Some problems in Objectivist Epistemology

I can't, myself, think of this as dissenting from Objectivism, but it does seem to be the place for it, given the options.

I will lay out here some disagreements I have with Objectivist epistemology. My interest in that branch of thought, and my knowledge related to such questions is strong and long-standing. In my experience, casual efforts to discuss epistemology run quickly into problems that derail them, and they end up a waste of time.
On the other hand, I would love nothing better than to discover that in this case my pessimism is misguided. I open this thread, therefore, with a plan and some structure that might seem arbitrary--its readers will indulge me or ignore me, so be it.

First: it may seem that the number and subjects of the issues I take with Objectivist epistemology cannot sensibly be termed minor disagreements. That's a mistake. The point of Obj. epist. is that man is capable of everyday certainty. The details don't count. I don't challenge the validity of the senses, or anything that limits or diminishes reason.

Epistemology is a boring subject, I'm told, and I agree that the details of it don't matter to the rest of philosophy. They needn't matter to most Objectivists, either.

I can't offer a logical structure to the problems I see in Obj. epist. The fact is that they can't be entirely separated, or I don't yet know how to do so. I couldn't possibly write this all out at one time, and I suppose there will be some responses, discussion, certainly disagreement. So my exposition and our discussion will have to co-exist.

I'll commit to laying out my ideas as long as there seems to be real interest.

Mindy

Post 1

Wednesday, December 31, 2008 - 4:31pm

Seems like a good start. As much as possible, separate the issues into bite-sized pieces, one to a post - otherwise, you're better off doing a more complete article, with everything, which does require some structure and a theme.

Post 2

Wednesday, December 31, 2008 - 4:35pm

I'm interested.

"The point of Obj. epist. is that man is capable of everyday certainty."

I think the point of objectivism is everyday things are ultimately rational. Things can be too complicated with too many variables, some unknown, for everyday certainty. If we waited for absolute certainty before making everyday decisions nothing would ever get done. It is enough to know that things are knowable. Mistakes are our way of learning new things. You have to stop thinking at some point and do things.

Post 3

Wednesday, December 31, 2008 - 4:49pm

Mindy, in order to make it easier for us to address your questions, could you fill out the relevant portions of your extended profile? Any question you do not want to answer can remain blank.

Post 4

Wednesday, December 31, 2008 - 7:06pm

It already sounds interesting. Bring it on!

Post 5

Wednesday, December 31, 2008 - 11:31pm

Mindy,

I'm interested in your thoughts (as you know). A good starting point to this amalgamation/collaboration of "your exposition" with "our discussion" might be the very thing you mentioned: everyday certainty.

Mike made a good point to ask about what kind of certainty we're discussing. He mentioned something called: "absolute certainty." He delineated absolute certainty from a kind of everyday certainty that allows for human action. I agree with the thrust of that, but how does it grab you?

Also, would you agree to the notion that falsifications are contextually-absolute certainties?

In other words, if you think that a room is empty but go in it and meet someone inside (shaking hands with them, and whatnot), then would you agree that you are certain -- certain in some kind of "absolute manner" -- that your initial impression (that the room would be empty) has been falsified?

In addition, if you had it in your mind that all swans were white, but then you saw a black one -- wouldn't you be justifiedly certain that your initial thoughts were wrong?

Ed

Post 6

Friday, January 2, 2009 - 4:28pm

By "everyday certainty" I meant the certainty that everyday people would intend. I am certain I awoke this morning, I am certain I am married, I am certain there was a holocaust, I am certain I never commited murder, I am certain my daughter has red hair, that sort of thing.
Ed, your example is more of a thought experiment than I'm comfortable with, at least in what I'm aiming at here, excuse my ignoring it for the time being?
I assume we've all read ITOE, and are familiar with basics of Obj. epist.

I'll begin with measurement-omission. I don't think it is necessary (or possible) to form a classification of everything that is omitted in all instances of concept-formation, much less to classify all of it as "measurements." On top of that, I don't think measurement-omission succeeds in its role. The second point first:
The point of measurement-omission is that it allows all true statements to be viewed as analytically true, or true by definition. (And the importance of that, of course, if that there are not, then, two kinds of truth, one of which is implicitly found wanting by being inferior to the other.) Practically, it means that what is said in the predicate of a true statement was already "contained" in its subject.
Measurement-omission and conceptual meaning:
"Measurements" are a second-class set of characteristics, the "meat" of their meaning lying not in the numerical specifics, but in the trait they measure. That trait is not itself omitted, so nothing of real import is left out. "Pencil" and pencils' some-but-any length are Rand's exemplar of this, and a great deal of work has gone into elaborating a measurement-measured analysis of all kinds of things.

