| | I wrote, “What I meant is that at present, [an entity] must have the characteristics that it presently possesses and no others, including the capacity to act in certain ways and not in other ways. So, for example, an untanned Socrates would possess the capacity to acquire a tan when exposed to the sun for a certain period of time; he would not possess the capacity to turn blue under those same conditions. This point may seem tautological, but it needs to be emphasized, because modern philosophy has expanded the concept of 'logical possibility' to include anything that one can imagine. Since I can 'imagine' Socrates turning blue after 4 hours in the sun, modern philosophy says that it’s 'logically possible' for him to do so -- which is nonsense.” I'm not sure if you understand my position on modality. I do not deny that under the same conditions things will act in a predictable manner (when conditions are understood as the general laws of nature). However, as I mentioned earlier, this is necessity of the consequence, not necessity simpliciter. Barring divine intervention or a sudden change in the fundamental structure of the universe, things will act predictably in accordance with their identity. In this sense, the identity of things is necessary. But this is a form of necessity ex hypothesi, not necessity simpliciter, since the existence of our universe is contingent. The universe or existence is not contingent, since there is nothing on which it could be contingent. Existence is all there is. We do not determine necessary and contingent truths via imagination in general. Necessary truths have this distinguishing characteristic: if they are thought or understood, they are self-evidently true. Understanding that 2 plus 2 equals 4 is all one needs to do to realize its necessity. By contrast, my understanding that when people tan, they turn brown (not blue) does not suffice to prove it necessarily true. There is no essential difference between these two examples. In order to know that when people tan they turn brown rather than blue, you have to identify a certain relationship in reality. Once having made the relevant observation, you can know that the proposition that people (with a certain melanin content to their skin) turn brown rather than blue when exposed to the sun is necessarily true. Similarly, in order to know that 2+2=4, you have to identify a relationship between certain quantitative aspects of reality – that two units of something added to two other units of it equal four units. Once having made the identification and learned the relationship, one can know that the proposition that 2+2=4 (that 2 units plus 2 units equals 4 units) is necessarily true.
I wrote, “The law of identity would preclude this from happening, precisely because a thing must have the characteristics it possesses and no others, and Socrates does not possess the characteristic of turning blue in response to sun exposure, even though he does possess the characteristic of acquiring a tan under the same conditions.” I do not wish to challenge the law of identity. But the dividing line between essential and accidental properties is very fuzzy, and what we commonly take to be the laws of nature are not ineluctable. To illustrate the former, all we need to do is wonder whether an alligator with Socrates' brain transplanted and connected to it would in fact still be Socrates. If, by "Socrates," you simply mean his soul (i.e., his mind and its contents), then yes; however, if by "Socrates," you mean the entire person including the rest of his physical body, then no. An alligator with Socrates' brain transplanted and connected to it would be a strange creature, half-man, half-alligator, but it would not be Socrates in the conventional sense of the person to whom that name has traditionally been applied. To illustrate the latter, all we need to do is meditate upon why it is that what are widely accepted to be the laws of nature break down the closer one approaches t=0 of the Big Bang's singularity. The laws of nature don't break down. These laws pertain to a specific context involving entities of a specific nature. What breaks down is the physical context in which the laws are manifested. See below.
I wrote, “No, I’m not restricting its mode of action to its essential characteristic(s). Essence is an epistemological, not a metaphysical, concept. Metaphysically, an entity is all of its characteristics, not just its essential characteristic(s). For example, the essence of ice is solid water. But ice possesses other characteristics besides being a solid form of H2O. It is cold to the touch; it floats; it cools drinks, etc. I’m saying that an entity’s action is limited by its identity, and it’s identity includes all of its characteristics, not just the essential ones." All of its characteristics aren't derivable from its identity alone, for surely how it acts on other bodies has largely to do with the laws of material interaction. How it acts on other bodies is one of its characteristics.
I wrote, “First of all, an entity’s identity is all of its characteristics, known and not yet known, including its mode of action under conditions that have yet to be discovered. Careful, you are very near to giving up human free will. For, if one can only act in a manner conditioned by one's antecedent characteristics (brain states, physical location, causal relations), one is not free (in any real sense of the term). In short, one has no power over determining his personal characteristics, since one only can "discover" them. Not true. Even if one's actions are ultimately determined by antecedent causes, such as one's heredity and environment, one can still be said to determine one's personal characteristics. For example, one can attend university and become a better educated person. One's action of attending university will then be the proximate cause of one's becoming better educated, even if heredity and environment are the remote causes. William: does what you are fully determine wholly what you will be in the future? If so, free will is in danger, and a fatal necessity is imputed to all human action. There is no rejection of free will here, as the capacity for choosing among alternatives can itself be regarded as one of man’s characteristics that determines how he acts (viz., by consciously choosing his behavior), even if that choice it itself determined by his previous values.
