RoR: Forum

Excellent, Ed - really enjoyed that. When I first read it in the queue I feared you might, as per your recent history here, be arguing that Rand & Kant really had a lot in common & should be fused in posthumous philosophic matrimony. No doubt someone will leap onto this thread & argue that soon enough. :-)

Linz

Post 1

Wednesday, April 7, 2004 - 5:19am

Thank you Linz!!!!!

:]

The title of your March 22 SOLO piece, "Kant Can't", prompted me to submit this essay. I have toyed for years with a title for a piece on Kant of "Immanuel Kant (Can't) Be Right!!!!!

Cheers!!!!!

Ed

Post 2

Wednesday, April 7, 2004 - 8:52am

I am still reading your article, and it looks like a good summation, but I would take issue with your sentence:

According to Rand, there is no basis upon which to differentiate analytic propositions from synthetic ones.

You do not put analytic or synthetic in quotes (as is done in Peikoff’s essay on the topic), which may not adequately convey the fact that not only does Rand reject the distinction, but also she rejects the very concepts of “analytic truths” and “synthetic truths.”

Post 3

Wednesday, April 7, 2004 - 9:03am

Kant in German is not pronounced like the English "Can't", but closer to the English "Cunt"!

Also, the "thing in itself" in German is "das Ding an sich". "Ding" in German is a slang word for penis, like "thingy" in English.

So you could say that "Cunt" was obsessed with the "Thingy" in itself!!!! :-)

Make sense.....?

Philosophy my arse!!!! It's pure smut!!! :-))

But seriously, thanks Ed, that was an excellent summary of Kantian philosophy and Rand's opposition to it.

Post 4

Wednesday, April 7, 2004 - 10:12am

This is really a great summary. I would quibble with:

Rand vehemently disagrees with Kant’s defense of faith, intuition, and feeling as the valid means of dealing with the noumenal world.

Probably it is just an unfortunate wording on your part, but Rand of course rejects the whole idea of a noumenal world.

Could you elaborate on how all this was supposed to save science—how it established the perceptual manifestation of necessity? Doesn’t it just “prove” that everything science deals with is contingent?

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 4/07, 11:26am)

Post 5

Friday, April 9, 2004 - 7:49am

Rodney and Marcus:

Thanks for the good words! I am pleased that you liked my summary essay demystifying Kantianism

Also, thanks Rodney for pointing out where I could make some clarifications in the essay!

Take care.

Ed

Post 6

Saturday, April 10, 2004 - 6:31pm

To avoid the impression that AR’s rejection of Kant was superficial, might I suggest a sentence at the end of the first paragraph along these lines: “Rand’s perspective on Kant’s conclusions will be described only in very general terms at the end.”

(Perhaps someone might want to write a companion article titled “Ayn Rand: Immanuel Kant’s Intellectual Enemy” in which the ratios of the space devoted to each thinker were switched.)

I’ve noticed that this passage might be misleading: “The purpose of this essay is to explain the reasons for Rand’s hatred of Kant. In order to do this, Kant’s ideas will be given a distinctly Randian interpretation in this paper.” It sounds as though you are saying Kant’s views can be interpreted in multiple ways, and you choose Rand’s interpretation. I think what you meant to say was that any evaluations in your essay (especially at the end) are made on the basis of AR’s philosophy.

It is surely true that certain aspects of Kant’s views, including those you discuss, have multiple possible interpretations (which is to be expected in a philosophy so fundamentally in error and so full of contradictions), but I suspect that that was not what you were focusing on.

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 4/10, 6:32pm)

Post 7

Saturday, April 10, 2004 - 7:46pm

Ed was a colleague of mine at Wheeling Jesuit from 1986-1996 and a finer colleague I never had. It is a pleasure to add a few comments on his article. I think he does have Rand right, pretty much. But that means that he has Kant wrong, pretty much. Those interested can see my book, AYN RAND, OBJECTIVISTS AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, chapters 4 & 5. But I would like to comment en passant on a few sections.
PHENOMENAL AND NOUMENAL REALITY
Second paragraph. I thought this whole “distortion” complaint was handle quite well by Walsh on p. 95 of his article in JARS, vol. 2, #1. I’ll merely second his answer.

KANT’S ATTACK ON CONSCIOUSNESS. Ed writes in the first sentence that “Kant laments the fact that a person can only perceive and comprehend things through his own consciousness.” Whereas Kant actually berates people who feel this way. “…such complaints are quite improper and unreasonable…For they then want us to be able to cognize things, and hence intuit them, even without senses, and consequently want us to have a cognitive power wholly different from the human one. . .” (A278-B334)
Paragraph 3. Again I would cite Walsh. Kant never made the argument attributed to him by Rand. It just isn’t there. See p. 91ff.

