Rights of Children and Mentally Handicapped?

Jon,

I agree with your formulation. That is similar to how I hold it in my mind, I just used simpler language in my description. Individual rights adhere fully when the baby is separated (becomes an individual) and may partially adhere when the baby is capable of living separately as an individual. That last is questionable because of rights of the mother and how one frames the 'contract' or 'obligation' of a parent.

But the point I wanted to make is that we do NOT derive the concept of rights from a individual person. To do that would be backwards. We derive the concept of rights from the concept of man - from human nature. My rights don't come from MY capacity to reason (which is fine right now, but if I drop into a coma, wouldn't exist). We don't look at each individual person and their circumstance to determine if individual rights exist, we just ask if they are human. If so, they have rights and if they don't violated the rights of others, their rights are seen as intact.

I agree with Rand's formulation of rights - that they arise out of man's need to make choices, out of man's capacity to reason as the means of making those choices - those are the metaphysical conditions of existence that form the basis for rights. That isn't a discussion of my rights, but of the rights of all humans. It isn't a discussion of my capacity to reason, but of the capacity that is the hallmark of humanness - of man in general.

(Edited by Steve Wolfer on 5/09, 11:37am)

Post 61

Saturday, May 9, 2009 - 11:43am

Jon and John,

As Jon acknowledged, we need a bright line, not a fuzzy one. Birth certainly fulfills that criterion to a T. Now you could argue that the third trimester (a la Roe V. Wade) also does. But birth has the added advantage of allowing the mother to abort up to the point of delivery. That's an advantage to the mother, and it's one that doesn't violate the rights of the fetus, because the fetus does not yet possess the capacity to reason.

- Bill

Post 62

Saturday, May 9, 2009 - 11:53am

Ed made this statement in post #59: "There are things with no capacity to reason -- i.e., rocks and water"

We don't go to each rock in question and examine it to see if it is an exception to the "rocks don't have the capacity to reason" rule - we look at the nature of rocks, and if it is not in the nature of rocks to reason, we never have to examine rocks individually, or types of rocks. We don't have to get into a dispute about sandstone versus quartz. 'Rock' is more fundamental, while 'quartz' or 'sandstone' are derived from 'rock' and therefore what is true for rock will be true for quartz.

Post 63

Saturday, May 9, 2009 - 12:09pm

Bill,

You said, "As Jon acknowledged, we need a bright line, not a fuzzy one. Birth certainly fulfills that criterion to a T. Now you could argue that the third trimester (a la Roe V. Wade) also does. But birth has the added advantage of allowing the mother to abort up to the point of delivery. That's an advantage to the mother, and it's one that doesn't violate the rights of the fetus, because the fetus does not yet possess the capacity to reason."

The need for a bright line is more a legal need than the fine parsing of a moral principle. We have to draw lines with the law to make it possible to follow them clearly - we purposely shade the black and white of morality a small amount to achieve a black and white law in terms of being able to observe it.

But the important thing isn't the bright line. It is the part of the statement where you say, "...doesn't violate the rights of the fetus, because the fetus does not yet possess the capacity to reason." The rights of fetus/baby/child/adult don't depend upon their individual ability to reason, or their individual capacity to reason. Their rights depend upon being human, because it is human nature that declares the capacity for rationality as being man's means of survival. The bright line or the moral parsing need to focus upon when do we call a fetus a human - because that is when individual rights adhere.

Post 64

Saturday, May 9, 2009 - 12:09pm

but they surely possess it in the days prior to due date, which we know because hundreds of thousands of them have been C-sectioned in the days prior to due date and have turned out just fine.
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You've presumed such, because they survived - but ye no idea how much less they may have been for coming in early, what little glitches they possess as consequence...

(Edited by robert malcom on 5/09, 12:10pm)

Post 65

Saturday, May 9, 2009 - 12:44pm

Steve,

Does a human being that's a vegetable have the same rights as a normal human being? He does, according to your standard, because he's part of "man in general." But there is no such thing as "man in general." There are only particular human beings. Man in general does not exist. Individual human beings do, which is why we say that they possess "individual rights."