I wrote, “Secondly, your statement that ‘the laws of nature could be changed such that an entity could be placed under conditions completely foreign to those permitted by our own universe’ is simply false. In fact, it’s a contradiction in terms. If they’re not permitted by our own universe – i.e., by existence – then they’re not permitted period.” All scientists should be required to study the foundations of mathematics and logic. Such study would disabuse them of the philosophically annoying habit of inferring necessary truths from actual ones. First, show me that the laws of nature are necessary. Show me that Newton's law of gravitation enjoys the same sort of necessity that Euclid's theorems do. You can't, because it doesn't. Existence is nothing more than actualized essence. Aristotle to the contrary notwithstanding, essence is epistemological, not metaphysical. And modern philosophy to the contrary notwithstanding, causal necessity is based on logic, because the law of causality is a corollary of the law of identity. If one thing the same in nature at different times, or two things the same in nature, are to act in situations the same in their nature, they must act on both occasions in the same way. . . . That a cause must act uniformly in the above sense we may the more readily realize, if we ask what is involved in the supposition that it does not. It will be found that this tantamount to denying the existence of causal connexions altogether. . . . If any plant might produce any seed, or any seed any plant, and it was impossible to discover, in such circumstances as graft or soil –because no reason of the kind existed – why the same plant produced now one seed and now another, or the same seed now one and now another plant, then we should just deny that there was any cause for that which happened. We should not say that there was always a cause, though the cause need not act uniformly. If two plants, whose nature is really the same, can determine the growth of totally different seeds, how can we call either the seed of that plant at all? Grant that a seed may sometimes be produced by a plant of its own kind, and sometimes by a plant of another kind, without any difference of circumstances, and merely because causes do not act uniformly, and you have really granted that anything may produce anything; flint and steel may produce seed instead of a spark, and oil raise the waves or quench a conflagration. But to say that anything may produce anything is to empty the word ‘produce’ of all its meaning. For the causal relation is a necessary relation, such that if you have one thing you must have another. To add that it does not matter what the other is, destroys the force of the must. H.W.B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic (Oxford University Press, pp. 406, 407)
In short, everything must act according to its nature, because existence is identity. Ice being less dense than water must float; man, being a rational animal, must choose. Etc.
I wrote, “’This universe’ is all there is. ‘Universe’ refers to what is universal – to everything that exists. Another universe is not logically possible, any more than it’s logically possible for water to freeze at 212 degrees Fahrenheit. What is logically possible to existence depends on the entities that it comprises, to which the only actions logically possible are those consistent with their natures.” Wrong. A universe with different 'universal' laws of nature would be a different universe by definition. Moreover, a cat in another universe might take on what appear to be inattainable properties from the perspective of our uinverse. If you have the same entities, then you must have the same laws, because a law of nature is simply an expression of how entities behave under various conditions. It is simply an expression of their identities.
I wrote, “Well, I reject the notion that the universe is contingent. Contingent on what? There is nothing for the universe or existence to be contingent on. Existence is all there is.” Contingent in that the reason for its existing is not present in itself. A “reason for existing” is an explanation for why something exists; it presupposes an antecedent cause. Therefore, the reason for a thing’s existence cannot be present in itself, for the same reason that a thing cannot cause itself. But that does not mean that it is, therefore, caused by something else. Causality presupposes existence -- the existence of that which acts as a cause; existence does not presuppose causality. Mathematical truths are necessary because their truth becomes self-evident through analysis. Not so with the universe. All truths, not simply mathematical ones, become self-evident through analysis, once a person grasps their empirical foundations – their basis in the real world – and correspondingly, no truths are self-evident simply from analysis, unless the analysis is based on real-world observation.
