The definition of rights

This thread is split off from "Evaluating Initiation of Force in Emergency Situations" and is addressing Jordan's view of rights.

Jordan:

Rights do entail a positive. "[F]or every individual, a right is the moral sanction of a positive—of his freedom to act on his own judgment, for his own goals, by his own voluntary, uncoerced choice," Rand writes. Of course, with that positive is a correlative negative obligation of others not to coerce you. But the positive is primary. (And we're talking about moral rights here, under Objectivism -- not legal rights, just so there's no confusion.)

That's not what I meant by rights being positive. I meant positive as in it doesn't entail prescribing a particular action, only an inaction, i.e. to not coerce another. Yes of course, it is a positive if you are looking at it from someone positively recognizing the moral sanction, but what the moral sanction itself entails is an inaction.

Positive rights is commonly referred to in political philosophy as the kind of rights Democrats believe in. As in I have a right to health care, or I have a right to education. You can read more on positive vs. negative rights here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_and_positive_rights

"Rights are conditions of existence required by man’s nature for his proper survival," Rand writes. Aren't there conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival, even if there's no one else around, even when stuck on that desert island?

Jordan you are missing the point. Man's nature is that he is a social animal. So Rand is correct, it is in his nature to arrive at a set of conditions necessary for his survival that must include conditions for his social interactions with other men. That latter part "social interactions with other men" is what the moral principles of "rights" address, and only that. The example of the alone on deserted island was eliminating part of man's natural existence (the part that he has to associate with other men).

". . .[T]he right to life means the right to engage in self-sustaining and self-generated action—which means: the freedom to take all the actions required by the nature of a rational being for the support, the furtherance, the fulfillment and the enjoyment of his own life," Rand writes. Again, aren't there actions required by the nature of a rational being, even if there's no one else around, even if when stuck on that desert island?

Note she said "the freedom to take all actions required by the nature of a rational being for the support, the furtherance, the fulfillment and the enjoyment of his own life" Emphasis mine.

What do you think she means by the "freedom" to take an action? Free from what?

"If man is to live on earth, it is right for him to use his mind." (Italics mine.) So long as there's some action optimally conducive to furthering the moral agent's life, a right exists. What is optimal is subject to change; there's nothin' intrinsic about it.

Here you have equivocated the word 'right'. There is 'right' as in something is not wrong, it's good, it's moral etc. as opposed to a political 'right', that is a particular rule that says what one man cannot do to another. They are two different meanings.

Rand means "If man is to live on earth, it is [good] for him to use his mind."

If she had meant to use 'right' in that sentence as in a political right, she would have worded the sentence this way:

"If man is to live on earth, it is his right to use his mind"

To be sure, I do not mean to short-change the function of rights in society, but I'd say that social function is secondary.

Nonsense, it is not secondary, it is necessary to the definition. Rand says about rights:

"A 'right' is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context."

Without the aspect of a "social function" included in that definition, we are speaking of something that is more broader than rights, and speaking more generally of just morality. Rights are a subset of morality, and as being part of that subset, how it is differentiated from the rest of the set is that they serve in the context of a social function only.

Post 1

Sunday, April 5, 2009 - 9:22am

John,

"A 'right' is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context."

Without the aspect of a "social function" included in that definition, we are speaking of something that is more broader than rights ... Rights ... serve in the context of a social function only.

You seem to be defending a contractarian view of individual rights. I could be wrong about that, so I'd like to explore it.

In Viable Values, Tara Smith writes about contractarianism: the notion that "obligation is the product of human agreement" (28). The contractarian view is that you should be moral because you agreed to be moral. With regard to rights, it follows, you should respect other's rights because you agreed to respect their rights. You voluntarily restrict your own sphere of rights (by refraining from violating the rights of others') because of a brute, instrumental calculation -- you respect rights because of the fear of the consequences of not respecting rights. It's utilitarian.

In this view, the notion of individual rights is a conceptual/cognitive thing (like a "social contract", or something), rather than something deeper than that -- i.e., rather than something metaphysical.

Have I correctly characterized -- or at least broadly identified -- your position on individual rights?

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 4/05, 9:24am)

Post 2

Sunday, April 5, 2009 - 9:42am

A leading question: Do men have rights in dictatorships?

In dictatorships, according to social contract theory, men trade away, or alienate, their own -- or others' -- individual rights for some other value, such as for "security":

"Times are really tough," the dictator says, "so we have got to each make some more sacrifices. I'll be needing you folks to start dis-believing in your own rights a little more than I've ever asked you before. And, having less belief that rights are right (because what's needed here and now is more sacrifice), it'll be more morally okay for me to lead you like lambs to the slaughter."

