Refutations to criticisms of religion

GWL wrote,

I would dispute the point that whatever a thing is, it must have the characteristics it possesses and no others. True enough, it must retain its essential characteristics, otherwise it would cease to be itself. But acquisition or loss of accidental characteristics ought not to have a substantial affect on what an entity is. For example, if Socrates were to acquire the accidental property of a tan, though we could refer to Socrates before and after his tanning as 'white Socrates' and 'tanned Socrates' (respectively), we would in both cases still be referring to the same entity, viz. Socrates.

What I meant is that at present, it must have the characteristics that it presently possesses and no others, including the capacity to act in certain ways and not in other ways. So, for example, an untanned Socrates would possess the capacity to acquire a tan when exposed to the sun for a certain period of time; he would not possess the capacity to turn blue under those same conditions. This point may seem tautological, but it needs to be emphasized, because modern philosophy has expanded the concept of “logical possibility” to include anything that one can imagine. Since I can “imagine” Socrates turning blue after 4 hours in the sun, modern philosophy says that it’s “logically possible” for him to do so -- which is nonsense. The law of identity would preclude this from happening, precisely because a thing must have the characteristics it possesses and no others, and Socrates does not possess the characteristic of turning blue in response to sun exposure, even though he does possess the characteristic of acquiring a tan under the same conditions.

You would have it that among an entity's essential characteristics is "its mode of action under a given set of conditions."

No, I’m not restricting its mode of action to its essential characteristic(s). Essence is an epistemological, not a metaphysical, concept. Metaphysically, an entity is all of its characteristics, not just its essential characteristic(s). For example, the essence of ice is solid water. But ice possesses other characteristics besides being a solid form of H₂O. It is cold to the touch; it floats; it cools drinks, etc. I’m saying that an entity’s action is limited by its identity, and it’s identity includes all of its characteristics, not just the essential ones.

I agree with this much, but deny the inference you make from this, i.e. that "it could only have different characteristics if it were different." This is because I maintain that the laws of nature could be changed such that an entity could be placed under conditions completely foreign to those permitted by our own universe. Under these inconceivable conditions, the entity would necessarily be shown to have inconceivable characteristics, according to your inference. But this is absurd, because, as you've rightly said, among an entity's essential characteristics is its mode of action under a given set of conditions . . .
Correction: among an entity’s characteristics (not simply its essential characteristics).
. . . although here I've suggested a case in which, as it were, the conditions of the conditions have been changed, such that the entity takes on different characteristics (based on its acting under different universal circumstances) even though the entity itself has not changed.

First of all, an entity’s identity is all of its characteristics, known and not yet known, including its mode of action under conditions that have yet to be discovered. Secondly, your statement that “the laws of nature could be changed such that an entity could be placed under conditions completely foreign to those permitted by our own universe” is simply false. In fact, it’s a contradiction in terms. If they’re not permitted by our own universe – i.e., by existence – then they’re not permitted period. You state that the conditions are inconceivable. Well, if they’re inconceivable, then on what grounds do you claim to be conceiving of them? If your point is simply that an entity will act differently under different conditions, then I agree, but its mode of action is still limited by what its nature permits it to do under those conditions.

My point, then, is a practical one. Though we are justified in believing that "the future will resemble the past, certeris paribus", it is not as if such a proposition is a necessary truth. For in the statement "the future will resemble the past, ceteris paribus" lies the hidden assumption that "all things being equal" only applies to what is possible within this universe, under its own particular laws of nature. But this universe and its particular laws of nature are not logically necessary. (I shall discuss this point later).

“This universe” is all there is. “Universe” refers to what is universal – to everything that exists. Another universe is not logically possible, any more than it’s logically possible for water to freeze at 212 degrees Fahrenheit. What is logically possible to existence depends on the entities that it comprises, to which the only actions logically possible are those consistent with their natures.

GWL wrote, "When we describe things in our universe, we don't just describe them in themselves, though that is certainly the lion's share of metaphysics. We also describe them with reference to those things which act upon them, like the laws of physics. If the laws of physics were significantly altered, then things would be acting very differently, though they may not become much different in themselves."

I replied, “Again, I am not talking about their descriptions, but about the things themselves. You are confusing identity with identification.” I would like to add that the “laws of nature” are themselves an expression of the things in nature. So, the laws of nature could not be significantly different without the things in nature being significantly different.

I stressed the descriptions of things over things-in-themselves in order to emphasize the contingency of these things, and to show that what you take to be the fundamental identity of a thing (as opposed to its description) is in fact conditioned by a contingent universe.

Well, I reject the notion that the universe is contingent. Contingent on what? There is nothing for the universe or existence to be contingent on. Existence is all there is. And even if other things in existence were different, a thing would still be what it is. It may respond differently to different conditions, but that’s because it would be part of its nature to do so. By the way, to say “fundamental” identity is redundant. There is no fundamental versus non-fundamental identity. There is only identity, because a thing simply is what it is.

I wrote: “You accept your parents as loving you, because their actions reflect it. This is not faith; it is hard evidence. GWL replied, "No, I accept it to be true that my parents love me based on hard evidence." I replied, “Same difference.”

No, not the same difference. Faith is intellectual assent, whereas hard evidence is what influences intellectual assent. You speak as though faith merely means 'the absence of evidence', such that faith and hard evidence compose a disjunction. But this is simply not how I'm employing the word.”

Indeed, though you might often hear people say, "He had no evidence; he took it on faith", this is not the way I use the word. What I mean by 'faith' is 'intellectual assent' or 'belief'.

Well, then your use of it, especially in the context of our discussion, is misleading, as I’m sure you were aware that it would be.

I wrote: “If we say, your perceptions ‘represent’ the external world, the implication is that what you’re aware of is a representation of the external world, not the external world itself.

I would say that perceptions represent the external world to us, and would hold that we are aware of the external world insofar as we are aware of our perceptions of it.

You don’t perceive your perceptions; you perceive the object of your perceptions, and are aware of the world directly, not via a representation of it. If you were aware only of a representation of it, then you couldn’t know that what you are aware of is a true representation, since you’d have no independent verification that that what you are aware of corresponds to the external world.

I wrote, “According to Objectivism, concepts (including mathematical concepts) are not a priori, but are acquired experientially. Man is born tabula rasa (as a blank tablet), for he can have no knowledge of reality prior to any contact with it.”

GWL replied, “In my opinion, the tabula rasa understanding of the human mind is both philosophically and scientifically repugnant. Philosophically, the idea is without merit, since it somehow maintains that necessary truths like 1+1=2 and the absurdity of the conjunction A^~A can be deduced from particular representative examples."

Not deduced; induced. 1+1=2 and the laws of logic are arrived at inductively, not deductively. For instance, in order to grasp the proposition that “One plus one equals two,” one must first have formed its constituent concepts. How does one form the concepts “one” and “two”? In the same way that one forms any other concept -- by observing various instances of the concept’s units and then abstracting their common feature – i.e., by observing that certain things bear a greater similarity to each other than they do to certain other thing(s) from which they’re being differentiated. In other words, one forms a concept by identifying similarity against a background of difference.

For example, one forms the concept ‘fruit’ by observing that (say) an apple and an orange bear a greater similarity to each other than either does to a carrot or a beet. Similarly, one forms the concept ‘apple’ by observing that two different apples (say a MacIntosh and a Pippin) bear a greater similarity to each other than either does to an orange or a pear.