However, it is only those individuals who have the capacity to reason who possess rights. They possess rights, because they can recognize and respect them. Non-rational animals do not possess rights, because they cannot grasp or apply the principle of rights. A 'right' is a moral principle, and non-rational animals -- whether human or non-human -- do not have the capacity to grasp and apply abstract principles.

To say that a rational human being possesses rights does not mean that he possesses them only when he's awake or fully functional. A rational human being who has chosen to take a nap, say, has a right to have his choices respected just as much as if he had chosen to remain awake. A person who is in an accident and ends up comatose has presumably chosen to sustain his life and retain title to his property just as much as if he had remained conscious and fully functional. And those choices would, therefore, merit respect as well.

A fetus, by contrast, has not yet reached the stage at which it has the capacity to make rational choices. So, unlike the sleeping or comatose person, it has not yet made the kind of choices that deserve to respected.

- Bill

Post 66

Saturday, May 9, 2009 - 1:05pm

Further - to make a choice is an acting for survival, a necessary acting - yet while in the womb, what such is there for the fetus? none - as all is acted by the female who carries it...

Post 67

Saturday, May 9, 2009 - 2:28pm

Bill,

You said, "Does a human being that's a vegetable have the same rights as a normal human being?"

Yes, he does. And they are all negative rights. He does not have the right to be fed, or cared for. So, he isn't able to act on his rights but that does not mean he does not have the rights. If he 'comes back' from being a vegetable, he can move forward with his life. If someone chooses to take care of him while he is a vegetable, that is their choice. If no one takes care of him, and he dies, it is not because of him not having rights or because of anyone violating his rights.
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You said, "But there is no such thing as "man in general." There are only particular human beings. Man in general does not exist. Individual human beings do, which is why we say that they possess "individual rights."

Either you are stating the obvious, that a concept is a concept while concretes are concretes, or you are saying that concepts have no meaning.

We examine the concept of man to determine the common properties - human nature. Individual rights are also referred to as universal rights - both terms capture Rand's meaning which is that they belong to all individuals who are human, and not some subset, or group. That is why we say they possess "individual rights" - and please look to your sentence... who are you referring to when you say "they"? Are you going to name each concrete, each individual instantiation? Are you going to point at all entities or mime? Or are you going to say all who are human? Rand and I are only distinguishing "individual" rights from "group" rights in order to say they belong to each individual as a human.
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You said, "...it is only those individuals who have the capacity to reason who possess rights."

And, "They [those individuals] possess rights, because they can recognize and respect them."

I am taking this to mean that "capacity" is applied individual by individual - perhaps with no reference to human nature at all. The person in a coma, a baby, anyone who is asleep, these are all individuals who fail this capacity test. A test that potentially needs to be reapplied to each and every instance of each and every individuals life. The entire chain or reasoning needs fresh validation - does this individual's life require reason? Does this individual actually recognize and respect rights? Or, would it be sufficient to measure this individual's capacity, at this time, to do that recognition and respect, even if they choose to think differently?

I have no clue as to why you throw out human nature as if the concept of man has no meaning and yet attempt to make arguments that you expect to apply to man universally as moral arguments.
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You say, "A rational human being who has chosen to take a nap, say, has a right to have his choices respected just as much as if he had chosen to remain awake. A person who is in an accident and ends up comatose has presumably chosen to sustain his life and retain title to his property just as much as if he had remained conscious and fully functional. And those choices would, therefore, merit respect as well."

By what standard? Why give him a break because he is asleep? You said he has a right to have his rights respected when he is asleep, but you made his capacity to reason the source of rights (which he cannot do while asleep) which puts you right in the middle of a circular argument.
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I maintain that you cannot defend this position for all individuals, as a set of universal principles, without it being a set of principles derived from human nature. It is the conditions of existence and the nature of man that determine our rights. When you accept that, you no longer need to examine each person, in each situation, or other animals, or rocks. And, going further, you cannot abandon the more fundamental position of capacity meaning the capacity referred to in human nature, to redefine it for rights, based upon what you see in an individual circumstance.

And here is another problem with your approach. If you abandon human nature as the location of the capacity of reason, you logically should abandon a general statement of what existence requires. It would be logical to say that a pampered rich kid can be killed, not because that kid doesn't possess a rational capacity, but because he doesn't need it - his particular circumstance do not demand that he be rational, all will be provided for him.
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You said, "A fetus, by contrast, has not yet reached the stage at which it has the capacity to make rational choices. So, unlike the sleeping or comatose person, it has not yet made the kind of choices that deserve to respected."

