RoR: Forum

How Freud ties in to value-determinism

Freud's explanation of folks' behavior would be something like: "Oh, your Id made you lust after her." or "Oh, it is your SuperEgo that is making you feel too guilty to go to the police afterwards." The upshot is that you don't have to be blamed for your actions, that you need medical assistance and psycho-therapy -- that, because you need reform, you do not deserve retribution for what you did (to others). Your behavior was determined by these things inside your psyche. The real you is "ephemeral" or "amorphous" or whatever -- just like in Rand's essay: Selfishness without a Self.

The actual answer is not that there is some mystical thing besides yourself -- which "resides" in your psyche, but that Id, Ego, and SuperEgo are just 3 different ways of explaining aspects of a self-same person. It would be crazy to re-define parts of yourself as not "yourself" -- and then to go ahead and ascribe praise or blame to these things (for your actions).

That's just what value-determinism does (or ought to do, in order to avoid contradiction).

"I wouldn't have done that to you, Mable, but ... but ... it was my values that were making me choose to do that." So don't blame me, blame my values. I don't need to go to jail for what I did, I need more social engineering.

And notice how terribly close it is to the notion of "theory-free knowledge" or of Kant's talk of "sensation-free" knowledge -- because the human sense organs are considered to be warping what's really out there (the noumenal). Bill sees "choice" like Kant sees knowledge -- it's not a "pure choice", it's not "free," if it's tainted by "human" values.

But the values, metaphorically, are the person. The person, then, determines their behavior. Their values are part of them, not a separate thing. To be determined by your will and your values is what it means to have 'free will.' It's when the only thing in control of your will is ... you. There is no noumenal realm. No sense-free knowledge. There is no value-free behavior. No 'impartial' homunculus.

Expecting either of these things is either not fully rational or not fully informed, and will lead one to postulate wrong things such as 'the-Devil-made-me-do-it' appeals to some kind -- any kind -- of "determinism."

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 7/30, 5:37pm)

Post 1

Thursday, July 30, 2009 - 6:20pm

I was sorta confused by Dwyer's idea because where does it stop? If a value determines a choice, then what determines the value? And what then determines that which determined the value? Turtles all the way down!
(Edited by Bridget Armozel on 7/30, 6:20pm)

Post 2

Thursday, July 30, 2009 - 9:39pm

Ed writes,

Since free choice isn't so "free" -- since it springs up from underlying values, reasoning, and motives -- Bill and Roger thought it necessary to explain that the choices don't spring up from the person ex nihilo, but that things (values, reasons, motives) "make" these choices 'for us.'

No, that's not our position. We don't say that values, reasons or motives make these choices 'for us'. We make the choices, but we do so based on what we judge to be the most valuable choice under the circumstances.

For example, suppose that I have the opportunity to steal something I value, like a book that you happen to own, but hold the principle of property rights as a higher value. In that case, I will abstain from stealing your book, because I value respecting your rights more than I do gaining possession of the book. Under these circumstances (holding the moral values that I do), I could not have chosen otherwise. My moral values determined (that is, necessitated) my choice.

Bridgette wrote,

I was sorta confused by Dwyer's idea because where does it stop? If a value determines a choice, then what determines the value? And what then determines that which determined the value? Turtles all the way down!

What determines the value is your knowledge, experience and previous values. Where does it all begin? Well, you're born with certain innate desires, values, interests. Children are innately curious and enjoy learning and exploring the world around them. In addition, parents inculcate certain ideas and values and direct their children's formal education. Children also acquire values from their social environment. All of this contributes to the kind of human beings they eventually become and provide the foundation for their more mature conceptual and philosophical values. Reading Rand had a major influence on my values and convictions. This does not mean, of course, that people cannot do original thinking or develop new ideas, but these are themselves motivated and made possible by their previous experience, ideas and values.

- Bill

Post 3

Friday, July 31, 2009 - 12:06pm

Bill: Well, you're born with certain innate desires, values, interests.

