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Post 60

Wednesday, January 7, 2009 - 5:30pmSanction this postReply
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Do I understand you correctly, then, to say you see no difference between being a measurement, e.g., "six inches," and being measureable, e.g., "length?"
If "length" itself is a measurement, then what is it a measurement of?


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Post 61

Wednesday, January 7, 2009 - 6:28pmSanction this postReply
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Mindy,

Do I understand you correctly, then, to say you see no difference between being a measurement, e.g., "six inches," and being measureable, e.g., "length?"

If "length" itself is a measurement, then what is it a measurement of?
Please forgive me for not answering (again), but instead waiting -- waiting to see if anyone else would like to answer.

From your repeated questions, I'm getting the impression that you might be interested in increasing confusion, rather than in increasing understanding -- i.e., that you might be just an Internet troll -- so it's probably better if someone else interacts with you for a while. Time will prove whether you are reasonable and can/will reasonably disagree with other reasonable folks reasonably well. But I think I had better bow out for a short stretch.

You see, I had already addressed this issue before, I showed how it doesn't matter -- but then you bring it up again. There seems to be a pattern behind your answers indicating -- to me -- that you may not be being intellectually honest with me. All is not lost -- even though I have all of this doubt now -- because I will observe you interacting with others, and I will try to mend things with you if you prove yourself intellectually sincere (just by being yourself).

Thanks for interacting with me up until now.

Ed

Post 62

Wednesday, January 7, 2009 - 7:29pmSanction this postReply
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I am sorry, Ed, but my post 33 was directed to Steve, with whom I merely expressed agreement. Your *sigh* was a childish response to someone who hadn't addressed you. Your making up the justification that I hadn't provided a reference (for what, my agreement with him?) was a further childish self-justification for your rudeness. My concept of you and your character is not a percept, but an abstract integration based on observations of you over time.

Post 63

Friday, January 9, 2009 - 9:07amSanction this postReply
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I have waited a couple of days before answering you, Ed T., rather hoping someone would speak up to cajole you into retracting.
You are wrong about "measurement" versus "measurable." You can't admit it. You mount an ad hominem attacking me. Patently unreasonable.


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Post 64

Friday, January 9, 2009 - 11:02amSanction this postReply
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Mindy,

Heck, I WOULD have said something to Ed, but I was too scared you had me in mind with the ‘how to deal with unreasonableness’ thread. You had Ed in mind!

Both of you are hyper-analytical types who I love reading, so I do hope you mend this. It will be great to read many future debates between the two talk-across-each-other of you! Ed and I had a classic about object permanence in dogs. I know he looks back at that one as fondly as I do. Right, Ed?

I am going to provide each of you with a clue that will help you see 1) what the other is saying, 2) that you actually agree with it, and 3) have talked past it. Both of you are guilty and I will tolerate zero sassy talkback on the matter. Both of you have been unreasonable…Mindy, keep looking at me. Look at me. OK, thank you.


Ed, your clue comes from Mindy’s post 47. (Note that she does not demand any measurements be made):

“There is an important difference between being a measurement and being measurable. In Rand's case of the pencil's length, the fact that the pencil has length, of some-but-any quantity is retained. It is what is measurable. The measurement of that length, say, six inches, is what is ommitted.

“The difference between what is retained and what is ommitted is of the utmost significance in the theory of concept-formation, and that is the difference between what is measurable and what is a measurement.”



Mindy, your clue is from Ed’s post 58. (Note that OF COURSE he sees the difference between being a measurement and being measureable):

“If Rand said omitted things are merely measurable rather than actually measured -- and she said that -- then more details about measurements merely misses the point. You don't need a whole bunch of details to form a concept, just a shared trait, possessed by each referent, in somewhat different measure or degree.”



Post 65

Friday, January 9, 2009 - 1:36pmSanction this postReply
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Jon, E for effort.

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Post 66

Sunday, January 11, 2009 - 9:44amSanction this postReply
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I think Objectivist epistemology can dispense with the theory of measurement-ommission entirely. Concepts are radically abstract; they retain the common character of a type of thing, and ommit the variations of its individual members. In true propositions, the subject's principal noun concept comes to refer through the addition of grammatical markings. As a reference, it is inclusive or determinate. Referring to a thing is referring to it in its entirety. The predicate of a true sentence then names something that is "in" the subject, and there is no problem of analytic versus synthetic truths.
Critical observations are welcome.


