, but I don't know that it does; perhaps it equals 5." No one would say that, because it would be a self-contradiction.

- Bill

Post 103

Wednesday, November 26, 2008 - 1:01pm

Linda,

But are you saying that philosophical certainty and knowledge are the same thing?

I'm saying that knowledge is that about which you can make necessarily-true propositions, propositions which cannot be false.

Every fact known didn't necessarily have to be the case, but every truth (known or not yet known) is necessarily the case. It's a fact that Canada is north of Mexico -- but it didn't have to be that way. However, since it is that way, it is necessarily true that Canada is north of Mexico (it's a proposition about the reality of things that, considering the geography of the case, cannot be false).

That Canada is north of Mexico is an empirical proposition which cannot be false (given the facts integrated by geography). When we go to Mexico, and then go north to Canada, we have sense experiences of both places and a direction (north-south). When we put it all together -- when we integrate these experiences with the use of reason or logic -- we gain the understand afforded by a real relation, a relation of Canada to Mexico that is unshakable.

When we go that far, when we integrate facts into necessarily-true propositions, we've arrived at philosophical certainty. However, our sense experience of things like the weather and terrain of both Mexico and Canada are also knowledge (even before getting integrated into a necessarily-true proposition about the relation of Canada to Mexico).

So, we start with some common or special experience with the world, and that gives us basic knowledge about which we make these necessarily-true propositions (as shown above) -- in order to make certain of something, or to know something for certain about reality.

At this point, the skeptic usually counters by questioning how we can use sense experience to be certain of anything -- since sense experiences can be wrong. The skeptic is wrong to ask that. Sense experiences just are, they aren't right or wrong. Inferences from sense experiences, where we use our minds (not our senses) to identify and integrate them, can be knowably wrong -- and, therefore, eventually corrected.

At this point, the skeptic might ask how we know we've arrived at ultimate truth which cannot be eventually corrected. The skeptic is wrong to ask that. Ultimate truth is truth outside of the context of living as a human on earth. We need knowledge to live on earth -- not for anything more than that. Within that scope of things, within that context, we only require a measure of precision in our knowledge about things. Here is an example:

Noah is building an ark with planks of wood. If the planks aren't the same length, the ark will leak, and life itself will perish. Pretty grim outcome, huh? Puts a lot of pressure on an ark-builder. But don't fear -- we can use our non-omniscient minds to arrive at a certainty that we'll float. What do we need to know (given the context of a worldwide flood for 40 days and the float-ability of shaped wood)?

In truth, Noah doesn't have to have the planks exactly the same length -- just more or less exactly the same. He can use some kind of putty or some other packing material to seal off small gaps and such. But he couldn't have the planks be way off. He couldn't be off by yards or meters because the packing material wouldn't be enough to stop the leaks.

All he needs to do is get the planks within an inch or two -- and he can certain he'll float.

Ed

Post 104

Wednesday, November 26, 2008 - 1:18pm

Linda,

I think that many beliefs are conclusions arrived at through logical processes; to that extent, they are logical conclusions. The problem lies in what one accepts as true statements before logic is put into play. We can't verify the truth of every single fact for ourselves. And we can't have someone define every word they use in great detail before we'll agree or disagree with them.

Those beliefs you mentioned are still opinions, just opinions supported by the preponderance of evidence collected and reasoning (integration and differentiation) performed. They're logically superior to other opinions because they fit the facts best, and/or integrate the facts best. You're right we can't verify all facts, such as the special facts that come from scientific (specialized) investigation of the world.

We can verify all general facts, though.

And there are criteria for arriving at objective definitions of things (so that we don't all have our own unique definitions of things). For example, for two-year-olds scheming to escape the nursery, they might huddle together and say to each other that -- on their escape attempt -- that they have all got to try to avoid those tall, animated objects which have been taking care of them. They might even say -- in baby-speak -- to each other: "Just avoid everyone who isn't in a diaper (and don't run in a straight line, or they'll overtake you)."

That differentiation -- a differentiation based on diaper-wearing -- would serve as completely reliable in their present context of knowledge.

As they grow up to be young teenagers in high-school, looking to play hookie for the last half of the school day, they will have got to have arrived at a more precise definition which is still necessitated by the facts and, therefore, objectively true for each and all of them. They might scheme in the bathroom and tell each other that they can no longer use the diaper-differentiation to define their potential adversaries -- that something like "adulthood" or "that pin that faculty always wears" must serve as the new differentiator of who to avoid when trying to escape.

