| | Bill,
You said, "If a person is incapable of exercising a capacity, then he doesn't have it. What sense does it make to say that I have the capacity to run a mile under four minutes, if no matter how much training I do, I'm incapable of exercising it?!"
You may well have the capacity to run a mile under four minutes, but aren't able to exercise it because you are out of shape or under the weather or a muddy course is in front of you - that's obvious! On the other hand, a tortoise does not have the capacity to do four minute miles and it is not there for the tortoise to exercise. That makes it clear that the "capacity to reason" is being used in two different ways! One way is talking about what is normal to the species - and is in the machinery and can be said to be human nature. The other is a momentary examination of the ability to exercise that capability under current circumstances by a specific individual or group of individuals. Say I take a flu medication and it makes me woozy - as it wears off I might reasonably ask, "Am I capable of exercising my normal rational capabilities which I have, in general, because it is normal for a human to be capable of reason." That is three different categories of "capable of reason" - me now, me normal, normal to the human species as a capacity.
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You wrote, "Then why is rationality a precondition for individual rights, if an individual can possess individual rights without being able to exercise reason? What is it about reason that entitles those who possess it to individual rights? You seem completely oblivious to the importance of this issue. You write as if the relationship between reason and rights were self-explanatory."
Bill, it is our mode of survival, as determined from the nature of our species, and what our survival requires that lead us to several preconditions of rights. One of them is the capacity to reason. But it is really more important to recognize that this mode of survival is more than just the reasoning, it is also the action taken, and above all, the decision making based upon reasoning - that is, the choosing that fits between the reasoning and the acting. This chain of events works best, is optimized, when it is unlimited for an individual on the proverbial desert island. But if that individual is in a society of other individuals, then it is best optimized if this process (reason-choose-act) is limited to those acts that don't violate the reason-choose-act of other individuals, and no other limits applied. I am NOT oblivious - it just isn't possible to write an entire book - that is to include all things - in a single post.
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You said, "I can say that an IRS agent ought not to initiate force against me, even if he thinks otherwise, because he is capable in principle of grasping the moral principle of rights and applying it. I cannot say that a mountain lion ought not to initiate force against me, because it is not capable in principle of grasping the moral principle of rights and applying it. "Ought" implies "can."
Yes, exactly. In both cases you are referring to the nature of the species. You are expecting a human ("an" IRS agent - not "this" IRS agent) to have a capacity. You say "a" mountain lion, not "this animal in front of me"... and you use your knowledge of the nature of that species to determine what it is capable of. Your "ought" says what you believe "is" in the nature of mountian lions. A mountain lion, by nature, does not get rights, because they can't reason, make choices, and require the reasoning and making of choices for their survival. As a species they could not use moral principles since as a species they cannot grasp them - it is not in their nature. You don't need to examine each individual lion, or each sub-grouping of lions, like lion cubs, or SouthWestern US Mountain lions - the issue was settled at the species level and their non-rights were, in effect, attached at that point. Done.
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I said, "Imagine a mother killed her baby, and she was prosecuted and convicted and executed. She would have been killed even though she had violated no individual rights - according to your theory and by applying your legal bright line [birth]."
You replied, "The baby may not have been rational at the time she killed it, but you still need a clear-cut standard which the law can refer to. If she violates that standard, she deserves to be prosecuted." Well, we can try to find a better bright line, some test of budding rationality, some behavioral trait that anyone could observe that would preceed rationality with a safe margin. Let's say we settle on one of those. We still have the same problem - the woman could kill the child on one side of the bright line and be executed, legally for killing something that had no rights (according to you), or killed on the otherside of the bright line and not be prosecuted despite having killed an individual human being that following normal developmental progress that would lead to full rationality in months (years? decades? never?) Your position can't be rationally argued unless you accept that killing babies is okay under your theory.
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In terms or "having" rights versus "respecting" rights, you said, "But don't you see that the two are interrelated?" Yes, I see that.
You continue, "Rights are a moral principle, and moral principles must be grasped and applied." I'd say "should" instead of "must" - but we agree.
You continue, "To say that I have a right to freedom means that you "ought" to respect it, and to say that you have a right to freedom means that I "ought" to respect it." That is all true, but beside the point I was making. (The next sentence you wrote doesn't always hold true: "If it is not the case that I ought to respect your freedom, then it is also not the case that you ought to respect mine." If you were a thief, then it is a case where I ought not to respect your rights, but if I have not violated anyone's rights, you ought to respect mine. But that has nothing to do with our area of disagreement.)
I can have rights and someone may not respect them - they should but they might not. We both know and agree with that. What you seem to be saying, or avoiding examining, is that a person can possess rights without having to be aware that they do. And those rights can be violated. The fundamental position is "having" rights. Only next comes the issue of "being aware" of rights, and only then can you discuss "respecting" rights.
I can cage the lion - not because it doesn't respect my rights, which makes no sense. I can cage the lion because it has no rights. Why does it have no rights? Well, you can phrase it in different ways, but it boils down to this: Lions, by their nature, are not rational, volitional creatures. As a species, lions have no rights.
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You say, "To say that an agent "ought" to act a certain way means that it is capable of rational choice. If it is not capable of rational choice, then it is not subject to moral obligations. Moral principles, including rights, apply only to members of a rational community -- those who are capable of grasping and applying abstract moral principles. That means that animals, fetuses and even newborn babies are not technically rights-bearing entities."
We agree on everything you said there... until that last sentence. It is because of how we are applying/understanding the word "capable" - I apply it species-wide. Is the species capable of rational choice, then rights adhere. Rights apply to those [species] who are capable of grasping and applying abstract moral principles. That means that non-human animals and fetuses are not rights bearing entities, but that people in a coma and new born babies are. (The fetus is a human fetus, but it is not a human being).
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I understand about the setting of the bar, and about drawing a bright line in the best place... that isn't where our disagreement lies.
I'm just pointing out that you will likely have insurmountable difficulties, or, at best, a very awkward time doing so if you have to measure the individual in front of you to make a determination of rights-bearing or not.
The only way around it, and a more elegant and logical choice is to see rights adhering at the species level. That it is the rational/moral nature of the species that leads to the concept of rights. It is because of what we have in common, that we also have in common this set of natural rights. It is because of what lions don't have, as a species, that lions individually, or in a community, or as a species don't have rights.
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