I agree that a fetus (let us talk about the 1st trimester, just to keep from getting lost in physiology or technology), does not have rights - but for different reasons and I argue that your approach can be shot down.

The capacity of making rational choices is not something that happens all at once. It is not something that can be done without a great deal of foundation-laying. For example, when a baby plays peek-a-boo with Mom, it serves several ends at once - baby learns to deal with the fear of Mom disappearing and learns an application of concept of existence and identity - she exists even when out of sight. The ability to form percepts out of sensation has to happen before that. And there is much that goes on developmentally before that can happen. It is irrational to say you have rights when you can make choices, but that even though you are an individual, and a normal one, that you can be denied the right to necessary stages of development that make it possible to make choices. You will never find a place where you can draw any kind of line and you will open the door to arguments that if it is individual ability to reason, then it is also valid to measure the efficacy in this process and those who fall below it have no rights. Kill all who engage in faulty reasoning? How faulty? How often do they have to fall to that level? Is the standard to be moved down for cultural differences? Age differences?

Your approach to measuring the capacity for rationality at the individual time, place and person is not workable and should be set aside in favor of the concept of capacity to reason as a human characteristic and rights attach to those who are human.

Using human nature, you just have to decide if an entity is human to determine that rights have adhered. Birth (or right around there) is a reasonable point. I can entertain some arguments about some rights somewhere in the third trimester, but clearly there are mother's rights involved right up until separation. Birth seems like a good line, but it is the line of becoming an individual human - not a line for capacity for rationality which can be argued started earlier or later or never and will always be an ambiguity to obscure the more fundamental issue of capacity referring to a property of human nature.

Post 68

Saturday, May 9, 2009 - 2:59pm

But Jon, there's a capacity to reason at birth (like the Rev'rend said). There may not be a capability, but there is a capacity. This capacity is what it is that makes a human baby a "human."

Gotta disagree with you, Ed. Capacity implies capability, at least, that's how I read it. You don't say that a blind man has the "capacity" for sight if his eyes are missing, do you? Newborns have no capacity for reason, because they have no capacity to make choices. Everything a newborn does is a reflex, and nothing more. They merely react. How this changes so rapidly in the human life cycle is miraculous, and amazing, but I think it's a mistake to give attributes to newborns that they don't really have.

Without enough, or the right kind of "conditioning," capacity for reason isn't realized. If an infant was brought up by apes, I think it's a reasonable assumption to say we wouldn't get a reasoning human being in the end. (Tarzan not withstanding, of course. Har har.)

If you're saying that the potential for reason is good enough to recognize rights (because nothing else but a human can do calculus in the end, and no matter how well a chimpanzee is raised by humans, it'll never figure out complex math problems), I'm totally cool with that.

Post 69

Saturday, May 9, 2009 - 4:30pm

Bill a newborn doesn't have any more of a capacity to reason than a fetus does in the third trimester. I understand what you are arguing but I'm disagreeing on where you draw the line. A mother can't change her mind after giving birth about bringing a child into the world, and throwing her newborn into a dumpster, so why would we allow her to kill her fetus in the third trimester? After 6 months if she hasn't decided to abort, why would we extend the courtesy to decide after 6 months but not after child-birth? I think the distinction should be when a cerebral cortex is developed, because we know that is required for having any capacity to reason.

And to Steve, I think Bill is saying you can't divorce a concept or principle from the concretes they are derived from. So if we form a concept from a set of concretes, then when that concept in a particular context doesn't correspond to a particular concrete, it can't be said that the concept is valid in that instance. If we attempted to say it still does apply no matter what, in those instances where the concept breaks down it is indistinguishable from a floating abstraction.

So, if man has rights because it is in his nature to reason, it can't be said that principle makes sense to a particular human that does not possess the nature to reason.

