The definition of rights

John A.,

Your response seems to be only about when, and to a lesser extent how, rights can or cannot be violated, not what rights are.

(Edited by Merlin Jetton on 4/07, 5:17am)

Post 21

Tuesday, April 7, 2009 - 6:07am

Merlin I suppose so, but my response to you was not meant as an all inclusive definition of rights. Rights are rules, or moral principles, and as such these rules, or principles, can be violated, but if they couldn't be violated, there is no reason for the rule or principle to begin with. Why bother coming up with a rule if it wasn't physically possible for someone to violate it? Take a law for instance, which is a kind of rule, and let's say a particular law says you must "Keep off the grass", that's the definition of that rule "keep off the grass", and there would be no need for the rule "keep off the grass" if you didn't have any legitimate concern someone could actually do such a thing as stepping on the grass.

I'm only responding to what you said about rights "going in and out of existence" and I'm saying that makes no more sense than saying any other "rule", like "Keep off the grass" goes in and out of existence depending on if you are far far away from the grass, standing on concrete. As long as it's possible for someone to step on the grass, the rule exists. And as long as someone is capable of coercing another person, rights exist. That's all I'm saying.

(Edited by John Armaos on 4/07, 6:20am)

Post 22

Tuesday, April 7, 2009 - 12:04pm

Hi John,

An elaboration on rights as instantiatiating moral principles. . . a moral principle is a fact, a basic premise, about how we ought to live. For instance, it's a moral principle under Objectivism that property is required for our proper survival. In contrast, rights are not facts; they are not basic premises; they are not principles. They are actions that embody or instantiate those principles. A right to property instantiates the above-referenced property principle. The action (right) gives the fact (principle) legs.

Rights serve a particular purpose like values do, or virtues etc, so it's safe to say 'rights' are a subset of morals.

We might just be arguing semantics here, but I wouldn't say values or virtues are a 'subset' of morals either. They are integral to all of morality. They don't come into play under only some select moral tenets. They are always entailed, in every tenet, just like rights are.

Anyway, it looks like you and Bill might be saying that a right exists only if other people are capable of destroying it. Okay, so if I'm completely free and clear from others when I take a moral action, then I don't have a right to take that moral action? That formulation strikes me as untenable. Perhaps you deny that I am ever completely free and clear from others?

You have the right to love? What does that mean? You don't have a right to love anymore than you have a right to healthcare!

Whoa. I took "love" as an action, e.g., I have a right to care deeply if doing so is moral. That's all. "Healthcare" is not an action, so I don't have a right to do it like I have a right to love. So I'll ask again, rephrased more generally: If it is moral to act, then you have a right to act, yes?

Bill:

. . .otherwise there would be no point in saying that they "ought" not to interfere with it. "Ought" implies "can."

Weird. Others can always not interefere with me. Put a bit cryptically, when "oughting" a "not," a "can" is always entailed. Everyone can not do something to you. I don't see why they need to be looming nearby to be able to not do it. But your talk of "oughts" ties in with your notion of freedom as necessarily encompassing a freedom from other people, right?

For what it's worth, per Joe's post, I should probably emphasize that I full appreciate the vital role that rights play in society. I just reject that rights exist by virtue of any aspect of society, be it societal interaction, others' capability to coerce, or what have you.

Jordan

(Edited by Jordan on 4/07, 10:44pm)

Post 23

Tuesday, April 7, 2009 - 6:30pm

Jordan:

Hi John,

An elaboration on rights as instantiatiating moral principles. . . a moral principle is a fact, a basic premise, about how we ought to live. For instance, it's a moral principle under Objectivism that property is required for our proper survival. In contrast, rights are not facts; they are not basic premises; they are not principles. They are actions that embody or instantiate those principles. A right to property instantiates the above-referenced property principle. The action (right) gives the fact (principle) legs.

But I don't agree that is what a 'right' means, or at least I think it is an incomplete meaning. I don't believe it is only relegated to taking any kind of life sustaining action absent of any further context, I believe it also entails that one should be 'free' to take that action. And 'free' means 'without interference from others'. That is the meaning of 'free'. And before you ask, yes you have the right to take actions to sustain your life, and those actions are moral, but that doesn't mean you can take any kind of action to sustain your life. It's not just moral because it sustains you, it would also have to mean you let others do the same. You couldn't steal for example, because then you would just be denying someone else's right to take life sustaining actions. But stealing would be an act that could sustain your life, doesn't it? Do you see where I'm going with this? Just recognizing that you need to acquire food to live, and saying acquiring food is moral because it sustains your life, we haven't looked at the complete picture, we haven't taken into consideration that you are not the only person taking life-sustaining actions, and we have to then come up with a further elaboration of what are moral acts, when we do that, we've arrived at the concept of rights. Because you may just end up coming up with some solipsistic code of morality that never addresses the essential fact others that exist around you are also taking actions that may conflict with each other. Without that recognition that there might be some particular actions that you can take to sustain your own life that would mean the destruction of someone else's life, you haven't come up with a rational meaning of rights. Your definition of rights Jordan does not differentiate it from solipsism. Because you have to recognize the actions of many men, each taking a self-sustaining actions, should not interfere with one another. So I believe rights define an action you can take from specific contravening actions of others.