I wrote, “And even if other things in existence were different, a thing would still be what it is. It may respond differently to different conditions, but that’s because it would be part of its nature to do so." If entities acting under universal laws began to shave away Plank-length slices from a table, at what point would it cease to be the table? When it no longer sufficiently resembles those things which, because of their relative similarity, are grouped together under the concept of ‘table.’ Then it would no longer be ‘the table,’ because it would no longer be grouped under the concept ‘table’. But I can tell from your objections that you’re not following me. What I am saying is that whatever a thing is at any point in time, it is what it is, which is all of its characteristics at that particular time, including its action and its capacity for change. At what point would its "nature" alter? Your metaphysical theory is fraught with difficulties such as this. It’s nature is whatever it is at any point in time, including its capacity for change or alteration. A child has the capacity for continued growth and development, because of what he is; an adult does not, because of what he is.
I wrote, “By the way, to say ‘fundamental’ identity is redundant. There is no fundamental versus non-fundamental identity. There is only identity, because a thing simply is what it is.” We cannot have access to the fundamental identity of things. Such is the price of being less than omniscient. The distinction is warranted, since whatever we know about an existent will be knowledge of non-fundamental identity. You’re not hearing me. There is no fundamental versus non-fundamental identity, because there is no metaphysical essence. Essence is an epistemological concept. The Socratic alligator that you referred to above is what it is -- it has an identity, just as the conventional Socrates did, even if it is no longer the person whom we would normally identify as "Socrates".
I wrote, “You don’t perceive your perceptions; you perceive the object of your perceptions, and are aware of the world directly, not via a representation of it. If you were aware only of a representation of it, then you couldn’t know that what you are aware of is a true representation, since you’d have no independent verification that that what you are aware of corresponds to the external world.” This is dogmatism. Which is something you should be familiar with! ;-) Brain states-- neuronal relationships--are what influence (either by interaction or by divine pre-established harmony) mental states. But, of course, divine pre-established harmony is not dogmatism! Sensations are drawn from the world, sure, but these sensations are represented to the mind; the mind is not directly aware of the world: "I'm sorry, it's science" (a memorable quote from Anchorman). I don’t think so. Just as you don’t perceive your perceptions, you don’t sense your sensations. A sensation is a form of awareness. What you are aware of is the external world through your means of perception, which does not mean that you are not aware of it directly. Awareness always takes a particular form; there is no such thing as formless awareness; such a concept would have no meaning. Therefore, to say that you are aware of reality "directly" does not imply that your awareness is non-sensory -- that it does not take a perceptual form. Yes, if you were only aware of a representation of it, you couldn't know directly that what you are aware of is a true representation. But you could believe in the truth of these representations. On what grounds?
GWL wrote: “In my opinion, the tabula rasa understanding of the human mind is both philosophically and scientifically repugnant. Philosophically, the idea is without merit, since it somehow maintains that necessary truths like 1+1=2 and the absurdity of the conjunction A^~A can be deduced from particular representative examples."
I replied, “Not deduced; induced. 1+1=2 and the laws of logic are arrived at inductively, not deductively. For instance, in order to grasp the proposition that 'One plus one equals two,' one must first have formed its constituent concepts.” I said "deduced" to highlight the absurdity of trying to get to necessary truths by beginning from particular examples. After how many examples does the truth become necessary? 100,000,000? Or ought we to say that the necessary truth is a priori? (Hint: Yes.) By the law of identity, all truths are necessary, i.e., could not have been otherwise, because existence is identity, and a thing must act according to its nature. Is this fact incompatible with choice? No, because a person’s choices are necessitated by his value judgments.
However, what you seem to be referring to is our ability to know whether or not a proposition is true. Take the proposition, “All swans are white.” If the referent of this proposition is all the swans in existence, whether observed or not, then one cannot know that the proposition is true, because there might exist a black swan. (And black swans were in fact discovered.) But the proposition “Some swans are white” can be known to be true (and is, in the language of modern philosophy, a “necessary truth”), despite the fact that its truth is grasped only through experience and is therefore not “a priori.”
