After his book The Ideas of Ayn Rand appeared in 1991, I wrote to Dr. Merrill and invited him to contribute to Objectivity. He contributed "On the Physical Meaning of Volition" in 1992, "Axioms: The Eight-Fold Way" in 1994, and "Objectivist Ethics: A Biological Critique" in 1997. www.bomis.com/objectivity
I was the editor of Objectivity. Ron and I corresponded extensively concerning these three compositions (and concerning another one he was working on at the end of his life). Correspondence in those days was by surface mail, back and forth between me in Chicago and Ron in Torrance.
By the fall of 1994, Ron had completed the initial draft of "Axioms: The Eightfold Way." In his cover letter, he remarked of Objectivity: "the quality of the papers has been excellent, and I have found reading Objectivity very instructive." The manuscript on philosophical axioms elicited a three-page letter from Chicago to Torrance, a letter with a five-page addendum, which had been faxed down from heaven, from a former professor of philosophy at Konigsberg (concerning the representation of his philosophy). Below are excerpts from Ron Merrill's reply to me on 18 December 1994.
Most of the points you brought up have been clarified. In particular, I've expanded a bit on the issue of rationalistic deduction and the "fertility" of axiom sets. . . .
Your comments stimulated me to clarify my thinking on the nonindependence of axioms, and to come up with the formulation: If an axiom is truly inescapable, then it must be assumed in making any statement, even the statement of another axiom. This is why axioms (as opposed to postulates) are inherently nonindependent. The only limitation is that an axiom is inescapable only within the context of truth to which it applies. Thus "existence exists" is implicit in stating the axiom of consciousness; but the contrary does not hold. Again, the principle of noncontradiction is implicit in "existence exists," but the contrary does not hold. There are things that could be true, even though they are not true; and there are things that are true, even though they are not known to be true.
As to the completeness of the axiom set, I have left this question completely open. Your suggestion that this could be investigated by enumerating the implied primitives is very apt. . . .
The new version of the paper, I hope, will meet a better reception from Herr Professor Kant. . . .
Fond memories.
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