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Post 20

Friday, January 22, 2010 - 10:33amSanction this postReply
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The Seddon article is correct. "Glaube" - in the Kantian context - means rationally justified faith. Because, in the Kantian context, that is precisely what he sets out to do: rationally justify faith.

Your article is the result of taking the Bxxx quote out of context, and perhaps worse yet - taking a mere preface remark seriously. There is also your problem of judging a conclusion rather than the argument used to obtain it since, after all, it is a rationally or argumentatively justified faith Kant was striving for.

But if one is to believe the Objectivist caricature of Kant's works, all Kant apparently ever wrote was huge tomes containing nothing more than a bunch of E-vil one-liners.

Post 21

Friday, January 22, 2010 - 10:44amSanction this postReply
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FYI, Glaube is cognate with the English word "be-lief," which comes from the OE geleafa.

Post 22

Friday, January 22, 2010 - 11:15amSanction this postReply
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Ted,

Post #12 quotes a footnote from Werner Pluhar in which he argued against the "belief" interpretation of glaube.

Glaube. It is knowledge (Wissen), not cognition (Erkenntnis), that is being “annulled” (aufheben). Strictly speaking, what is annulled is the claim to knowledge; Kant is adding a touch of drama. As for Glaube, the term can mean either faith or belief. As the present context makes clear (cf. A 820–31 = B 848–59 incl. br. n. 113), Kant’s Glaube, in the full sense of the term, is incompatible with knowledge (though not with cognition; cf. above, A vii br. n. 6). As these terms are used in English, faith is usually considered incompatible with knowledge, whereas belief normally is not (but is even included in standard definitions of knowledge). Hence Kant’s Glaube, in the full sense of the term, must be rendered as "faith".


Post 23

Friday, January 22, 2010 - 2:32pmSanction this postReply
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TK:  FYI, Glaube is cognate with the English word "be-lief," which comes from the OE geleafa.
 
Unless you are talking to Beowulf, that is not very helpful. 

ge-laube (glaube) would be a past participle lieben, laubte, gelaubt ... if such were more than theoretical.  The English is lief as in "make willing."

When you be-lief (not ge-lief) you are "willed to" or "willed for" or "willed in."  The prefix "be" substitutes for an undefined directive adjective.  "Belong" means to long for; "behold" means hold by or hold to and bedeck means to deck with. "Deck the halls with boughs of holly" scans better than "boughs of holly bedeck the halls."

None of which is useful for Kant.  It might help with Nietzsche.  He loved etymologies.  Kant was mostly a guy to invite over to dinner before attempting to cross the seven bridges of Koenigsberg.
 
... maybe we should call this "Who the Heck Could Possibly Need Etymology?"


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Post 24

Friday, January 22, 2010 - 4:50pmSanction this postReply
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Robert, the error of Prof. Seddon’s for which my detailed trace of Kant’s context and development between A and B in #14 happened to be the resolution and answer was Seddon’s remark:

“I don’t know why he [Kant] wrote the word ‘Glaube’ (faith or belief). I am, however, convinced that he meant thought (Gedanke) . . . ” (Seddon 2005, 193).

Having read #14, Fred now knows why Kant wrote what he wrote and why what he wrote was what he should have written and what he meant by what he wrote. Slow down, and do not presume you know my position beyond what I write. You must read very closely what I write or I will not have time for you.


Post 25

Friday, January 22, 2010 - 8:26pmSanction this postReply
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You sound like a creationist, Michael. You are simply making things up. At this point if I were to say the sky was blue you would most likely try to argue that it is a cheese sandwich.

TK: FYI, Glaube is cognate with the English word "be-lief," which comes from the OE geleafa.

Unless you are talking to Beowulf, that is not very helpful.

ge-laube (glaube) would be a past participle lieben, laubte, gelaubt ... if such were more than theoretical. The English is lief as in "make willing."

