Tossing Around A Tautology

Bob wrote,

Let’s not worry about Big Bang cosmology according to which the universe precisely did come into existence some 15 billion years ago. Instead, let us ask ourselves how one can validly infer a statement about the nature of the existence of existing things, namely, that they cannot come into or pass out of existence, from a mere law of logic. Suppose we construct an argument on Rand’s behalf:

1. Necessarily, every x is self-identical.
2. To exist = to be self-identical
Therefore
3. Necessarily, every x exists
Therefore
4. Every x exists necessarily.
Therefore
5. No x exists contingently.
Therefore
6. No x can come into existence or pass out of existence.

Before addressing your comments on this hypothetical argument, let me say that, as I understand it, this is not a sound argument, so it if was intended to be one that is supposed to support the Objectivist position, it does not come close to doing so. Moreover, it is not the kind of argument that an Objectivist would be likely to give, even if it were logically sound, because it is steeped in rationalism -- in a peoccupation with logical formalism at the expense of direct observation. At any rate, you comment on it as follows

The problem with this argument lies with premise (2). Rand needs (2), but (2) does not follow from (1). (2) must be brought in as a separate premise. But, unlike (1), (2) is scarcely self-evident. For even if it is true that x exists iff x = x, it does not follow from this that the existing of x consists in x’s being self-identical. It is conceivable that there be a nonexistent object such as Pegasus that is self-identical but does not exist. For even if it is true that x exists iff x = x, it does not follow from this that the existing of x consists in x’s being self-identical. This shows that the biconditional given is circular: x exists iff x = x & x exists. There is more to existence than self-identity.

I think I see what you're saying, but I don't think your counter-argument is clearly presented. You say, "For even if it is true that x exists iff x = x, it does not follow from this that the existing of x consists in x's being self-identical." I think you may have misspoken yourself here. You're saying that even if it is true that x exists if and only if x is self-identical, it does not follow that the existing of x consists in x's being self-identical." Yes, it does. If the existence of x requires that it be self-identical, then it does indeed follow that the existing of x consists in its being self-identical. But I think that what you intended to say is that merely because an existing x is self-identical, it doesn't follow that a non-existing x is not self-identical, which is true, as a matter of inference, given your premises. However, I think that it is nonetheless true as a matter of fact that if something does not exist, then it does not possess identity, because "identity" refers to something in particular -- to "this" rather than "that" -- and the non-existent has no particular character or nature to identify. Therefore, it possesses no identity. You continue,

It is conceivable that there be a nonexistent object such as Pegasus that is self-identical but does not exist.

I don't understand this statement. Isn't an object, by definition, something that exists? How can you have an object that doesn't exist -- unless you mean an object that existed in the past but no longer exists, but if it no longer exists, then it no longer has identity. Granted, it had identity as a previous existent, but no longer has it, because it no longer exists.

This shows that the biconditional given is circular: x exists iff x = x & x exists. There is more to existence than self-identity.

Again, I think you may have misstated what you intended. Didn't you mean to say here that there's more to self-identity than existence -- that the non-existent can also possess identity? I don't agree with this, of course, but I also don't agree that there's more to existence than self-identity, because your identity comprises your existence -- it is your existence -- so to say that there is more to existence than identity is to say that there is more to existence than existence, which is a contradiction in terms.

But returning to your six-step argument, I think there are other problems with it that need to be addressed. Considering steps 3 through 6:

3. Necessarily, every x exists
Therefore
4. Every x exists necessarily.
Therefore
5. No x exists contingently.
Therefore
6. No x can come into existence or pass out of existence.

If "contingently" means dependent for its existence on something else, then "contingently" is not the contradictory of "necessarily," because the dependency can be one of necessity. The emergence of life on earth depended on the antecedent conditions that gave rise to it, but its emergence was nevertheless a necessary consequence of those conditions, which were, in turn, the necessary consequence of their antecedent conditions and so on. So the fact that every x exists necessarily does not imply that no x exists contingently, nor therefore that no x can come into or pass out of existence. Again, the forms comprising the elemental constituents of existence can come into and pass out of existence; the argument is that the constituents themselves cannot, unless you believe that nothing can be the cause of something, which would imply that events can occur without causes, which violates the law of causality. "Nothing" is not another kind of something, which I think is how you may be viewing it; it is the negation or the absence of something. If I say that I have nothing in my pocket, all I'm saying is that I do not have something in my pocket. So, something cannot arise out of literally nothing, nor can it disintegrate into nothing. Existents can change their forms -- in some cases quite radically, but it does not serve the cause of reason or of science to assume that miracles are possible and that events can happen without causes.