Okay, so if I'm completely free and clear from others when I take a moral action, then I don't have a right to take that moral action? That formulation strikes me as untenable. Perhaps you deny that I am ever completely free and clear from others?

I'm saying as long as it is possible for someone to take coercive action against you, rights as a purposeful concept exists. And yes, you can never be completely free of the capacity of others to violate your rights. That can never happen unless you were the last man on Earth and everyone else was dead. If you take away any frame of reference or experiences of someone being coerced, you would never understand what it means to be free.

I just reject that rights exist by virtue of any aspect of society, be it societal interaction, others' capability to coerce, or what have you.

And I reject your solipsistic notion that rights exist absent from any recognition of societal interactions. All 'rights' mean the freedom to act, and 'freedom' is only a comprehensible word if it was conceivable that someone could deny you that freedom.

(Edited by John Armaos on 4/07, 8:24pm)

Post 24

Tuesday, April 7, 2009 - 10:42pm

Hi John,

But stealing would be an act that could sustain your life, doesn't it?

No. Remember, "Rights are conditions of existence required by man�s nature for his proper survival," Rand writes. (Italics mine.) Stealing is an affront to our nature and is not necessary for our proper survival.

Onward... It seems you're saying that you are "free" only if others are capable of coercion or force against you. First, it's bizarre to me that you would get "freedom" only when others are capable of taking it away. That's kind of like saying you would get nourishment only if others were capable of starving you, that you would be able to move only if others are capable of making you stand still, that you would get life only if others are capable of killing you. Not my idea of "freedom." Second, it's more bizarre to me that others would always be able take any one of those freedoms away from me at any time, even the tiniest little freedom, in the remotest place, for just one teensy second. But okay. If that's your view...

The view I gave is not a "solipsistic" view of rights. It does not deny or discount that others exist. It just insists that rights are personal before they are social. And to reiterate from my Post #22, rights serve a vital societal role.

Jordan

Post 25

Tuesday, April 7, 2009 - 11:07pm

I wrote, "Other people must be capable of interfering with your freedom, otherwise there would be no point in saying that they "ought" not to interfere with it. 'Ought' implies 'can.'"

Jordan replied,

Weird. Others can always not interefere with me. In other words, if the CAN not interfere with it Put a bit cryptically, when "oughting" a "not," a "can" is always entailed. Everyone can not do something to you. I don't see why they need to be looming nearby to be able to not do it.

You're missing the point. When I said that "ought" implies "can," I meant it in the sense that there would be no point in saying that they OUGHT not to interfere with your freedom, if they CAN not interfere with it. Again, to say that others ought not to interfere with your freedom is precisely what it means to say that you have "a right" against such interference.

- Bill

Post 26

Wednesday, April 8, 2009 - 10:55am

Bill,

. . .there would be no point in saying that they OUGHT not to interfere with your freedom, if they CAN not interfere with it.

It still makes no sense to say that people ought not interfere only if they can interfere. I can always not do something. I can always not kill the King of Norway today. I wouldn't be able to even if I wanted to. Nonetheless, I ought not kill him. And I am constantly fulfilling my obligation not to kill him, even this very instant.

Again, to say that others ought not to interfere with your freedom is precisely what it means to say that you have "a right" against such interference.

I take no issue here with the notion that others shouldn't interfere with my rights. I take issue here with the notion that my rights exist simply because others can but don't interfere with them. Their obligation not to interfere is derived from the fact that I'm performing a moral action, which translates into an action to which I have a right. Their obligations are derived from that positive aspect of my rights (i.e., those condition of existence. . .). It doesn't work in reverse: My rights are not derived from others obligations not to mess with me.

Jordan

Post 27

Wednesday, April 8, 2009 - 4:53pm

Jordan:

Hi John,

"But stealing would be an act that could sustain your life, doesn't it?"

No. Remember, "Rights are conditions of existence required by man�s nature for his proper survival," Rand writes. (Italics mine.) Stealing is an affront to our nature and is not necessary for our proper survival.

Ah, so now all of a sudden to you rights do exist in a social context? Since saying rights entails prohibiting someone from stealing, that brings the concept into a social context. But you're saying that is not necessary to the definition, but then all of a sudden to you the meaning "proper" in your definition of a "proper survival" entails "not stealing". You are basically smuggling in the premise while denying it is part of the meaning of rights.