The same principle applies in forming the concept of a particular number (say, two). One observes that a group of two oranges and a group of two apples, say, bear a greater numerical similarity to each other than either does to a group of three oranges or to a group of four apples. In so doing, one isolates what the groups of two have in common as against the other groups, and thereby forms the abstraction ‘two’, which one then designates by the visual-auditory symbol “two” or “2.” The same principle of concept formation pertains to numerical concepts as to any other concept.

Having formed the concepts “one” and “two” along with the concepts of ‘addition’ and ‘equality,” one can then grasp the proposition “One plus one equals two.”

The laws of logic are also discovered by observing reality – by observing that existence itself is non-contradictory – that existence itself possesses identity. Aristotelian philosopher H.W.B. Joseph makes this point as follows:

We cannot think contradictory propositions, because we see that a thing cannot have at once and not have the same character; and the so-called necessity of thought is really the apprehension of a necessity in the being of things. This we may see if we ask what would follow, were it a necessity of thought only; for then, while e.g. I could not think at once that this page is and is not white, the page itself might at once be white and not white. But to admit this is to admit that I can think the page to have and not have the same character, in the very act of saying that I cannot think it; and this is self-contradictory. The Law of Contradiction then is metaphysical or ontological. So also is the Law of Identity. It is because what is must be determinately what it is, that I must so think. An Introduction to Logic (Oxford University Press), p. 13.)

It makes much more sense to say that geometrical, mathematical, and logical truths exist latently in the human mind, and that experience is what triggers our awareness of them.

Experience doesn’t “trigger” our awareness of them. Experience makes us aware of them.

The tabula rasa notion also flies in the face of scientific studies, which have shown that the brain is in a certain sense 'preprogrammed' to organize and assess conceptual relationships and hardwired to react in certain ways to sense-perception, to monitor certain emotions, and to process thought in terms of language.

What these studies show is that the mind has a certain innate capacity to grasp and conceptualize reality. They have not shown the presence of innate ideas -- ideas about reality that exist in the mind prior to any cognitive contact with reality.

I wrote, “To give a simple example, the concept 5 refers to a quantitative aspect of reality, namely |||||, and is acquired by observing different instances of such a quantity, like five oranges, five pencils, five lines, etc.”

No, the concept of 5 is present in the mind before the mind perceives 5 entities as |||||. For, when the mind perceives |||||, it understands them to be 5 by a correspondence between the inherent concept of 5 and its application to reality.

See above.

I wrote, “I was simply stressing that what you perceive must be something other than an aspect of your awareness (i.e., a mental representation of the external world); it must be the external world itself, because in order to be conscious, a consciousness must be conscious of something other than itself.”

If you believe the mind to be tabula rasa, you are forced to admit this. But tabula rasa seems dubious at best. Furthermore, I find that, even if your principle could be true for us, it could not be true for God. For God is not a composite of mind and body, but is rather pure consciousness, such that his self-awareness is immediate and timeless. Indeed, God's understanding is his being, whereas our understanding is derivative of our being. There is no 'external world' for God, since God is immediately present to all things as a cause is to its effect.

You are employing what Objectivists would term a “floating abstraction” – an abstraction that is not anchored to anything in reality. Your notion of ‘God’ as pure consciousness isn’t based on any concrete aspect of the real world. You are taking a concept, which you arrived at only by observing conscious organisms, divesting it of its basis in reality and then treating it as if it existed in the real world as a pure abstraction. This is no different in principle from claiming that there is in reality such a thing as “pure” two – not two oranges, two pencils or two people, but just two by itself. It’s as if I had said that I have two in my pocket, and you asked two what, to which I replied, “two nothing, just plain two.” Well, of course, that’s nonsense, but it’s no different if you declare the existence of a “pure” consciousness. The same principle applies. The concept of a pure consciousness is meaningless, because consciousness requires a concrete basis in reality, in the absence of which the concept makes no sense.

I wrote, “I don’t think you’re getting the point of my argument. 'Hallucinatory' means at variance with reality, but you can’t know what 'at variance with reality' means if you don’t know what reality is to begin with. If you don’t know what reality is, then you can’t know what it means to deviate from it. I can know what an hallucination is only because I recognize it as departing from what I know to be the real world. “

This is arguing in a circle. You cannot argue that our perceptions represent something 'real' because they must needs have access to the real in order to come up with the notion of 'imaginary'.

Again, our perceptions don’t represent reality; they’re of reality. You still haven’t grasped the difference.

Indeed, imaginary could just mean 'at variance with what is perceived to be real'.

You’re committing the same error, without realizing it. “Perceived to be real” itself presupposes the concept of reality, because it makes a distinction between what is perceived to be real and what is actually real.

Take the brain in a vat example once again. Now, as I've said, it is possible to stimulate the brain in such a way as to make it perceive things which, from a third person perspective, do not exist. A supercomputer could be attached to a brain-in-a-vat, such that the brain's mind would be subjected to extremely complex stimulations. The brain could be duped into believing that its perceptions represented real things, though it would in fact be the case that the supercomputer was merely triggering the brain to perceive certain non-existent things. Now, from the perspective of the mind inhering in the brain-in-a-vat, this would all seem real. In fact, its perceptions would be indistinguishable from the perceptions of the scientists monitoring its activity. But the scientists would know that their perceptions were actually real (or might not they also be the victims of the same sort of scientific experiment?). Anyway, suppose these same scientists, in order to be philosophically irritating, opted to have the programmed supercomputer create 'dreams' for the brain-in-a-vat. Let's say they deliberately designed these dreams to be incoherent, perhaps, or fanciful, so that the brain-in-a-vat would be convinced that they were at variance with what he perceived (falsely) to be reality. A dream within a dream...And the brain-in-a-vat would not require access to the 'real world' in order to be capable of imagining an unreal world. His imagined world would be part of a greater imaginary world, from the third person perspective.

You’re not getting my argument; at least your not addressing it. My point is simply that in order to conceive of the possibility of being a brain in a vat, you must assume the ability to identify an objective reality, in contrast to which you can then identify an illusion. An illusion is a state of consciousness that is unlike a perception of the real world, which, by definition, is what I am now experiencing. But if what I’m now experiencing is the real world, then I couldn’t possibly be a brain in a vat.

I wrote: ...[A] person who exhibits conscious behavior is actually conscious. And we can tell the difference between conscious-like behavior and conscious behavior.”

Again, since we are not capable of crawling inside the minds of other people, all we can strictly conclude is that a person exhibits conscious-like behavior (i.e. that he acts in a way which appears to be conscious).

No, the person exhibits conscious behavior, not conscious-like behavior. His behavior isn’t simply conscious-like; it is conscious. How do we know? We can infer it from his behavior.

How are we to know persons are actually conscious?

From their behavior. How am I to know that I’m actually communicating with you in my dialogue? By your words, which reflect a comprehension of what I am saying. I can infer from that that I am dealing with another mind.

We can only be aware of our own consciousness.

We can only be aware of our own consciousness introspectively, but we can be aware of other people’s consciousnesses extrospectively, via their behavior.

Indeed, we will soon be capable of creating algorithms for computers so that they will be able to 'communicate' with us. But this is just input-output. The computer receives certain symbols and it knows which signals to fire back. It doesn't really know the language, though. It doesn't fully understand what it's doing. There is no supervening consciousness.