Post 67

Sunday, January 11, 2009 - 3:21pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Mindy,

Some points to clarify:

1. Will the lack of particular grammatical markings strip a subject's principle noun concept from referring? Provide an example if so.

2. Why stipulate that such reference is determinate? Why not determinable? You might want to explain "determinate" and "inclusion" as these terms are not a part of the Objectivist vernacular.

Jordan

Post 68

Sunday, January 11, 2009 - 6:07pmSanction this postReply
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All words take on grammatical markings when they take part in a sentence. "Determinate" means specifying all details, all aspects of a thing. "Abstract" and "determinate" are in this sense opposite.

Post 69

Sunday, January 11, 2009 - 9:15pmSanction this postReply
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Mindy,

You didn't answer my questions.

Jordan

Post 70

Sunday, January 11, 2009 - 9:24pmSanction this postReply
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And unreasonableness is in the eye of the bowled over.


Post 71

Monday, January 12, 2009 - 9:48amSanction this postReply
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Jordan,
I thought I had addressed your questions, but I'll try again.
All the words in a sentence take on grammatical markings, or syntax, in order to become part of the sentence. A sentence is not a "laundry list" of words, as I am sure you know. The two sentences, "John shot Bob," and "Bob shot John," show how the same set of words means very different things depending on the role each word plays in the overall structure of the sentence. In light of this, I don't know what your "lack of particular grammatical markings" means. If a noun is in the subject of a sentence, it has grammatical markings.
The distinction between "determinate" and "determinable" is not a small one, it seems to me. "Determinable" means that there is available a means of discovering or setting a specific character or value for a thing or a variable. In a set of three equations with four variables, the values of the variables are not determinable, whereas in a set of four equations with three variables, they are.
"Determinate" means set, given, specified. Abstractions cannot be determinate. By definition, an abstraction has separated part from the whole--in mind--and retained some while ommitting the rest. Abstract ideas or notions describe things in part only.
Notice that classification depends entirely on abstraction. No two things are identical in every way, so no determinate meaning can have general reference. Only abstractions achieve generality. It is generality, of course, that gives us "unit-economy."


Post 72

Monday, January 12, 2009 - 12:43pmSanction this postReply
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Mindy, maybe you should say they take on a grammatical role, rather than grammatical markings, since in English, as opposed to say, Latin, most implicit grammatical functions are not explicitly marked.

Post 73

Monday, January 12, 2009 - 2:20pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Mindy,

Thanks for the elab. It's interesting to me that you're dealing with terms as they function conceptually in sentences rather than in isolation as Rand usually did. Is this significant?

That aside, given the last few sentences of your last post, I'm finding it hard to see where you and Rand disagree. What you'd call "parts," she'd call "measurements," so far as I can tell.

Jordan



Post 74

Monday, January 12, 2009 - 3:06pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan,
Except, possibly, in deriving them, we don't deal with concepts solo. We discuss individual concepts, their meaning, definition, possible referents, etc. But concepts cannot be employed as individual pieces of meaning. Dealing with them "in isolation" isn't otherwise possible, as far as I can see. Do you have something else in mind?

I think it is artificial to call whatever is ommitted in forming a concept "measurements." It lacks face validity. As I have tried to show, there is no theoretical need to recognize a special category of  traits that are ommitted, but not fully (because what they are measurements of is not ommitted.)

Rand says that a concept means everything about its possible referents, including, remarkably, the yet unknown. I certainly disagree with this! This is the determinate meaning I spoke of before. If concepts are genuinely abstract, they do not bear this sort of meaning.

Mindy


Post 75

Monday, January 12, 2009 - 8:10pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Mindy,

*******************
But concepts cannot be employed as individual pieces of meaning.
*******************

That seems to diverge from the Objectivist viewpoint, but I'm not sure the difference matters here, so I won't dwell.