PURE REASON, DUTY, AND GOOD WILL. Paragraph 2. No one who has studied and taught the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals could read the first sentence “Kant assigns one’s emotions…” without amazement and amusement. “Amazement” over how one could get Kant so wrong; “amusement” for the same reason. Here, of all Objectivists, Tara Smith is right on the money. She writes, “In the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant contends that ‘all morals concepts have their seat and origin entirely a priori in reason.’ …there are certain things a person simply must do . . . it is our rationality that obligates us.” (Viable Values, 38)
And of course we cannot “know” [in Kant’s stringent sense] the unknowable noumenal world. And feelings are explicitly dismissed by Kant as heteronomous vis-à-vis morality and hence “spurious” as a principle of morality. [See pp. 442 in the German text. Most English translations have these pages in the margins.]
As for the remark about Kant being a mystic, the interested reader is directed to a wonderful book from the late Kant that can be found in a collection of such short essays titled Raising the Tone of Philosophy where Kant excoriates such mystics and tells them that he is for philosophy and mysticism “is the exact opposite of philosophy.” (110) He accuses mystics of wanting to take a short cut to knowledge instead of doing the hard work of thinking! Delightful and easy reading.
KANT’S REJECTION OF SELF-INTEREST
For Kant position on “faith” and “reason” I refer the interested reader to my paper on this topic which can be found at the TOC advanced seminar site for 2003. Michelle recommended this reading and her reply in an earlier posting.
RAND’S DENUNCIATION OF KANT. I have never been able to understand how can be both a deontologist and a saver of altruism. Altruism ask the question “Who is to be the beneficiary of an action” whereas a deontologist ignores such questions in order to focus on the rightness of an action. If X is one’s duty, then it is one’s duty irrespective of any beneficiary consideration.
Well that’s enough for now. I would like to announce that I will be seeing Ed in the Fall since the West Virginia Philosophical Society is meeting in Wheeling. Ed has promised to present a paper. I’m sure we will have much to discuss.
Fred Seddon

Post 8

Sunday, April 11, 2004 - 6:02am

Just off the bat, I would say that when Mr. Younkins said he would discuss things from a Randian perspective, he may have meant more than I deduced in my post above (that the evaluations are Randian). He may also have meant that the statements and summations of Kant's beliefs would be from Rand's viewpoint. That is, as I mentioned in a reply to Mr. Seddons in another thread, no philosopher can adopt a fundamental opponent's views down to the root even for the sake of argument or of informed rebuttal--especially with space constraints. To do so would be to ignore what he (or she) knows (or thinks he [or she] knows). This would also apply to any discussion by a Kantian of Rand's philosophy.

Of course, who is right and who is wrong is also a factor here: the wrong thinker would at one point be forced to engage in the fallacy of the stolen concept (an Objectivist idea, be it noted).

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 4/12, 5:59am)

Post 9

Monday, April 12, 2004 - 5:51am

(Edited by Rodney Rawlings on 4/12, 5:54am)

Post 10

Monday, April 12, 2004 - 4:06pm

Fred Seddon was one of the best professors to ever teach at Wheeling Jesuit University. He introduced me to Ayn Rand via Atlas Shrugged in the Spring of 1992.

Fred is writing a piece for a collection of essays on Atlas Shrugged that I am putting together.

Rodney you are correct. In my essay my intention was to attempt to present Kant's ideas as interpreted by Ayn Rand. By seeing how she viewed Kantian philosophy, it becomes evident why she really did consider Kant to be evil!!!

I will leave the debate regarding what Kant really said to those of you who are philosophers. I am merely an accounting professor who has an interest in philosophy and am not qualified or able to determine what Kant was really trying to say.

:]

Ed

Post 11

Monday, April 12, 2004 - 5:53pm

Ah! Then I'll just say that I can see very easily why Rand, given her views on consciousness, would say Kant "laments," and the rest of the items Dr. Seddons spells out, even contrary to what Kant may himself say. Since she views his metaphysics and epistemology as so fundamentally in error, she often states his views in terms of what they add up to in reality (according to her view, and I think she is correct), rather than in the terms in which Kant sees or would like them to be seen.

I myself know how I would approach the items Dr. Seddons describes in detail, but at this time I cannot get into such a debate with a specialist in Kant. And I do not rule out the possibility that Seddon may be correct on some of these items that have been discussed elsewhere. My main concern here is to defend Rand against charges of error or ignorance in her criticisms of such a radical opponent, when the discrepancies between her description and his may have another explanation.

Post 12

Monday, April 12, 2004 - 9:41pm

Rodney wrote:
>My main concern here is to defend Rand against charges of error or ignorance in her criticisms of such a radical opponent, when the discrepancies between her description and his may have another explanation.

To me the explanation is obvious: Rand is trying to put Kant on trial, and providing any actual evidence is not worth the trouble. She's already decided he's guilty.

Rodney, the key question is this: what sort of trial is it where the defendant is not allowed to speak for himself - where the prosecution only allows their own paraphrasing to be heard - if at all?