What reason do you have to think that other people are nothing but programmed computers? None whatsoever. Programmed computers are not biological offspring. To be sure, if I had some reason to think that the responses I'm getting are not from a real person, as I do when I call a business and get computerized response that is programmed to answer my questions, then I have some basis for concluding that I am not or may not be interacting with another consciousness. But absent such evidence, I would have no reason to draw that conclusion.

GWL wrote that "'invoking the law of causality begs the question' with respect to consciousness being behind conscious-like behavior."

I replied, “Causal inferences are entirely legitimate. It does not beg the question for me to infer that if I leap from a tall building, I will plummet to my death. It is a valid and reasonable inference, one based on the law of causality.”

You misunderstood me. I agree that causal inferences, when employed properly, are entirely legitimate. But to say that you can draw the inference from conscious-like behavior to a consciousness behind such behavior is conclusion-begging. You've done nothing but assume that actual consciousness underlies conscious-like behavior.

Well, then it’s conclusion-begging to infer that if I jump off a tall building, I’ll fall to my death. The only reason I know that is through a causal inference; I don’t know it from direct experience. To know it from direct experience, I would actually have to jump off the building and experience falling, and even then I wouldn’t know from direct experience that I would die, because I can’t experience being dead. I could know that I would die only through a process of causal inference. Is that conclusion begging too? I don’t think so.

I wrote, “On the contrary, what you’re accepting as true is that it is very likely you will be alive tomorrow. Truth is a property of propositions, and the proposition that you are accepting as true is not that you will necessarily be alive tomorrow, but that it is very likely that you will be alive tomorrow.”

Again, conflating actuality and necessity. Of course I wouldn't accept the proposition "I necessarily will be alive tomorrow," since it's not even necessary that I exist at all. If my parents hadn't met, I would not be here. I rather accept the proposition "I will be alive tomorrow" to be actually true.

What I meant is you cannot know for certain that you will be alive tomorrow. In other words, how do you know that the proposition "I will be alive tomorrow" is actually true? You don't. So my point was that it is a mistake to "accept" it as actually true, since you have no grounds for accepting that conclusion. The most you can know as being actually true is the proposition that "It is very likely that you will be alive tomorrow."

I wrote, “The law of identity is a necessary truth (there is no other kind), and existence IS identity. Everything – every existent -- must act according to its nature. To deny this truth is to endorse a contradiction. It is a necessary truth that birds can fly but man cannot, that ice can float but rocks cannot, that gold is a precious metal but tin is not. Every true proposition is necessarily true in the sense that it could not possibly be false.”

You simply do not understand what necessity is. Absolute necessity takes the form: Necessarily, x. You are talking about necessity of the consequence, i.e. if x, then (necessarily) y. For you are saying, 'Given the universe as it is, and the laws of nature as they are, (necessarily) men cannot fly.' But I object, for I say that, since it is not necessary that the universe exist or be like ours, it does not follow as a necessary truth that men cannot fly.

It’s not possible for the universe not to have existed. Possibility refers only to the actions of already existing entities. Given the existence of the universe, one can talk about what is possible to the entities composing it, but what is possible to the entities composing it is a function of their respective identities, which necessitate a certain course of action and no other. They must act according to their natures; they cannot act otherwise.

On the contrary, I believe there are logically (and, of course, metaphysically) possible worlds in which men can and do fly.

When I said that it is not logically possible for men to fly, I was clearly referring to our present environment, which would include the earth’s gravitation, a medium of air and so on. Obviously, in zero gravity, it would be possible for men to fly. Is that the kind of thing you are talking about? If not – if you are supposing a normal earthly environment – then I don’t see how it’s logically possible for men to fly. How can you have a logically possible world in which men can fly that includes the same environmental conditions that exist on earth?

I wrote, “Well, if you live for the sake of obeying God’s commandments, then if God tells you to sacrifice your life for some cause or for the welfare of others, you must do it. You must obey God’s commandments rather than pursue your own self-interest. And that, I submit, is a form of suicide.”

False. Catholics take it as a maxim that obeying God's commandments will always be in our (at least long-term) self-interest.

Well, sure, if you assume that God will reward you for following them and/or punish you for not following them. But that assumes the existence of an afterlife. I was talking about our present earthly existence. Since there is no evidence for an afterlife, any more than there is for God’s existence, it makes no sense to sacrifice your actual life for the sake of an existence beyond the grave.

I wrote, “You are placing the commandments of God above your own needs and values.”

There is no such opposition.

There is, if you are talking about your life here on earth.

I wrote, “Catholics cannot practice artificial birth control, nor can they have abortions. So, if a woman becomes pregnant accidentally, but cannot afford another child, she must carry the fetus to term and then make sure that she finds a decent home for her offspring. If she cannot find a suitable foster home, she must raise the child herself, even though doing so can take years off her life. A Christian must obey the dictates of her religion, even if it conflicts with her own her interest and her survival requirements.”

This is because Christians, in placing the interests of God above their own selfishness, truly act in their own self-interest by demonstrating a love for God, a love which God ratifies by offering them communion with him in eternity.

Placing the interests of God above your own selfishness is self-defeating, if there is no God or life after death. And since there isn't any God or life after death, following Christian dogma and obeying God’s commandments is against your self-interest. And that, in the final analysis, IS suicidal.

"Survival requirements"? The human mortality rate is 100%, William. Even the universe is tending toward a heat-death.

The human mortality rate may be 100%, but that doesn't mean that one shouldn't promote one’s survival to the best of one’s ability and try to extend one's quality of life for as long as possible, which is what I was referring to, obviously. Or are you suggesting that there is no reason to do this, since we will eventually die anyway? I should hope not.

As for the universe tending toward a heat-death, perhaps in its present form it is, but existence qua existence cannot self-destruct. The universe will simply take a different form.

- Bill

Post 21

Sunday, February 18, 2007 - 6:40pm

Bill, thanks for pointing out the "floating abstraction" fallacy in there. I've been meaning to respond to a previous post by GWL, and you've helped me affirm my argument. In response to my earlier question regarding his claim that God can't know things in advance (thereby absolving God of any responsibility for the presence of evil in his creation) and how he squared that with the existence of biblical prophecies about the future, he said:

No, I do not agree, since prophecies about the future are given to men who exist temporally. Indeed, even though from the human perspective it appears as though God knows what occurs in advance in order to impart this knowledge to men, sub specie aeterni, that is, from the perspective of God, all temporal events exist within an eternal present, such that God does not properly know anything 'in advance'.

A floating abstraction like the above gives GWL the freedom to engage in all sorts of intellectual gymnastics in order to side step any reality based argumentation. Floating as his abstractions may be at times, I often find them clever and creative.

Post 22

Friday, February 23, 2007 - 9:21am

From Post 20 William Dwyer wrote:

I wrote, “I don’t think you’re getting the point of my argument. 'Hallucinatory' means at variance with reality, but you can’t know what 'at variance with reality' means if you don’t know what reality is to begin with. If you don’t know what reality is, then you can’t know what it means to deviate from it. I can know what an hallucination is only because I recognize it as departing from what I know to be the real world. “
This is arguing in a circle. You cannot argue that our perceptions represent something 'real' because they must needs have access to the real in order to come up with the notion of 'imaginary'.
Again, our perceptions don’t represent reality; they’re of reality. You still haven’t grasped the difference.
Indeed, imaginary could just mean 'at variance with what is perceived to be real'.
You’re committing the same error, without realizing it. “Perceived to be real” itself presupposes the concept of reality, because it makes a distinction between what is perceived to be real and what is actually real.