When you be-lief (not ge-lief) you are "willed to" or "willed for" or "willed in." The prefix "be" substitutes for an undefined directive adjective. "Belong" means to long for; "behold" means hold by or hold to and bedeck means to deck with. "Deck the halls with boughs of holly" scans better than "boughs of holly bedeck the halls."

None of which is useful for Kant. It might help with Nietzsche. He loved etymologies. Kant was mostly a guy to invite over to dinner before attempting to cross the seven bridges of Koenigsberg.

... maybe we should call this "Who the Heck Could Possibly Need Etymology?"

There is so much not even wrong here I don't know where to begin. Here is just some of it.

According to Calvert Watkins' American Heritage Dictionary of Indo-European Roots and easily verified English and German grammar:

• Belief does indeed come from an earlier form with a ge- prefix, although you ignorantly deny it. (In English that prefix weakens or disappears. The words alike and enough come from OE gelic and genog which are cognate with German gleich and genug.)
• Obviously you don't know that the prefix ge- was not limited to past particples prior to the modern German you learned in high school.
• The prefix ge- is cognate with Latin com-, the prefix be- with the Latin ambi.
• The addition of the be- prefix as an intensifier, just like ge- is a typical English development, regardless of your ignorance of the fact.
• The prefix be- means does not mean "for." It is cognate with the English preposition by.
• You have simply made up the etymologies "willed to" et cetera.
• belong derives from gelang, "along with," not, as you ludicrously invent, "to long for."
• Neither the word belief nor Glaube (nor enough, nor alike, etc.,) is or derives from a past participle as you invent.
• The word belief derives from the verb *galaubo, not the adjective lief which comes from the separate word *leubaz. You are, in part, misled by a coincidence of modern spelling, in part by emotion.
• The actual forms of lieben, "to love," are liebe, liebte, geliebt.
• The actualforms of glauben, "to believe," are glaube, glaubte, geglaubt.
•The "words" laubte and glaubte are your inventions.
• While the roots of love and belief (and to give "leave") are distantly related at the Proto-Indo-European, they were already entirely separate in Proto-Germanic. The verbs to believe and glauben come from the Proto-Germanic O-grade *loubh >*galaubo. The verbs to love and lieben come from roots with other stem vowels.
• This: When you be-lief (not ge-lief) you are "willed to" or "willed for" or "willed in." is plain nonsense. The verb form was never be-lief. The last consonant in the verb believe developed from a Germanic intervocal -b- to an English intervocal -v- which was written as an -f- in Old English. The noun form with a final voiceless -f (like off) developed separately. None of these forms developed from the adjective lief, "gladly," as in the archaic "I would as lief." And as mention the "willed-to" etymology is your own not even plausible invention.

Your rationalism here is shocking. Just as with your made up accusations against Beck, you have started with you hatred as the given, and made up the facts to suit.

(Edited by Ted Keer on 1/23, 3:05pm)


Post 26

Friday, January 22, 2010 - 10:08pmSanction this postReply
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Steve,

I don't recall replying to your post #12. I only quoted the Pluhar quote from it.

If you don't want to find the time for me, that's quite all right.
(Edited by Robert Keele on 1/22, 10:08pm)


Post 27

Saturday, January 23, 2010 - 6:56amSanction this postReply
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Ed,

You wrote:

Considering how myself and Robert Malcom have responded to the inescapably-spurious connection between knowledge and belief, then didn't you, at least implicitly, offer up the following Kant quote as further validation to #9 from my essay?:

====================
I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge[italicized] in order to make room for faith[italicized].
====================
-"Critique of Pure Reason", trans. N. Kemp Smith, B xxx


It should be noted that "knowledge" and "faith" were not italicized in the original German text.

Perhaps they were inserted by translators to help sell more books.

Post 28

Saturday, January 23, 2010 - 7:41amSanction this postReply
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It should be noted that "knowledge" and "faith" were not italicized in the original German text.
..............