And why would you care if stealing is not proper to your survival if rights do not need to be applied to a social context? I could just as easily interpret your definition of rights not requiring that we look at the fact that man exists on the same planet with other men as a solipsistic. Because essentially the moral sanction you are attaching to "rights" doesn't matter what other people do or what you do to other people, because you've just blocked them out of your definition of 'rights'.

Onward... It seems you're saying that you are "free" only if others are capable of coercion or force against you. First, it's bizarre to me that you would get "freedom" only when others are capable of taking it away. That's kind of like saying you would get nourishment only if others were capable of starving you, that you would be able to move only if others are capable of making you stand still, that you would get life only if others are capable of killing you.

No, actually that's not what I'm saying. I'm saying you wouldn't understand what nourishment means if it wasn't possible for someone to starve. Nourishment being the opposite of starvation, you would not be able to understand one without reference to the other. It's an important concept in epistemology.

The view I gave is not a "solipsistic" view of rights. It does not deny or discount that others exist. It just insists that rights are personal before they are social. And to reiterate from my Post #22, rights serve a vital societal role.

If they serve a societal role than you are admitting they exist in a social context.

(Edited by John Armaos on 4/08, 5:13pm)

Post 28

Wednesday, April 8, 2009 - 6:38pm

I wrote, ". . .there would be no point in saying that they OUGHT not to interfere with your freedom, if they CAN not interfere with it." Jordan replied,

It still makes no sense to say that people ought not interfere only if they can interfere. I can always not do something. I can always not kill the King of Norway today. I wouldn't be able to even if I wanted to. Nonetheless, I ought not kill him. And I am constantly fulfilling my obligation not to kill him, even this very instant.

Morality implies choice, right? If there is no choice -- if you're not "able" to choose a particular action -- then what sense would it make to say that you "ought" (or ought not) to choose it? If you're not able to interfere with someone's freedom, then what sense would it make to say that you "ought" not to interfere with it? The concept "ought" pertains to what alternatives you should choose. If you're not able to choose a given alternative, there is simply no point in saying that you "ought" (or "ought not") to choose it. Moral and legal responsibility for an action imply a capacity to choose the action. Without that capacity, a person cannot be held morally or legally liable for it. Surely, as an attorney, you're aware of that!

I wrote, "Again, to say that others ought not to interfere with your freedom is precisely what it means to say that you have 'a right' against such interference."

I take no issue here with the notion that others shouldn't interfere with my rights. I take issue here with the notion that my rights exist simply because others can but don't interfere with them.

It's not that they exist because others can but "don't" interfere with them. They exist because others can but "ought not" to interfere with them.

Their obligation not to interfere is derived from the fact that I'm performing a moral action, which translates into an action to which I have a right. Their obligations are derived from that positive aspect of my rights (i.e., those condition of existence. . .). It doesn't work in reverse: My rights are not derived from others obligations not to mess with me.

Ask yourself what it means in concrete terms to say that I have a right to freedom of action? Remember, we have to reduce a concept down to its base in concrete reality; otherwise, we have a floating abstraction. What it means to say that I have "a right" to freedom of action is that others are morally obligated not to interfere with it. That's all it means, which is why Rand defines 'a right' as "a moral principle defining and sanctioning man's freedom of action in a social context." You cannot first conceive of a right to freedom of action independently of a moral obligation not to interfere with it, and then after having formed the concept, ask whether or not abstaining from such interference is morally obligatory. To conceive of such a right is to conceive of the moral obligation not to interfere with it. To say that I have a right against your interfering with my freedom of action is simply another way of saying that you ought not to interfere with it.

- Bill

Post 29

Thursday, April 9, 2009 - 12:15pm

John,

Ah, so now all of a sudden to you rights do exist in a social context?

I never denied that rights exist in a social context. I just argue that they exist primarily in a personal context. I reject that society gives rise to natural/moral rights. The actions optimally conducive to our survival change per context, including in the context of society.

Nourishment being the opposite of starvation, you would not be able to understand one without reference to the other.

Sounds like Hegelian epistemology to me -- with heavy emphasis on opposites (sometimes called "contradictions" by Hegel) -- which differs from Objectivist epistemology. That aside, nourishment exists regardless of whether people understand it. Similarly, rights exist regardless of whether people understand them or are aware of them. Most stuff exists with or without an opposite.

Bill,

I'm always able not to do something. That's why I said a "can" is always entailed when "oughting" a "not." I'm not sure what more we can discuss on this point.

What it means to say that I have "a right" to freedom of action is that others are morally obligated not to interfere with it.

Natural/moral rights entail non-interference; they are not defined by non-interference. If there is an action required by my nature for my proper survival, that means it is a moral action, and as such it follows (and does not come before) that others would be immoral were they to interfere with that moral action.

Jordan

Post 30

Thursday, April 9, 2009 - 10:12pm

In replying to me, Jordan wrote,

I'm always able not to do something. That's why I said a "can" is always entailed when "oughting" a "not." I'm not sure what more we can discuss on this point.