Hello William,

I think you missed the point that GWL was making. He is actually using Hume's arguments from the Enquiry. Both you and Hume have the same starting line (i.e. tabula rosa), but you arrive at different conclusions. One of Hume points is that if you start out tabula rosa, and all you have is your perceptions, you have no way of comparing those perceptions to reality. Yes, you can assume there is a reality, that is not the question. Are you accurately perceiving that reality, is the question. Without any way of comparing those perceptions to reality, you are merely assuming they have some degree of accuracy, but you don't really know that at all.

GWL is quite right in pointing out your circular reasoning. You attempt to justify your perceptions simply by appealing to other perceptions. As they say, that is simply not cricket. It would seem that Hume is spot on here: from your presuppostions, it is impossible to justify your perceptions.

Post 23

Friday, February 23, 2007 - 9:50pm

G. Brady Lenardos,

========if you start out tabula rosa, and all you have is your perceptions, you have no way of comparing those perceptions to reality========

Perceptions of what? Of reality? What is being perceived, Mr. Lenardos? Certainly you wouldn't take your (Hume's) skeptical line of reasoning so far as to say that what one is perceiving is the Unreal, would you? Are you someone who might argue, for instance, that some of the "non-existence" that is "out there" is "getting in between" us and reality? That some "things" that aren't real are acting in a manner so as to sever our ties to reality.

Or are you saying this (ie. following your argument where it logically leads)?

Ed

Post 24

Saturday, February 24, 2007 - 9:39am

Ed Thompson quotes me: "if you start out tabula rosa, and all you have is your perceptions, you have no way of comparing those perceptions to reality"

He then asks a number of questions. Let me take them one by one.

Perceptions of what?

Given William's presuppositions, we just don't know.

Of reality?

Once again, we don't know.

What is being perceived, Mr. Lenardos?

From William's point of view the answer is clear, we don't know!

Certainly you wouldn't take your (Hume's) skeptical line of reasoning so far as to say that what one is perceiving is the Unreal, would you?

At the risk of sounding redundant, Given William's presuppositions, we just don't know.

Please correct me if I am wrong, but these question do not offer any counter argument; they seem to imply that you just don't like the the necessary implications of Williams position. If you do have an answer to Hume's argument, given Williams presuppositions, I would love to hear it.

Perhaps you have a different set of presuppositions that evade Hume's outcome?

Regards,

G. Brady Lenardos

Post 25

Saturday, February 24, 2007 - 4:35pm

G. Brady Lenardos,

Thank you for tacitly agreeing to collaborate with me on finding the 'resolution to Humean Skepticism', which I will now shorten, for brevity, to RtHS. You quoted ...

Perceptions of what?
Given William's presuppositions, we just don't know.

At this point in our collaboration, it would really prove expedient to be as clear as we can. For instance, an enumeration of Bill's presuppositions is in order. Wouldn't you agree? If not, then we could go on and on, post after post, arguing about 2 different things (talking past each other) -- effectively preventing ourselves from ever reaching the RtHS. So, Mr. Lenardos, what IS it that Bill presupposes?

You ended with ...

Perhaps you have a different set of presuppositions that evade Hume's outcome?

Before responding to this question, I prefer for you to first show a bit of intellectual generosity by answering my inquiry into what it is that you suppose that Bill presupposes (as a series of bullet-pointed propositions). After you have shown me that you actually do understand that argument (Bill's) which you here claim to deny as valid, then I will more than gladly share with you the necessary "pre-"suppositions that "evade" Hume's epistemological pitfalls.

My words may sound arrogant, but I am merely acting in self-defense. As a general rule, skeptics are folks that ought to be made to show they understand what it is that they are arguing against -- otherwise, they too often waste the valuable time of rational others who are interested in understanding values and reality (i.e., interested in "philosophy").

Please pardon the poignant pun, but skeptics shouldn't ever be given the benefit of the doubt, so to speak.

;-)

It would be epistemological suicide to grant the benefit of the doubt to a proponent of the arbitrary (unless said proponent could demonstrate an understanding of what it is that they are arguing against). Curiosity: Can you see how or why this is true, Mr. Lenardos?

Ed

Post 26

Saturday, February 24, 2007 - 6:33pm

In reference to my Post #20, G. Brady Lenardos (Post #22) writes as follows:

Hello William,

I think you missed the point that GWL was making. He is actually using Hume's arguments from the Enquiry. Both you and Hume have the same starting line (i.e. tabula rosa) [tabula rasa], but you arrive at different conclusions. One of Hume points is that if you start out tabula rosa [tabula rasa], and all you have is your perceptions, you have no way of comparing those perceptions to reality. Yes, you can assume there is a reality, that is not the question. Are you accurately perceiving that reality, is the question. Without any way of comparing those perceptions to reality, you are merely assuming they have some degree of accuracy, but you don't really know that at all.

There is nothing else to perceive except reality. You certainly don't perceive your perception, which is itself the act of perceiving an object. The object of your perception has to be the external world -- it has to be something external to consciousness, because a consciousness conscious of nothing is a contradiction in terms, and a consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms. Before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something. If what you claim to perceive is not reality, then what you possess is not consciousness. (Rand)

GWL is quite right in pointing out your circular reasoning. You attempt to justify your perceptions simply by appealing to other perceptions.

Where have I done that -- justified my perceptions by appealing to other perceptions? My argument is the one that you see before you now, if you'd care to address it.

- Bill

Post 27

Sunday, February 25, 2007 - 9:12am

So I guess it's about time I respond. Sorry for the wait; I've been very busy this week.

I'm not sure if you understand my position on modality. I do not deny that under the same conditions things will act in a predictable manner (when conditions are understood as the general laws of nature). However, as I mentioned earlier, this is necessity of the consequence, not necessity simpliciter. Barring divine intervention or a sudden change in the fundamental structure of the universe, things will act predictably in accordance with their identity. In this sense, the identity of things is necessary. But this is a form of necessity ex hypothesi, not necessity simpliciter, since the existence of our universe is contingent.

We do not determine necessary and contingent truths via imagination in general. Necessary truths have this distinguishing characteristic: if they are thought or understood, they are self-evidently true. Understanding that 2 plus 2 equals 4 is all one needs to do to realize its necessity. By contrast, my understanding that when people tan, they turn brown (not blue) does not suffice to prove it necessarily true.

The law of identity would preclude this from happening, precisely because a thing must have the characteristics it possesses and no others, and Socrates does not possess the characteristic of turning blue in response to sun exposure, even though he does possess the characteristic of acquiring a tan under the same conditions.

I do not wish to challenge the law of identity. But the dividing line between essential and accidental properties is very fuzzy, and what we commonly take to be the laws of nature are not ineluctable. To illustrate the former, all we need to do is wonder whether an alligator with Socrates' brain transplanted and connected to it would in fact still be Socrates. To illustrate the latter, all we need to do is meditate upon why it is that what are widely accepted to be the laws of nature break down the closer one approaches t=0 of the Big Bang's singularity.