Post 7

Saturday, January 3, 2009 - 12:31am

Mindy,

=======================
I don't think it is necessary (or possible) to form a classification of everything that is omitted in all instances of concept-formation, much less to classify all of it as "measurements."
=======================

So then, if you were to state this idea in positive terms, it would go like this:

"As we form concepts, we're going to omit some things. Sometimes we'll omit measurements, sometimes other things -- but we don't need to, or can't, narrow down what kind of a thing we'll be omitting."

First of all, do you agree with this rewording of what you said (into positive terms)?

Also, do you have an example of concept-formation where -- in order to form the concept -- something other than "measurements" had to be omitted?

=======================
The point of measurement-omission is that it allows all true statements to be viewed as analytically true, or true by definition. ... Practically, it means that what is said in the predicate of a true statement was already "contained" in its subject.
=======================

I don't follow this. I understand what it takes for something to be true-by-definition. I understand what it takes for a statement or proposition to be analytically true. I just don't see the connection with concept-forming measurement-omission -- which is when things have the same feature, although in different measure or degree.

Will you expand on your thoughts?

=======================
"Measurements" are a second-class set of characteristics, the "meat" of their meaning lying not in the numerical specifics, but in the trait they measure. That trait is not itself omitted, so nothing of real import is left out.
=======================

I think I agree with this outline, but don't (yet) see the point.

I'm aware that measurements are not those concrete things that we're differentiating and integrating (as we form concepts), but are, instead, somewhat more abstract or higher-level (or "second-class" -- if you prefer that term).

I agree that their "meaning" is in the measured trait -- rather than their numerical value. I agree that the trait isn't omitted and that nothing needed is left out (as we correctly form concepts). I just don't see the "problem" with any of this (yet). I hope that you will be inclined to elaborate.

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 1/03, 10:04am)

Post 8

Saturday, January 3, 2009 - 10:24am

Hi Mindy,

The point of measurement-omission is that it allows all true statements to be viewed as analytically true, or true by definition.

I'd disagree that this is the point of measurement-omission. First, measurement-omission serves to keep our mental categories manageable. We can't deal with too many traits or too many variations thereof without being quickly overwhelmed. Measurement omission is not so much to allow analytic truths.

Second, because Objectivists reject the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, they will further reject that measurement-omission deals in any way with analytic truth. Objectivst definitions are not derived or true analytically; they are derived from experience and true by virtue of their accordance with that experience. Predicate terms are not "contained" in subject terms, as analytics would have it. Instead, the referent of the predicate is contained in the referent of the subject.

"Measurements" are a second-class set of characteristics, the "meat" of their meaning lying not in the numerical specifics, but in the trait they measure. That trait is not itself omitted, so nothing of real import is left out.

Under Objectivism, when we're dealing with concept-formation, "measurement" just means "trait." So the phrase "the trait they measure" doesn't make sense.

Best,
Jordan

Post 9

Saturday, January 3, 2009 - 10:02pm

I seem to have failed successfully to up-load a post I wrote earlier today! Just found out, by coming to review it! My apologies, I'll get back to it tomorrow.

Post 10

Sunday, January 4, 2009 - 7:10am

Jordan wrote:

Under Objectivism, when we're dealing with concept-formation, "measurement" just means "trait." So the phrase "the trait they measure" doesn't make sense.

Where did Rand say this?

Post 11

Sunday, January 4, 2009 - 7:14am

Mindy,
To submit an article to the forum:

Go to the "Content" (upper left) part of the forum.
Click "Content"
Click "Add your Own Content", then click "Add Article".

In that section, you'll just copy and paste your article into the body, give it a title, tell us what kind of piece it is (commentary, war, etc. in a drop down menu) and find your name in the Authors drop down menu. When you're finished, click "Submit Article" and you're done.

Someone will review the article (either Joe, myself or whomever gets it first), and then the article gets approved for the site for everyone to read. It shouldn't take more than a couple of hours on the weekend, but during the week some of us have lives that get in the way of our RoR fun, so it might take a little longer. :)

So in short, there is really no "upload" you have to do. Submitting an article is very similar to writing an email.

If you have any trouble at all with any of the tools, let Joe or I know. We can help you.

"Cheers!" ;)

Teresa Isanhart

Post 12

Sunday, January 4, 2009 - 10:39am

Merlin,

Equating "measurement" with "trait" is implicit in ITOE. For instance on page 16, Rand gives green and long as potential common, albeit incommensurable, units of measurement, and in the same breath she calls them "characteristics," which I take as synonymous with "trait." And on the same page when discussing the concept of a table, she says shape is a measurement, then says shape is an attribute, which like "characteristics" I take as synonymous with "trait."