I hope that I've given your argument a fair hearing, Bob, even if what I've said in response to it does not meet with your total agreement.

Regards,

Bill

Post 121

Friday, March 24, 2006 - 1:59pm

William Dwyer - you kick ass. Great arguments. When I read what you say, it makes sense. When I read Mac and the like, I get obfuscation and evasion.

Post 122

Friday, March 24, 2006 - 2:12pm

Very well put, Bill.

Ed

Post 123

Friday, March 24, 2006 - 4:46pm

Good arguement... But if I see anything that goes in that big of circles again anytime soon my head will explode.

---Landon

Post 124

Monday, March 27, 2006 - 10:17am

UberKuh,

I read your attempted refutation of the validity of two of the typically considered attributes of the Creator. I made a short rebuttal of your position. I will send it to you privately.

In case anyone in this forum is interested in reading my discussion, I will post it publicly here.

(Edited by Joel Català on 3/27, 10:28am)

Post 125

Monday, March 27, 2006 - 11:04am

Dear Michael, you said:

Joel,

I am suspecting something. Here is where you get into conflicts with Objectivists:

I don't agree. Logic is not based on the senses, but sometimes supported by sensory data.
Are you familiar with the Objectivist theory of knowledge, especially concept formation? As you ask questions about higher concepts like virtues being based on sensory data, I suspect you do not know it.

(Michael, I read and analyzed the Objectivist view of morality.) My position is that morality cannot be based on sensory data, as you seem to assert. The philosophical name given to your fallacious view is 'naturalistic fallacy', and it is based on the intrinsic independence of ought and is. It was once described by David Hume. (You can check the link.)

(Basically integrations of integrations of integrations of integrations of integrations, etc., but ultimately all concepts can be boiled down to a sensory level if the integrations are traced.)

In fact, the question of how we relate sensory data to concepts and universals --namely, the referents of concepts-- is an unsolved philosophical problem.

Certainly, I don’t think it has been solved by the shaky definitions of Rand, and I don’t think it will be possible for us, at least in the short term, to know how we relate materiality with ideas. To put it more explicitly, Prof. Albert Einstein said:

“The very fact that the totality of our sense experiences is such that by means of thinking (*) it can be put in order, this fact is one which leaves us in awe, but which we shall never understand... In my opinion, nothing can be said concerning the manner in which the concepts are to be made and connected, and how we are to coordinate them to the experiences.” [1]

I agree with Einstein on this: we humans can conceive ideas that may be useful to put in order “the totality of our sense experiences”; but, at the same time, we cannot know what an idea is “made of”, or how we can relate them (and wow: sometimes successfully) to materiality and experience. (Now, I understand that to defenders of the philosophies of strict materialism --as I interpret Objectivism is--, this view may result unsettling. That’s something those defenders themselves should deal about.)

*: operations with concepts, and the creation and use of definite functional relations between them, and the coordination of sense experiences to these concepts.

[1]: A. Einstein, Out of My Later Years (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1950).

Best wishes,

Joel Català

(Edited by Joel Català on 3/27, 11:29am)

Post 126

Monday, March 27, 2006 - 11:19am

William (and all,)

Tomorrow I will try to find time to reply your last messages directed to me, #113 and #107, which continued our parallel discussions, related to the problem of the Prime Mover, and to the value that mankind should give to morality, respectively.

(Edited by Joel Català on 3/27, 11:30am)

Post 127

Monday, March 27, 2006 - 1:14pm

Joel,

You didn't answer my question, but you are in the ball park. I asked you about your familiarity with the Objectivist theory of knowledge and concept formation. You answered:

(Michael, I read and analyzed the Objectivist view of morality.)

I was asking about epistemology, not ethics. (Objectivist ethics derives from its metaphysics and epistemology, so you eventually get there.) The example discussed was virtue, but we were talking at the "What is it?" and "How do I know?" stage. This stage is called defining your terms, in other words, knowledge.

Where you are in the ball park is by bringing up universals. (I liked the Wikipedia article you linked to, incidentally, as a simple overview of a bit of the history of thought on this.) Objectivism's answer to the problem of universals is to postulate the validity of reason as the human means for understanding reality, then go on from there - starting with fundamental axiomatic concepts (the basic universals), i.e., existence, identity (including causality) and consciousness.

I suggest investing a little time in gaining familiarity with the Objectivist theory of concept formation. You don't have to agree, but knowing it will save you a lot of time when you talk to Objectivists.