Usually it's called a show-trial. And that is, I think, what we are looking at here. At this point, it doesn't matter what you think about Rand or Kant's thought - this approach destroys not the defendent's credibility, but the prosecutor's.

Look at the facts. The IOE is Rand's major statement on epistemology, and therefore the perfect opportunity to dissect what Kant said and compare it to her thinking - to trounce him for all time. Yet while she attacks him vigorously, she doesn't quote him directly *once* - just some obscure secondhand source, and only briefly at that. It's all just her say-so.

Oh, but wait! Michelle Cohen points out (on another thread) that Rand did get around to directly quoting Kant - in *one* whole essay! Gee, considering she's attacking the "greatest criminal of all time" you'd think there might be a little more to it. And you'd have to be an irony-free zone not to notice that her essay on Kant called "From The Horse's Mouth" is an analysis of a book by....Frederick Paulsen!

Even Mr Younkins seems to be hedging his bets in this essay, saying only that this is what *Rand* thinks - not whether he agrees or not. Perhaps this is because the Austrians, whom he admires, were Kantians to a man, and there is an obvious conflict there.

On the other hand, guys like Fred Seddon and George Walsh seem to me to have taken the task of assessing Kant seriously. So when they criticise him, you take them seriously. Ladies and gentlemen, this is how this sort of thing *is done*.

But if you support Rand's evidence-free attack on Kant because, well, he's evil anyway, you're adopting an ends-justify-the-means argument. Nothing less.

Either that, or you have to believe that somehow she could have knowledge of Kant without the experience of having read him.

- Daniel

Post 13

Tuesday, April 13, 2004 - 5:39am

Her main concern was not to dissect the errors of the past, but to present her own philosophy. Thus, her summations of the actual nature and import of his thought reflect her philosophy, not his. Remember, a philosophy is a view of reality, not a word game.

Post 14

Tuesday, April 13, 2004 - 3:58am

Ed,

I think it is possible for a non-philosopher to pass an estimate of Kant's philosophy. The notion of accepting someone's authority on ideas because he is a professional philosopher is inimical to independent thought.

-- Michelle

Post 15

Tuesday, April 13, 2004 - 1:36pm

Rodney wrote:
>Thus, her summations of the actual nature and import >of his thought reflect her philosophy, not his.

Need I say more? And, if this is the case, it is certainly not a flattering reflection.

>Remember, a philosophy is a view of reality, not a >word game.

Exactly my point.

- Daniel

Post 16

Tuesday, April 13, 2004 - 1:57pm

I agree with Rodney's position, assuming I'm understanding him right.

A different example is an evaluation of Communism, or its supporters. Certainly to evaluate their position, you can't work within their framework. They may believe that profit is theft, and the workers should get it all, or that everyone should have free stuff. But their assumptions are all wrong. Evaluating their conclusions within the framework of their mistaken premises wouldn't be a proper evaluation at all. You have to evaluate it from the position of reality, and your best understanding of it.

So when the communist says he's for peace, you don't take him at face value. You analyze his whole position. He wants a system where property rights are impossible, where the state (or the people "as a whole") wield force to get whatever they want, and where those who refuse to go along with them are said to be criminals. It's only be analyzing their system objectively that you can see this.

So it really doesn't matter at all that they claim they want a system that's loving, peaceful, prosperous, and supports human dignity. Quoting them as saying "We want peace" is not proof of anything but their own inability to see the contradictions. You certainly can't use that as proof that communism is compatible with peace.

Post 17

Tuesday, April 13, 2004 - 2:17pm

Michelle wrote:
>I think it is possible for a non-philosopher to pass an estimate of Kant's philosophy. The notion of accepting someone's authority on ideas because he is a professional philosopher is inimical to independent thought.

Both those issues are irrelevant. The question is why should we accept *Rand's* authority on Kant's ideas at all, given she presents scarcely any objective evidence for her case. In fact, the careful examination of the "facts of reality" (ie: what Kant actually wrote) by Walsh, Seddon etc points in exactly the *opposite* direction (Seddon even shows that key arguments attributed to Kant by Rand simply don't exist ie: she invented important parts of her evidence!)

Of course, you can keep defending this sort of thing till the cows come home. It's really an either/or. If objective evidence matters, then Rand's approach is inexcusable. If it doesn't, then you must believe she's discovered some method of ascertaining truth that doesn't require it. It becomes, in the end, a matter of standards.

- Daniel

Post 18

Tuesday, April 13, 2004 - 2:55pm

Joe: “Certainly to evaluate their position, you can't work within their framework.”

According to this principle one could not evaluate the position of Objectivism from within its own framework either. But Objectivists invariably insist that Rand must be taken on her own merits, that any analysis of Objectivism from “outside” her own “context” is invalid. There seems to be a double standard operating here.

“So when the communist says he's for peace, you don't take him at face value.”

And when Rand says she’s for reason, you don’t take her at face value either. Nor do you take at face value her evaluations of Kant.

Brendan

Post 19

Tuesday, April 13, 2004 - 3:47pm