| | Aquinas on the Divine Name (which was discussed in my earlier post):
"This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:
First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (Question [3], Article [4]), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.
Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, "HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean of substance."
Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v)."-Summa Theologiae (p. 1, q. 13, a. 11)
Let me now return to William's statement:
Nor could the universe have been created out of nothing, since every creation requires pre-existing materials from which it is made. Aquinas and Co. would argue that, for limited beings such as ourselves, our ability to create is restricted to acting upon preexistent material. However, for God, who is Pure Act and Unparticipated Esse, it belongs to create things 'from the ground up' as it were, i.e. to create out of nothing. Such an act is fitting for a Being such as God, who is able to impart both form and substance, since He is properly beyond form and substance, and the limitation implied therein.
Also, why would a benevolent and omniscient being, like a god, want to create a race of intelligent creatures, whom it knew would disobey it and inevitably be sent to Hell where they would suffer for all eternity? Why would an intelligent and benevolent (let alone omniscient) being even want to do something that bizarre and sadistic?! A good question. I would point out that it is not assured that anyone is in, or will be in, Hell. As Holy Church teaches, in a Catechism published with approval from Rome:
“Neither Holy Scripture nor the Church’s Tradition of faith asserts with certainty of any man that he is actually in hell. Hell is always held before our eyes as a real possibility, one connected with the offers of conversion and life.” The Church’s Confession of Faith: A Catholic Catechism for Adults, tr. Stephen Wentworth Arndt (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), p. 346. Thus, your question appears wrongheaded-- at least for the Catholic. For it cannot be admitted that those intelligent creatures created by God are "inevitably" headed to Hell. Now, as to whether or not God 'foreknows' human disobedience, it must be expressly stated that He does. However, this knowledge does not interfere with human freedom, for God knows this particular truth atemporally, and thus does not cause the human to act sinfully.
Besides, how could an immortal, indestructible god, who has nothing to gain or lose by its actions, have any values or desires that needed to be fulfilled and for the sake of which it is motivated to choose between alternative courses of action? How could it have any goals that it recognized as worth pursuing? How could it regard anything as for or against it, as serving or threatening its welfare, as fulfilling or frustrating its interests? It could have no interests and no goals. God is Love. People often forget this, I think, which is perhaps why Pope Benedict XVI took it upon himself to write his first encyclical "Deus Caritas Est." Thus, although it must be agreed that God himself has nothing to gain or lose by his actions, it cannot be admitted that God cannot create creatures ordered to Himself as an end. A God who is Love would order his creations to Himself as an end, not on account of Himself, but on account of his creation. Thus, though God's goal is and remains Himself, God, through grace, created beings ordered to Himself, who could be drawn to Himself as an end. As Aquinas put it,
"Every one desires the perfection of that which for its own sake he wills and loves: for the things which we love for their own sakes we wish to be excellent, and ever better and better, and to be multiplied as much as possible. But God wills and loves His essence for its own sake. Now that essence is not augmentable and multipliable in itself, but can be multiplied only in its likeness, which is shared by many. God therefore wills the multitude of things, inasmuch as He wills and loves His own perfection.
3. Whoever loves anything in itself and for itself, wills consequently all things in which that thing is found: as he who loves sweetness in itself must love all sweet things. But God wills and loves His own being in itself and for itself; and all other being is a sort of participation by likeness of His being. 6. The will follows the understanding. But God with His understanding understands Himself in the first place, and in Himself understands all other things: therefore in like manner He wills Himself in the first place, and in willing Himself wills all other things. This is confirmed by the authority of Holy Scripture: Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest nothing of the things that thou hast made (Wisd. xi, 2)" -Summa Contra Gentiles, (1.73)
Teleological action is entirely inapplicable to an indestructible, invulnerable, non-biological entity such as a god. Only if one thinks anthropomorphically.
If there were such a thing as a god, it could have no purpose. Please refer to the italicized sentence in point 3, given in the Aquinas excerpt above.
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