Me: Can you cite any good articles in developmental neuralogy that back up this claim? No one to my knowledge in the field makes this extreme apriorism in terms of mental capacities as content.

Bill: Children are innately curious and enjoy learning and exploring the world around them

Me: Curiosity and being autodidatic are not values, they are actions. Actions themselves imply some basic values, but these have to be grasped at some level that can be called cognitive (or conscious).

Bill: In addition, parents inculcate certain ideas and values and direct their children's formal education. Children also acquire values from their social environment.

Me: Okay, now I agree that the mental/epistemological environment can color a person's system of values, but taking a unique perspective: my mother and my sister. My mother was sexually and physically abused, she grew up to be a person that may have been too timid at times, but on the whole she is a well rounded person capable of learning and self-determination. My sister, on the other hand, who had similar incidents as my mother, turned to drugs and self-abuse. Both fundamentally have equivalent environments to 'osmose' values from, but they choose different paths in life. That difference isn't something as simple as blind chance or Keynesian animal spirits. There's some mental integration that's going on, which weighs the values, this integration acts both apart and influenced by these values.

Bill: This does not mean, of course, that people cannot do original thinking or develop new ideas, but these are themselves motivated and made possible by their previous experience, ideas and values.

Me: Much of your ideas seem colored by some of Hayek's ideas that humans were passive agents in the economy, where information was like bread crumbs along the way that lead a person to the right or wrong conclusion in entrepreneural (economic) action. Now, I do agree that some information is dispersed in the world (and the economy), but I disagree sharply in a passive view of the human mental life. It is one that is wild and wooly as the real world for us. I hope I'm not turning Kantian Realist with such a assertion, but I don't see how passivity in human valuation can be justified in any form of determinism or not.

Post 4

Friday, July 31, 2009 - 1:15pm

Bill: Children are innately curious and enjoy learning and exploring the world around them

Bill: In addition, parents inculcate certain ideas and values and direct their children's formal education. Children also acquire values from their social environment.
...........................

The way you are structuring this is to treat humans as if just another animal - for this is essentially how one approaches animal development among the higher animals...

all the primates hold this 'innately curious' - but only humans take it past the childhood stage to a lifelong extension...
(Edited by robert malcom on 7/31, 1:18pm)

Post 5

Friday, July 31, 2009 - 7:26pm

Bill: Well, you're born with certain innate desires, values, interests.

Bridgette: Can you cite any good articles in developmental neuralogy that back up this claim? No one to my knowledge in the field makes this extreme apriorism in terms of mental capacities as content.

Bill: I think you make a good objection here. My statement was too strong or at best misleading. I should have said that, beyond the pleasure-pain mechanism and perhaps the suckling reflex, you're born with the capacity to acquire certain values. Your experience fills in the rest.

Bill: Children are innately curious and enjoy learning and exploring the world around them

Bridgette: Curiosity and being autodidatic are not values, they are actions. Actions themselves imply some basic values, but these have to be grasped at some level that can be called cognitive (or conscious).

Bill: I would define "curiosity" as an interest in learning about the world, which is something that the child values. So curiosity is a kind of value, namely, that of knowledge acquisition.

Bill: In addition, parents inculcate certain ideas and values and direct their children's formal education. Children also acquire values from their social environment.

Bridgette: Okay, now I agree that the mental/epistemological environment can color a person's system of values, but taking a unique perspective: my mother and my sister. My mother was sexually and physically abused, she grew up to be a person that may have been too timid at times, but on the whole she is a well rounded person capable of learning and self-determination. My sister, on the other hand, who had similar incidents as my mother, turned to drugs and self-abuse. Both fundamentally have equivalent environments to 'osmose' values from, but they choose different paths in life. That difference isn't something as simple as blind chance or Keynesian animal spirits. There's some mental integration that's going on, which weighs the values, this integration acts both apart and influenced by these values.

Bill: I agree. I would say that different people who are exposed to the same environment often weigh and evaluate the same information differently, because their respective experiences, interests and personalities are never exactly the same. However, identical twins studies reveal some fascinating parallels.