I wrote, “How does one form the concepts 'one' and 'two'? In the same way that one forms any other concept -- by observing various instances of the concept’s units and then abstracting their common feature – i.e., by observing that certain things bear a greater similarity to each other than they do to certain other thing(s) from which they’re being differentiated. In other words, one forms a concept by identifying similarity against a background of difference.” We think in terms of concepts, not in terms of the 'things out there'. We think in terms of concepts, but our concepts are formed by first observing and then by classifying the things out there. Our mind is not just a wax tablet on which sense-impressions get impressed. Rather, our mind conceptually organizes sensory information before they become present to us as impressions. How can you organize sensory information before receiving it? Such is the reason behind our experiencing 3 dimensions, not 2 dimensions with shadow and highly variant shape. We experience the world in a certain way – three dimensionally – given the nature of our senses, but that does not mean that three-dimensionality is an innate idea. The idea of three dimensions had to be formed via a process of abstraction from observation. Furthermore, if all concepts are formed by abstracting from sense-impression, from where does the concept of a concept come? By abstracting from abstractions, which are themselves formed by abstracting from concretes. For example, the concept ‘furniture’ is an abstraction from abstractions, which is formed by identifying what chairs, tables, desks, etc. have in common as against other features of human habitation, such as doors, windows, pictures, etc.
“Observe that the concept ‘furniture’ is an abstraction one step further removed from perceptual reality than any of its constituent concepts. ‘Table’ is an abstraction, since its meaning can be conveyed simply by pointing to one or two perceptual objects. There is no such perceptual object as ‘furniture’; there are only tables, chairs, beds, etc. The meaning of ‘furniture’ cannot be grasped unless one has first grasped the meaning of its constituent concepts; these are its link to reality.” (Rand, ITOE, p. 22)
One forms the concept of ‘concept’ in a similar way, by observing that different (implicitly held) concepts have something in common as against other aspects of conscious awareness, such as percepts, sensations, feelings, etc., from which they are being differentiated.
I wrote, “For example, one forms the concept ‘fruit’ by observing that (say) an apple and an orange bear a greater similarity to each other than either does to a carrot or a beet. Similarly, one forms the concept ‘apple’ by observing that two different apples (say a MacIntosh and a Pippin) bear a greater similarity to each other than either does to an orange or a pear. . . .” Assuredly, because concepts like 'fruit' are not a priori. No concepts are a priori. " . . . The same principle applies in forming the concept of a particular number (say, two). One observes that a group of two oranges and a group of two apples, say, bear a greater numerical similarity to each other than either does to a group of three oranges or to a group of four apples. In so doing, one isolates what the groups of two have in common as against the other groups, and thereby forms the abstraction ‘two’, which one then designates by the visual-auditory symbol 'two' or '2.' The same principle of concept formation pertains to numerical concepts as to any other concept." Look closely at what you just said. You began with the intention of describing how it is that we form the concept of two. Then you say, "One observes that a group of two oranges..." Whoa. You've employed the concept to account for it, which looks circular. I have a question, how does one ever differentiate the two apples into 2 without recourse to the concept of 2? Initially, you observe a quantity of two oranges perceptually -- O O -- without identifying the quantity conceptually or giving it a name. Only after you recognize their quantitative similarity to another group of two objects -- | | -- are you then able to form the concept of 'two'.
I wrote, “The laws of logic are also discovered by observing reality – by observing that existence itself is non-contradictory – that existence itself possesses identity.” No, the laws of logic are not discovered by observing 'reality' (if reality be understood as that which is outside us), at least not in an essential sense. They are discovered by introspection-- thinking about how we think--and realizing that we can't think against the basic laws of logic. And once we realize this, we realize their necessity. See below:
I quoted Joseph, “We cannot think contradictory propositions, because we see that a thing cannot have at once and not have the same character; and the so-called necessity of thought is really the apprehension of a necessity in the being of things.” I agree with Joseph, but he's got it backwards. One cannot apprehend necessity in the being of things, if the being of things is understood merely as that which is given through the senses. For the perception of the being of things conforms itself to a necessity of thought, and the necessity of thought comes from the necessity of truth, and this is found whole and entire in the Mind of God. What you want to say is that the being of things conforms itself to a necessity of thought. But once you put it that way, the fallacy becomes obvious. Reality doesn’t conform itself to our thoughts; our thoughts, if they are to be accurate and true, must conform to the being of things.
Continuing with the Joseph quote, “The Law of Contradiction then is metaphysical or ontological. So also is the Law of Identity. It is because what is must be determinately what it is, that I must so think.” The Law of Contradiction is metaphysical, ontological, and epistemic. Our thoughts are distinct from our encounters with 'what is'. Descartes showed that every person can prove his own existence through the contemplation of the implications of one's own thought. But, n.b., one can only prove one's own existence in such a fashion during this introspective process. One can also prove one’s own existence extrospectively, by observing one’s physical body. In any case, one’s existence does not depend on one’s recognition of it; one’s recognition of it depends on one’s existence.