*******************
I think it is artificial to call whatever is ommitted in forming a concept "measurements."
*******************

I maintain that Rand uses "measurements" interchangeably with "characteristics" when she's discussing concept formation. It sounds like you might agree that "characteristics" would be the proper term, yes? If so, it looks like you're just honing in on preferable wording rather than a new view altogether.

Lastly, I'm not convinced Rand's "concept" is determinate. For her, forming a concept means *abstracting* something instantiated in members of a particular category. The other attributes of the members may vary. Seems like the epitome of abstraction, not its opposite.

I think what might be causing confusion is that you say Rand says that "a concept means everything about its possible referents, including, remarkably, the yet unknown." Would you mind citing such a passage? The word "means" is ill-used there. "Includes" or "encompasses" is a more sensible term.

Jordan

Post 76

Monday, January 12, 2009 - 11:55pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan wrote, "I maintain that Rand uses "measurements" interchangeably with "characteristics" when she's discussing concept formation."

Not true. She does not use "measurements" interchangeably with "characteristics." Why would she? A measurement is not a characteristic. If you want to know what she means by the term, you have only to read her definition on Page 7 of ITOE, to wit:

"Measurement is the identification of a relationship -- a quantitative relationship established by means of a standard that serves as a unit. Entities (and their actions) are measured by their attributes (length, weight, velocity, etc.) and the standard of measurement is a concretely specified unit representing the appropriate attribute. Thus, one measures length in inches, feet and miles -- weight in pounds -- velocity by means of a given distance traversed in a given time, etc." (My emphasis) (p. 7, ITOE)

Her use of "measurement" is pretty straightforward. She means what anyone normally means by the term.

- Bill

Post 77

Tuesday, January 13, 2009 - 5:37amSanction this postReply
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I agree with Bill Dwyer's post 76, with an exception.

Her use of "measurement" is pretty straightforward. She means what anyone normally means by the term.
The exception is her use of teleological measurement and ordinal measurement. These are not ordinary uses of "measurement." Simply because one could assign numbers to goals or non-measurable traits does not make the acts measurements.



Post 78

Tuesday, January 13, 2009 - 10:24amSanction this postReply
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Bill, see my post #12 in this thread.


Jordan

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Post 79

Wednesday, January 14, 2009 - 10:11amSanction this postReply
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Jordan has referred to Post 12 in which he writes,
Equating "measurement" with "trait" is implicit in ITOE. For instance on page 16, Rand gives green and long as potential common, albeit incommensurable, units of measurement, and in the same breath she calls them "characteristics," which I take as synonymous with "trait."
Whoa! First of all, she doesn't give 'green' and 'long' as common units of measurement, in the sense that they share something in common. On the contrary, she refers to them as lacking a common unit of measurement. She writes, "All conceptual differentiations are made in terms of commensurable characteristics (i.e., characteristics possessing a common unit of measurement). No concept could be formed, for instance, by attempting to distinguish long objects from green objects. Incommensurable characteristics cannot be integrated into one unit." Her point is that if you're going to measure something, you have to measure it in terms of a common or commensurable characteristic. 'Green' and 'long' are incommensurable.

Secondly, she doesn't equate "measurement" with "trait" or "characteristic." She says that a characteristic is a unit of measurement, meaning that you can only measure something in terms of a common characteristic.

By the way, the passage that you refer to appears on Page 13, not Page 16. I think that both the hard and soft covers have the same pagination.
And on the same page when discussing the concept of a table, she says shape is a measurement, then says shape is an attribute, which like "characteristics" I take as synonymous with "trait."
Again, she doesn't say that shape is a measurement. She says that "shape represents a certain category or set of geometrical measurements" -- that "any shape can be reduced to expressed by a set of figures in terms of linear measurement." This is not the same a saying that shape is a measurement.
Again, this is how I read "measurement" just with regard to concept formation. Rand uses "measurement" differently in other areas. For instance, see ITOE page 49 where she discusses anti-measurement.
Where on Page 49 does she discuss "anti-measurement"? She does refer on that page to "anti-concepts", by which she means "words without specific definitions, without referents, which can mean anything to anyone." But there is no mention there of anything called "anti-measurement." Nor have I ever heard her use that term.

- Bill



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