Bill: This does not mean, of course, that people cannot do original thinking or develop new ideas, but these are themselves motivated and made possible by their previous experience, ideas and values.

Bridgette:: Much of your ideas seem colored by some of Hayek's ideas that humans were passive agents in the economy, where information was like bread crumbs along the way that lead a person to the right or wrong conclusion in entrepreneural (economic) action. Now, I do agree that some information is dispersed in the world (and the economy), but I disagree sharply in a passive view of the human mental life. It is one that is wild and wooly as the real world for us. I hope I'm not turning Kantian Realist with such a assertion, but I don't see how passivity in human valuation can be justified in any form of determinism or not.

Bill: I don't regard our thoughts and actions as passive -- motivated, yes, but not passive -- unless you want to say that what is determined by one's motivation is by definition passive. Let's say that you're a highly motivated student with a strong desire to get an A in a course you're taking. So you study hard and proceed to answer all of the questions on the mid-term correctly. Could you have chosen to answer them incorrectly? No. Your knowledge and your interest in getting an A necessitated your choosing the right answers, but that doesn't make your performance on the test "passive." It was as active as anything you could have chosen.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer on 7/31, 7:27pm)

Post 6

Friday, July 31, 2009 - 11:52pm

Bill,

***********
Let's say that you're a highly motivated student with a strong desire to get an A in a course you're taking. So you study hard and proceed to answer all of the questions on the mid-term correctly. Could you have chosen to answer them incorrectly? No.
***********

But that's not true. You could have chosen to answer them incorrectly. Let's say that all of the above is true, but that you have been such a stellar student that getting the mid-term questions correct means you would be put into an accelerated learning program away from your friends and the girl that you want to marry.

Remember, I said that all of the above is true, but that you could have chosen differently (if other things are true, too). I could come up with a million 'other things.' Each time that you say someone couldn't have chosen differently, I could find a way for that statement to be wrong.

I could even do it without changing the 'outside' circumstances.

If, for instance, you were the same highly motivated student you describe, but you forgot that you'd lose contact with your friends and a chance to court the girl of your dreams, but then, upon taking the exam, you remembered -- then nothing outside you had changed, and you choose differently merely because of remembering.

Now, if you keep moving the goal line -- if you say: "Well, in the case where he remembers he'd lose his friends etc, he'd have to choose to not get an A grade (because he values his friends etc. more than the grade), but in the case where he didn't remember, he'd have to choose to answer the questions correctly and get the A grade." -- then what you are doing is simply post facto rationalization.

I showed how he could have chosen otherwise, even without changing any 'outside' circumstances. What changed -- his memory -- was an 'inside' (mental) circumstance. It has nothing to do with his 'will' (intellectual appetite), it's just a mental change that allows him to chose differently in the same circumstances.

There have been cases where I forgot my own value hierarchy such that I chose 'otherwise' (I chose a lesser value). I felt regret after the decision. I also remember not having enough virtue to be true to my value hierarchy -- and letting others walk all over me. I deeply regret doing that. So much so that I have chosen to respond differently.

Now, if I can 'chose otherwise' like that when I am in the same kinds of circumstances, then the thing that changed is me. The upshot is that people can change themselves -- and a changed person can 'choose otherwise.'

The simplest change, as mentioned above, is the choice-changing effect of something as 'innocent' as memory. In the case of memory, in the case of remembering forgotten details, you retain the same character, and the external circumstances remain exactly the same, but an internal mental change allows you to 'choose differently.' If you don't remember, then you'll mistakenly make a choice that goes against your values.

Let me restate that, if you do not focus enough on your value hierarchy -- then you will 'choose differently.' And the kicker is that no one knows how much focus is 'enough' (to guarantee that the choice you made really does stem from the values you hold).

In the case of growing more virtuous, and choosing more in line with your value hierarchy, you change -- and that is what allows you to 'choose differently.