GWL wrote: "It makes much more sense to say that geometrical, mathematical, and logical truths exist latently in the human mind, and that experience is what triggers our awareness of them."
I replied, “Experience doesn’t ‘trigger’ our awareness of them. Experience makes us aware of them.” Please give an account of how experience "makes us aware of them.” Can experiences speak? What I meant is that to experience something is to be aware of it. What is it that analyzes experiences? Surely necessary truth does not come from experience alone. We have to distinguish between perceptual awareness and conceptual understanding or propositional knowledge. Of course, propositional knowledge depends on the identification and integration of that which one experiences, but without the initial experience itself, no such identification and integration is possible.
I wrote, “What these studies show is that the mind has a certain innate capacity to grasp and conceptualize reality. They have not shown the presence of innate ideas -- ideas about reality that exist in the mind prior to any cognitive contact with reality. You seem to be tied down by a sort of intransigent idea that "reality" is only 'out there', and that we only really perceive things 'out there'. But this is false, and we can imagine that an infant in a womb experiences some kind of subconsious apperception (i.e. self-awareness of his/her own state of mind). Advances in neuroscience have shown that fetuses experience neuronal activity. Now, of course an infant is liable to sensation within the womb, but the point is that, even in such a state of experiential darkness, the first forms of thought are taking place, and these thoughts are introspective. Experiences in the womb, such as they are, are experiences of the external world. But a fetus does not think in the normally understood sense of that word, let alone introspect. Of course, there is a mental world, -- an “in here,” so to speak -- which is identified by introspection, but before a consciousness can have any kind of mental content, it must be aware of something external to itself. It bears repeating: a consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms. Before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something (other than itself). Mental contents refer ultimately to information obtained extrospectively. Hume’s example of a golden mountain is relevant here. Even though there is no such thing as a golden mountain, one acquires the ideas of “golden” and “mountain” from observing reality.
GWL wrote: "If you believe the mind to be tabula rasa, you are forced to admit this. But tabula rasa seems dubious at best. Furthermore, I find that, even if your principle could be true for us, it could not be true for God. For God is not a composite of mind and body, but is rather pure consciousness, such that his self-awareness is immediate and timeless. Indeed, God's understanding is his being, whereas our understanding is derivative of our being. There is no 'external world' for God, since God is immediately present to all things as a cause is to its effect."
I replied: “You are employing what Objectivists would term a 'floating abstraction' – an abstraction that is not anchored to anything in reality. Your notion of ‘God’ as pure consciousness isn’t based on any concrete aspect of the real world. You are taking a concept, which you arrived at only by observing conscious organisms, divesting it of its basis in reality and then treating it as if it existed in the real world as a pure abstraction. This is no different in principle from claiming that there is in reality such a thing as 'pure' two – not two oranges, two pencils or two people, but just two by itself. It’s as if I had said that I have two in my pocket, and you asked two what, to which I replied, “two nothing, just plain two.” Well, of course, that’s nonsense, but it’s no different if you declare the existence of a “pure” consciousness. The same principle applies. The concept of a pure consciousness is meaningless, because consciousness requires a concrete basis in reality, in the absence of which the concept makes no sense. First and foremost, I've never observed any consciousness other than my own. To observe another consciousness is impossible. (Refer to Nagel: What is it like to be a bat?) So, I obviously didn't arrive at a concept of consciousness by "observing conscious organisms". Well, you may not be able to experience what another conscious organism experiences, but you can observe that the organism is conscious. You’re not denying that other people and other animals are conscious, are you? And even if you had not observed other people or animals, you are certainly aware of the fact that your own consciousness is a faculty of a living organism and is dependent on a brain and physical senses. Now, as to your suggestion that there cannot be a "pure" two, I ask you to provide an account of how we are to discern two entities in the first place without recourse to the concept. First of all, you're not suggesting, are you, that I could have pure two in my pocket, or pure two on the dining room table! If you are, then you need some serious help! Secondly, You don’t have to have the concept “two” in order to perceive a group of two entities, any more than you have to have the concept chair in order to perceive a chair. A concept is formed from observing that certain objects are similar enough to be grouped together (as against other objects that are different enough to be excluded). So one observes that different groups of objects exhibit the same quantity, as against other groups that exhibit a different quantity. One then assigns a name to the quantity, e.g., “two” for | |, or “three” for | | |. Moreover, I petition you to show me how speaking of God's consciousness as "pure consciousness" is to entail that God is not anchored in reality. If you remember from what I've said in the past, I've attributed all positive reality (limitations excepted) to God. This ought to be adequate grounding for His consciousness, which is, as I've said again and again, not to be confounded with any sort of human consciousness. You can certainly call “God” a pure consciousness and “attribute all positive reality” to him, but that’s not an adequate grounding for your assertion. The point I am making is that the concept of a pure consciousness doesn’t make any sense, any more than the concept of pure two makes sense. Just as there is no such thing as pure two in reality (“two” is simply an abstraction from observed particulars), so there is no such thing as a pure consciousness in reality. Just as there must be two something (e.g., two pencils, two oranges, two lines on a piece of paper) -- so there must be something that is conscious (e.g., an insect, a bird, a dog, a human being). You cannot have a pure consciousness as an actual existent, any more than you can have pure two as an actual existent.