What makes it okay is that there is nothing underlying or metaphysical about individual rights but, instead, rights are merely really, really good principles that we happen to socially agree on (they're "social products of the mind") -- they are the best principles for men in most of the familiar social contexts men find themselves within, but they are only principles (heuristic rules of thumb) -- and principles as such can be thrown out when they don't fit the "characterized" context.

Speaking in my own voice now, I say that men are in possession of (dis-respected) rights inside of the dictatorships they may live under. That rights are there underneath the social contracts that they got themselves into (by choice or mere political inaction). The upshot is that they always have the rights -- i.e., the rights are inalienable -- but that they'll get themselves into various existential conditions which, on a sliding scale, tend to respect their rights or not (rights being a constant in the background of differing social conditions).

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 4/05, 9:46am)

Post 3

Sunday, April 5, 2009 - 10:24am

Hi John,

Thanks for starting the thread.

I meant positive as in it doesn't entail prescribing a particular action, only an inaction, i.e. to not coerce another.

Rand used to the term "positive" to describe a set of actions, i.e., the "freedom to act on one's own judgment." For Rand, the positive is personal. That inaction you mention is what Rand identified as the "negative". "As to his neighbors, his rights impose no obligations on them except of a negative kind: to abstain from violating his rights," Rand rights. The negative is social.

There is also an epistemological reason for starting with positive rights, and that is when carving out concepts, it will not do to start with a nothing. The negative aspect of rights must be pinned to some positive for it to hold cognitive weight.

Man's nature is that he is a social animal.

We are primarily a creative animal. To realize our creativity we need the "freedom to act on his own judgment." We need that positive right. And we stand best to realize this aspect of our nature through society, which as Rand points out in TOE, benefits us through knowledge and trade. To seize those social benefits, "Man is not a lone wolf and he is not a social animal. He is a contractual animal. He has to plan his life long-range, make his own choices, and deal with other men by voluntary agreement. . . ," Rand writes.

What do you think she means by the "freedom" to take an action? Free from what?

For Rand, freedom is always twofold, a freedom to and a freedom from -- freedom to act on one's own judgement and freedom from being coerced by others. I'll answer your questions, and I do hope you'll answer mine. I'll ask again: Aren't there conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival, even if there's no one else around, even when stuck on that desert island?

Now, I have not equivocated on "rights" so long as we keep the term within the context of natural/moral rights. You have simply cut off half of the term's meaning, the positive part, and started with the second half, the negative part, i.e., the social/political part.

I don't think that Objectivism considers rights a subset of morality. I can't think of one Objectivist moral tenet that does not also entail a right. But rights do hold a special function under Objectivism. Rand writes,

“Rights” are a moral concept—the concept that provides a logical transition from the principles guiding an individual’s actions to the principles guiding his relationship with others—the concept that preserves and protects individual morality in a social context—the link between the moral code of a man and the legal code of a society, between ethics and politics. Individual rights are the means of subordinating society to moral law.

You'll note that Rand identifies "rights" as moral, not political or social. They bridge the person to the social, the ethical to the political. At one side of the bridge is the personal aspect of rights, on the other the negative.

Jordan

Post 4

Sunday, April 5, 2009 - 11:36am

Jordan:

There is also an epistemological reason for starting with positive rights, and that is when carving out concepts, it will not do to start with a nothing. The negative aspect of rights must be pinned to some positive for it to hold cognitive weight.

I don't know what you mean by 'positive rights' in your sentence. There is no such thing as 'positive rights'. Of course rights are a recognition that man needs to be free to carry out actions that will sustain his life, there is no epistemological problem there. We are defining a specific kind of action as a moral transgression, particularly actions that prevent someone from carrying out actions that will sustain his life, and calling it immoral, and then defining the recognition that one should be free from such coercion as a 'right', because without that recognition, man could not sustain his life because he wouldn't be able to take actions to sustain it. But the definition here requires a particular component "society", because man doesn't exist as an individual by himself, but exists with other men, and how their behaviors interact with each other is what 'rights' is concerned with. You can't say that a 'right' exists independently from the social interactions of man. That makes no more sense than saying a consciousness exists independently from a brain.

For Rand, freedom is always twofold, a freedom to and a freedom from -- freedom to act on one's own judgement and freedom from being coerced by others.

Those both mean the exact same things. To be free to take action MEANS one is free from coercion to take that action.

Aren't there conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival, even if there's no one else around, even when stuck on that desert island?

YES! Of course Jordan! I never said otherwise! Perhaps you missed the part where I said "rights" are a subset of "morality". By removing the component of "social interactions" from the definition of "rights", you are speaking of something more broadly, something that is no longer a subset of morality. Rights are a narrower focus of morality that is concerned with "man qua man" not just "man qua himself". Man does have conditions for survival, for example he needs food to eat, and it would be moral for him to grow food to sustain his life. But once we start recognizing that other men can come in and steal his food, or kill him for it, we are now discussing another condition required, "to be free to grow the food". But to be "free" from what? Free from the actions of others. Do you see how rights are a subset of morality? It went from "you need food to live" to "you can't get food if someone stops you from acquiring it". Do you understand what subset means?