(Edited by John Armaos on 5/09, 4:54pm)

Post 70

Saturday, May 9, 2009 - 6:17pm

John,

You are not applying the concept of a floating abstraction correctly. To say that man has a rational capacity in not contradicted by the existence of a particular man who is in a coma or whatever. He is still human, and reasoning is still a hallmark of human nature. He may lose the ability to reason after a car accident, but not his being a human and it is being human that his rights are hooked to. To live fully as a human ought to live, he would need to recover and be able to exercise that faculty, but he hasn't lost his rights because he is human and humans by their nature have these rights, and it is because, by their nature they are reasoning creatures. That all stayed at the level of the universal which is how it needs to.

A floating abstraction in this instance would be tearing rights loose from human nature, and attempting to connect them to an individual as if they were a property of that particular individual as a result of his reasoning, while also saying they were still universal rights. Making them universal but arising out the individual would be to treat them as intrinsic to the concrete unit. To say that they varied from human to human based upon the quantity or quality of the human's reasoning would be a kind of relativism - the person in a coma having different rights then another.

If your formulation were correct, then the existence of a 'human' without the capacity to reason would in and of itself invalidate any definition of man, or any statement about man that said man was a rational animal.

We are saying that for man qua man it is proper to reason. We are saying that reasoning is a part of human nature. We are saying that the proper and necessary form of our survival is the exercise of our reason. Those are made as statements located in the concept of man, and not in some limited collection of concretes - like those not in a coma. While we are still 'in' that area, working on the concept of man (which includes all men), we go on to elaborate the individual rights from the statement of man's nature and the conditions of his existence.

If it isn't done in that way then you have to start from scratch and determine separately for each concrete individual, each time, and you will never be able to generalize to make your rights universal.

If we have the same rights, then they come from what is common to all of us. That is, they come from our understanding human nature.

You say, "So, if man has rights because it is in his nature to reason, it can't be said that principle makes sense to a particular human that does not possess the nature to reason." "His" meaning mans, meaning human nature. We have the ability to act against some of the things it is in our nature to do. There are some animals that go wacky, like whales that insist on beaching themselves, but that doesn't invalidate the principle that it is in the nature of whales to migrate (without beaching). A human being, asleep, in a coma, asleep, lobotomized, or a new-born has rights. They come with being human - not with that individual's capacity to reason. Other wise it would be okay to kill people who are asleep, in a coma, etc. A man has the nature to reason by being a man, but if he is in a coma his measure of the property is very low, but it is there and we can see a measure of it in his previous activities, what physiology supporting the capacity is still there, etc.
(Edited by Steve Wolfer on 5/09, 6:21pm)

Post 71

Saturday, May 9, 2009 - 6:45pm

Steve:

You are not applying the concept of a floating abstraction correctly. To say that man has a rational capacity in not contradicted by the existence of a particular man who is in a coma or whatever.

I didn't say it was. I said if you try to apply the abstraction even in a context where the concrete doesn't correspond to the abstraction, it becomes only in that instance, indistinguishable from a floating abstraction. A floating abstraction is an abstraction disconnected from any concretes, so when you try to apply an abstraction to a particular concrete that doesn't correspond to it, I trust you understand that I'm making the observation that it is similar to a floating abstraction.

To say that they varied from human to human based upon the quantity or quality of the human's reasoning would be a kind of relativism

Then the law recognizes this relativism, if that's how you want to characterize it. Because children do not have the same rights as an adult has. But it's not relativistic anyways, they are based on objective criteria for classification. We can further refine a generalization into more specific generalizations, i.e. a subset.

You say, "So, if man has rights because it is in his nature to reason, it can't be said that principle makes sense to a particular human that does not possess the nature to reason." "His" meaning mans, meaning human nature. We have the ability to act against some of the things it is in our nature to do. There are some animals that go wacky, like whales that insist on beaching themselves, but that doesn't invalidate the principle that it is in the nature of whales to migrate (without beaching).

You misunderstand, I'm not trying to invalidate 'abstractions' or man's essential nature. While certainly it is perfectly valid to make an abstraction about man's essential nature, it is done through commonly recognized characteristics among many concrete examples. If you were to find one concrete example that doesn't fit the abstraction, for example a newborn, that doesn't invalidate the abstraction all together, it just isn't applicable to that particular concrete example, because in that concrete example, there is an uncommon, contradictory characteristic to the rest of the concretes that we used to derive the abstraction. Now that doesn't mean I'm saying a newborn must therefore have no rights, we recognize they don't have all the same rights that an adult has. You are making an all or nothing case for rights based only on the criteria of being 'human', because a human's essential nature is the capacity for reason. But we can recognize subsets of man (more narrowly defined generalizations) that do not retain a full capacity for reason, e.g. children, and attach rights appropriately to that subset of man.