I wrote, “Again, our perceptions don’t represent reality; they’re of reality. You still haven’t grasped the difference.” I've grasped the difference. But you seem to think that our eyes and other sensory faculties are like windows through which we "see" what is out there-- a position which runs contrary to the findings of brain science. No, that’s not my position; the senses are not like “windows” to the external world; I am not a naïve realist. But the senses are required in order to observe reality. To be aware, one must be aware by some particular means and in some particular form. Since a pure consciousness has no particular means or form of awareness, it cannot exist; it cannot be conscious.
GWL wrote: “Indeed, imaginary could just mean 'at variance with what is perceived to be real'.”
I replied, “You’re committing the same error, without realizing it. “Perceived to be real” itself presupposes the concept of reality, because it makes a distinction between what is perceived to be real and what is actually real.” Of course it presupposes the concept of reality. But the point is that reality may not be something to which we have direct access. It may be that our perceptions (which we believe to correspond with something 'out there' that is perceived) are in fact illusory, e.g. created through an artificial brain stimulation. How then did you get the concept of ‘reality’? And what does that concept in fact mean? Doesn’t it mean the object of your awareness. If the object of your awareness isn’t reality, then what is reality?
I wrote, “We can only be aware of our own consciousness introspectively, but we can be aware of other people’s consciousnesses extrospectively, via their behavior." GWL replied, "I do not doubt that other people are conscious. But, epistemically speaking, it cannot be proven that other people are conscious. Descartes' cogito argument works only for individuals contemplating their own thoughts." I responded, "What reason do you have to think that other people are nothing but programmed computers? None whatsoever." This isn't about evidentialism, it's about knowledge. And, since you want to push out the notion of belief from your epistemology, you are committed to the idea that knowledge is infallible, which means that you can't settle for merely weighing the evidence, because then belief would have to step in to settle the choice. What do you mean, “belief would have to step in and settle the choice”? This isn’t about an arbitrary choice to believe; it’s about drawing the appropriate conclusion, one which is warranted by the evidence. No, you must present proof. What do you consider proof? If all the evidence supports and none contradicts, that’s proof. If all the evidence supports the charge that Scott Peterson murdered his wife, Lacy, and none contradicts it, then Scott Peterson has been proved guilty of murder. I wrote, "Programmed computers are not biological offspring. To be sure, if I had some reason to think that the responses I'm getting are not from a real person, as I do when I call a business and get computerized response that is programmed to answer my questions, then I have some basis for concluding that I am not or may not be interacting with another consciousness. But absent such evidence, I would have no reason to draw that conclusion.” I'd like proof that I am conscious (from your perspective), please. See above.