“Rights” are a moral concept—the concept that provides a logical transition from the principles guiding an individual’s actions to the principles guiding his relationship with others—the concept that preserves and protects individual morality in a social context—the link between the moral code of a man and the legal code of a society, between ethics and politics. Individual rights are the means of subordinating society to moral law.

You'll note that Rand identifies "rights" as moral, not political or social. They bridge the person to the social, the ethical to the political. At one side of the bridge is the personal aspect of rights, on the other the negative.

Rights are moral and political and they exist in a social context by virtue of the definition "political". There's no difference in those terms other than they are subsets of each other. It's like saying "squares are not parallelograms, but rather squares are the bridge to the parallelogram" Which leaves me scratching my head trying to understand what that means. And thus, quite frankly, I'm finding your understanding of Rand's view of rights as quite bizarre.

I don't know how else to put something that should be a rather easy concept to grasp.

We are primarily a creative animal. To realize our creativity we need the "freedom to act on his own judgment." We need that positive right. And we stand best to realize this aspect of our nature through society, which as Rand points out in TOE, benefits us through knowledge and trade. To seize those social benefits, "Man is not a lone wolf and he is not a social animal. He is a contractual animal. He has to plan his life long-range, make his own choices, and deal with other men by voluntary agreement. . . ," Rand writes

What I mean by man is a social animal is that his essential nature is not one where he literally lives on a deserted island all by himself. He lives among other men. I agree what Rand says by saying he is a "contractual animal" and I think you were just taking my definition of man as a "social animal" out of context. I only mean "social" as in man interacts with other men, not in the sense of any kind of social "obligation". Social as in I talk with you, I trade with you, etc etc, actions directed towards other people, not to inanimate objects.
(Edited by John Armaos on 4/05, 12:05pm)

Post 5

Sunday, April 5, 2009 - 11:47am

Ed:

You seem to be defending a contractarian view of individual rights. I could be wrong about that, so I'd like to explore it.

In Viable Values, Tara Smith writes about contractarianism: the notion that "obligation is the product of human agreement" (28). The contractarian view is that you should be moral because you agreed to be moral. With regard to rights, it follows, you should respect other's rights because you agreed to respect their rights. You voluntarily restrict your own sphere of rights (by refraining from violating the rights of others') because of a brute, instrumental calculation -- you respect rights because of the fear of the consequences of not respecting rights. It's utilitarian.

In this view, the notion of individual rights is a conceptual/cognitive thing (like a "social contract", or something), rather than something deeper than that -- i.e., rather than something metaphysical.

Have I correctly characterized -- or at least broadly identified -- your position on individual rights?

No I don't believe you've correctly characterized my definition (which my definition is identical to Rand's) Rights are a recognition of the requirements for man to survive and flourish with the understanding he lives on the same planet with other men. And so rights correspond to reality. They are a recognition that for man to survive and be happy, he must be free to take life-sustaining actions. It's a truth about the reality of man's existence and what is required for that existence that doesn't go away just because someone denies it to be true.

So to address your next post's question, yes even under a dictatorship, man still has rights, meaning the conditions required for man to survive and flourish are still the same under a dictatorship as they would be under a free republic, those conditions required for his survival hasn't changed, only that a dictator refuses to allow other men to live and flourish because he prevents them from doing so. But the necessary conditions for survival don't change.

It's like saying "do you still need to eat food to survive if all farmers went on strike", and the answer would be of course you still need food, what farmers do does not change the fact of reality that you need food to survive. No matter what actions people take, that requirement for survival will never go away, can never be wished away, can never be legislated away.

Post 6

Sunday, April 5, 2009 - 3:29pm

John,

We are defining a specific kind of action as a moral transgression

See, your view starts with the transgression, with the negative. Mine starts with that against which others ought not transgress. You're starting on the other side of the bridge, at the social/political side. You've cut the tree from the trunk.

You can't say that a 'right' exists independently from the social interactions of man. That makes no more sense than saying a consciousness exists independently from a brain.

I would analogize differently -- that rights cannot exist apart from the moral agent any more than consciousness could exist apart from her or his brain. And it makes no sense to predicate one's consciousness on another's, as you predicate the existence of my rights on the existence of other people. And I believe you do so predicate, for according to you, if other people don't exist, neither do my rights. That is a second-hand view of rights, so far as I can tell.

Those both mean the exact same things.

No, they are the flipsides to the same coin. Freedmon "to" and "from" do not mean the same thing; they are just a necessary relation here.

Do you see how rights are a subset of morality? It went from "you need food to live" to "you can't get food if someone stops you from acquiring it". Do you understand what subset means?

