RoR: Forum

Not so much terrible, Ed, as too oft convoluted and perverse. Unless by terrible you mean signally destructive.

I knew who Kant was when I was six years old. Can anyone guess why?

(Edited by Ted Keer on 1/09, 9:29am)

Post 101

Friday, January 8, 2010 - 11:08pm

Yes, Ted, I meant what you said I might mean.

And lemme' guess how you knew who Kant was at age 6:

Your school teacher made you write a 50-word essay finishing this sentence?: "My duties and obligations to the reigning City-State are ..." and she gave you a copy of The Metaphysics of Morals in order to help you along and get you up to speed with the 'progressive' education which has sweeped all across America

Or, was it a 50-word essay finishing this sentence?: "My mind is impotent in identifying reality so I will simply adopt a proto-Nazi, post-Nietzchean existentialism and I will ..."

I don't know. But I suspect that it has to be one of the two.

Ed

Post 102

Saturday, January 9, 2010 - 8:11am

Ed,

You wrote:

Jeezus, Robert, do you ever interpret Rand in a negative light!

It's like a forgone conclusion or something. You are calling Rand a whim-worshipper.

The movie about Barbara Branden's biography attempted merely to humanize, not demonize, Ayn Rand. For instance, the scene where you hear a toilet flushing just as Rand walks into camera range.

Ok. So Ayn Rand was human and not a goddess. But for me to label her a whim-worshipper would be to stoop to her level of judging everybody in black-and-white terms. Such thinking is typically the result of intense, passionate anger, and I am not particularly angry at Rand. Nor am I one to sit here passing judgment on others and stamping labels on their foreheads. That was Ayn Rand, not me.

It is this very issue that has divided the Movement that survives and (thankfully) made this very forum possible as a place to go to get away from all that judgmentalism and anger.

Post 103

Saturday, January 9, 2010 - 8:25am

Ed quoted Peikoff saying:

Kant also found it necessary to deny happiness, in order to make room for duty. The essence of moral virtue, he says, is selflessness--selfless, lifelong obedience to duty, without any expectation of reward, and regardless of how much it might make one suffer.

I read OP over 20 years ago, so I am familiar with Peikoff's thesis. I have also read Kant so I am familiar with Kant's theory of happiness. Peikoff believes that Kant wanted to deny happiness. My own studies indicate that Kant believed the road to happiness could ONLY involve doing one's duty, not to the state or the emperor, but to reason.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/

Kant argued that this Highest Good for Humanity is complete moral virtue together with complete happiness, the former being the condition of our deserving the latter.

"Deserving happiness" is the key to understanding Kant's views on the issue. And it is the key to understanding why Kant based his moral theory partially on the Idea of immortality. Happiness for man, in Kant's view, was inevitable; mankind, moreover, deserves to be happy - even if it requires an eternity (and the possession of an immortal soul) to achieve.

This to me is such an astoundingly optimistic view of humanity on Kant's part that it infinitely surpasses Rand's own apparent optimism. For Rand cannot guarantee that a man will ever attain happiness in his lifetime, no matter how hard he tries, granted a limited span of time to achieve it. Kant, on the other hand, grants you all eternity to achieve it, in only this way can he guarantee perfect happiness (and perfect virtue) will be achieved.

(Edited by Robert Keele on 1/09, 8:28am)

Post 104

Saturday, January 9, 2010 - 9:38am

Of the two competing theories of planet formation, stellar collision and nebular condensation, Kant formulated the latter and correct one, which was illustrated in a children's science text that belonged to my best friend in first grade. There was even a scary little illustration of his visage.

Post 105

Saturday, January 9, 2010 - 10:36am

Robert,

*************
Happiness for man, in Kant's view, was inevitable; mankind, moreover, deserves to be happy - even if it requires an eternity (and the possession of an immortal soul) to achieve.

This to me is such an astoundingly optimistic view of humanity on Kant's part that it infinitely surpasses Rand's own apparent optimism.
*************

But being infinitely optimistic isn't a good thing, because of being unrealistic. In fact, almost anything infinite -- is unrealistic (because things have natures). So, by being too optimistic for the context, Kant does harm -- just as someone too optimistic in the stock market does harm.

