| | Robert,
Ayer's variation on the analytic-synthetic theme is logical positivist, and that is the one Peikoff took issue with in his essay on the "dichotomy," not Kant's. Kant was not a logical positivist, nor could he be since logical positivism had rejected the theory of the synthetic a priori at the logical basis of Kant's architectonic. But Kant needn't be a card-carrying logical positivist in order to be in error regarding the relation of the following 3 things: the a priori, the synthetic, and the analytic. All he would need to do is to accept it -- to accept a dichotomy (rather than reject it, as Objectivists do). If Kant were to initially accept such a dichotomy, then he would have to put some work in in order to try to transcend it. He would have to come up with the "synthetic a priori" as a solution to the "problem."
If, on the other hand, there isn't a problem -- then the concept of the "synthetic a priori" is not needed as a solution. This is the thinking error with which Kant has been charged, not for creating the synthetic a priori, but for perceiving a need for it (to explain things). If Kant had rejected the analytic-synthetic dichotomy in the first place, then Rand and Peikoff would not have included him in a scornful discussion about it.
So I don't buy Peikoff's claim that the "moderns" played with Kant's "marked cards" only they played it "deuces wild." Philosophers are quite capable of marking their own cards, they don't need Kant's help. Okay, but Kant, in offering a solution to a non-existent problem, didn't help philosophy make the progress it has made. Instead, leaning on a false solution (like leaning on "fool's gold" for your fortune) ended up setting philosophical progress back a few notches. Notice how you do not even have to discuss the details or even the merits of Kant's solution -- like you do not need to know the weight of the fool's gold that you have (because it's all a sham, anyways) -- in order to criticize Kant's thinking.
You consider my idea of the a priori to be static. I think Kant's point about the mind is that the rules it operates by are static - do you believe the laws of nature are changing or unchanging? Well, as I showed above, this (examining the "synthetic a priori" for its merits, etc) is already water under the bridge. I will answer anyway, to be as clear as I can. The rules that the mind operates by are static, I agree. But that doesn't mean that we need to know anything about reality before (or independently of) experiencing it. It's a non sequitur. To think that we need experience-free knowledge about reality in order to know reality is a bold-faced acceptance of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy (as I showed above).
Kant considered the expressions "laws of nature" and "laws of experience" to be identical. And they are static, unchanging, immutable, necessary. Those ideas go to the very heart of what it means to be a priori, along with "independently of experience," where appearance only brings with it constant change. I disagree. I don't believe in innate ideas (knowledge, independent of experience). Furthermore, I do not see the epistemological need to postulate such a thing. It seems to me to be a rejection of the method humans use to know reality.
Hume mistook the forms of understanding for forms of sensibility. Leibniz mistook the forms of sensibility for forms of understanding. Kantian Critique brought both kinds of form to their respective proper transcendental topics. Good observation, though Kant was still wrong -- in the same way that "fixing" any non-existent problem is wrong. At best, you waste resources; at worst, you legitimize a falsehood (rather than outright rejecting it).
Rand and Peikoff know nothing of this. I beg to differ (but do so without the appropriate counter-evidence).
... by definition the a priori is that which is known independently of any and all experience. I reject this as an anti-concept. This sense of the a priori is not needed.
Your argument concludes that there needs to be something more than just the static notion of an a priori judgment, but Kant has already provided that answer for you: the synthetic a priori judgment. That's an epistemological "bait-n-switch" if I've ever seen one. An analogy would be a defense contractor mentioning a need for a missle defense system, and then offering the government a crate of toy slingshots at the price of a billion dollars. Just because there's a need for something, doesn't mean that "any" imagined solution will do (or is, therefore, a "good" solution).
The better solution, rather than postulating that we have to know some things about the world before ever experiencing it, would be to say that we learn things about the world via a combination of logic and experience. This solution would work, unless you initially accept the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, that is.
Ed
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