To the first question, in my last post I explained the problem with viewing rights as a subset of morality. Name one Objectivist moral tenet that does not also entail a right. If you cannot, then there's no such subset. To the second question, yes, I think I understand what "subset" means, but is asking that really necessary? Again, rights serve a special function in the realm of morality, different from other moral concepts, e.g., value, virtue, goal, etc.

There's no difference in those terms other than they are subsets of each other.

Are you talking about the difference between "society" and "political." It's not clear to me what you're saying. I say "political" to parallel "ethical." I say "society" to parallel "individual." Not sure that helps.

What I mean by man is a social animal is that his essential nature is not one where he literally lives on a deserted island all by himself.

Who is arguing that our essential nature is to live on a desert island in solitaire? Not me. I'm arguing that we are first creative individuals, and second, contracting or social or political individuals. Sure, in the context of society, rights take on a terrific role that is not available on the desert island; they give us an organizational framework for subordinating people to (individual) moral law. But that societal role neither instantiates rights, nor enables rights to exist without first that personal context.

Jordan

Post 7

Sunday, April 5, 2009 - 7:04pm

In the thread "Evaluating Initiation of For in Emergency Situations," (Post 126) which has since moved here, Jordan quoted Rand as follows: "Rights are conditions of existence required by man’s nature for his proper survival," and asked, "Aren't there conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival, even if there's no one else around, even when stuck on that desert island?"

Sure, but that doesn't mean that there are rights on a desert island. To say that rights are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival is not to say that every such condition is therefore a right. A human being is an animal, but not every animal is a human being. A right is a moral principle defining and sanctioning man's freedom of action in a social context.

Jordan also quoted Rand, "If man is to live on earth, it is right for him to use his mind," and added, "So long as there's some action optimally conducive to furthering the moral agent's life, a right exists."

Not true. You're dropping context, Jordan. Rand's point was that since it is right for man to use his mind, it is wrong for others to interfere with his acting on his judgment and that he therefore has "a right" to such action. The full quote is as follows: "If man is to live on earth, it is right for him to use his mind, it is right to act on his own free judgment, it is right to work for is values and to keep the product of his work. If life on earth is purpose, he has a right to live as a rational being: nature forbids him the irrational." She was not saying that a right exists every time there's an action conducive to furthering one's life. Again, there are no rights on a desert island, even though there are actions on a desert island conducive to furthering one's life.

- Bill

Post 8

Sunday, April 5, 2009 - 10:27pm

Hi Bill,

Thanks for transferring the post.

To say that rights are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival is not to say that every such condition is therefore a right.

I disagree. I think that's exactly what Rand is saying. The quote I gave defines rights, and like all definitions, it identifies all units subsumed under the concept while excluding everything else. "Right," as defined above, is not a species of some genus, as you would have it per your analogy of "human" as being a species of the genus "animal." To see this point, just try to come up with some condition for existence required by your nature for your proper survival that is not a right. Under Objectivism, I don't think such a species exists. It'd be akin to coming up with some rational animal that is not human. (But there surely will be a more nuanced discussion on the opposite project -- whether rights can include stuff other than conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival -- in short, whether one has a right to do what's wrong. And I'm ready for that discussion when it comes.)

You, like John, appear to be chopping rights off at the trunk. See my post to him for details. And let me ask you and John a question quite similar to Ed's dictatorship question to John: If no one treats you as though you have rights -- e.g., they coerce or force you when and as they wish -- do you therefore not have rights?

Jordan

Post 9

Monday, April 6, 2009 - 1:53am

I wrote, "To say that rights are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival is not to say that every such condition is therefore a right." Jordan replied,

I disagree. I think that's exactly what Rand is saying. The quote I gave defines rights, and like all definitions, it identifies all units subsumed under the concept while excluding everything else.

Why do you assume that it's a definition? To say that rights are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival does not mean that there cannot be other conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival besides rights. Granted, the statement includes a genus -- "conditions of existence" -- and a differentia -- "required by man's nature for his proper survival." But that doesn't mean that Rand's statement is a definition, although a definition would include a genus and differentia. Suppose I said that man is an omnivorous animal. My statement would include a genus -- "animal" -- and a differentia -- "omnivorous." But that wouldn't imply that every omnivorous animal is a man. The same is true of Rand's statement: not every condition of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival is a right.

"Right," as defined above, is not a species of some genus, as you would have it per your analogy of "human" as being a species of the genus "animal." To see this point, just try to come up with some condition for existence required by your nature for your proper survival that is not a right.