*************
For Rand cannot guarantee that a man will ever attain happiness in his lifetime, no matter how hard he tries, granted a limited span of time to achieve it.
*************

So what! Neither could Aristotle. In fact, considering a human lifetime, neither could Kant. At least Rand and Aristotle supported doing the right thing for the happiness in your life now. Folks following Kant might not be happy their whole life (while maintaining the unrealistic optimism that they will get happy in the afterlife).

Ed

Post 106

Saturday, January 9, 2010 - 11:11am

Ed wrote: But being infinitely optimistic isn't a good thing, because of being unrealistic. In fact, almost anything infinite -- is unrealistic (because things have natures). So, by being too optimistic for the context, Kant does harm -- just as someone too optimistic in the stock market does harm.

It's not about optimism, but happiness. Anyway, Kant's optimism encompasses all mankind in the long run, not just stockholders in the short run.

Individual happiness within a given lifespan is a different matter. There are too many circumstances to account for, both internal (psychological, organic), and external (life circumstances), so Rand cannot guarantee happiness to anybody.

For example, Rand only grants the possibility of serenity, not happiness, to the man trapped in a ghastly dictator's prison.

And anyway, Kant is referring to a state of perfect happiness, which is a state of continual bliss, and yes it is unrealistic to expect it of most people although it is generally possible to achieve within the span of a lifetime given the right conditions.

This state of perfect happiness or bliss Kant considered a realistic expectation extending to all mankind, past, present and future. It is an idea for individuals to strive toward in each individual's life.

My take on this is that each individual human is an individual unit of mankind. So to the extent that an individual can achieve it is the extent to which an all-encompassing bliss has indeed become a reality, even if in a very small way relative to the actual goal.

The Idea of immortality takes on regulative purposes for Kant's moral theory. Therefore he is not saying that people actually have immortal souls, it is a mere postulate of practical reason. It is postulated just as Rand's Benevolent Universe Premise is postulated.

Post 107

Saturday, January 9, 2010 - 11:54am

Ed wrote:

So what! Neither could Aristotle. In fact, considering a human lifetime, neither could Kant. At least Rand and Aristotle supported doing the right thing for the happiness in your life now. Folks following Kant might not be happy their whole life (while maintaining the unrealistic optimism that they will get happy in the afterlife).

My comment about immortality in my previous post also extends to the idea of an afterlife. It is a postulate of practical reason. Nobody should hold the unrealistic guarantee of attaining happiness within the span of a lifetime, particularly that form of it known as "bliss" which requires perfection and continuity.

However, as regulative of moral practice, it stands as an ideal to strive for through duty. And that brings me around to my original point against your Peikoff quote.

Kant never actually denies anything, although he may have expressed himself that way in order to cause some eyelids to pop open. But he was too agnostic about faith-oriented or religious issues to literally deny reason by means of faith. The point about "denying" is really, according to Kant's actual arguments, a limiting. Reason is limited by faith -

- but also, faith is limited by reason -

That's the primary point that Objectivism will never, ever explain to you. But I will.

Reason, for Kant, limits faith by limiting its tendency toward, let's say, an over-expression of its capacities. Or to put it in better terms, reason limits faith's tendency toward an irrational, hyper-spiritual fanaticism. This anti-fanaticism was a common theme during the Enlightenment, and it is an attitude Kant shared.

But faith also limits reason's tendency to over-exert and attempt to over-extend its capacities. HOW is this possible, you may ask? Reason, it seems, is unlimited.

In this Kant was primarily taking on Leibniz, who believed that there was nothing reason could not know, no intellectual territory (including the spiritual realm) reason could not conquer.

Thus there is also an over-optimism involved in reason, a fanaticism of reason, so to speak. The philosophical results in the modern world are atheism, materialism (including Marxist materialism), and pragmatism.

The noumenal for Kant represents Leibniz's belief that even the spiritual realm could eventually be conquered by reason. The noumenal "realm" for Kant is an intellectual limit upon the pretenses of reason to stray beyond its limits into those realms best handled by faith.

