The Argument from Intimidation

Roger Bissell wrote, "By the way, SOLO's own Bill Dwyer wrote a magnificent refutation of Branden's essay back in the early 1970s. It was entitled "The Contradiction of 'The Contradiction of Determinism' ", and it was published by editor John Hospers in The Personalist. It is well worth checking out, whether you are a staunch free willist or a compatibilist."

Thanks for the kudos, Roger! I would also like to mention that I criticize that argument in a review of Tibor Machan's Initiative: Human Agency and Society, which I wrote for the Fall, 2001 issue of JARS. The title of the review is "Do Knowledge, Ethics, and Liberty Require Free Will."

The thrust of the determinism-is-self-defeating argument is that if we are determined, then our beliefs are outside of our control, in which case, we cannot know whether they are true or false, including our belief in determinism.

The problem with this argument is that it is based on a false premise, for it does not follow that if our beliefs are determined, then they are outside of our control. For example, in driving near the edge of a cliff, I am controlling my car so as to keep it on the road. But that control is itself determined by my desire to stay alive. I don't have any control over that desire, nor over the effect that it has on my decision to stay on the road and to drive carefully. But even though I could not have chosen to drive any differently than I have, given my desire to stay alive, no one would say that the operation of my car is outside of my control.

Similarly, if I am interested in knowing whether a particular idea is true or false, I will evaluate it based on what I understand to be a correct process of thought, and will control my thinking accordingly. However, the fact that the control I exercise over my thought processes is determined by my desire to know what is true does not mean that I don't have any control over the direction of my thinking and indirectly over what I believe. I do have control over it, but that control is determined by my interest in knowing what is true, just as the control that I exercised over the direction of my car was determined by my interest in staying alive.

The fact that all chosen action - including the choice to think and any subsequent thought processes - is determined by one's values does not mean that it is outside of one's control, nor does it mean that one is not the causal agent of one's action.

- Bill

Post 301

Sunday, November 6, 2005 - 1:51pm

So, there is no determinism in determined?

--Brant

Post 302

Sunday, November 6, 2005 - 3:03pm

Brant Gaede exclaimed, somewhat incredulously, "So there is no determinism in determined?"

Of course, there is determinism in determined. The point is that there is no necessary absence of control in determined. Think about it. To be free of any determining factors is to be capable of choosing an alternative under exactly the same conditions. But the driver in my example who controls the direction of his car in an effort to keep it on the road is not psychologically free to drive it over the cliff, since he has no reason to commit suicide. His choice to keep his car on the road is determined by his values - by his desire to stay alive. He cannot choose differently, because he has no interest in ending his life. Yet, it still makes sense to say that he is in control of his car. What part of this don't you understand??

- Bill

Post 303

Sunday, November 6, 2005 - 4:12pm

> it does not follow that if our beliefs are determined, then they are outside of our control. For example, in driving near the edge of a cliff, I am controlling my car so as to keep it on the road. But that control is itself determined by my desire to stay alive...the fact that the control I exercise over my thought processes is determined by my desire to know what is true does not mean that I don't have any control over the direction of my thinking and indirectly over what I believe. [Bill]

You're assuming that the determinism always operates benignly or without interference so that we get the same results as if we had free will, both in the case of physical/motor control and (more importantly) in the case of mental control. In other words, if I understand you, you are saying we are determined to have the same freedom to be rational and ethical, and overcome our bad childhood upbringing in the projects that free will advocates would claim.

But free will in the Objectivist versions holds that you are -caused- by your nature to have these choices. So aren't you just substituting the word -determined- for caused in the above statement? Is it a distinction without a difference?

Phil

Post 304

Sunday, November 6, 2005 - 5:22pm

I have a real problem with all the different subtle meanings attributed to the word "determinism" and how they usually silently shift in the middle of a discussion.

I'll take the good old "nature to be commanded must be obeyed" thing over that word any day.

Michael

Post 305

Sunday, November 6, 2005 - 7:13pm

Phil,
I think you are being too lenient with Bill. He's trading on an ambiguity in language. 'Determined' as it's used in the theory called Determinism, means exactly that -- that we have no choice, period. I.e. that all our choices are the inevitable result of antecedent factors. All the subtle, 20th century variants serve only to confuse, not to clarify the debate.

As you rightly (though implicitly) note, the Objectivist theory of free will does not require any kind of breakdown, at any level, in any circumstance in causality. R. Bissel's views to the contrary, nothwithstanding.

That is only one (though the major one) way in which Rand's solution to the problem is brilliant.