All of its characteristics aren't derivable from its identity alone, for surely how it acts on other bodies has largely to do with the laws of material interaction.

First of all, an entity’s identity is all of its characteristics, known and not yet known, including its mode of action under conditions that have yet to be discovered.

Careful, you are very near to giving up human free will. For, if one can only act in a manner conditioned by one's antecedent characteristics (brain states, physical location, causal relations), one is not free (in any real sense of the term). In short, one has no power over determining his personal characteristics, since one only can "discover" them. William: does what you are fully determine wholly what you will be in the future? If so, free will is in danger, and a fatal necessity is imputed to all human action.

Secondly, your statement that “the laws of nature could be changed such that an entity could be placed under conditions completely foreign to those permitted by our own universe” is simply false. In fact, it’s a contradiction in terms. If they’re not permitted by our own universe – i.e., by existence – then they’re not permitted period.

All scientists should be required to study the foundations of mathematics and logic. Such study would disabuse them of the philosphically annoying habit of inferring necessary truths from actual ones. First, show me that the laws of nature are necessary. Show me that Newton's law of gravitation enjoys the same sort of necessity that Euclid's theorems do. You can't, because it doesn't. Existence is nothing more than actualized essence. Believing anything else is an exercise in dogmatism.

You state that the conditions are inconceivable. Well, if they’re inconceivable, then on what grounds do you claim to be conceiving of them? If your point is simply that an entity will act differently under different conditions, then I agree, but its mode of action is still limited by what its nature permits it to do under those conditions.

Pardon, I meant to say indeterminable, not inconceivable, from the perspective of our universe.

Wrong. A universe with different 'universal' laws of nature would be a different universe by definition. Moreover, a cat in another universe might take on what appear to be inattainable properties from the perspective of our uinverse.

Well, I reject the notion that the universe is contingent. Contingent on what? There is nothing for the universe or existence to be contingent on. Existence is all there is.

Contingent in that the reason for its existing is not present in itself. Mathematical truths are necessary because their truth becomes self-evident through analysis. Not so with the universe.

And even if other things in existence were different, a thing would still be what it is. It may respond differently to different conditions, but that’s because it would be part of its nature to do so.

If entities acting under universal laws began to shave away Plank-length slices from a table, at what point would it cease to be the table? At what point would its "nature" alter? Your metaphysical theory is fraught with difficulties such as this.

By the way, to say “fundamental” identity is redundant. There is no fundamental versus non-fundamental identity. There is only identity, because a thing simply is what it is.

We cannot have access to the fundamental identity of things. Such is the price of being less than omniscient. The distinction is warranted, since whatever we know about an existent will be knowledge of non-fundamental identity.

I wrote:

"Faith is intellectual assent, whereas hard evidence is what influences intellectual assent. You speak as though faith merely means 'the absence of evidence', such that faith and hard evidence compose a disjunction. But this is simply not how I'm employing the word. Indeed, though you might often hear people say, 'He had no evidence; he took it on faith', this is not the way I use the word. What I mean by 'faith' is 'intellectual assent' or 'belief'."

William responded:

Well, then your use of it, especially in the context of our discussion, is misleading, as I’m sure you were aware that it would be.

It is not my fault that you are not familiar with traditional Christian epistemology.

This is dogmatism. Brain states-- neuronal relationships--are what influence (either by interaction or by divine pre-established harmony) mental states. Sensations are drawn from the world, sure, but these sensations are represented to the mind; the mind is not directly aware of the world: "I'm sorry, it's science" (a memorable quote from Anchorman). Yes, if you were only aware of a representation of it, you couldn't know directly that what you are aware of is a true representation. But you could believe in the truth of these representations. Ah, rational belief, a wonderful antidote to skepticism, isn't it? ;)

I wrote:

“In my opinion, the tabula rasa understanding of the human mind is both philosophically and scientifically repugnant. Philosophically, the idea is without merit, since it somehow maintains that necessary truths like 1+1=2 and the absurdity of the conjunction A^~A can be deduced from particular representative examples."

William responded:

Not deduced; induced. 1+1=2 and the laws of logic are arrived at inductively, not deductively. For instance, in order to grasp the proposition that “One plus one equals two,” one must first have formed its constituent concepts.

I said "deduced" to highlight the absurdity of trying to get to necessary truths by beginning from particular examples. After how many examples does the truth become necessary? 100,000,000? Or ought we to say that the necessary truth is a priori? (Hint: Yes.)

How does one form the concepts “one” and “two”? In the same way that one forms any other concept -- by observing various instances of the concept’s units and then abstracting their common feature – i.e., by observing that certain things bear a greater similarity to each other than they do to certain other thing(s) from which they’re being differentiated. In other words, one forms a concept by identifying similarity against a background of difference.

We think in terms of concepts, not in terms of the 'things out there'. Our mind is not just a wax tablet on which sense-impressions get impressed. Rather, our mind conceptually organizes sensory information before they become present to us as impressions. Such is the reason behind our experiencing 3 dimensions, not 2 dimensions with shadow and highly variant shape. Furthermore, if all concepts are formed by abstracting from sense-impression, from where does the concept of a concept come?

For example, one forms the concept ‘fruit’ by observing that (say) an apple and an orange bear a greater similarity to each other than either does to a carrot or a beet. Similarly, one forms the concept ‘apple’ by observing that two different apples (say a MacIntosh and a Pippin) bear a greater similarity to each other than either does to an orange or a pear.

Assuredly, because concepts like 'fruit' are not a priori.

The same principle applies in forming the concept of a particular number (say, two). One observes that a group of two oranges and a group of two apples, say, bear a greater numerical similarity to each other than either does to a group of three oranges or to a group of four apples. In so doing, one isolates what the groups of two have in common as against the other groups, and thereby forms the abstraction ‘two’, which one then designates by the visual-auditory symbol “two” or “2.” The same principle of concept formation pertains to numerical concepts as to any other concept.

Look closely at what you just said. You began with the intention of describing how it is that we form the concept of two. Then you say, "One observes that a group of two oranges..." Whoa. You've employed the concept to account for it, which looks circular. I have a question, how does one ever differentiate the two apples into 2 without recourse to the concept of 2? Again, it looks as though we have good reason to suppose that mathematical concepts are innate, especially if a person trying to argue against their being innate unintentionally proves their innateness.

The laws of logic are also discovered by observing reality – by observing that existence itself is non-contradictory – that existence itself possesses identity.

No, the laws of logic are not discovered by observing 'reality' (if reality be understood as that which is outside us), at least not in an essential sense. They are discovered by introspection-- thinking about how we think--and realizing that we can't think against the basic laws of logic. And once we realize this, we realize their necessity.

We cannot think contradictory propositions, because we see that a thing cannot have at once and not have the same character; and the so-called necessity of thought is really the apprehension of a necessity in the being of things.

I agree with Joseph, but he's got it backwards. One cannot apprehend necessity in the being of things, if the being of things is understood merely as that which is given through the senses. For the perception of the being of things conforms itself to a necessity of thought, and the necessity of thought comes from the necessity of truth, and this is found whole and entire in the Mind of God.

The Law of Contradiction then is metaphysical or ontological. So also is the Law of Identity. It is because what is must be determinately what it is, that I must so think.