Now, if you retreat to the position that goes something like this: "If you keep EVERYTHING the same, you couldn't have chosen otherwise." -- then I'd say that that's a true but unacceptable premise in the free will (could-have-chosen-otherwise) debate.

What makes it unacceptable is how true it is. It's true for everything. In fact, it's so true, that you can use it as an answer to everything:

If folks ask you why the economy is in the tank -- Then tell them that if you kept all of the details the same, then the situation would be exactly the same situation that we are in now.

If folks ask you why certain metals rust -- then tell them that if you kept all of the details (of oxidation, etc) the same, then the situation would be exactly the same situation that we have now (where certain metals end up rusting).

It turns out, upon reflection, that WHENEVER you keep everything the same -- you get the same results. But that doesn't bear on the free will debate. Free will is NOT an absolutely-free will -- where even values don't matter, for instance.

Your values and your will (and your memory) are part of yourself, they aren't something 'different' from you -- determining your choices. They are YOU, determining your choices. If you choose things based on your values, then you are exercising 'free will.' If, due to memory lapse, you choose things that go against your values, then you are exercising 'free will.'

What makes it free is not some Kantian 'absolute' or 'pure' freedom, what makes it free is that you can change it. I know I have changed my will. Even if the will, your values, and your consciousness of your values (your memory, etc) necessarily lead to just one choice, that doesn't mean that your choice is determined to be one thing over the other -- because will, values, and memory can all, individually, change.

In a way, your will, values, and memory just ARE you. Whenever they change, you can 'choose differently.' It's only when you make the unfounded assumption that your will, your values, and your memory are NOT you, that value-determinism makes any sense. Otherwise, it's just a murky way of talking about someone's free will.

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 7/31, 11:59pm)

Post 7

Saturday, August 1, 2009 - 11:22am

Ed,

You said Bill is just using "post facto rationalizations" when you add another element to the context. I think that is unfair. That is how we figure people out when they defy our expectations. We use the principle that if something doesn't turn out as expect, then we haven't accounted for all the variables.

You brought up that merely remembering a fact can change a person's actions. True that, but you changed the context. You don't seem interested in the idea that there might be a causal nature in why that person remembered just then. That causal nature being something other than your will. It seems like you are appealing to randomness or mind mysteries to put the 'free' in free will.

If we are to take psychology as a serious reign of inquiry, one that will produce laws and theories; if we are to take seriously our capability to know a person's intimate desires and beliefs; if we are to take seriously that in principle, we can know a situation to any degree we need to; then we should believe that in principle, people's actions can be predicted with certainty.

You conceded that ultimately the same context must yield the same results. I think you scoff at the tautological nature of this premise. Yet this is the idea that Bill's determinism rests on. Do you want it another way?

Post 8

Saturday, August 1, 2009 - 12:39pm

"..I�ve learned this�free will is a gift with a price tag, and whatever you choose to do you�re going to pay, but how much you�re going to pay is really dependent on you."

http://sports.yahoo.com/top/news?slug=ys-phelps080109&prov=ap&type=lgns

Milorad Cavic on free will. Not bad, I say. Then, I'm not a determinist.

Post 9

Saturday, August 1, 2009 - 1:29pm

Bill: I would define "curiosity" as an interest in learning about the world, which is something that the child values. So curiosity is a kind of value, namely, that of knowledge acquisition.

Me: I would say that's the case, yes. But with the proviso that no inherent values exist in terms of the pursuit of say a given kind of knowledge. In some ways I would say because of the nature of sense-perception that rather instead of there being a value system sort of "bootstrapped" into the brain, that our brain and our sense-perception has evolved to find information or meaning in the world. Thus, curiosity is a natural consequence that requires no inherent conscious action by itself, but when one considers curiosity about *what*, then one must consider a will that directs blind curiosity to that which is preferred by the given person/agent.

Bill: I agree. I would say that different people who are exposed to the same environment often weigh and evaluate the same information differently, because their respective experiences, interests and personalities are never exactly the same. However, identical twins studies reveal some fascinating parallels.