So? irrelevant whether italicized or not, as that merely makes sure those words are noted and not glossed over...

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Post 29

Saturday, January 23, 2010 - 9:08amSanction this postReply
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No, Mr. Keele, Prof. Pluhar’s translation is from Kants gesammelte Schriften, the standard edition of Kant’s works known as the Akademie edition. Pluhar has preserved the original typographical emphases throughout his translation.

Post 30

Saturday, January 23, 2010 - 1:13pmSanction this postReply
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Steve,

Then ask Fred Seddon why he wrote: Notice that all of the translations emphasize both knowledge and faith (belief) and all put a full stop after the word “faith.” But neither the emphasis nor the period is in the German original.
http://www.objectivistcenter.org/events/advsem03/SeddonKantonFaith.pdf

I'll check on Pluhar's to see what it contains later.

Experience informs me, however, that Kant only italicized Latin and Greek terms (e.g., a priori).
(Edited by Robert Keele on 1/23, 2:49pm)


Post 31

Sunday, January 31, 2010 - 5:48amSanction this postReply
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Concerning history of philosophy, in an informal remark, Rand said “some schools of philosophy did hold just that—that a concept is a memory of a concrete, only very vague” (ITOE Appendix 156–57). What schools would those be? (Yes, there are such schools.)


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
PS (Re: #30)

I mentioned to Fred the circumstance of Pluhar’s translation in a seminar discussion of Fred's paper a year or so before its publication. He did not follow up and address that countervailing indicator in the published version. Probably he forgot.

Robert’s point in #28 is well-taken.

(Edited by Stephen Boydstun on 1/31, 6:42am)


Post 32

Monday, February 8, 2010 - 7:41amSanction this postReply
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Custom and Reason in Hume: A Kantian Reading from the First Book of the Treatise
Henry Allison
(Oxford 2008)

This book will be the topic of an Author-Meets-Critics session at the Pacific Division Meeting in a joint session of the Hume Society and North American Kant Society. The session will be on March 31, 1:00–4:00 p.m. The critics will be Lorne Falkenstein and Manfred Keuhn.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Related to the preceding topic in Objectivity

Habit v. Conceptual Knowledge V1N3 27–32 (Hume/Law of Inertia)

Habit and Logical Connection V1N2 37–41 (Aristotle/Mill/Piaget)
and V1N3 5–32 (Nicolaus: Substance / Hume: Cause and Effect; Time; Necessity; Uniformity)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The Pacific Division Meeting will be at the St. Francis hotel in San Francisco.
The Ayn Rand Society session there will be on April 3, 6:00–9:00 p.m. It will be an Author-Meets-Critics on Essays on Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged, Robert Mayhew, editor. The critics will be Christine Swanton, Lester Hunt, and William Glod. Responding authors will be Onkar Ghate, Allan Gotthelf, and Gregory Salmieri.



Post 33

Monday, October 17, 2011 - 1:38amSanction this postReply
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Hi,

 

Thank very much for your share. It help me to think about for my ideals.

 

Tks again.


Post 34

Monday, December 30, 2013 - 1:18amSanction this postReply
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i think knowledge as justified true belief is quite problematic.

Post 35

Monday, December 30, 2013 - 6:02amSanction this postReply
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I mentioned Nozick’s knowledge conditions in #10:
    Robert Nozick writes that person X knows that p [that p is the case] if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
    (i) p is true.
    (ii) X believes that p.
    (iii) If p were not true, X would not believe that p.
    (iv) If p were true, X would believe that p.
    [The fourth is going beyond the satisfaction of the first two. Compare with the following: Not only was it the case that the bird's landing captured the cat's attention, but if the bird were to land as it did, it would capture the cat's attention as it did.]
    (Philosophical Explanations 172-78; see further 179-96)
I am pleased to see that Nozick’s tracking view of truth—with (iii) and (iv) formulating the tracking in knowing a truth as opposed to merely believing a truth—has received significant attention, development, and criticism in a book from Cambridge. Its title is The Sensitivity Principle, Kelly Becker and Tim Black, editors (2012). The title refers to Nozick’s (iii).