The Law of Contradiction is metaphysical, ontological, and epistemic. Our thoughts are distinct from our encounters with 'what is'. Descartes showed that every person can prove his own existence through the contemplation of the implications of one's own thought. But, n.b., one can only prove one's own existence in such a fashion during this introspective process.

I wrote:

"It makes much more sense to say that geometrical, mathematical, and logical truths exist latently in the human mind, and that experience is what triggers our awareness of them."

William responded:

Experience doesn’t “trigger” our awareness of them. Experience makes us aware of them.

Please give an account of how experience "makes us aware of them". Can experiences speak? What is it that analyzes experiences? Surely necessary truth does not come from experience alone. But if the recognition of necessary truth does not come from experience alone, it must come from the mind's meditation upon it, for necessary truths can only come to us via conceptual analysis (since concepts are universals).

You seem to be tied down by a sort of intransigent idea that "reality" is only 'out there', and that we only really perceive things 'out there'. But this is false, and we can imagine that an infant in a womb experiences some kind of subconsious apperception (i.e. self-awareness of his/her own state of mind). Advances in neuroscience have shown that fetuses experience neuronal activity. Now, of course an infant is liable to sensation within the womb, but the point is that, even in such a state of experiential darkness, the first forms of thought are taking place, and these thoughts are introspective.

I wrote:

"If you believe the mind to be tabula rasa, you are forced to admit this. But tabula rasa seems dubious at best. Furthermore, I find that, even if your principle could be true for us, it could not be true for God. For God is not a composite of mind and body, but is rather pure consciousness, such that his self-awareness is immediate and timeless. Indeed, God's understanding is his being, whereas our understanding is derivative of our being. There is no 'external world' for God, since God is immediately present to all things as a cause is to its effect."

William replied:

First and foremost, I've never observed any consciousness other than my own. To observe another consciousness is impossible. (Refer to Nagel: What is it like to be a bat?) So, I obviously didn't arrive at a concept of consciousness by "observing conscious organisms". Now, as to your suggestion that there cannot be a "pure" two, I ask you to provide an account of how we are to discern two entities in the first place without recourse to the concept. Moreover, I petition you to show me how speaking of God's consciousness as "pure consciousness" is to entail that God is not anchored in reality. If you remember from what I've said in the past, I've attributed all positive reality (limitations excepted) to God. This ought to be adequate grounding for His consciousness, which is, as I've said again and again, not to be confounded with any sort of human consciousness.

Again, our perceptions don’t represent reality; they’re of reality. You still haven’t grasped the difference.

I've grasped the difference. But you seem to think that our eyes and other sensory faculties are like windows through which we "see" what is out there-- a position which runs contrary to the findings of brain science.

I wrote:

Indeed, imaginary could just mean 'at variance with what is perceived to be real'.

William responded:

Of course it presupposes the concept of reality. But the point is that reality may not be something to which we have direct access. It may be that our perceptions (which we believe to correspond with something 'out there' that is perceived) are in fact illusory, e.g. created through an artificial brain stimulation.

I think it rather the case that you are not getting my point, which is really quite simple. All I'm saying is that what we perceive may be at variance with what is, in actuality, 'out there' (whatever that may be). Now, you say that I need to have some notion of reality in order to conceive of an illusion. This is not true, for though I can construct a notion of "reality", and then imagine an illusion, I can also imagine that what I take to be "reality" might actually be an illusion in the same sense of the imagined illusion that is abstracted from what I take to be "reality." That is, from the concept of "illusion" I take from "reality", I can question whether or not the "reality" from which I derived "illusion" is not also an "illusion", and perhaps beneath that illusion there is yet another, etc. So the illusionary chain can stretch almost infinitely far back before it terminates in something 'real'.

[A] the person exhibits conscious behavior, not conscious-like behavior. His behavior isn’t simply conscious-like; it is conscious. How do we know? We can infer it from his behavior.

Right, but this isn't a logical inference. It isn't necessary that an entity exhibiting conscious-like behavior be conscious.

I wrote: "How are we to know persons are actually conscious?"

William responded:

Again, conclusion-begging. I could just be a very well-programmed computer that knows what symbols to spit out when certain symbols are presented to it.

We can only be aware of our own consciousness introspectively, but we can be aware of other people’s consciousnesses extrospectively, via their behavior.

I do not doubt that other people are conscious. But, epistemically speaking, it cannot be proven that other people are conscious. Descartes' cogito argument works only for individuals contemplating their own thoughts.

What reason do you have to think that other people are nothing but programmed computers? None whatsoever.

This isn't about evidentialism, it's about knowledge. And, since you want to push out the notion of belief from your epistemology, you are committed to the idea that knowledge is infallible, which means that you can't settle for merely weighing the evidence, because then belief would have to step in to settle the choice. No, you must present proof.

Programmed computers are not biological offspring. To be sure, if I had some reason to think that the responses I'm getting are not from a real person, as I do when I call a business and get computerized response that is programmed to answer my questions, then I have some basis for concluding that I am not or may not be interacting with another consciousness. But absent such evidence, I would have no reason to draw that conclusion.

I'd like proof that I am conscious (from your perspective), please.

The analogy fails, because while we can justly conclude that people die when they jump off of buildings (from our seeing them do this, from the law of gravity, etc.), we cannot so easily conclude that other people are conscious. For the analogy to work, it would be required that we see consciousnesses in the same way that we see falling bodies. But this is not the case.

This doesn't answer the question. If someone were to ask me, "Do you believe you'll be alive tomorrow?" I would answer, "Yes." I would not answer, "I believe it is very likely that I will be alive tomorrow," since this doesn't answer the question. The question is obviously not about the probability of my being alive tomorrow, but rather about whether I will be alive tomorrow. And to the question of whether, there are only three possible answers: 'yes', 'no', and 'undecided'. The 'undecided' option is really quite impractical, and could in fact endanger marriages and friendships. For instance, consider if my future wife (that is, if I don't become a priest) were to ask: "Do you love me?" And I responded, "Judging from your behavior, there is a high probability that you love me." And she pressed, "What if you had to choose whether or not I really do love you." And I responded, "I can't choose, because based on inconclusive evidence I must withhold judgment." I would be sleeping in the garage for a few weeks, I assure you, as punishment for pedantry. The point: Life presents us with situations in which we ought to form committed beliefs about objective uncertainties.

It’s not possible for the universe not to have existed.

So it's necessary that the universe exist, is what you're saying. And I'm asking, "Why?" It's certainly not demonstrably necessary, as mathematical truths are.

Possibility refers only to the actions of already existing entities.

An unsupportable assertion.

Given the existence of the universe, one can talk about what is possible to the entities composing it, but what is possible to the entities composing it is a function of their respective identities, which necessitate a certain course of action and no other. They must act according to their natures; they cannot act otherwise.

I agree with this. This is called necessity of the consequence.

Yes, that is the kind of thing I am talking about, though I also think it possible that men could be made to fly by being so moved through the action of God. Of course, in this case, they wouldn't be flying according to their nature, but rather according to the intervention of God.

I wrote:

"Catholics take it as a maxim that obeying God's commandments will always be in our (at least long-term) self-interest."