My point wasn't that it makes no sense to say that you ought not to do something unless you're able not to do it; my point was that it makes no sense to say that you ought not to do something unless you're able to do it. In particular, it makes no sense to say that you ought not to interfere with my freedom unless you're able to interfere with it.

I wrote, "What it means to say that I have "a right" to freedom of action is that others are morally obligated not to interfere with it."

Natural/moral rights entail non-interference; they are not defined by non-interference.

True, they're not defined by non-interference; they're defined by the moral obligation of non-interference.

If there is an action required by my nature for my proper survival, that means it is a moral action, and as such it follows (and does not come before) that others would be immoral were they to interfere with that moral action.

Strictly speaking, it is impossible to interfere with a moral action, because once the action is interfered with, it is no longer open to one's choice, in which case, it can no longer be considered moral or immoral. An action can be moral or immoral only if one is able to perform it. Once again, "ought" implies "can." If one is no longer "able" to perform an action, because someone else is interfering with it, then it is no longer an action that one "ought" to perform.

- Bill

Post 31

Thursday, April 9, 2009 - 11:23pm

Hi Bill,

...my point was that it makes no sense to say that you ought not to do something unless you're able to do it.

To do what? You ought not act unless you're able to not act? Still makes no sense. This part of the discussion might be at impasse.

...they're not defined by non-interference; they're defined by the moral obligation of non-interference.

Seems like you're still trying to define moral rights second-hand, trying to start at the social end of the rights bridge, trying to derive positive (rights) from a negative (obligations). This part of the discussion might be at impasse, too.

If one is no longer "able" to perform an action, because someone else is interfering with it, then it is no longer an action that one "ought" to perform.

I'm not sure what you're going for here. While an act is moral, the agent ought to perform it, and subsequently has a right to perform it. If someone interferes with that action, then I agree, the ability to perform it has been lost, meaning the "oughtness" of performing it has been lost, meaning the right has been lost. If my action was moral, it was immoral for others to strip it of that moral luster. It is wrong to take away what's right.

Jordan

Post 32

Friday, April 10, 2009 - 11:36am

I wrote, "...my point was that it makes no sense to say that you ought not to do something unless you're able to do it." Jordan replied,

To do what? You ought not act unless you're able to not act?

No! What I said -- and I said it very clearly -- is that it makes no sense to say that you ought not to act unless you're able to ACT (not unless you're able to NOT act)!!! Why on earth you would draw that interpretation I have no idea, especially since I added, "In particular, it makes no sense to say that that you ought not to interfere with my freedom unless you're able to interfere with it." You're so focused on your objection, you're not paying attention to what I'm saying.

I wrote,"If one is no longer 'able' to perform an action, because someone else is interfering with it, then it is no longer an action that one 'ought' to perform."

I'm not sure what you're going for here." While an act is moral, the agent ought to perform it, and subsequently has a right to perform it.

Why? You haven't proved this? You've just asserted it. If you and I have a conflict of interest, the fact that you ought to perform an act because it's in your interest does not mean that you have a right to perform it if it's also in my interest to prevent you from performing it.

If someone interferes with that action, then I agree, the ability to perform it has been lost, meaning the "oughtness" of performing it has been lost, meaning the right has been lost.

This last point doesn't follow. It doesn't follow that the right has been lost. The violation of a right does not constitute the loss of that right. You still retain your rights even when they've been violated. In fact, without the presence of the right, there would be no violation.

What I think you intended to say is that because the "oughtness" or moral obligation to perform the action has been lost, the right to perform it has been violated. But even that isn't true. The reason the right has been violated isn't that the "oughtness" or moral obligation to perform the act has been lost. The reason is simply that the perpetrator has interfered with the victim's freedom to act on his judgment (whether his judgment is right or wrong, moral or immoral). It doesn't have anything to do with the victim's moral obligation to perform the act that he's been prevented from performing, since in being prevented from performing it, he no longer has any moral obligation to perform it.

If my action was moral, it was immoral for others to strip it of that moral luster. It is wrong to take away what's right.

You can't take away "what's right," since "what's right" depends on the options. If you change someone's options by restricting his freedom, you simply change what it is right for him to do; you don't take it away. For example, suppose that there were no income tax. Then it might be "right" for me to spend a certain portion of my money on a new car. But if I am taxed 40%, then it may be "right" for me to forgo the purchase of a new car. The imposition of the tax does not take away what it is right for me to do; it simply changes it. Before the tax, it was right for me to spend my money on a new car. After the tax is imposed, it is right for me to forgo the purchase of a new car.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer on 4/10, 11:39am)

Post 33

Friday, April 10, 2009 - 3:06pm

Bill,

. . .it makes no sense to say that you ought not to act unless you're able to ACT

Sigh. I maintain that whether I am able to do something is irrelevant do whether I ought not do something. You say I ought not kill the King, but only if I am able to kill the King, right? I say I ought not kill the King one way or other. Look at it this way. An action is either morally permissible, mandatory, or prohibited by one's moral code. These moral prescripts are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. In the case of the King, you'd say it's not prohibited to kill him unless I am actually able to kill him, so it logically follows then that I am permitted or mandated to kill him, which strikes me as absurd.