I wrote, “Well, then it’s conclusion-begging to infer that if I jump off a tall building, I’ll fall to my death. The only reason I know that is through a causal inference; I don’t know it from direct experience. To know it from direct experience, I would actually have to jump off the building and experience falling, and even then I wouldn’t know from direct experience that I would die, because I can’t experience being dead. I could know that I would die only through a process of causal inference. Is that conclusion begging too? I don’t think so.” The analogy fails, because while we can justly conclude that people die when they jump off of buildings (from our seeing them do this, from the law of gravity, etc.), we cannot so easily conclude that other people are conscious. For the analogy to work, it would be required that we see consciousnesses in the same way that we see falling bodies. But this is not the case. You are missing the point of the analogy. If we can infer that we will die, because we are directly aware of others dying, then we can infer that other people are conscious, because we are directly aware of our own consciousness. Like causes beget like effects. If someone were to ask me, "Do you believe you'll be alive tomorrow?" I would answer, "Yes." I would not answer, "I believe it is very likely that I will be alive tomorrow," since this doesn't answer the question. The question is obviously not about the probability of my being alive tomorrow, but rather about whether I will be alive tomorrow. Yes, you can certainly answer “I believe I will be alive tomorrow,” but all you mean by that is you think that it very likely that you will be alive tomorrow. If someone asks me, “Do you believe you’ll get an A on the test,” you could answer, “Yes, I believe I will get an A on the test,.” You are not saying that you know that you will, because you don’t know what you’re grade will be. But you can say that you believe it will be an A. Similarly, you certainly don’t know that you will be alive tomorrow, but you can say that you believe that you will be alive tomorrow, meaning that, from your perspective, there is a very high probability that you will. And to the question of whether, there are only three possible answers: 'yes', 'no', and 'undecided'. The 'undecided' option is really quite impractical, and could in fact endanger marriages and friendships. For instance, consider if my future wife (that is, if I don't become a priest) were to ask: "Do you love me?" [I think you meant for her to say, “Do you believe I love you?”, right?] And I responded, "Judging from your behavior, there is a high probability that you love me." And she pressed, "What if you had to choose whether or not I really do love you." And I responded, "I can't choose, because based on inconclusive evidence I must withhold judgment." I would be sleeping in the garage for a few weeks, I assure you, as punishment for pedantry. The point: Life presents us with situations in which we ought to form committed beliefs about objective uncertainties. Again, it’s not just an arbitrary belief. If all of the evidence supports and none contradicts, then you can conclude without a doubt that she loves you. If, however, you had evidence of lies and infidelity on her part, then you would have some basis for doubting that she loved you.
I wrote, “It’s not possible for the universe not to have existed.” So it's necessary that the universe exist, is what you're saying. And I'm asking, "Why?" It's certainly not demonstrably necessary, as mathematical truths are. Yes, it is, because the concept of possible non-existence doesn’t apply to the universe. There is a sense in which it is possible for me not to have existed – e.g., if my parents choose not to conceive a child. But what would it mean to say that it’s possible for the universe not to have existed. I can only say that it’s possible for the universe not to have existed, if a certain condition had not been fulfilled. But what condition could that possibly be? There is nothing on which the non-existence of the universe could depend, since the universe is all there is; existence is everything.
I wrote, “Possibility refers only to the actions of already existing entities.” An unsupportable assertion. How is it unsupportable?
I wrote, “Given the existence of the universe, one can talk about what is possible to the entities composing it, but what is possible to the entities composing it is a function of their respective identities, which necessitate a certain course of action and no other. They must act according to their natures; they cannot act otherwise.” I agree with this. This is called necessity of the consequence. Right. If P, then necessarily Q. But it’s also true that something is necessary if it could not have been otherwise. And I don’t see how the universe could have been otherwise – could not have existed. Again, it could not have existed only if some condition had not been fulfilled? What condition could that be? There isn’t any.
I wrote, “When I said that it is not logically possible for men to fly, I was clearly referring to our present environment, which would include the earth’s gravitation, a medium of air and so on. Obviously, in zero gravity, it would be possible for men to fly. Is that the kind of thing you are talking about?” Yes, that is the kind of thing I am talking about, though I also think it possible that men could be made to fly by being so moved through the action of God. Of course, in this case, they wouldn't be flying according to their nature, but rather according to the intervention of God. Well, as you know by now, it is my position that divine intervention is not logically possible, because a pure, omnipotent spirit is not logically possible.
GWL wrote: "Catholics take it as a maxim that obeying God's commandments will always be in our (at least long-term) self-interest."