William replied:

I would dispute the fact that there is no evidence for an afterlife or for God's existence, but let's place that to one side. It makes much more sense for me to respond to the question of whether it is worth living according to the belief that God and afterlife exist, even if they do not in fact exist. I'm glad you brought up this question. My belief is that the virtuous and faithful life is ultimately the most fulfilling, even if what incites it to action-- a love of God-- is shown to have no actual object. You'll remember that Socrates was willing to stake his whole life on the "if" of immortality, and that his was one of the most noble lives, motivated wholly by the pursuit of truth and goodness. He died thinking that he would "have life more abundantly", as the Phaedo reports. But what if he just decomposed? Well...what if he did? What if we all do? In that case, I don't think it really matters how we live, because all our lives, without exception, end in decomposition. Surely, it might be desirable to live, to move, to learn, to have children, etc., but in the end we must believe that everything we do here comes to naught. And I do not want to build my life around that belief. I'd rather not live thinking that behind every human face there is inevitably a skeleton buried in dirt, that every new insight into our universe is to be just another discovery that we'll inevitably have to surrender to nothingness, that every single action I do here is destined to be counted as nothing once humanity dies out, and our sun, and our universe.

On your view, it's all suicidal in the final analysis.

If nothing that you do while you live ultimately matters (and it doesn't, from the perspective of atheism and cosmological inevitability), why live? I mean, I don't mean to depress you, but I find your worldview insipid and wholly uninspiring.

As for the universe tending toward a heat-death, perhaps in its present form it is, but existence qua existence cannot self-destruct. The universe will simply take a different form.

Right, and this form will be a dead form, with no more energy to sustain activity or life. As G.K. Chesterton once said of Nietzsche's thought, he "scales staggering mountains, but he turns up ultimately in Tibet."

(Edited by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz on 2/25, 10:16am)

Post 28

Sunday, February 25, 2007 - 9:05am

Hi Ed,

Nice to hear from you again.

Thank you for tacitly agreeing to collaborate with me on finding the 'resolution to Humean Skepticism', which I will now shorten, for brevity, to RtHS.

Sure, I will be happy to go over this with you, but your really don't need me. This has been around for about 250 years, and coming from William's position (and perhaps even your position?) there is no solution; unless, you would accept someone's assertion of "because I say so," as a solution.

I have read numerous posts from William in his discussions with GWL. If you would like I can go back and pull exact quotes for each of theses points, but since William is participating in this discussion I am sure he will be happy to affirm these points himself.

His cosmological view is quite simple, there are only two points:

1) God doesn't exist

2) There is a material world (universe) that does exist around us, and we are part of that material universe.

William has also given us one more point concerning the ontology of Man, our third point: 3) Tabula Rosa. There is a great deal of problems with this in itself, but for the moment we can overlook them, as they probably won't come into play.

The first two point make up one of two possible atheistic cosmological positions. This one is called, Naturism or Naturalism, depending on how loosely you want to play with these terms. There is one other point that flows from this cosmology. This is called accedentalism or unintentionalism. The antithesis to accedentalism is intentionalism. All cosmological positions hold to one of these two. I think you can readily see why William's view demands accedentalism; it is one of the few cosmologies that are so obvious. Accedentalism says that everything is what it is by accident or unintentionally, in other words there is no intent. Intentionalism says that everything is what it is by intent. This would require an intender. Point 1 kind of eliminates this possibility.

My words may sound arrogant, but I am merely acting in self-defense. As a general rule, skeptics are folks that ought to be made to show they understand what it is that they are arguing against -- otherwise, they too often waste the valuable time of rational others who are interested in understanding values and reality (i.e., interested in "philosophy").

Ed, you are fine, don't worry about it. By the way, I am not a skeptic. I am just pointing out that given the cosmological position that William (and perhaps you?) hold it is impossible to know anything.

Let's stop here, for the moment, if there is no objections we can move on the the heart fo the argument.

Regards,

G. Brady Lenardos

Post 29

Sunday, February 25, 2007 - 9:43am

Hi William,

Please forgive me for not addressing your most recent post to me at this time. I want to continue going through this process with Ed, point by point.

I assure you that your post will be addressed shorthy. Until then, please feel free to comment on my post to Ed concerning this issue.

Regards,

G. Brady Lenardos

Post 30

Sunday, February 25, 2007 - 8:50pm

G. Brady Lenardos, thank you for distilling the argument down to what you take to be its essentials. Let's take them one by one ...

1) God doesn't exist

This proposition makes a positive claim for the absence of the existence of an all-powerful, supernatural, omniscient being. It is more epistemologically proper (though perhaps somewhat hair-splitting) to refrain from making any such claim -- as the very idea of an all-powerful, supernatural, omniscient being is completely arbitrary and, therefore, absurd on its face. And reasonable people don't normally make claims regarding the 'completely arbitrary' (because they realize that it is a waste of time and breath to do such a thing).

2) There is a material world (universe) that does exist around us, and we are part of that material universe.

This statement, unlike the first one, is axiomatic. It is, therefore, implied in our every undertaking. It is thus completely uncontroversial and to be accepted without question -- if reason is taken to be our one road to truth.

3) Tabula Rosa.

This proposition -- that we are born without specific 'genetic' knowledge -- has to be true, but is often misunderstood. While our 'slate' has to be initially blank, it is not without a kind of 'shape' so to speak (i.e., because of the kind of creatures that we are, there are only certain kinds of data that will be able to fill our specific kind of blank slate -- namely perception and non-contradictory reasoning).

Another way to say this is that while our road to knowledge, either at birth or somewhat before then, is completely untraversed -- it is a road that comes with specific guardrails (i.e., 'blank slate' doesn't mean "anything goes").

;-)

Mr. Lenardos, are we in agreement so far?

Ed

Post 31

Monday, February 26, 2007 - 12:32pm

Ed wrote:

G. Brady Lenardos, thank you for distilling the argument down to what you take to be its essentials. Let's take them one by one ...

You are quite welcome. And in the spirit of clarity I will take these one by one.

1) God doesn't exist

This proposition makes a positive claim for the absence of the existence of an all-powerful, supernatural, omniscient being. It is more epistemologically proper (though perhaps somewhat hair-splitting) to refrain from making any such claim -- as the very idea of an all-powerful, supernatural, omniscient being is completely arbitrary and, therefore, absurd on its face. And reasonable people don't normally make claims regarding the 'completely arbitrary' (because they realize that it is a waste of time and breath to do such a thing).

However much you dislike proposition 1, it is William's position. As I state in my last post, if need be I would provide quotes. So, here we go:

From Post 20 in this thread, William writes:

Placing the interests of God above your own selfishness is self-defeating, if there is no God or life after death. And since there isn't any God or life after death, following Christian dogma and obeying God’s commandments is against your self-interest. And that, in the final analysis, IS suicidal.

So, his cosmological position is as I stated.

As for the rest of your statement, it seems to me that if an all-powerful, supernatural, omniscient being exists, making statements about such a being would be neither arbitrary nor absurd. Even if we didn't know if an all-powerful, supernatural, omniscient being existed, statements about such a being would not be arbitrary or absurd, because testing and analyzing such statements would be the only way to determine if such a being exists. The only time that statements about an all-powerful, supernatural, omniscient being would be absurd is, if we already know and affirm that such a being does not exist.

Well, I will stop here. If we can agree that William's position is that God does not exist, then I will go to the next point.