I suppose we could salvage your emphasis on "ability" by couching every moral precept as a hypothetical, such that when I say "I ought not kill the king" what I actually mean is that "if I were able to kill the king, then I ought not." But this reformulation won't save your point one way or other.

I wrote: "While an act is moral, the agent ought to perform it, and subsequently has a right to perform it." Bill responded:

. . .the fact that you ought to perform an act because it's in your interest does not mean that you have a right to perform it if it's also in my interest to prevent you from performing it.

Because "oughts" cannot contradict, it follows that others can't have "oughts" that kill my "oughts."

It doesn't follow that the right has been lost. The violation of a right does not constitute the loss of that right. You still retain your rights even when they've been violated

We disagree. A violated moral/natural right is a lost right. We call it "violated" just to point out that it was lost by the immoral actions of others. If someone steals my car, then my right to my car is lost; and because it is lost through the immoral actions of others, I can say my right is "violated." Importantly, I still have the right to remedy wrongs done against me, as that is definitely something required by my nature for my proper survival. So when I lose my right to my car, I still keep my right to get my car back.

You can't take away "what's right," since "what's right" depends on the options. If you change someone's options by restricting his freedom, you simply change what it is right for him to do; you don't take it away.

First, under Objectivism, any context requires freedom to act on our own judgment. Interfering with that judgment doesn't merely shift us to a different set of available options; it undermines all options. "Man's mind will not function at the point of a gun," Rand writes. Second, when we look at whether others a right is lost (including whether it was violated), we look at the context in which it was allegedly taken, not the context following the alleged taking. We ask, "did the alleged victim have a right at the time and place of the alleged rights loss/violation. Investigating a loss of a right (or a violated right) is always a backward-looking procedure.

Jordan

Post 34

Friday, April 10, 2009 - 4:10pm

Jordan:

John,

Ah, so now all of a sudden to you rights do exist in a social context?

I never denied that rights exist in a social context. I just argue that they exist primarily in a personal context.

Yet the definition you provide is one where it can only make sense if we were talking about a social context. You said yourself rights are defined as the conditions of existence proper for your survival, and you define proper to mean one ought to allow others the pursuit of their own survival. So it's not just any kind of condition of existence for survival, but a particular one, because you refuted someone like a dictator is fulfilling his conditions for existence for a proper survival, since he is doing so in a way that violates the notion of a "proper survival". Yet a dictator still survives, but he has no right to be a dictator, why? Because he doesn't allow others the same pursuit of their own survival. Within your own definition you include the premise that rights exist in a social context. If you have some other definition in mind that doesn't include the words "proper survival" then let me know. But as it stands now you've included the premise of a social context in your own interpretation of your own definition of rights. You can't define "proper survival" without defining particular actions one ought not to do to someone else.

Nourishment being the opposite of starvation, you would not be able to understand one without reference to the other.

Sounds like Hegelian epistemology to me -- with heavy emphasis on opposites (sometimes called "contradictions" by Hegel) -- which differs from Objectivist epistemology. That aside, nourishment exists regardless of whether people understand it.

Of course what you're saying is true, but it's also not at all what I said now is it? You've twisted my words from "you can only understand what it means to be nourished if it was possible you could starve" to "nourishment exists regardless of whether people understand it". Now how did you come to that interpretation? You've shifted the meaning of the sentence from how one can come to an understanding of a concept to the concept exists whether one is ignorant of it or not. Two completely different ideas. Ignorance isn't what I'm talking about, the only way to know the concept of nourishment is by understanding what happens if you don't get it. If you're ignorant of that, of course it doesn't change the fact you would starve if you didn't get nourishment. But it also doesn't mean if you have no knowledge of the concept of "nourishment" that you could possibly attain such knowledge if it weren't possible you could starve.

(Edited by John Armaos on 4/10, 5:05pm)

Post 35

Friday, April 10, 2009 - 6:00pm

I wrote, . . .it makes no sense to say that you ought not to act unless you're able to ACT." Jordan replied,

Sigh. I maintain that whether I am able to do something is irrelevant do whether I ought not do something. You say I ought not kill the King, but only if I am able to kill the King, right? I say I ought not kill the King one way or other. Look at it this way. An action is either morally permissible, mandatory, or prohibited by one's moral code. These moral prescripts are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. In the case of the King, you'd say it's not prohibited to kill him unless I am actually able to kill him, so it logically follows then that I am permitted or mandated to kill him, which strikes me as absurd.