I replied: “Well, sure, if you assume that God will reward you for following them and/or punish you for not following them. But that assumes the existence of an afterlife. I was talking about our present earthly existence. Since there is no evidence for an afterlife, any more than there is for God’s existence, it makes no sense to sacrifice your actual life for the sake of an existence beyond the grave.” I would dispute the fact that there is no evidence for an afterlife or for God's existence, but let's place that to one side. It makes much more sense for me to respond to the question of whether it is worth living according to the belief that God and afterlife exist, even if they do not in fact exist. I'm glad you brought up this question. My belief is that the virtuous and faithful life is ultimately the most fulfilling, even if what incites it to action-- a love of God-- is shown to have no actual object. You'll remember that Socrates was willing to stake his whole life on the "if" of immortality, and that his was one of the most noble lives, motivated wholly by the pursuit of truth and goodness. He died thinking that he would "have life more abundantly", as the Phaedo reports. Well, I think he made a big mistake; he should not have staked his life on the “if” of immortality. But what if he just decomposed? Well...what if he did? What if we all do? In that case, I don't think it really matters how we live, because all our lives, without exception, end in decomposition. This is a non-sequitur. It matters to us while we are still alive how we live our lives; if we live poorly, we suffer the consequences; if we live well, we reap the benefits. In fact, you just said as much, when you stated “the virtuous and faithful life is ultimately the most fulfilling, even if what incites it to action – a love of God – is shown to have no actual object.” Fulfilling in what respect? Evidently, with respect to the life that one experiences while one is still alive -- even though, of course, I don't agree that adhering to religious doctrine is as fulfilling as you claim it is. Surely, it might be desirable to live, to move, to learn, to have children, etc., but in the end we must believe that everything we do here comes to naught. But it comes to naught only if we get no enjoyment, no fulfillment, out of the lives we are actually living – only if we think that a fantasy life beyond the grave is the only thing worth striving for. And I do not want to build my life around that belief. I'd rather not live thinking that behind every human face there is inevitably a skeleton buried in dirt, that every new insight into our universe is to be just another discovery that we'll inevitably have to surrender to nothingness, that every single action I do here is destined to be counted as nothing once humanity dies out, and our sun, and our universe. You are assuming that unless happiness and enjoyment are never ending, they have no value, which is a false assumption. As Rand would say, check your premises.
I wrote, “Placing the interests of God above your own selfishness is self-defeating, if there is no God or life after death. And since there isn't any God or life after death, following Christian dogma and obeying God’s commandments is against your self-interest. And that, in the final analysis, IS suicidal.” On your view, it's all suicidal in the final analysis. The fact that we will eventually die does not mean that our deaths are, therefore, suicidal! Suicide is the deliberate ending of one’s life.
I wrote, “The human mortality rate may be 100%, but that doesn't mean that one shouldn't promote one’s survival to the best of one’s ability and try to extend one's quality of life for as long as possible...” If nothing that you do while you live ultimately matters . . . Matters to whom and for what? What you do while you are alive certainly matters to you for the sake of your happiness and wellbeing. . . . (and it doesn't, from the perspective of atheism and cosmological inevitability), why live? To gain the values that life has to offer I mean, I don't mean to depress you, but I find your worldview insipid and wholly uninspiring. You find the real world that offers actual values and achievements uninspiring, but a mystical fairy tale of disembodied spirits inspiring?? Yours is the mentality of a child who lives in a world of fantasy – a world in which he will be taken care of and given everything he wants by an omnipotent parent, just so long as he’s obedient and does what he’s told. You may find that inspiring; I find it revolting? If this is your summum bonum, then why don’t you commit suicide, like Socrates or some suicide bomber, so you can go to heaven, be united with God and live happily ever after? Oh, right. I forgot, it’s a sin to commit suicide. You must endure this "veil of tears" until the Supreme One decides in his infinite wisdom and mercy to summon you to his magical kingdom.
I wrote, “As for the universe tending toward a heat-death, perhaps in its present form it is, but existence qua existence cannot self-destruct. The universe will simply take a different form.” Unfortunately, I was much too generous in granting this possibility, as there is no reason to believe that the universe itself is subject to entropy, which pertains only to a closed system, one that does not permit the escape or transfer of energy. For such closed systems, the notion of a heat-death is applicable, but the same result cannot be predicted for the entire universe. According to L.D. Landau and E.M. Lifshitz, authors of Statistical Physics: “[I]n the general theory of relativity the universe as a whole must be regarded not as a closed system, but as one which is in a variable gravitational field. In this case the application of the law of increase of entropy does not imply the necessity of statistical equilibrium.” (p. 29) (Quoted in George H. Smith’s Atheism: The Case Against God, p. 256).
- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 3/03, 3:00pm)
(Edited by William Dwyer
on 3/03, 3:06pm)
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