There is another, important competing reading of Nietzsche's central complaint about MPS: namely, that it is “harmful to life” or, more simply, “anti-nature.” Geuss, for example, says that, “There is little doubt that ‘Life’…in Nietzsche does seem to function as a criterion for evaluating moralities”

I would have to say that "transcending" the tension created by a dichotomy would definitely - even absolutely - be a tactic employed by Fichte and not Kant. That tactic is called "dialectics," and the third part of the CPR was devoted to opposing such methods.

Taking their cue from their needs, men can properly believe (for instance, in God and in an afterlife), even though they cannot prove the truth of their beliefs. And no matter how powerful the rational argument against their faith, that argument can always be dismissed out-of-hand: one need merely remind its advocate that rational knowledge and rational concepts are applicable only to the world of appearances, not to reality.

In a word, reason having been silenced, the way is cleared once more for an orgy of mystic fantasy. (The name of this orgy, the philosophic term for the nineteenth-century intellectuals' revolt against reason and the Enlightenment, is: romanticism.) "I have," writes Kant, "therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith."[4]

Kant also found it necessary to deny happiness, in order to make room for duty. The essence of moral virtue, he says, is selflessness--selfless, lifelong obedience to duty, without any expectation of reward, and regardless of how much it might make one suffer.

Kant's attack on reason, this world, and man's happiness was the decisive turning point. As the main line of modern philosophy rapidly absorbed his basic tenets, the last elements of the Aristotelian approach were abandoned, particularly in Germany. Philosophers turned as a group to variants of Platonism, this time an extreme, militant Platonism, a Platonism shorn of its last vestiges of respect for reason.

It is Kant who made possible the sudden mushrooming of the Platonic collectivism in the modern world, and especially in Germany. Kant is not a full-fledged statist, but a philosopher's political views, to the extent that they contradict the essentials of his system, have little historical significance. Kant accepts certain elements of individualism, not because of his basic approach, but in spite of it, as a legacy of the Enlightenment period in which he lived. This merely suggests that Kant did not grasp the political implications of his own metaphysics and epistemology.

His heirs, however, did.