You're still not getting it. What I am saying is that morality doesn't apply to actions that you're not capable of choosing. Because morality is a code of values to guide your choices and actions (Rand's definition), it does not and cannot apply to actions over which you have no choice.

I wrote: "While an act is moral, the agent ought to perform it, and subsequently has a right to perform it." Bill responded:
. . .the fact that you ought to perform an act because it's in your interest does not mean that you have a right to perform it if it's also in my interest to prevent you from performing it.
Because "oughts" cannot contradict, it follows that others can't have "oughts" that kill my "oughts."

They don't contradict. I ought to try to steal your food (if doing so is necessary to my survival), and you ought to try to stop me (if doing so is necessary to your survival). There is no contradiction here; there is simply a conflict of interest. I ought to try to prevent you from acting in your interest if it's in my interest to do so, and you ought to try to prevent me from acting in my interest if it's in your interest to do so. Morality pertains to actions over which you have control, not to actions over which you have no control.

Think of a football game. If I am the fullback and you are the defensive lineman, I ought to try to run through the defensive line, and you ought to try to stop me from running through the defensive line. Do these two "oughts" contradict each other? No, because they pertain only to the choices and actions that each player has control over.

I wrote, "It doesn't follow that the right has been lost. The violation of a right does not constitute the loss of that right. You still retain your rights even when they've been violated."

We disagree. A violated moral/natural right is a lost right. We call it "violated" just to point out that it was lost by the immoral actions of others. If someone steals my car, then my right to my car is lost . . .

No, your car is lost, not your right to your car. If your right to your car were lost, you wouldn't have a right to repossess it. You don't lose your rights simply because someone violates them.

. . . and because it is lost through the immoral actions of others, I can say my right is "violated." Importantly, I still have the right to remedy wrongs done against me, as that is definitely something required by my nature for my proper survival. So when I lose my right to my car, I still keep my right to get my car back.

If you lose your right to your car, you no longer have a right to it. On what grounds, then, do you have a right to get it back? You'd have a right to get it back only if you still had a right to it after it was stolen.

I wrote, "You can't take away 'what's right,' since 'what's right' depends on the options. If you change someone's options by restricting his freedom, you simply change what it is right for him to do; you don't take it away."

First, under Objectivism, any context requires freedom to act on our own judgment. Interfering with that judgment doesn't merely shift us to a different set of available options; it undermines all options. "Man's mind will not function at the point of a gun," Rand writes.

What she means is that his mind won't function (or function effectively) in the service of the action that he is forced to perform, because he cannot freely evaluate the worth of the action outside the context of coercion. But his mind (as such) still functions. He still has options. I am forced to pay taxes at the point of a gun. Does that mean that my mind no longer functions at all? Does it mean that all of my options are undermined? No, I still have the option of paying my taxes or of not paying them, and I can still decide which I would rather do, based on a consideration of the relative consequences.

- Bill

Post 36

Friday, April 10, 2009 - 10:27pm

John,

Yet the definition you provide is one where it can only make sense if we were talking about a social context.

Not so. The definition I'm defending can be applied within a social context, but it doesn't have to be. A condition of existence required by my nature for my proper survival doesn't always have to entail some relationship with others.

the only way to know the concept of nourishment is by understanding what happens if you don't get it.

This reformulation changes nothing, and it's still a useless point. Now you're just saying the only way to know the concept of "rights" is by understanding what happens if you don't get them. Who care if one doesn't understand the concept? That doesn't make the units of that concept any less real. My rights exist (and have definition) regardless of whether someone manages to form a concept for them.

Bill,

Heh. Apparently, you're not getting it either.

What I am saying is that morality doesn't apply to actions that you're not capable of choosing. ... Because morality is a code of values to guide your choices and actions (Rand's definition), it does not and cannot apply to actions over which you have no choice.

You totally bypassed the three mutually exclusive but jointly exhaustive moral prescripts that I mentioned. I hoped that would've made some headway, but alas it didn't. Anyway, my argument doesn't reject the Objectivism view of morality, but I think I see how you got to that. I think this might boil down to a difference in our understanding "ought not." It has to do with what we are choosing when we're "oughting not."

You think "oughting not" implies choosing to not act where one otherwise could act. I don't think that last preposition is needed. I think "oughting not" means choosing a non-action, and I am capable of choosing that non-action regardless of whether I could choose an action. (I hope you don't deny that I can choose a non-action.) Just to apply our differences to the example I'm using:

When I say I ought not kill the King, I am saying I've chosen non-action with regard to King killing. I am fulfilling this moral obligation just by sitting here at home! But for you to say that I ought not kill the King, you first need me to get him marked in the scope of my rifle. Only then does choice of non-action become obligatory for you.

Since we appear to be going in circles here, let me try another way around. I've been saying your obligations not to interfere with me are derived from my rights, not vice versa. But there's another, perhaps stronger, way that your obligations are derived, and that is by deriving them from your rights.