Me: I've found actually similar studies on twins that show many divergences between biological twins. Especially in concerns of tastes of music, food, and careers. Granted, one could still consider it "background noise" of nature (of blind chance), but to my knowledge no one has yet shown a mechanism for this. Maybe in the future there could be such a mechanism found, but until then I stand by the view that future knowledge is not knowledge (as in much as it cannot be validly referenced in present arguments).

All in all, I do find some of your ideas not problematic, but rather possibly slightly off base in as much as the nature of definitions. Free will is a bad word in some ways as it can be used to mean will free of all consequences of reality (and causality). Also, free will can merely mean the degree of freedom by which one's will can alter in terms of thought or action. Or one can go to the other extreme where free will is merely some cognitive illusion that should be ignored altogether. I tend toward the middle definition, of course. Once the definitions are set and shown to be non-contradictory, I think one can find there's little problem with your concepts (as you seem to not show any false belief that such a value determinism can calculate apriori the future states/decisions of individuals).

Post 10

Saturday, August 1, 2009 - 2:59pm

Doug,

************************
You said Bill is just using "post facto rationalizations" when you add another element to the context. I think that is unfair. That is how we figure people out when they defy our expectations. We use the principle that if something doesn't turn out as expect, then we haven't accounted for all the variables.
************************

Okay. I agree it's how we figure people out: by starting with what we think their motives are or were, and then adjusting to new data as it comes in. We retro-actively explain their behavior. That's how we deal with folks in the real world, but this subject is more basic than that. The problem is when you leave things open-ended when you are trying to defend determinism.

Think about the basics of that kind of an argument.

Let's say that I attempt to defend an omni-directional tachyon field as what it is that governs your acceleration toward the center of mass of the earth. This makes gravity a 'pushing' force, not a 'pulling' one. Large objects, like the earth, slow down the tachyons that would have hit the bottom of your feet -- and the ones coming down on your head hit you with full force, producing a net acceleration to the center of mass of the earth of 9.8 meters per second each second.

Now, let's say you then ask me about airplanes. And let's say that I just say that airplanes fly for the same reason -- net tachyon forcing. I say that airplanes fly because of the space between the earth and the airplane. After all, 99% of plane flight involves a big distance from earth to plane. The space between the earth and the plane allows for more tachyons traveling at an oblique angle to hit the undersurface of the plane. Let's say I stick to my guns about these tachyons explaining your acceleration to the earth (even during plane flight).

That would be an error on my part because it doesn't effectively explain take-offs, which don't involve any big distance between the earth and the plane (and such distance is needed for the oblique-traveling tachyons to hit the underside of the plane).

What I should have done is amend my theory to incorporate plane flight into my tachyon field theory of 'gravity' -- rather than to keep blaming tachyons for all and every motion. My new theory then, a theory that explained both gravity AND plane flight, would involve conventional aerodynamics as well as tachyons.

The upshot is that, if I don't account for the new data in my theory, then I'm just retroactively rationalizing that my 'pet theory' is in control of your distance from and acceleration to the earth -- whether you're just walking or flying.

The onus or burden of explanation is on me, not you. If you add new facts into the equation, and I say: "Well, if it wasn't for tachyons, then none of this would be true!" then I'm the one failing in the argument -- not you (for demanding that I explain the 'other fact' of plane flight).

Bill, gets unearned mileage out of saying that values determine choices, because there are these instances (e.g. memory lapses, etc.) where they don't. If Bill can't account for choices made during memory lapses, etc. then his theory doesn't fly. What he should have done is amend his theory to incorporate the changed choices which stem from both deliberate and unintentional changes of focus -- and the character-building of the choosing agent.

Because he doesn't do that, because he just sticks to his guns and back-pedals with statements like:

'Well, if your focus changed, then that means that you VALUED a change in focus -- so values STILL determine behavior or choice.'

... then I call him out on that. He can't just say "values" like he does, if only the 'conscious' values determine behavior. And he can't just say it's "value-determinism" -- if it includes extra things like 'memory lapse'. During a memory lapse, it isn't your values that cause you to change your level of focus (and hence, to "choose differently"). And if it wasn't, then value-determinism cannot be true.