Again, this is how I read "measurement" just with regard to concept formation. Rand uses "measurement" differently in other areas. For instance, see ITOE page 49 where she discusses anti-measurement.

If you disagree, let's not derail Mindy's thread. Please post anew.

Cheers,
Jordan

(Edited by Jordan on 1/04, 10:40am)

Post 13

Sunday, January 4, 2009 - 2:08pm

Teresa,
Thanks very much.

Re: "measurement" is "trait" (That's part of what I lost.) A measurement would best be thought of as a special kind of trait or feature. Actual traits are existing things/aspects whereas, technically, measurements are thoughts about existing things/aspects. We get to talking about measurements as if they were traits, but that is a short-cut that can lead to disastrous confusion.
In Rand's theory, the term plays a major role, and the difficulties attend!

Post 14

Sunday, January 4, 2009 - 6:13pm

Jordan wrote:

And on the same page when discussing the concept of a table, she says shape is a measurement, then says shape is an attribute, which like "characteristics" I take as synonymous with "trait."

Several times Rand used the phrase "measurement of the shape" or similar, which differs from your "shape is a measurement."

If you disagree, let's not derail Mindy's thread. Please post anew.

I'm not trying to derail her thread. Indeed, I quite agree with her point in post 6:

I'll begin with measurement-omission. I don't think it is necessary (or possible) to form a classification of everything that is omitted in all instances of concept-formation, much less to classify all of it as "measurements."

She also wrote in post 6:

"Measurements" are a second-class set of characteristics, the "meat" of their meaning lying not in the numerical specifics, but in the trait they measure.

I mainly agree with this, too, but would not express it the same way. The main point is that traits or characteristics are more fundamental than measurements -- if identified -- of said traits or characteristics. Measurement identifies a trait more precisely. A measurement is a relationship; a trait may not be.

Post 15

Sunday, January 4, 2009 - 9:12pm

Hi Merlin,

It looks like Mindy is okay with the tangent, so I'll continue on.

Rand could just as well have called her idea "trait omission" rather than "measurement omission." Consider this excerpt:

"[The child] forms the concept 'table' by retaining that characteristic [a flat, level surface and support(s)] and omitting all particular measurements, not only the measurements of the shape, but of all the other characteristics of tables. . ." -ITOE, P.12.

Here, "measurement" and "characteristic" are virtually interchangeable. It would've made little difference had she just stuck with the term "characteristic."

Also, under Objectivism, a trait is *always* in relation to something. Traits are always traits *of* existents. Traits do not exist in a vacuum or on their own. Indeed, the same can be said of a "measurement," if we are to discern that term as Rand did elsewhere. "Measurement" is just a trait of a trait, or a particular kind of second order trait if you like.

Jordan
(Edited by Jordan on 1/04, 9:14pm)

(Edited by Jordan on 1/05, 10:22am)

(Edited by Jordan on 1/05, 10:23am)

Post 16

Monday, January 5, 2009 - 10:25am

Mindy,

Actual traits are existing things/aspects whereas, technically, measurements are thoughts about existing things/aspects. We get to talking about measurements as if they were traits, but that is a short-cut that can lead to disastrous confusion.
In Rand's theory, the term plays a major role, and the difficulties attend!

So, to state this in positive terms, you might say:

"Concept-formation requires the omission of some thoughts about existing things/aspects. Some of these thoughts will be of measurements, some will be other kinds of thoughts -- but we don't need to, or can't, narrow down what kind of a 'thought-about-things' we'll be omitting."

First of all, do you agree with this rewording of what you said (into positive terms)?

Also, do you have an example of concept-formation where -- in order to form the concept -- some thought other than a "measurement" had to be omitted?

Ed

Post 17

Monday, January 5, 2009 - 6:25pm

Ed T. wrote:

Also, do you have an example of concept-formation where -- in order to form the concept -- some thought other than a "measurement" had to be omitted?

This was addressed to Mindy, but she hasn't responded. So I will give three examples. Flavors - try giving the differences between particular flavors simply by measurement. Languages - try giving the differences between particular languages simply by measurement. Book genre - try giving the differences between romance novel, mystery novel, calculus, physics, history, self-help and so forth simply by measurement. These only scratch the surface. The differences are in terms of categories, not in terms of measurements.

Post 18

Monday, January 5, 2009 - 9:00pm

Measurement is qualitatively as well as quantitatively...

Post 19

Tuesday, January 6, 2009 - 12:50am