Under Objectivism, force and fraud run contrary to our nature -- and thereby undermine our proper survival -- and therefore cannot be moral actions -- and therefore cannot be rights. They run contrary to our (individual-based) nature primarily for the same reason productivity and honesty run concordant with our (individual-based) nature: because our nature rests in the fact that we are creative animals: We need our own judgment. Force and fraud kill our own judgment; rationality and honest preserve it. I therefore have no right to force or defraud you, lest I contradict my nature. That's not just a conflict of interest; that's an outright contradiction.

I ought to try to steal your food (if doing so is necessary to my survival), and you ought to try to stop me (if doing so is necessary to your survival).

I would stick the word "proper" before "survival" each time, just to drive home the point that "survival" in Objectivism is more than just "stayin' alive." But not a big deal. If we descend to such a fundamental conflict that stealing is required by my nature for my proper survival, and stopping me is required by your nature for your proper survival -- then we're pretty screwed! I do not want to dive back into the emergency situations thread, but that's what this situation would amount to. Suffice it to say that in this situation we're either stuck with a contradiction in morality -- that it is impossible for these two moral actions to coexist -- or we maintain the morality cannot contradictions and simply jettison this whole affair from the realm of morality, as we do when staring down the barrel of a gun, since at that point all our options are zeroed out, except for one. At that point, the mind functions, but in some sort of sub-human fashion, some fashion not proper to our nature, thus some sub-moral fashion.

Per your football analogy... I'd prefer a real example, not analogies to games, but that's okay. To humor your analogy, this is where the three mutually exclusive but jointly exhaustive moral prescripts are helpful. It is morally permissible for you to run at me, and morally permissible for me to try and stop you. Moral permissives needn't contradict. But if somehow my action were morally mandatory (like stay on my side before the play begins), then it's morally prohibitive for you to try and stop me (uh....somehow come over and drag me off my side??). Mandatories entail prohibitives.

No, your car is lost, not your right to your car. ....

I don't think this formulation serves your view. I thought you thought a right implies some ability to do something? If I lose my car, I lose my ability to act with respect to my car, and I therefore lose my right to it, don't I?

On what grounds, then, do you have a right to get it back? You'd have a right to get it back only if you still had a right to it after it was stolen.

I explained this. It's not the (now lost) right to my car that entitles me to get my car back. It's a different right that entitles me to get my car back. Like I said, it's my right to remedy wrongs done against me. This is a right, under the view I'm defending, if remedying wrongs done against me is required by my nature for my proper survival, and according to Objectivism, it is. It is on this ground that I have a right to get my car (and my lost right to it) back. Identifying the loss of my rights as a "violation" tells me whether and who to go after to remedy the wrong.

I'd like to start wrapping up. It's taxing to argue a view one doesn't fully endorse.

Jordan

Post 37

Saturday, April 11, 2009 - 1:04am

I wrote, "What I am saying is that morality doesn't apply to actions that you're not capable of choosing. ... Because morality is a code of values to guide your choices and actions (Rand's definition), it does not and cannot apply to actions over which you have no choice." Jordan replied,

You totally bypassed the three mutually exclusive but jointly exhaustive moral prescripts that I mentioned.

I didn't bypass them; I addressed them by pointing out that morality doesn't apply to actions that you're incapable of choosing. Your three mutually exclusive but jointly exhaustive moral prescripts would apply only where morality itself applies, and since morality doesn't apply to actions that you're incapable of choosing, your three moral prescripts don't apply to them either.

You think "oughting not" implies choosing to not act where one otherwise could act. I don't think that last preposition is needed. I think "oughting not" means choosing a non-action, and I am capable of choosing that non-action regardless of whether I could choose an action. (I hope you don't deny that I can choose a non-action.)

You're not capable of choosing it versus choosing the alternative, which is what it means to say that you "choose" it in this context. For instance, it would make no sense to say that I "choose" to be a human being instead of a monkey, since I couldn't become a monkey if I wanted to. Similarly, if I were incapable of choosing to violate your rights, it would make no sense to say that I choose to abstain from violating them, since I couldn't violate them if I wanted to.

When I say I ought not kill the King, I am saying I've chosen non-action with regard to King killing. I am fulfilling this moral obligation just by sitting here at home! But for you to say that I ought not kill the King, you first need me to get him marked in the scope of my rifle. Only then does choice of non-action become obligatory for you.

I'm not saying that you have to have him in the scope of your rifle, but you must at least be capable of killing him in order for it to make sense to say that you should abstain from doing so. There would be no point in saying that you should abstain from killing him, if you were incapable of doing so, to begin with.

Since we appear to be going in circles here, let me try another way around. I've been saying your obligations not to interfere with me are derived from my rights, not vice versa. But there's another, perhaps stronger, way that your obligations are derived, and that is by deriving them from your rights.