Do you understand this 'modus tollens' type of reasoning of how value-determinism can't be true if choices are ever made which contradict values or valuing? Do you see how the onus or burden of proof is on him?

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 8/01, 3:34pm)

Post 11

Saturday, August 1, 2009 - 8:23pm

Ed,

I understand your point. It would be quite an abuse of the value model to encompass all actions. I'll watch for this and read some back posts.

Post 12

Saturday, August 1, 2009 - 11:04pm

I wrote, "Let's say that you're a highly motivated student with a strong desire to get an A in a course you're taking. So you study hard and proceed to answer all of the questions on the mid-term correctly. Could you have chosen to answer them incorrectly? No."

Ed replied,

But that's not true. You could have chosen to answer them incorrectly. Let's say that all of the above is true, but that you have been such a stellar student that getting the mid-term questions correct means you would be put into an accelerated learning program away from your friends and the girl that you want to marry.

I agree, but you're missing the point of the example. The point I was making is that the test taker is a normal highly motivated student whose highest priority is doing well in school. In that case, he HAD to choose what he knew to be the correct answers. He could not have chosen otherwise.

- Bill

Post 13

Sunday, August 2, 2009 - 2:33am

Bill,

You said, "The point I was making is that the test taker is a normal highly motivated student whose highest priority is doing well in school. In that case, he HAD to choose what he knew to be the correct answers. He could not have chosen otherwise."

From your perspective, I guess you could NOT have chosen to make that post the tiniest bit different. And I could NOT have stopped myself from typing this reply. But I don't agree with your perspective.

It is the awareness of the great number of options that are open to us in every minute that requires choice. It is true that our values have a great force and will tend to restrict the options much of the time, but they never eliminate the need to choose. That student who is so highly motivated to do well in school may also be motivated to be liked by classmates who would tease him for getting much better grades than they do. He might be tempted to choose to get one or two answers wrong and he will raise or lower his focus, his awareness, choosing between healthy pride, and an unhealthy desire to sacrifice. He will be choosing between two goals, and assaulted by two emotions, and choosing between two modes of consciousness - heightened awareness and denial or evasion. His volition will determine. He will be a first cause as he wills integrity, or suppresses his will to soothe a feeling of not being accepted.

Post 14

Sunday, August 2, 2009 - 9:00am

Steve,

Thanks for your input.

Of course, you know what a "soft determinist" or compatibilist would say. He would say that in choosing to fudge a few of the answers in order to appear less "brainy," he was simply weighing his respective values and acting on the stronger and more compelling of the two.

Offhand, I'm not sure there's any clearcut way to refute this rejoinder except to argue that introspection does not reveal any decisive preference for one alternative over the other and that a metaphysically free choice is the only reasonable explanation.

I'm still not sure. Like all animals, human beings are goal oriented creatures whose actions are motivated by perceived values, but free will seems to say that of two alternatives, either one is viewed as equally valuable, so that the choice one makes for one alternative over the other is itself unmotivated. It is unmotivated, because if one alternative were viewed as more valuable than the other, then the choice would be determined by what is perceived to be the greater value. But the idea of a free, unmotivated choice seems incompatible with goal-directed behavior. There's something odd about it.

But there we are -- stuck, it seems to me, between a rock and hard place or perhaps I should say "between a free and a softly determined place." :)

But please understand that the point of my test-taker example was simply to illustrate that it is possible to make an "active" choice that is nonetheless clearly determined by one's value hierarchy. I was, of course, assuming a student who was not influenced by peer pressure to appear less studious -- who was not in other words "tempted" by the desire to be popular -- but whose highest priority was doing well in school.

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer on 8/02, 9:12am)

Post 15

Sunday, August 2, 2009 - 10:00am

The bottom line, which Steve touched upon, is that for the most part we act even when our environment offers us a virtually infinite number of alternatives with few constraints. When traveling to a brand new destination I may face innumerable options. To get to LA from NYC I could take many different highways, train routes, air planes or even a cruise. Or I could stay home.