But remember, faith is also tempered by reason. So the "handling" of such issues by faith is guided by reason (Ideas of reason, that is), such that so-called spiritual ideas are no longer considered constitutive - meaning, nobody is saying that God, Freedom, and Immortality actually exist. They are converted by reason to regulative principles only. Faith therefore takes its guidance not from some alleged spirits in another dimension, but from principles that rationally regulate faith's handling of the entire moral realm of belief.

(Edited by Robert Keele on 1/09, 11:56am)

Post 108

Saturday, January 9, 2010 - 9:31pm

Robert,

************
Individual happiness within a given lifespan is a different matter. There are too many circumstances to account for, both internal (psychological, organic), and external (life circumstances), so Rand cannot guarantee happiness to anybody.
************

That is a non sequitur. No one can guarantee happiness to anybody. Claiming that this fact, specifically, detracts from the merit of Rand's philosophy is a non sequitur.

Here is Rand on the 'fallacy of the guarantee of happiness' (FotGoH):

************
Observe, in this context, the intellectual precision of the Founding Fathers: they spoke of the right to the pursuit of happiness—not of the right to happiness. It means that a man has the right to take the actions he deems necessary to achieve his happiness; it does not mean that others must make him happy.
************
"Man's Rights", VOS, 97

Available online:
http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/pursuit_of_happiness--right_to.html

Ed

Post 109

Saturday, January 9, 2010 - 11:21pm

Ed,

"Pursuit of happiness" sounds ok to me. Of course you have the right to pursue non-happiness if you want. But the idea is to pass safely between the horns of a moral dilemma consisting of Hedonism on one side and Stoicism on the other.

(Edited by Robert Keele on 1/10, 1:53am)

Post 110

Sunday, January 10, 2010 - 9:29am

Robert,

Nobody should hold the unrealistic guarantee of attaining happiness within the span of a lifetime, particularly that form of it known as "bliss" which requires perfection and continuity.

I disagree, not with the letter of this quote, but the spirit of it. It treats happiness or bliss as a potentially-transferable "thing-in-itself." This is the error of the utilitarians, to ontologically view "the good" as an entity -- rather than as a relation.

However, as regulative of moral practice, it stands as an ideal to strive for through duty.

Yes, but that's morally wrong (to strive for some castle-in-the-sky ideal through duty).

Kant never actually denies anything, although he may have expressed himself that way in order to cause some eyelids to pop open.

But, every affirmation is a denial of its contradiction (and almost always a denial of its opposite). For example, to affirm that "infidels" are to be converted or beheaded -- a tenet of radical Islam -- is to deny the humanity of these "infidels." You cannot have a cake and eat it, too.

Reason is limited by faith -

- but also, faith is limited by reason -

That's the primary point that Objectivism will never, ever explain to you.

Not if the strict interpretation of the word "faith" (i.e., a belief independent of evidence) is used. Under the strict interpretation of the word "faith" -- Objectivism would see folly in any kind of explanation. It's as useless, potentially destructive, and arbitrary as explaining to me why green martians are controlling Obama's mind with an invisible ray gun.

Reason, it seems, is unlimited.

In this Kant was primarily taking on Leibniz, who believed that there was nothing reason could not know, no intellectual territory (including the spiritual realm) reason could not conquer.

Thus there is also an over-optimism involved in reason, a fanaticism of reason, so to speak. The philosophical results in the modern world are atheism, materialism (including Marxist materialism), and pragmatism.

I disagree. It's like you are viewing reason as an entity-in-itself (by the way, what is it with you doing that? It's so ... well ... Kantian.), rather than as a capacity.

But all earthly capacities are limited (because they have a nature). And materialism and pragmatism, to be clear, are not the result of the over-use of reason. Though, to be fair, you may not be trying to imply that. There is a sense in which wrong folks over-believe in the "reasoning" for something, but that is not an indictment against reason, but against certain (non-Aristotelian, non-Randian) philosophers and other elites.