(Simply stating that Einstein did not have a theory of concept formation is not the same as understanding what an Objectivist means when he talks about reason. If you wish to refute Objectivism, you first have to understand the fundamental theories - and they are specific, clear and easily learnable.)

Michael

(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 3/27, 1:28pm)

Post 128

Monday, March 27, 2006 - 3:19pm

I recently discovered a cool book called The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning ed. by Keith J. Holyoak and Robert G. Morrison. It is described on the back cover as: "the first comprehensive and authoritative handbook covering all the core topics of the field of thinking and reasoning. Written by the foremost experts from cognitive psychology, cognitive science, and cognitive neuroscience, individual chapters summarize basic concepts and findings for a major topic, sketch its history, and give a sense of the directions in which research is currently heading. This work includes work related to developmental, social and clinical psychology, philosophy, economics, AI, linguistics, education, law, and medicine." Part I is called "The Nature of Human Concepts", Part II called "Reasoning", Part III called "Judgment and Decision Making"... Part V: "Cognitive and Neural Constraints on Human Thought", Part VI: "Ontogeny, Phylogeny, Language, and Culture", Parv VII: "Thinking in Practice". If anyone's interested that there is interdisciplinary research going on; my disclaimer is that even though this book is 800 pages long it's only a handbook.

Post 129

Monday, March 27, 2006 - 5:24pm

Jenna:

Re The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning, as you quoted the back cover and listed the title-names of 7 parts of its (I gather) Table of Contents, it definitely sounds like a potentially interesting book, apart from it's being only 800 pgs long, and that you consider it a handbook.

My question is: how informative did you find the contents to be, and, for what reasons? (In short, is it worth the bother of anyone interested in such topics? "Cambridge" IS a 'name', but, so are 'Wesleyan' and 'Harvard'.)

LLAP
J:D

Post 130

Monday, March 27, 2006 - 7:05pm

I just called it what it was titled so people can look it up. It could say the Iowa State University Handbook and I would've still bought it, but what's interesting is that both editors are from UCLA. I think Cambridge here is about the publisher rather than where the researchers are from.

I picked it up b/c it is applicable to my education. I've read through the first few chapters and I'm amazed how research can open my eyes to the multiple perspectives on how thinking and reasoning are explained. For instance, the chapter on "similarity" covers how people use similarity to categorize; the chapter covers various models used to explain the phenomena. The next chapter is called "Concepts and Categories"-- where concepts refer to categories, are interrelated with memory and meaning, and are graphed as a hierarchical network.

Post 131

Monday, March 27, 2006 - 10:37pm

Jenna, I just ordered it online after reading your two posts. Your description of the similarity and hierarchy discussions (both of which are essential to a proper approach to this subject), the massive thoroughness and organization of the table of contents on the Cambridge website, and the fact that I have been impressed with the other Cambridge reference work type academic books I own made me decide I had to have it (for a little light reading).

Thanks for the find! - Phil

Post 132

Tuesday, March 28, 2006 - 5:44am

Michael, in your last post, you said:

I asked you about your familiarity with the Objectivist theory of knowledge and concept formation.

What I did in that precise paragraph is not answering any question, but to critique the point you added about morality. The proof follows:

In your former post, you said --see the bold letters,

As you ask questions about higher concepts like virtues being based on sensory data, I suspect you do not know it [...].

With my sentence "I read and analyzed the Objectivist view of morality", I was critiquing your affirmation of "virtues being based on sensory data," precisely because virtues are something about morality.

And, about this, I said that Objectivism here falls --and does it hopelessly-- in the 'naturalistic fallacy' (I would urge you to read this last link.)

The senses does not "tell" us what is true or false, nor what is good or evil. For the senses, things are, but "source" us nothing about what ought to be. (This is at the core of the 'naturalistic fallacy''s unfolding.)

Where you are in the ball park is by bringing up universals.

Absolutely not.

If you read my post carefully enough, you will see that I did address your inquiry. I said:

"In fact, the question of how we relate sensory data to concepts and universals --namely, the referents of concepts-- is an unsolved philosophical problem.

"Certainly, I don’t think it has been solved by the shaky definitions of Rand [...]" [Bolds added.]

And please read carefully this: I talked about universals because Objectivism places the problem of universals as a problem of epistemology (so it results a form of nominalism.) Universals are a problem of metaphysics. To put it plainly: are universals physically "out there", or are they entities of "the mind"?