For every instance -- nurseries, high schools, biochemistry labs -- there is an objectively true definition valid for everyone.

Ed

Post 105

Wednesday, November 26, 2008 - 1:26pm

Linda,

How do you apply that to my father-in-law's voting? How he voted is a matter of fact; he did vote. But because I wasn't there with him, it's a matter of opinion for me.

Right. You have an opinion of how your father-in-law voted and, after considering things like his trustworthiness and your general history with him, it is the right opinion for you to have about that. There are also wrong opinions to have, such as an unprecedented disbelief in him -- as when someone projects devious motives onto others, and starts believing that everything that they have to say is a lie.

In this context (of trusting your relatives), you have to appeal to something called virtue epistemology -- which is your capacity for reliably arriving at the truth of a matter (concerning them and their potential lies and mischaracterizations of their political views, etc).

In the enterprise of knowing relatives down to their core, that's the best you can hope for. You cannot get much philosophical certainty when you are trying to understand something so inherently subjective as the kind of privileged access required for totally understanding another human being (as good as, or better than, you understand even yourself).

Ed

Post 106

Wednesday, November 26, 2008 - 2:56pm

Welcome to the forum, Jeffrey.

Ed

Post 107

Wednesday, November 26, 2008 - 3:23pm

Hi Jeffrey:

Now we have four Steves, three Mikes and two Jeffs. This place is getting crowded! Now people are going to have to start paying attention to the 'ery' vs. the 'rey'. :-)

Post 108

Wednesday, November 26, 2008 - 6:10pm

Ed, you wrote,

Every fact known didn't necessarily have to be the case, but every truth (known or not yet known) is necessarily the case. It's a fact that Canada is north of Mexico -- but it didn't have to be that way. However, since it is that way, it is necessarily true that Canada is north of Mexico (it's a proposition about the reality of things that, considering the geography of the case, cannot be false).

I don't think this is the correct distinction between fact and truth. If, as you say, it didn't have to be a fact that Canada is north of Mexico, then it also didn't have to be true that Canada is north of Mexico. If the names of these countries had been reversed, then it would not be a fact, and it would also not be true, that Canada is north of Mexico. By the same token, insofar as Canada is north of Mexico, it is necessarily a fact, and necessarily true, that Canada is north of Mexico.

The correct distinction between fact and truth, as I understand it, is that truth pertains to a judgment or an idea, whereas facts exist independently of judgments and ideas. For example, it would be a fact that the earth revolves around the sun even if no human beings existed to recognize it or entertain it, whereas it would not be a truth, because a truth is the correspondence of a fact to an idea or to a proposition, both of which require human recognition or judgment.

That Canada is north of Mexico is an empirical proposition which cannot be false (given the facts integrated by geography).... [T]he skeptic might ask how we know we've arrived at ultimate truth which cannot be eventually corrected. The skeptic is wrong to ask that. Ultimate truth is truth outside of the context of living as a human on earth.

I don't think so. If, as you say, "ultimate truth" is defined as that which cannot eventually be corrected," then an "ultimate truth" is no different from what you had previously defined as a "(necessary) truth," for if a proposition is necessarily true, then it cannot be false, in which case, it cannot be corrected. And if it cannot be corrected, then it is both a necessary truth and an ultimate truth.

- Bill

Post 109

Wednesday, November 26, 2008 - 8:13pm

Do you know that the sun will rise tomorrow, or are you merely certain of it?

Post 110

Wednesday, November 26, 2008 - 8:48pm

LOL - dragging OL over to here now, huh... ;-)

Contextually speaking, I know it will... as such, am certain of it... ;-)
(Edited by robert malcom on 11/26, 8:49pm)

Post 111

Thursday, November 27, 2008 - 12:25pm

Thanks, Bill.

You've definitely helped refine my thinking. They say the strongest steel is forged in the hottest of fires.

Thanks for the hot fire.

Regarding facts vs. truth I can see where your "line of demarcation" is better -- where facts are acknowledged as independently existing things and truths aren't. Instead, truths "pop into" existence when conscious beings try to recognize or judge reality.

When I said ultimate truth, I was ambiguous, because in just the sense you describe -- the necessary is the ultimate. I had meant, when I said ultimate, a context-free absolute.

An example would be when someone claims that atoms are as small as things get. On the atomic level, they're right. But they're not right when you take things to a deeper level (such as a sub-atomic level). Atoms aren't the fundamental ingredient or ultimate fabric of reality (smaller things than atoms are).

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 11/27, 12:27pm)

Post 112

Monday, December 8, 2008 - 7:51am