The noumenal "realm" for Kant is an intellectual limit upon the pretenses of reason to stray beyond its limits into those realms best handled by faith.

Again, if you are using the strict interpretation of faith, then you are literally speaking nonsense.

... nobody is saying that God, Freedom, and Immortality actually exist. They are converted by reason to regulative principles only.

I will have to take some time to wrap my mind around this one. There is a kindling of truth in this, but there is also a pernicious and spiritually-caustic nature of it. More on this later ...

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 1/10, 9:33am)

Post 111

Sunday, January 10, 2010 - 11:44am

Ed wrote:

I disagree. It's like you are viewing reason as an entity-in-itself (by the way, what is it with you doing that? It's so ... well ... Kantian.), rather than as a capacity.

But all earthly capacities are limited (because they have a nature). And materialism and pragmatism, to be clear, are not the result of the over-use of reason. Though, to be fair, you may not be trying to imply that. There is a sense in which wrong folks over-believe in the "reasoning" for something, but that is not an indictment against reason, but against certain (non-Aristotelian, non-Randian) philosophers and other elites.

But Ed, I did pinpoint Leibniz as Kant's "elite" target for his critique and usage of the notion of a noumenon.

Did I say anything about Aristotle?

What I am saying, however, is that critics such as Rand and Peikoff mischaracterize the Kantian noumenal as a "realm." It is a realm in a sense - the realm of faith-entities, not of actual spiritual entities.

Faith (if I may be allowed treat it as an "entity-in-itself" for simplicity's sake) still holds that these entities are real. But its capacity (and in this sense I bring in the term "capacity") for fanaticism is held in check by reason, and that is, by reason limiting the employment of faith-entities (such as God) to their intellectual heuristic value only.
(Edited by Robert Keele on 1/10, 11:50am)

Post 112

Sunday, January 10, 2010 - 12:16pm

Ed:

You wrote: Not if the strict interpretation of the word "faith" (i.e., a belief independent of evidence) is used.

It's a definition not an interpretation. And it seems you are giving too much credence to faith's power over reason. That is an Objectivist tendency that probably applies to other 20th-century anti-faith philosophies as well.

Your answer is simply to eliminate one definition of "faith," the one that concerns belief independently of the possibility of any and all evidence. This would be accomplished, I suppose, by observing that the feelings which accompany this form of faith are real, and then displacing them onto some other object, an object that we know exists. And that new object of worship, in the case of Objectivism's creed, is "man."

Rand's faith in man was certainly a religious one. And although it may be praiseworthy, it can just as little be justified as a belief in God because of the the emotionalistic fanaticism inherent in her view of man. That fanaticism is not praiseworthy, it is condemnable for the very reason of being irrationally based.

If a belief in God is wrong, then so is idolatry.

(Edited by Robert Keele on 1/10, 12:20pm)

Post 113

Sunday, January 10, 2010 - 12:30pm

I should add that this idolatry also has its philosophical basis. That basis is called Monadism - a theory developed by Leibniz, and it can be used in this case to cover both theistic and secular objects of worship because both Man and God are terms used singularly.

Question: Which philosopher originally introduced or at least popularized Monadism?

Post 114

Sunday, January 10, 2010 - 12:37pm

Robert,

Whereas this thread started as a discussion of Kant, your last post has the appearance for a back-door entry for an argument for God. Am I wrong to assume that?

And I believe you need to show a quote of some sort that justifies your statement that Rand had "faith" in man as opposed to a position based upon reason.

Post 115

Sunday, January 10, 2010 - 12:39pm

Robert, you continue to treat every idea or notion as if it stands on equal footing. You can't act as if faith and reason are equal alternatives. Those who wish you to act on faith want you to apply reason to the implications of their beliefs. If a person insists that their is an afterlife in which how you are judged determines your destination expects you to use reason to follow the rules and attempt to avoid the worse alternative. The advocate of faith doesn't expect you to respond to his assertion by screaming "yellow penguins!" while you slap him in the face and eat drywall. Nor does he expect you to respond that you have faith by so doing that god will be John Cleese and hell will become a puppy litter.