Under Objectivism, force and fraud run contrary to our nature -- and thereby undermine our proper survival -- and therefore cannot be moral actions -- and therefore cannot be rights. They run contrary to our (individual-based) nature primarily for the same reason productivity and honesty run concordant with our (individual-based) nature: because our nature rests in the fact that we are creative animals: We need our own judgment. Force and fraud kill our own judgment; rationality and honesty preserve it. I therefore have no right to force or defraud you, lest I contradict my nature. That's not just a conflict of interest; that's an outright contradiction.

If I understand the the thrust of your statement, I agree with it, given a normal context in which survival by production and trade is possible.

I wrote, "I ought to try to steal your food (if doing so is necessary to my survival), and you ought to try to stop me (if doing so is necessary to your survival)."

I would stick the word "proper" before "survival" each time, just to drive home the point that "survival" in Objectivism is more than just "stayin' alive."

Yes, it's more than just staying alive -- more than just sustaining your life; it's sustaining a happy, enjoyable life -- a life worth living.

But not a big deal. If we descend to such a fundamental conflict that stealing is required by my nature for my proper survival, and stopping me is required by your nature for your proper survival -- then we're pretty screwed! I do not want to dive back into the emergency situations thread, but that's what this situation would amount to. Suffice it to say that in this situation we're either stuck with a contradiction in morality -- that it is impossible for these two moral actions to coexist . . .

It's not impossible for these two moral actions to exist. Why do you keep claiming this? If each action is in the interest of the actor (which in this case it is), then each action is moral, even if it entails a conflict of interest.

. . . -- or we maintain the morality cannot [allow?] contradictions and simply jettison this whole affair from the realm of morality, as we do when staring down the barrel of a gun, since at that point all our options are zeroed out, except for one. At that point, the mind functions, but in some sort of sub-human fashion, some fashion not proper to our nature, thus some sub-moral fashion.

There is no reason to think that if one is forced at the point of a gun, the mind ceases to function except in a sub-human fashion. That just isn't true. I'm forced to pay taxes; that does not mean that every April 15th, my mind ceases to function except in a sub-human fashion. If it did, I wouldn't be able to do my taxes! :-)

Per your football analogy... I'd prefer a real example, not analogies to games, but that's okay. To humor your analogy, this is where the three mutually exclusive but jointly exhaustive moral prescripts are helpful. It is morally permissible for you to run at me, and morally permissible for me to try and stop you. Moral permissives needn't contradict. But if somehow my action were morally mandatory (like stay on my side before the play begins), then it's morally prohibitive for you to try and stop me (uh....somehow come over and drag me off my side??). Mandatories entail prohibitives.

Given the nature of the game and his participation, it is not just permissible but mandatory for the fullback to try to gain yardage. If he chose not to when the play called for his participation, he would betray his team-mates and his job as football player.

I wrote, "No, your car is lost, not your right to your car. ...."

I don't think this formulation serves your view. I thought you thought a right implies some ability to do something? If I lose my car, I lose my ability to act with respect to my car, and I therefore lose my right to it, don't I

My point was that you don't have a right to an object as such, but a right to the act of producing or earning the object. However, once you earn it, you have a right to the object in the sense of a right to use and control it according to your own judgment. So, if you earned (i.e., purchased) your car, instead of stealing it, then you would have a right to it in this latter sense. So, it would make sense to say that if your car is stolen, you lose your ability to act with respect to your car, but it would not make sense to say that you lose your right to act with respect to it.

I wrote, "On what grounds, then, do you have a right to get it back? You'd have a right to get it back only if you still had a right to it after it was stolen."

I explained this. It's not the (now lost) right to my car that entitles me to get my car back. It's a different right that entitles me to get my car back. Like I said, it's my right to remedy wrongs done against me.

Yes, the theft of your car was a wrong done against you, but the wrong was losing your car to the thief; it was not losing your right to your car (i.e., the right to use and control it as you choose). You retained that right. Of course, you have a right to remedy the wrongs done against you as well as a right to repossess your car, because you remained the rightful owner. Remedying the wrong done against you goes beyond simply retrieving your car; you are entitled to additional compensation for the time during which you were deprived of its use.

I'd like to start wrapping up. It's taxing to argue a view one doesn't fully endorse.

If you don't fully endorse it, then why are you arguing for it? It's disingenuous to argue for a view that you don't fully support. If I had known that you didn't fully support it, I wouldn't have wasted my time replying to you.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer on 4/11, 1:11am)

Post 38

Saturday, April 11, 2009 - 9:25am

Hi Bill,

I'll reply just to your last point. I discuss moral/natural rights theory for the same reason I discuss utilitarianism, or theism, or socialism. You find elements of these views everywhere. They are important. It's behooves me and others to understand them well, to understand their application and influence....because they are not going anywhere. Oh, and it's just damn interesting.

Jordan

Post 39

Saturday, April 11, 2009 - 9:57am