The abstraction for 'rights' and why we have them is not just from the common characteristics of the concrete of "man", it is as you say "man's capacity for reason". So you can't extend that abstraction even to a particular man that has no capacity to reason, because the common characteristic is the capacity for reason, not just being human.

(Edited by John Armaos on 5/09, 6:54pm)

Post 72

Saturday, May 9, 2009 - 7:11pm

John,

Then, unless I read you incorrectly, you don't believe that a man in a coma has rights - you are creating some kind of degree of rationality equals/grants some degree of full possession of rights.

We completely disagree.

Post 73

Saturday, May 9, 2009 - 7:28pm

Steve,

Why do you think human beings but not animals have individual rights? The reason is that unlike animals, human being have the capacity to reason, which implies the capacity to grasp and apply moral principles. Since rights are a moral principle, they require the capacity to act on the basis of moral principles. But not every human being possesses that capacity. A fetus does not possess it, a person who is born a vegetable does not possess it, and a newborn baby does not possess it.

A newborn baby cannot think abstractly -- cannot grasp and apply abstract principles. Even though he may be in the process of acquiring that capacity, he does not yet possess it. At some point in his development he will.

When I say that a rights-bearing entity must have the capacity to think abstractly -- to grasp and apply moral principles -- I don't mean that he must be able to exercise that capacity at every moment of his life (e.g., when he is asleep or in a coma). But he must be able to exercise it in the normal course of his life. And once having exercised it, his rational choices deserve to be respected. For example, if he chooses to fall asleep, his choice to do so must be respected. You cannot argue that because he's asleep (and therefore incapable of making rational decisions in that condition), he loses his rights. The same is true of a person who, because of an accident, is rendered comatose. Prior to the accident, he made certain rational choices (such as to sustain his life and to retain his property) which deserve to be respected even while he is comatose. He does not lose his right to have those choices respected simply because while being comatose he lacks the ability to make rational decisions.

By contrast, a fetus, a person who is severely retarded, or a newborn baby lacks the capacity to reason not just when he is unconscious (e.g., asleep) but in his normally conscious moments. As a result, he cannot be said to have made any rational decisions that deserve to be respected.

- Bill

Post 74

Saturday, May 9, 2009 - 7:52pm

Steve I defer you to Bill's post 73. That's pretty much my position as well.

Post 75

Saturday, May 9, 2009 - 8:01pm

Bill,

You asked me, "Why do you think human beings but not animals have individual rights?" I don't.

I was very clear about that. Take a look at the posts - I say things like, "...human nature as the location of the capacity of reason" and " Their rights depend upon being human, because it is human nature that declares the capacity for rationality as being man's means of survival."
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You said, "The reason [that human beings have individual rights] is that unlike animals, human being have the capacity to reason, which implies the capacity to grasp and apply moral principles."

That statement could be interpreted to mean that by nature, humans have the capacity to reason - meaning that they don't, as an individual, have to achieve any specified degree or rationality in their own life. But I know that isn't how you intended it. Or, it could be interpreted as meaning that they have rights because they are capable of grasping rights.
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You said, "Since rights are a moral principle, they require the capacity to act on the basis of moral principles. But not every human being possesses that capacity."

This implies that a person must have some, as of yet undetermined, measurement of IQ before rights can be said to exist. Does the newborn have no rights because it can't conceptualize at the level required to make moral decisions. Is it okay to kill the mentally handicapped who are functional but only have an IQ of say 70? This is totally unworkable in practical terms - for making laws and all moral or ethical judgments would have to have this clause attached to it: "assuming the person has the required IQ."
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I know many individual who are very bright in terms of IQ but they are muddled up in their thinking from bad premises and can't think clearly at all about moral issues - do they have to forfeit the rights they had until they went to college and adopted some very faulty premises?
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As an aside: We talk about "reason" (disagreeing if we should be examining it at the level of human nature or at the level of the individual) but it is as much about choice as it is about reason - although they are inextricably joined with one needed for the existence of the other.