Objectivism holds that concepts are hierarchical. You can't use certain derived concepts to deny the validity of fundamental concepts upon which the depend any more than you can safely detonate a bomb on the first floor of the building in whose penthouse you are standing. This means that you can't respond to a fundamental argument based on axioms with an observation snatched out of the space of floating abstractions that for members of the Church of the Blessed Insane Clown Posse, faith is more of a warm fuzzy feeling than an acceptance of a claim without evidence.

Post 116

Sunday, January 10, 2010 - 1:38pm

Ed,
I wrote: ... nobody is saying that God, Freedom, and Immortality actually exist. They are converted by reason to regulative principles only.

To which you replied -

I will have to take some time to wrap my mind around this one. There is a kindling of truth in this, but there is also a pernicious and spiritually-caustic nature of it. More on this later ...

I surprised that you find a kindling (inkling?) of truth in anything I say, Mr. Skeptical.

There should at least be nothing "caustic" about Freedom, or free-will, since Objectivism takes it as a given.

I wrote: Nobody should hold the unrealistic guarantee of attaining happiness within the span of a lifetime, particularly that form of it known as "bliss" which requires perfection and continuity.

To which you replied -

I disagree, not with the letter of this quote, but the spirit of it. It treats happiness or bliss as a potentially-transferable "thing-in-itself." This is the error of the utilitarians, to ontologically view "the good" as an entity -- rather than as a relation.

I don't know what you're saying there.

I wrote: However, as regulative of moral practice, it stands as an ideal to strive for through duty.

To which you replied -

Yes, but that's morally wrong (to strive for some castle-in-the-sky ideal through duty).

As I said, it's a goal set for mankind. But Kant argued that for the individual it was the ONLY way to maximize your potential for happiness - not, however by raising the goal impossibly out of reach, but simply by arguing for its merely intellectual possibility.

Critics often think Kant has proven more than he has actually argued for, and so they accuse him of biting off more than he can chew. I'm not saying that's what you're doing, it's just that Kant is really just being philosophical by attempting or alleging to provide for the intellectual possibility of perfect bliss for all mankind. How it can stand as both a real goal for you and an intellectually-based goal for mankind I'll try to explain here.

The way to explain this properly is by using the mathematical concept of an asymptotic curve that forever approaches the x ond y-axis. The "axis" in this case is the goal of perfect happiness (x-axis) and perfect virtue (y-axis). The goals are not held to actually exist, they exist only transcendentally.

By almost the same token, the "goal" for the asymptotic curve only exists mathematically.

Either mathematically or transcendentally, they are both generally the language of a formal manner of discourse. In other words, it's an intellectual venture, but more than a mere intellectual exercise because it is set forth as practical in nature, i.e., its tenets can be put into practice (and its goals are benevolent).

http://www.peoi.org/Courses/mic/Resources/Image118b.gif

Remember that the intellectual goal is a goal set for mankind, so I'm not saying that individuals can't possibly attain a real goal within the span of a lifetime. That real possibility, I think, would be necessary for the eventual attainment of the wider goal that is based on immortality and hope for mankind.

At least it is an intellectually or rationally grounded hope for mankind, and not an emotional faith in Man as with Objectivism. And it is this Kantian hope for mankind that drives his moral system and makes for the possibility of happiness for all, including each and every individual autonomous moral agent.

Post 117

Sunday, January 10, 2010 - 2:41pm

Steve,

You wrote:

Whereas this thread started as a discussion of Kant,

Yes, there was a Kantian beginning to this entire sub-thread. I started by pointing out that a thinker as formidable as Fred Seddon managed to get away with his critique without happening to mention the synthetic a priori.

your last post has the appearance for a back-door entry for an argument for God. Am I wrong to assume that?

In this regard, Kant is just giving faith its due without letting it go to fanatical extremes by tempering the possibility of faith-driven emotional excesses, no more than that.

It has been argued that everybody has their "God," even atheists and materialists. If religion can be defined by the feelings a certain attitude generates, then mankind was Rand's God. If all men have an innate tendency toward such beliefs, then Kant has to argue for their intellectual place in his system since it is a cosmopolitan and not an elitist philosophy.