Becker writes in the Preface:
    In the fall of 1991, while . . . preparing applications for graduate school, I audited John Dolan’s epistemology seminar at the University of Minnesota. We read Robert Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations, which struck me as such a misguided reply to skepticism that I dedicated my application’s writing sample to saying exactly why (which I no longer recall). Fast forward to 2001 to . . . a reading group at University of Kentucky . . . [discussing] DeRose and Warfield’s (1999) Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. My task was to present Nozick’s epistemology, and I was surprised to find myself not only explaining it but also endorsing it. . . .
Black writes in the Preface:
    I came to the sensitivity principle indirectly, not through the work of Nozick or Fred Dretske or Alvin Goldman, but through the work of Keith DeRose, who makes use of the principle in his epistemological contextualism. I was then—and am now—convinced that contextualism is not to be preferred over certain invarianatist alternatives, and so I set out to show that one could make use of the very same principle, the sensitivity principle, in constructing an invariantism that is just as plausible as, if not more plausible than, contextualism. In trying to construct a sensitivity-based invariantism, I encountered a disheartening number of negative appraisals of sensitivity as a condition for knowledge. As I began to examine these, however, I realized just how many of them were either criticizing too rudimentary a notion of sensitivity or objecting that sensitivity violates a much too simple version of the epistemic closure principle. One of the main virtues of this volume, then, is that it gives some very talented epistemologists a chance to say why they (continue to) object to sensitivity-based accounts, even when those accounts have been strengthened and expanded as they have been over the past forty years or so. . . .



Post 36

Monday, December 30, 2013 - 9:52pmSanction this postReply
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i always viewed knowledge as demonstrative

Post 37

Tuesday, December 31, 2013 - 4:17amSanction this postReply
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Hi Michael,

By demonstrative, do you mean it as including of all these?

(i) the everyday case of demonstrating that the chair in which I am sitting is strong enough to support my weight.

(ii) the geometric demonstration that the internal angles of any triangle sum to two right angles.

(iii) the applied mathematical demonstration that the central force causing the earth to orbit the sun with the specifics of its orbit is the same kind of central force causing the moon to orbit the earth with the specifics of its orbit.

(iv) inductive demonstrations, informed by thermodynamic demonstrations, that all men are mortal.

(v) analytic demonstrations, informed by concepts based on experience, that value presupposes life.

Post 38

Friday, January 10, 2014 - 2:16amSanction this postReply
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Hi Stepehen

I will formulate a response to your comment but in the meantime let me ask you, do you agree with the view of knowledge as a kind of justified true belief.

Post 39

Sunday, January 12, 2014 - 6:57pmSanction this postReply
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Well, I'd say that knowledge be true is necessary for that belief state to be knowledge. So the idea that knowledge is a form of true belief seems fine.

But if I believe I'll die day after tomorrow, and that turns out to be true, then all the same, I did not know that outcome to be true. Say I've been having way too many ministrokes and have lately come round to all sorts of bolt-from-the-blue beliefs. They are caused by my deteriorating brain, say, and I have no justifying reasons for holding these bolty beliefs. To me they just feel right, say. One of them is I'll die day after tomorrow. Then I do. Did I know that outcome?

I do know that I'll not be alive sixty-five years from now. I have a lot of reasons for thinking that true. Suppose that sixty-five years from now, I died some time before and died for the sound reasons I thought that would be the case. Now we're talking knowledge.

So I'd say knowledge is true belief, but not every true belief, only justified true belief. The main task, if that is so, is to delineate what counts as justification in this setting. All sorts of demonstration will surely be part of what we count as sound reasons and justification.


(Edited by Stephen Boydstun on 1/12, 7:06pm)


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