G. Brady Lenardos

Post 32

Monday, February 26, 2007 - 8:54pm

Mr. G. Brady Lenardos,

We're certainly talking past each other now. Hmf! Didn't take very long, now did it??

;-)

I admit that I had expected more out of us (from my brief experience of your writing here; and, of course, my constant experience of myself). But, 'tis no matter. It's nothing that a single post shouldn't fix. Here's the resolution to this first miscommunication of ours then ...

There are 2 points for us to discuss:

1) What 'Bill' has said
2) What 'can' be said (by straight-thinking humans, without contradiction or arbitrariness)

You seem pretty interested in honing in on #1 (on the words that Bill has used in order to show his cosmology) -- and I'm trying to show you, by appealing to a principle drawn from #2, how it is that words won't ever make any difference; at least not on this one subject of 'God.' Before responding (if you have retained an interest), please point your browser here -- in order to see what I mean, when I say that it won't ever matter what it is that one has to say, when the subject is 'about' God.

The kicker is (if you experience that Eureka! moment -- because you've figured out how the arbitrary can never have any meaning for man), is that Bill's cosmology ends up being the default cosmology for humans to entertain in their minds -- whether Bill has argued perfectly for it, or not, that doesn't actually matter.

There are notions men have, and some of them are proper, epistemologically. There are others that aren't and, like the practice of putting on a blindfold before you are about to read a book -- they don't even deserve to be entertained, when knowledge is what is being sought.

Ed

Post 33

Tuesday, February 27, 2007 - 2:11am

Ed: “There are 2 points for us to discuss:

1) What 'Bill' has said
2) What 'can' be said (by straight-thinking humans, without contradiction or arbitrariness)”

Ed, as a matter of recorded fact, you specifically asked G Brady Lenardos to enumerate what he saw as William’s presuppositions, as a show of “intellectual generosity”. Lenardos has responded to your request.

Perhaps you can now extend the same intellectual generosity and answer the simple question: is it William’s position that God does not exist?

Brendan

Post 34

Tuesday, February 27, 2007 - 7:15am

Brendan,

First of all, thanks for chiming in. You asked whether it's Bill's position that God doesn't exist. To tell the truth, I'm not so sure. But there is one thing that I know absolutely, no matter what it is that is anyone's position on what it is that God is, 'God' is arbitrary and unworthy of rational discussion.

In this statement of how to properly use a human mind (i.e., how NOT to use a mind), I hope I've answered your inquiry well.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson
on 2/27, 7:17am)

Post 35

Tuesday, February 27, 2007 - 1:03pm

Ed wrote:

Now (p. 499), Adler outlines the 3 possible conceptions of God:

1) As totally unlike anything else that we know (where we can have no "conception" of God).
2) As essentially like all the things we know -- all the things in our experience (ie. finite, corporeal, mutable, and imperfect).
3) As both like and unlike all the things that we know (and here is where the Adlerian argument breaks down).

If it were to be accepted as true, that God is both like and unlike all the things that we know, then how would we be able to ascertain that which is 'God's will' from that which is, say, the will of the 'Devil'? This question is unanswerable. Not knowing how to differentiate the things we can know from the things that we can't -- there is no ascertainable way to differentiate the will of God from the will of the Devil. No mortal can perform this insurmountable feat.

This is just a bad argument. We would be able to know God's will from the Devil's will by assigning what is good to the nature of God and what is bad to the nature of the Devil, and then inferring that the will of each would depend on the defined nature of the being in question-- making God's will good, and the Devil's bad.

Pivotal Question #3 -- Can we know God's existence and nature (independent of revelation and religious faith)?

No.

I take it this is your answer, and not Adler's. I assume that Adler, being a Christian (and eventually a Catholic), would disagree, so long as knowledge be understood, not as proof, but as justified acceptance.

God is an arbitrary concept -- not derivable from perception or reason.

If anything is left undefined, then it is arbitrary. If I say I have a "juther" on my desk, you might say it's pointless to discuss whether or not a "juther" is in fact on my desk, since the "juther" is left undefined. However, if I say that God exists, and then define God in a coherent manner-- an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, uncreated Creator of the universe and everything that exists in it-- then we assuredly can have a real discussion as to whether or not such a being exists (so long as you agree with me that the concept of such a God is coherent).

An active belief in God requires a rejection of the foundation of human consciousness (ie. a rejection of evidential reasoning, as the standard for truth).

To justify this claim you would have to first demonstrate that all purported evidence for God does not actually qualify as evidence.

Post 36

Tuesday, February 27, 2007 - 3:06pm

Ed wrote:

Mr. G. Brady Lenardos, We're certainly talking past each other now. Hmf! Didn't take very long, now did it??

I understand you may not like where this is going and would like to change the subject, but I really don't see how we could be talking past each other. You asked me to enumerate the points that Bill had made that brought about my comments about Hume. I did just that. You seemed to have some difficulty with proposition 1) God does not exist. So, I quoted from post 20 of this thread where Bill specifically states his position that "there isn't any God."

You may not like Bill's position, but that is his position. If you would like to change the topic and discuss your essay (I did read it and there is so much of your essay that in itself is arbitrary, I did not find it of much value; remember "because I said so," is not a good argument), I would be happy to do that at some other time, or perhaps you can do that with GWL; I see he has already started addressing your essay in another post.

So, if we can agree that Bill's position is 1) God does not exist, I will move on to the next point.

Brady

Post 37

Wednesday, February 28, 2007 - 12:00am

Ed: “You asked whether it's Bill's position that God doesn't exist. To tell the truth, I'm not so sure.”

We’ve both seen the quote, in black and white: “And since there isn't any God…” Couldn’t be plainer.

Fact is, Ed, you’ve been hoist by your own petard. In post 25 you made a great song and dance about not wasting your valuable and rational time on “skeptics”. Lenardos ponied up to your request for information, which you then proceeded to spin in your post 30, in a clumsy and transparent bait and switch.

That’s not trading value for value. Miss Rand would not be pleased. If you don’t want to discuss the “arbitrary”, remain silent. But ‘god is arbitrary’ is mere assertion, and with repetition becomes a mantra, which, well, you know the rest.

Given our history, Ed, I’m sure you will permit me a personal observation. In the time since I was sent to Siberia, your intellectual powers seem to have gravely deteriorated. Is there something happening in your off-screen life that is draining you of your vital energy?

Yours in concern

Brendan

Post 38

Wednesday, February 28, 2007 - 11:47am

Fellas, I'll address GWL's concerns later. For potentially needed clarity, let me explicitly restate the 3 ways that there are to fail to attain a positive belief in God ...

1) agnosticism
2) soft atheism
3) hard atheism

2 of these 3 ways of thinking are irrational because of contradictory premises (as I alluded to in my essay). Now, Bill might've made some statements here that make it sound like he belonged in the #3 way of thinking about this subject -- but I think, if pressed, he would revert to the #2 option (perhaps Bill could answer this himself). However, this might not even matter to the task at hand. I will agree to the following proposition (so that we can move forward) ...

Bill doesn't hold a positive belief in God.

Ed
[and thanks for the concern, Brendan -- I'm currently working 60 hours a week, and I am also now in a long-distance relationship; these 2 things comprise a good deal of my time and energy lately]

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 2/28, 11:49am)

Post 39

Wednesday, February 28, 2007 - 1:04pm