Of course I use some simple heuristics and force of habit plays a role. But ultimately it is absurd to say that I exhaustively weighed all the alternatives in the context of my values. My ultimate value is getting to the destination, and at some point the weighing process is cut off, and I act. That is what volition is, the ability to act when the outside circumstances provide us with sub-determinative options.

If there is one glass of water, and I am dying of thirst, circumstances are determinative. But in most real life actions, we are neither dying of thirst, nor is there only one glass. We do not stand paralyzed like Buridan's ass between two equally attractive piles of fodder. We choose. And our choice is not, and cannot be "determined" by exhaustive calculation of values. If humans were mere value calculators we would all eventually crash like Microsoft operating systems caught in infinite loops and subroutines with decision trees whose resolution would take longer than the projected time until the heat death of the universe.

Even my computer's chess program has a simple volitionality. Some opening moves are better than others. But there is no best opening move in chess. The alternatives are endless. Yet the chess program does make an opening move, and not always the same one. Human beings are somewhat more subtle, powerful, and effective than chess programs. We do act even when our own values are not sufficient to determine our actions.

(Edited by Ted Keer on 8/02, 10:01am)

Post 16

Sunday, August 2, 2009 - 11:18am

The bottom line, which Steve touched upon, is that for the most part we act even when our environment offers us a virtually infinite number of alternatives with few constraints.

But most of these we don't even consider.

When traveling to a brand new destination I may face innumerable options. To get to LA from NYC I could take many different highways, train routes, air planes or even a cruise. Or I could stay home.

Of course I use some simple heuristics and force of habit plays a role. But ultimately it is absurd to say that I exhaustively weighed all the alternatives in the context of my values.

Who said that? Of course, you don't "exhaustively" weigh all of the alternatives.

My ultimate value is getting to the destination, and at some point the weighing process is cut off, and I act. That is what volition is, the ability to act when the outside circumstances provide us with sub-determinative options.

You cut off the deliberative process, because you don't see any value in continuing it. This is perfectly consistent with value-determinism.

We do act even when our own values are not sufficient to determine our actions.

Which would mean that we don't act for the sake of a value. Do you really believe that?

(Edited by William Dwyer on 8/02, 11:22am)

Post 17

Sunday, August 2, 2009 - 12:58pm

"You cut off the deliberative process, because you don't see any value in continuing it. This is perfectly consistent with value-determinism."

That's an infinite regress on your part Bill. If you cut off the deliberative process because you have determined that there is no value in continuing it, then how did you make that determination to cut off the deliberative process, if not on some prior deliberative process, and so forth.

Ed is right. The ultimate cause is you. Either values determine values, and you have infinite regress, or entities and not values are the prime movers.

Post 18

Sunday, August 2, 2009 - 5:29pm

I wrote, ""You cut off the deliberative process, because you don't see any value in continuing it. This is perfectly consistent with value-determinism." Ted replied

That's an infinite regress on your part Bill. If you cut off the deliberative process because you have determined that there is no value in continuing it, then how did you make that determination to cut off the deliberative process, if not on some prior deliberative process, and so forth.

It doesn't have to be a prior deliberative process. I can simply recognize that there's no value in continuing the process. For example, let's say that I'm reviewing various movies in order to decide which one to attend. If I see that I don't have time to continue it, I can simply terminate the process.

Ed is right. The ultimate cause is you. Either values determine values, and you have infinite regress, or entities and not values are the prime movers.

Values determine choices in the sense that they motivate them, but the choices are performed by the moral agent. There's no contradiction in saying that I chose the action and that I chose it because I valued it. The giraffe ate the lion, because he was hungry. The man married his fiance, because he loved her. We don't choose a course of action arbitrarily for no reason or purpose. We choose it in order to gain or keep something we value.

-�Bill

Post 19

Sunday, August 2, 2009 - 7:56pm