That's easy: food and shelter. Food and shelter are required by man's nature for his proper survival, but, according to Rand, neither food nor shelter is a right, something she made clear in her essay "Man's Rights," in which she states: "Bear in mind that the right to property is a right to an action like all the others: it is not the right to an object, but to the action and the consequences of producing or earning that object." (VOS, p. 94) In the same essay, she criticizes the 1960 Democratic Party's platform on rights, which includes such things as "the right to adequate medical care" and "the right to a decent home." The proper definition of a right, according to Objectivism, is the one listed in the "Glossary of Objectivist Definitions," viz., "a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context."

(But there surely will be a more nuanced discussion on the opposite project -- whether rights can include stuff other than conditions of existence required by man's nature for his proper survival -- in short, whether one has a right to do what's wrong. And I'm ready for that discussion when it comes.)

Well, the one indispensable condition required by man's nature for his proper survival is the right to act on his own judgment, and that includes the right to do what someone else (including the government) may judge as wrong or harmful.

You, like John, appear to be chopping rights off at the trunk. See my post to him for details. And let me ask you and John a question quite similar to Ed's dictatorship question to John: If no one treats you as though you have rights -- e.g., they coerce or force you when and as they wish -- do you therefore not have rights?

No, of course, you would still have rights. The violation of a right doesn't render it non-existent. A right is a moral principle, and true moral principles deserve to be respected even when they're being violated.

- Bill

Post 10

Monday, April 6, 2009 - 10:50am

Hi Bill,

Why do you assume that it's a definition?

Heh. Why do you assume it's not? Lots of natural rights philosophers use this definition. Should I spout a slew of quotes? Rand seems often to use the term with this as the definition as well.

Food and shelter are required by man's nature for his proper survival, but, according to Rand, neither food nor shelter is a right. . .

Food and shelter are categorically wrong answers to the question. "Conditions of existence" refer to actions, as Rand explained in the quote you provided. When tasked to name conditions for existence required by our nature for our proper survival but that are not rights, the answer must be some sort of action(s).

The proper definition of a right, according to Objectivism, is the one listed in the "Glossary of Objectivist Definitions," viz., "a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context."

I acknowledge that many Objectivists view this as the definition, but it's wrong. Rights instantiate moral principles but are not themselves moral principles. When I say I have a right to property, I'm not saying I have a moral principle to property. That makes no sense. I'm saying, acquiring property is a condition of existence required by me yada yada yada.

Well, the one indispensable condition required by man's nature for his proper survival is the right to act on his own judgment, and that includes the right to do what someone else (including the government) may judge as wrong or harmful.

Hey, you beat me to the punch. :-)

The violation of a right doesn't render it non-existent.

I didn't mean that they necessarily violated your rights, just that they didn't treat you as though you had rights, meaning they treat you as though you have no more rights than a plant; maybe they squish, maybe not. But more generally, I'm trying to figure out what what society-related factors you think are needed to exist for yours rights to exist? Is is enough that you live near others? Or do they need to interact with you? Or do they need to acknowledge that you have rights while interacting with you? Or do they need to interact with you without force or coercion? It strikes me that whatever your answer is, it necessarily entails a second-hand view of rights -- a dependence of your rights on some attribute found in others (or groups of others).

Jordan

Post 11

Monday, April 6, 2009 - 12:16pm

Jordan:

I'm trying to figure out what what society-related factors you think are needed to exist for yours rights to exist?

As long as you don't accept Rand's definition of rights, you will never understand why I believe it is only used in a social context. Since she has repeatedly and explicitly used the phrase "in a social context" when defining rights, you can either accept that definition as true or not. If you don't, then you just want to drop the context of Rand's definition of rights. This is an Objectivist forum. Most of us go by her definition. But even still, rights belong to the realm of "political philosophy", and that whole branch of philosophy deals with questions of man's relationship with other men. So it's a narrower more specific application of philosophy to just that context. You keep saying there are still moral conditions required for man to exist on an deserted island, I absolutely agree with this, but you think those moral actions are still called 'rights', but this dropping context. There is still morality in this situation but it does not require any use of "political philosophy" to be applied, because on a deserted island, man has no relationship with other men accept himself.

These are basic definitions. If you don't like it or wish to use them in any commonly accepted form, we will never come to any understanding on this. And I don't see why I should accept your usage of the term 'rights' since how you want to apply it makes the term indistinguishable from any other kind of moral principle.

Or do they need to acknowledge that you have rights while interacting with you? Or do they need to interact with you without force or coercion? It strikes me that whatever your answer is, it necessarily entails a second-hand view of rights -- a dependence of your rights on some attribute found in others (or groups of others).

What do you mean a second-hand view? Others do not need to recognize you have rights in order for you to recognize they exist. So I don't understand what you're getting at. The point is that rights do no exist without it corresponding to a specific context. There is no necessity for a 'second-hand view' to understand man interacts with other men. Do you rely on other people to tell you that you have social interactions with them? Really? Can't you tell when you're talking with someone? Or can't you tell if someone tried to hurt you? You need them to recognize that for you?