Post 76

Saturday, May 9, 2009 - 8:18pm

Or, it could be interpreted as meaning that they have rights because they are capable of grasping rights.
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Yes - and that is why humans have rights, and that there are no rights at the waterhole - indeed, rights did not come into existence until humans came along.........

Post 77

Saturday, May 9, 2009 - 9:02pm

Steve,

If you believe that human beings possess rights, because they have the capacity to reason, then how is it you believe that individuals who don't possess that capacity could still have rights? You say that human beings have that capacity "by nature." Then what about human beings who don't have it? Are they not by "by nature" human?

I wrote, "Since rights are a moral principle, they require the capacity to act on the basis of moral principles. But not every human being possesses that capacity." You replied,

This implies that a person must have some, as of yet undetermined, measurement of IQ before rights can be said to exist. Does the newborn have no rights because it can't conceptualize at the level required to make moral decisions.

As I explained in an earlier post, it is best to treat newborns as having rights in order to avoid the problem of defining precisely when a particular child acquires the capacity to reason. We need an easily identifiable bright line as a standard for rights acquisition. Birth fulfills that criterion better than any alternative, in my opinion.

Is it okay to kill the mentally handicapped who are functional but only have an IQ of say 70?

A person with an IQ of 70 can grasp and apply moral principles. Such a person does possess the capacity for abstract thought; he's just not capable of the more sophisticated forms of it. But that isn't necessary in order to understand the principle of rights and to respect it.

I know many individual who are very bright in terms of IQ but they are muddled up in their thinking from bad premises and can't think clearly at all about moral issues - do they have to forfeit the rights they had until they went to college and adopted some very faulty premises?

They have the capacity to grasp and apply moral principles; they just haven't correctly identified them. The point is, you can't say that a person "ought" to respect rights, if he or she is incapable in principle of grasping them. Even if very bright people are mistaken in their thinking, they are still capable in principle of grasping individual rights and respecting them.

- Bill

Post 78

Sunday, May 10, 2009 - 12:26am

You said, "If you believe that human beings possess rights, because they have the capacity to reason, then how is it you believe that individuals who don't possess that capacity could still have rights?"

Your sentence uses "capacity to reason" in two different ways. Man has the capacity to reason - that is in the nature of our species. An individual may or may not be able to exercise that capacity. The capacity I'm talking about is in the nature of human beings - it is a description of our method of survival. The capacity you are talking about is the capacity to use the capacity I'm talking about. Because a person is human they are members of a species that uses reason for survival. But being human doesn't mean that the individual will exercise that faculty.

Rights are logically assigned to the species because of the nature of the species and the conditions of existence. Rational animals have individual rights. Those rational animals who don't exercise their rational faculty still have their individual rights.
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You said, "Since rights are a moral principle, they require the capacity to act on the basis of moral principles."

But the fact is that a person can possess rights even if he has less than the capacity to act on moral principles. He may only avoid violating the rights of others because he was so trained, or out of fear of retaliation - that isn't a capacity of acting on moral principle.
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When you say, "As I explained in an earlier post, it is best to treat newborns as having rights in order to avoid the problem of defining precisely when a particular child acquires the capacity to reason." That means that if we attempt to define precisely when a particular child acquires the capacity, that it would be okay for parents to kill their kids until they get to that age we haven't figured out yet - an age that would vary from child to child.

Imagine a mother killed her baby, and she was prosecuted and convicted and executed. She would have been killed even though she had violated no individual rights - according to your theory and by applying your legal bright line.
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I mentioned that the mentally handicapped could be killed because, according to your theory, they have no right - I used the IQ figure of 70. You disputed the number, but the principle stays the same. Choose what ever number you want... say, 50.
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You said, "...you can't say that a person 'ought' to respect rights, if he or she is incapable in principle of grasping them." Yes, that is true and it is reflected in the law where they discuss the ability to tell right from wrong. But, I'm talking about a person "having" rights, not about a person "respecting" rights.
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Post 79

Sunday, May 10, 2009 - 9:51am