And I believe you need to show a quote of some sort that justifies your statement that Rand had "faith" in man as opposed to a position based upon reason.

The nearest you may ever come to a faith-based position would be found in the Man-worship article of the Ayn Rand Lexicon:

The man-worshipers, in my sense of the term, are those who see man’s highest potential and strive to actualize it. . . . [Man-worshipers are] those dedicated to the exaltation of man’s self-esteem and the sacredness of his happiness on earth.

How, may I ask, do these man-worshippers "SEE" man's highest potential BEFORE it has been actualized?

This is religion. All religion needs faith. Kantian morality is about actualizing potential that men can "see," albeit intellectually. This "seeing" for Rand is apparently - no, obviously - non-intellectual.

Sometimes it astounds me that people who have read Rand, sometimes numerous times, manage to get by without noticing these simple things. Because it is simply not possible to "see" man's potential BEFORE it has been actualized without some kind of faith at work, and some kind of human faculty designed for the particular purpose of making such "seeing" possible.

It is upon such basis that many religions have grown and flourished down through the centuries.

Since you asked, allow me to give you the textual support for Rand's non-intellectual faith in mankind:

It may be considered strange, and denying my own supremacy of reason, that I start with a set of ideas, then want to study in order to support them, and not vice versa, i.e., not study and derive my ideas from that. (First Philosophic Journal, May 15, 1934 entry)

Ayn Rand's ideas were not rationally derived. Her words. She even admits to denying her own belief in the supremacy of reason.

She does not, however, admit to the source of her beliefs which she seeks to justify, but instead rationalizes them:

But these ideas, to a great extent, are the result of subconscious instinct...

Where does "subconscious instinct" come from? Reason?

...which is a form of unrealized reason.

Unrealized reason??

All instincts are reason, essentially...

Essentially??

...or reason is instincts made conscious.

So, which is it, Miss Rand? No answer is given in the text. Apparently it didn't matter for her purposes.

The basis of Rand's philosophy is axiomatic, correct? In Rand's subconscious reality, the axioms consist of Rand's "subconscious instinct" which tells her the difference between, even the very meaning of, right and wrong. The only necessity is to find a way in which to intellectually express her pre-intellectual "instincts," that is, to set them down in writing such that they are expressed as a system of philosophy and not merely a pre-verbal set of instinct-driven beliefs.

Post 118

Sunday, January 10, 2010 - 4:07pm

Ed:
I wrote:
Kant never actually denies anything, although he may have expressed himself that way in order to cause some eyelids to pop open.

To which you replied:

But, every affirmation is a denial of its contradiction (and almost always a denial of its opposite). For example, to affirm that "infidels" are to be converted or beheaded -- a tenet of radical Islam -- is to deny the humanity of these "infidels." You cannot have a cake and eat it, too.

Every affirmation is a denial of its contradiction only where contradictories exist. Sometimes there are only contraries. But that's not what I want to argue. I don't think this need go any deeper than to point out that his denial is not an abnegation. Kant is pursuing nothing more than a limiting, thus a denying in the respect that one should

"give unto faith that which is faith's, and to give unto reason that which is reason's."

But they respectively delimit each other, as I pointed out. And so the extremes which are so opposed, which seem contradictory to you, are moderated through their cooperation which is now no longer a conflict, they are now merely contraries and no longer a "contradiction in terms."

We're only talking tables and chairs here, not true contradictories. It is an invention to say they are contradictory just as it is an invention to deny the humanity of "infidels."

But it is natural for the mind to stray into the extremes: for faith to go fanatical and to abnegate reason, or for reason to abnegate faith because faith has a tendency to fly to the extremes. That is how the "contradictories" are constructed. The strategy of the third division of the CPR is not to eliminate this inherent tendency of the mind (which is impossible), but only to show the possibility of a philosophical way to expose this dilemma and thus "defuse" it. The result is called Critique.

Post 119

Sunday, January 10, 2010 - 4:14pm