I would analogize differently -- that rights cannot exist apart from the moral agent any more than consciousness could exist apart from her or his brain.

Ok fine, think of it this way, can a feeling of happiness exist independently of a brain? Rights are a subset of morality, just like happy feelings would be a subset of conscious thought.

Those both mean the exact same things.

No, they are the flipsides to the same coin. Freedmon "to" and "from" do not mean the same thing; they are just a necessary relation here.

The freedom to speak means one is free to speak without coercion. Every definition of freedom in the political context requires the qualifier that one can take action without interference.

free⋅dom
/ˈfridəm/ Show Spelled Pronunciation [free-duhm] Show IPA
–noun
1. the state of being free or at liberty rather than in confinement or under physical restraint: He won his freedom after a retrial.
2. exemption from external control, interference, regulation, etc.
3. the power to determine action without restraint.
4. political or national independence.
5. personal liberty, as opposed to bondage or slavery: a slave who bought his freedom.

To the first question, in my last post I explained the problem with viewing rights as a subset of morality. Name one Objectivist moral tenet that does not also entail a right.

By all means, the moral tenet that man requires food and shelter to live. How's that?

Again, rights serve a special function in the realm of morality, different from other moral concepts, e.g., value, virtue, goal, etc.

And folks here we have the definition of subset! Squares are parallelograms, different from other parallelograms e.g., rhombuses and rectangles. Why are you trying to reinvent the English language?

(Edited by John Armaos on 4/06, 12:53pm)

Post 12

Monday, April 6, 2009 - 1:15pm

Hi John,

I've explained why your definition of rights is inadequate. Simply asserting that most of us go by that definition will not do.

What do you mean a second-hand view? Others do not need to recognize you have rights in order for you to recognize they exist.

This is important. If rights exist only in a social context, then what factors are needed for that social context to obtain? It's the same question I asked Bill.

Read my reply to Bill's post -- where he, too, incorrectly sites food and shelter -- and please answer again: which conditions for existence (i.e., actions) required by our nature for our proper survival are not rights? No answer means no subset.

And folks here we have the definition of subset!

Nope. Natural rights and morality are perfectly congruent. Each right corresponds with a moral principle and vice versa. That rights serve a special function does not entail any subset. That special function allows see a different face on the same thing.

Jordan

Post 13

Monday, April 6, 2009 - 2:34pm

Jordan:

Hi John,

I've explained why your definition of rights is inadequate. Simply asserting that most of us go by that definition will not do.

If we can't have a common understanding of the meaning, we can't have a meaningful conversation about it. There isn't much point in discussing it. And I maintain how you wish to define rights is in such a broad way that it no longer has any commonly accepted usage of the term and makes it indistinguishable from any other kind of moral principle.

This is important. If rights exist only in a social context, then what factors are needed for that social context to obtain?

I'm not sure I understand your question. Are you asking what is a "social context"? If so, then a social context is defined as man interacting with other men. Any kind of relationship is 'social'.

Read my reply to Bill's post -- where he, too, incorrectly sites food and shelter -- and please answer again: which conditions for existence (i.e., actions) required by our nature for our proper survival are not rights? No answer means no subset.

I don't understand what you're getting at with your question. All actions to further one's survival requires that he has a right to do it because other men could enslave him and prevent him from taking those actions if he didn't have the right. It is moral to have food and shelter, because without it you'd die, but how you acquired it is a whole different question. A condition for existence is food and shelter, but an action to get food and shelter can take on many forms, you could for example forcibly take someone else's food or shelter, you could grow food and build your own shelter, you could contract someone else to do thees things for you in exchange for something else of value, etc etc. When we speak of how to acquire these things that are necessary to man's survival, we are asking a different question than just what the conditions are for his survival. The conditions for man's survival does not at all necessitate we outline a particular course of action to make those conditions possible in order to recognize what those conditions are. We do need to do that so that we can understand how to live optimally on this planet, but that's a different matter than describing the necessary conditions for survival. When we say it is moral for a farmer to grow food, we are not necessarily discussing how that act may be impacted by the actions of other men. We are speaking about these conditions initially in the broadest sense of the term, and once we recognize there's another possible factor involved to acquiring these things, and that factor being the existence of other men, we now have to define how a man can acquire these things with the realization there are other men around him.

And folks here we have the definition of subset!

Nope. Natural rights and morality are perfectly congruent. Each right corresponds with a moral principle and vice versa.

I don't even know what you're getting at. All moral principles are not rights, but all rights are moral principles. Just as all squares are parallelograms, but all parallelograms are not squares. But each square corresponds too with a parallelogram. But all parallelograms do not correspond to squares.