So Objectivist epistemology is flawed.

The concept of universal --an universal is an idea referent of concepts-- is a subtle one. Universals are not sensory data, not strictly concepts, and can be counted among the most elevated ideas a human mind can deal with. Of course, Einstein (or, better, the philosopher Bertrand Russell) knew that very well:

"Universals exist, and they exist outside of the world of senses." (Namely, universals exist and are immaterial.)

Objectivism (as a philosophical system) tries to deny both nominalism and realism and, at the same time, oscillates between them. This is having a cake and eating it, too.

Additionally, Objectivism cannot be easily amended: amendments require honesty, but Objectivism is at odds with morality. The key word is honesty.

I settle it here.

Best wishes,

Joel Català

(Edited by Joel Català on 3/28, 5:53am)

Post 133

Tuesday, March 28, 2006 - 5:59am

Joel,

You can talk around my question if you like, but after doing so, then concluding that Objectivism is dishonest and that you "settle it here" is not really settling it. So let me ask you outright.

Have you read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology by Ayn Rand?

That's a pretty easy question.

Michael

Post 134

Tuesday, March 28, 2006 - 7:49am

Michael said,

Have you read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology by Ayn Rand?

Not the complete book.

I was not being evasive with your question, simply because I don't need to pledge any allegiance to Objectivist books. Most poignantly, I went to the meat of the issue, and addressed the philosophically relevant questions.

P.S.: I am sorry William; I will try to respond your messages #113 & #117 tomorrow.

(Edited by Joel Català on 3/28, 8:40am)

Post 135

Tuesday, March 28, 2006 - 5:50pm

Wow living in that world Joel is describing would really be horrible.

---Landon

Post 136

Tuesday, March 28, 2006 - 10:41pm

Joel,

=============
And, about this, I said that Objectivism here falls --and does it hopelessly-- in the 'naturalistic fallacy' (I would urge you to read this last link.)

The senses does not "tell" us what is true or false, nor what is good or evil. For the senses, things are, but "source" us nothing about what ought to be.
=============

Moore's naturalistic fallacy is ambiguious and therefore unfruitful (except for possible misuses, as you've displayed above). If you use this 'fallacy' in the sense that "what IS, here and NOW -- is what is good" well then, sure, it's a 'fallacy' to avoid. But this is using it in a way that pertains to a present state of things, and not to a teleological end-goal for creatures (an 'end-state' -- so to speak).

If, for instance, "living happiness" were taken to be an ultimate aim for human action, then naturalism would apply -- without fallacy (the 'snap-shot' fallacy of the present state of things). The 'natural' thing here would be what Aquinas (among others)called human nature -- the ultimate source and grounding of natural law.

Moore didn't realize that what's good is not a property -- it's a relation. Things are always and only good TO creatures FOR purposes.

================
I talked about universals because Objectivism places the problem of universals as a problem of epistemology (so it results a form of nominalism.) Universals are a problem of metaphysics. To put it plainly: are universals physically "out there", or are they entities of "the mind"?
================

False dichotomy. Universals don't have to be in a particular mind, or out, particularly, in extra-mental reality. Universals are "in" the interaction of mind and reality -- they are our mode of understanding the world. Animals never understand the world, but merely deal with remembered particulars.

Humans, conceptualizing through universals (as their method of intellectual understanding), do it different. Universals are 'how' we think. We're conceptualists, though some other-wise intelligent folks think that they are successfully being 'realists', or that they are successfully being 'nominalists' -- as they go about their daily lives. Here's a continuum of alternatives ...

=============
Realism* ---------------- Intentional Conceptualism* ------------- Classical Conceptualism* ----------- Nominalism*

*Universals are:

[things "out" there] [relational mode of "in" to "out"] [things "in" here] [non-existent]
=============

Rand was right.

Post 137

Tuesday, March 28, 2006 - 10:43pm

Joel, if that isn't enough to settle the false dichotomy between realism and nominalism, then go here ...

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/GeneralForum/0170.shtml

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/28, 10:44pm)

Post 138

Tuesday, March 28, 2006 - 11:20pm

Joel,

Just to be clear, you wrote:

I was not being evasive with your question, simply because I don't need to pledge any allegiance to Objectivist books.

I was not requiring any pledge any allegiance. I thought that was clear - sorry if I wasn't clear (although on rereading my posts, I can't find that insinuation). I was asking whether or not you were aware of what is in the mind of those you debate.

Michael

Post 139

Wednesday, March 29, 2006 - 5:24am