| | A few weeks ago, Ed Thompson reproduced a number of reflections, written by some rather notable authors, concerning religious belief. Because all of these reflections betray a certain antipathy/criticality toward religion in general, and Christianity in particular, I believe they warrant response from a religious protagonist (such as myself). Thus, in the interests of furthering religious discussion and defending Christianity, I've decided to offer a response to each reflection.
Religions are not revealed: they are evolved. If a religion were revealed by God, that religion would be perfect in whole and in part, and would be as perfect at the first moment of its revelation as after ten thousand years of practice. There has never been a religion that fulfils those conditions.--Robert Blatchford, God and My Neighbor, 1903. I disagree. If a religion were revealed by God, and that religion was to be interpreted, practiced, and transmitted by human beings possessing free will, such a religion would most likely not "be perfect in whole and in part," as Blatchford suggests. For a God who respected human free will, though He certainly would offer a perfect revelation to man, would not be able to ensure that His revelation would remain unmarred and unsullied through its human reception, lest he deliberately override human free will. This explains why Christians believe that Christ is in fact a perfect revelation of God, despite their recognization of Christian inability to perfectly perform and live by Christianity. Christians are well-aware that their religion is not "perfect in whole and in part", since they (as its practictioners) possess free will, and are imperfect. Thus, I must disagree with Blatchford, and deny the necessary perfection of any God-revealed religion, since the perfection of a religion depends upon the perfection of its practictioners. And a God who respects the free will of its creatures cannot ensure their perfection.
It has always seemed absurd to suppose that a god would choose for his companions, during all eternity, the dear souls whose highest and only ambitition is to obey.--Robert G. Ingersoll, "Individuality." From the perspective of Christianity, it is not at all absurd that God "choose for his companions, during all eternity, the dear souls whose highest and only ambition is to obey", for to obey God above all else is to treat him as one's final end and ultimate purpose. For Christianity, such a obedience is not absurd, but is rather incomparably rational-- since there is no greater ambition than to offer one's obedience and service toward that Reality which is Highest in terms of Blessedness, Goodness, and Love.
A being who can create a race of men devoid of real freedom and inevitably foredoomed to be sinners, and then punish them for being what he has made them, may be omnipotent and various other things, but he is not what the English language has always intended by the adjective holy.--John Stuart Mill, Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, 1865. I agree with Mill: such a being would not be "what the English language has always intended by the adjective holy". However, I don't believe that the God of Christianity is such a being, since Christian doctrine affirms that men are not "devoid of" but rather possess real freedom, and that they are not "inevitably foredoomed to be sinners", because the sin of the First Man (i.e. Adam) was not a necessary event. Still more, on the Christian view, God does not "punish men for what he has made them", but instead, for what they have made themselves; for the Christian doctrine of free will implies personal responsibility for human action, and thereby only imputes guilt where it affirms responsibility.
Since the masses of the people are inconstant, full of unruly desires, passionate, and reckless of consequence, they must be filled with fears to keep them in order. The ancients did well, therefore, to invent gods, and the belief in punishment after death.--Polybius, Histories, 125 B.C. Though I do not share Polybius' cynical sentiments regarding the "masses", even if one were to agree with such sentiments, it would not follow that P.'s assertion- that the ancients "invent[ed] gods, and the belief in punishment after death" in order to keep the masses in order through fear- would affect the truth or falsity of the proposition "God exists". For it could well be that God exists, despite the fact that the ancients deemed it practical to instill belief in Him among the unruly masses. Thus, we must conclude that, used as an argument against the existence of God, Polybius' assertion commits the 'genetic fallacy', and so fails.
Heaven, as conventionally described, is a place so inane, so dull, so useless, so miserable, that nobody has ever ventured to describe a whole day in heaven, though plenty of people have described a day at the seaside.--George Bernard Shaw, Misalliance, 1910. No one has ventured to describe a day in heaven for the simple reason that heaven is essentially beyond detailed description. What we know about heaven-- that it consists in the eternal enjoyment of the Beatific Vision, or union with God-- should only appear "inane...dull...useless...[or] miserable" to someone who doesn't know who God is, or who hasn't experienced the awesomeness of God through religious experience.
Our reason can never admit the testimony of men who not only declare that they were eyewitnesses of miracles, but that the Deity was irrational; for He commanded that He should be believed, He proposed the highest rewards for faith, eternal punishment for disbelief.--Percy Byssshe Shelley, Queen Mab, 1813. First, I see no justifiable reason why our reason can "never admit the testimony of men who...declare that they were eyewitnesses of miracles". For, if we had reason to admit the testimony of these men, or reason to believe that such miracles were likely to occur, we should find it reasonable to believe such men's testimonies. Second, though I agree that our reason can never admit testimony from men which implies that "the Deity was irrational", I do not believe that the Deity was/is irrational. Shelley believes God to be irrational on the grounds that: 1) He commanded that He should be believed and 2) He proposed the highest rewards for faith, eternal punishment for disbelief. As to the first charge, that God commanded that He should be believed, I do not agree that such divine action is irrational. For, if belief be understood as voluntary acceptance, and not involuntary recognition-as-true, it is perfectly rational that God command that He be "believed" (and this is, I think, the proper employment of the word). With respect, then, to the second charge, that God "proposed the highest rewards for faith, eternal punishment for disbelief", I must deny it for the same reason I denied the first: it confuses the meaning of belief. Indeed, it would be irrational for God to reward and punish belief and disbelief, respectively, if such belief meant 'involuntary recognition-as-true', since only voluntary action can merit reward or punishment. But if belief (cred-) be taken in its other sense, i.e. as intellectual, voluntary acceptance, then it would be perfectly rational for God to give out reward and punishment for belief and unbelief, respectively.
God's contempt for human minds is evidenced by miracles. He judges them unworthy of being drawn to Him by other means than those of stupefaction and the crudest modes of sensibility.--Paul Vale`ry, Tel quel, 1941-43. I must disagree with Mr. Vale`ry, as it is not true that God "judges [people] unworthy of being drawn to Him by other means than those of stupefaction and the crudest modes of sensibility". As the Divine Constitution Dei Verbum makes clear, God draws men to Himself primary through Christ, who is a revelation of the Love of God:
In His goodness and wisdom God chose to reveal Himself and to make known to us the hidden purpose of His will (see Eph. 1:9) by which through Christ, the Word made flesh, man might in the Holy Spirit have access to the Father and come to share in the divine nature (see Eph. 2:18; 2 Peter 1:4). Through this revelation, therefore, the invisible God (see Col. 1;15, 1 Tim. 1:17) out of the abundance of His love speaks to men as friends (see Ex. 33:11; John 15:14-15) and lives among them (see Bar. 3:38), so that He may invite and take them into fellowship with Himself. Therefore, it is not true that God has no other means to draw men to Himself than by over-awing them by miracles, since God primarily draws men to himself through Love in the Person of Christ, through whom miracles flow.
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