Morality deals broadly with what is or isn't proper conduct. To love is moral, it is proper to one's happiness, but 'rights' have nothing to do with love. Having a good, healthy relationship with your wife is proper to your existence, but 'rights' have nothing to do with that. This is what I mean by rights are a subset of morality. It is something that is specifically applied.

(Edited by John Armaos on 4/06, 3:05pm)

Post 14

Monday, April 6, 2009 - 3:21pm

It seems to me there are three “best” candidates for Ayn Rand’s definition of rights.

"Rights" are a moral concept—the concept that provides a logical transition from the principles guiding an individual's actions to the principles guiding his relationship with others—the concept that preserves and protects individual morality in a social context—the link between the moral code of a man and the legal code of a society, between ethics and politics. (VOS 108)

Thus, for every individual, a right is the moral sanction of a positive—of his freedom to act on his own judgment, for his own goals, by his own voluntary, uncoerced choice. (VOS 110)

A "right" is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context. (VOS 110)

I could not find Rand saying in writing which was her definition. The second is the definition according to Jordan. The last is Ayn Rand’s definition according to Peikoff (OPAR 351) and John Armaos.

All seem reasonable. The second seems best in accordance with the natural rights tradition. If the phrase “in a social context” is added, then it seems rights vanish whenever a person exits a social context and reappear whenever a person re-enters a social context. Also, I believe it better to not confuse when rights exist versus when they can be violated. Obviously they can only be violated in a social context.

On the other hand, it’s difficult for me to see how any of them apply to a newborn without appealing to its potential future.

Post 15

Monday, April 6, 2009 - 4:16pm

Hi John,

If we can't have a common understanding of the meaning, we can't have a meaningful conversation about it.

Isn't this whole conversation about which definition of rights is preferable?

And I maintain how you wish to define rights is in such a broad way that it no longer has any commonly accepted usage of the term and makes it indistinguishable from any other kind of moral principle.

I'm skeptical you are reading my posts closely. I rejected the notion of rights as moral principles. See Post #10. I said they instantiate moral principles. Anyway, as I've been saying, rights are moral concepts with a distinct function, e.g., they don't function like values or goals or virtues. Those are all moral concepts with other functions.

Are you asking what is a "social context"? If so, then a social context is defined as man interacting with other men. Any kind of relationship is 'social'.

That's pretty close to what I'm asking. If rights need a "social context" in order to exist, then what does that social context, at bare minimum, entail. According to your answer, it entails interacting with others, which would mean your rights exist so long as you are interacting with others, which suggests that if you stop interacting, then your rights stop existing, and when you start up again with the interacting, then your rights flit back into existence. Do you see how this renders your rights dependent on others?

A condition for existence is food and shelter. . .

Again, it doesn't look like you're reading my posts closely. I explained, a "condition for existence" must be some sort of action(s), not an object, i.e., not food or shelter. Again, see Post #10. I'm getting at the fact that you can't name a moral action -- i.e., "a condition of existence required by man’s nature for his proper survival -- that is not a moral right. Moral rights cannot be a subset of moral actions unless there is some other set of moral actions that are not rights. A set cannot be a subset of itself.

To love is moral, it is proper to one's happiness, but 'rights' have nothing to do with love.

I disagree. If it is moral to love, then you have a right to love. You always have the right to do what's moral, yes?

Jordan

Post 16

Monday, April 6, 2009 - 6:17pm

Jordan:

Hi John,

If we can't have a common understanding of the meaning, we can't have a meaningful conversation about it.

Isn't this whole conversation about which definition of rights is preferable?

Sure. And I prefer Rand's definition because it has the most meaning, hers is more useful.

I rejected the notion of rights as moral principles. See Post #10. I said they instantiate moral principles.

What does that mean? This seems a bit vague.

Anyway, as I've been saying, rights are moral concepts with a distinct function, e.g., they don't function like values or goals or virtues. Those are all moral concepts with other functions.

Ok fine, then if rights serve a distinct function (which I'm pretty sure I've been saying the same thing) then why won't you accept they are something more specific than just "morals"? Rights serve a particular purpose like values do, or virtues etc, so it's safe to say 'rights' are a subset of morals. Rights are specific moral statements, but still abstractions, just not as general as morals. I don't think what you're saying here is terribly all that different from what I'm saying.

If rights need a "social context" in order to exist, then what does that social context, at bare minimum, entail. According to your answer, it entails interacting with others, which would mean your rights exist so long as you are interacting with others, which suggests that if you stop interacting, then your rights stop existing, and when you start up again with the interacting, then your rights flit back into existence. Do you see how this renders your rights dependent on others?

Not really sure what you mean actually. You can't stop interacting with others in the sense you can withdraw from someone else's capacity to coerce you. You exist on the same planet with other men, so you can't escape that fact of reality. If you go off and live in a cave, someone can still come along and drag you out of it and beat you up. Rights depend on the existence of social interactions, i.e. they only exist if someone else has the capability to coerce you. Your rights do not depend on someone else, whether your rights are violated certainly depends on someone else's actions. But rights do not exist absent a society, because absent a society means you are talking about man existing by himself, with no one else capable of violating his rights. Hence my "deserted on an island" example was to demonstrate in this scenario, no one could possibly coerce you, so rights do not take on any meaningful importance in that kind of setting.

To love is moral, it is proper to one's happiness, but 'rights' have nothing to do with love.

I disagree. If it is moral to love, then you have a right to love. You always have the right to do what's moral, yes?

You have the right to love? What does that mean? You don't have a right to love anymore than you have a right to healthcare! Having a healthy relationship with your wife is good, i.e. moral, but you don't have a right to a healthy relationship with your wife.

(Edited by John Armaos on 4/07, 4:29am)

Post 17

Monday, April 6, 2009 - 10:30pm

I wrote, "Food and shelter are required by man's nature for his proper survival, but, according to Rand, neither food nor shelter is a right. . ." Jordan replied,

Food and shelter are categorically wrong answers to the question. "Conditions of existence" refer to actions, as Rand explained in the quote you provided.

Yes, they refer to actions (more precisely to freedom of action), but not only to freedom of action. Food is also condition of existence required for your survival, for without food, you would die. The fact that Rand was referring to those conditions of existence that involve freedom of action does not imply that the meaning of the term "conditions of existence" is confined to freedom of action. It clearly is not. It refers to any condition of existence required for your survival.

I wrote, "The proper definition of a right, according to Objectivism, is the one listed in the 'Glossary of Objectivist Definitions,' viz., 'a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context'."

I acknowledge that many Objectivists view this as the definition, but it's wrong. Rights instantiate moral principles but are not themselves moral principles. When I say I have a right to property, I'm not saying I have a moral principle to property. That makes no sense. I'm saying, acquiring property is a condition of existence required by me yada yada yada.

I don't think this will do as a definition. One can be free to acquire property without having a right to acquire it. There is a moral component to rights that has to be part of the definition. To say that you have a right to freedom is to say that others have a moral obligation to abstain from interfering with it, which is why Rand defines a right as "a moral principle defining and sanctioning man's freedom of action in a social context." The qualification "in a social context" is also important, because it would make no sense to say that others ought not to interfere with your freedom if they were not around to violate it in the first place -- if, for example, you were on a desert island or were the last person on earth.

I wrote, "The violation of a right doesn't render it non-existent."

I didn't mean that they necessarily violated your rights, just that they didn't treat you as though you had rights, meaning they treat you as though you have no more rights than a plant; maybe they squish, maybe not.

The fact that others treat you as if you had no more rights than a plant also does not gainsay your rights, because it is still true that they ought not to treat you that way.

But more generally, I'm trying to figure out what society-related factors you think are needed to exist for yours rights to exist? Is is enough that you live near others? Or do they need to interact with you? Or do they need to acknowledge that you have rights while interacting with you? Or do they need to interact with you without force or coercion? It strikes me that whatever your answer is, it necessarily entails a second-hand view of rights -- a dependence of your rights on some attribute found in others (or groups of others).

Other people must be capable of interfering with your freedom, otherwise there would be no point in saying that they "ought" not to interfere with it. "Ought" implies "can." Again, to say that others ought not to interfere with your freedom is precisely what it means to say that you have "a right" against such interference.

- Bill

Post 18

Monday, April 6, 2009 - 11:39pm

Jordan and Bill,

I think you're reading Rand's comments in very different ways, and because of that semantic difference, are talking past each other.

Rights are conditions of existence required by man’s nature for his proper survival

One way to read this is that man has certain "conditions of existence", specifically to be free to act on his own judgment, and that 'rights' are those particular conditions. This is the way many people read the statement. They think it means that 'rights' are these metaphysical requirements for living that man needs. If it said "rights are the conditions of existence", that reading would be better supported. The point though is that it sounds like a definition. It seems to be pointing out some necessary conditions for our lives, such as freedom to speak our minds and freedom to act on our own judgment, and then defines rights to be that particular set of conditions.

The other way to view it is that it is making a statement about rights, instead of defining them. The statement is that 'rights' are a necessary condition of our lives. It isn't defining rights, but pointing out that they are part of a group of conditions that we require for our survival. There may be many necessary conditions of existence, and rights are one of them. What are rights in this case? They aren't referring to the conditions of existence. They're referring to the moral sanction/principle Merlin posted above.

We can think of these two statements as:
1.) Rights are the conditions of existence... (rights refer to specific conditions)
2.) A rights is a condition of existence (and in plural form, Rights are conditions of existence) (rights are moral sanctions, but we need those moral sanctions to survive)

I can see how it can be read in each of these ways.

Post 19

Tuesday, April 7, 2009 - 4:16am