Jeff

Post 306

Sunday, November 6, 2005 - 10:41pm

Bill, he is free to kill himself for whatever reason he deems sufficient. Determinism means you are not free. You would say that reason is the or a determining factor. What nobody seems to address is that everything is determined except human volitional consciousness and its consequences, wherein resides reason, as far as we know, and that that consciousness acting on nature determines something that was not necessarily determined. We are either free or we are not free. This is the psychological underpinning of anarchism: what's the use, live and be as happy as we can for tomorrow we die. The rest of the world won't be improved by us, even our own society, we can only make things worse. And, of course, we usually do make things worse when we undermine our actions with altruism and we engage in improper foreign adventures--and domestic ones, too--just because we are so sure of our rectitude and have the resources at our command (other peoples' resources--other people's lives) to do good!

--Brant

Post 307

Sunday, November 6, 2005 - 11:47pm

Phil wrote, "You're assuming that the determinism always operates benignly or without interference so that we get the same results as if we had free will, both in the case of physical/motor control and (more importantly) in the case of mental control. In other words, if I understand you, you are saying we are determined to have the same freedom to be rational and ethical, and overcome our bad childhood upbringing in the projects that free will advocates would claim."

Not, I'm definitely not saying that "we are determined to have the same freedom...that free-will advocates would claim." Determinism and free will (in the classical sense of that term) are two radically different concepts. As Richard Taylor puts it, "In the case of an action that is free, it must be such that it is caused by the agent who performs it, but such that no antecedent conditions were sufficient for performing just that action." (Metaphysics, 1963, p. 50). Determinism, on the other hand, holds that the antecedent conditions are indeed sufficient for performing just that action. In other words, what I am saying is that control over one's (mental and physical) actions is not incompatible with determinism.

Jeff Perren wrote, "Phil, I think you are being too lenient with Bill. [Don't believe him, Phil; he's messing with your mind!] [Bill is] trading on an ambiguity in language. 'Determined' as it's used in the theory called Determinism, means exactly that -- that we have no choice, period. I.e. that all our choices are the inevitable result of antecedent factors. All the subtle, 20th century variants serve only to confuse, not to clarify the debate."

On the contrary, Jeff, to say that all our choices are the inevitable result of antecedent factors is not to say that we have no choice. I choose to keep my car on the road rather than drive it over the cliff, because I want to stay alive, but that doesn't mean that I could just as well choose to drive it over the cliff. I could do no such thing, because I have absolutely no reason to. Yet, it still makes sense to say that I "choose" to stay on the road.

The reason my action constitutes a "choice," even though I could not have chosen otherwise given my desire to live, is that there is nothing preventing me from choosing otherwise if I were to value doing so. Staying on the road is a choice, because I could choose otherwise, if I wanted to; it's just that I don't want to.

If, on the other hand, I were forced to stay on the road, even though I wanted to drive over the cliff, then it would make no sense to say that I am "choosing" to remain on the road, since in that case I would have absolutely no choice in the matter. In short, determinism is not incompatible with choice; it is incompatible with a psychologically free choice.

- Bill

Post 308

Monday, November 7, 2005 - 12:00am

Brant wrote, "Bill, he is free to kill himself for whatever reason he deems sufficient. Determinism means you are not free."

Brant, the point is that he doesn't have a sufficient reason to kill himself. He wants to live. Therefore, he is not psychologically free to kill himself. A person who has no motive to kill himself is not psychologically free to do so.

- Bill

Post 309

Monday, November 7, 2005 - 7:43am

I don't understand freedom without psychological freedom in at least some choices; our psychologies pervade everything we say, think and do.

--Brant

Post 310

Monday, November 7, 2005 - 11:45am

Also, "psychologically determined" begs the question of what determined the psychology, etc.

--Brant

Post 311

Monday, November 7, 2005 - 12:39pm

Psychologically free? Psychology itself is based on cognitive (volitional) factors, even if many of those evaluations were made at such a young age that they are not readily or even desirably overturned or adjusted in later years. Some of our earliest evaluations may be wrong and self-destructive and may require cognitive therapy to heal for an individual to feel proper self-esteem and happiness, but psychology is nevertheless cognitive in nature. So this is like saying that you are not free to contradict the choices you have made -- but then, that's why the choices were made -- to automate further choices so they do not clash with fundamental choices. You evaluate life and decide to live, you evaluate how to drive in accordance with that fundamental choice and order all other choices to line up with your fundamental core evaluations. You even decide to be a careful driver if you value life highly enough to focus on its importance, or, if you take life for granted you may drive recklessly, or if you believe in an afterlife you may drive an airplane into a skyscraper. All this proves is that there is a hierarchy of choices, not that there is determinism further downstream from the fundamental evaluations. No? A person who loves life and drives carefully may contract a disease or suffer an injury so damaging to the quality of life that he reevaluates his core evaluation and opts for suicide. If we are not calling proper evaluation of reality in order to have integrity to our core evaluations "determinism" (which would be so wrong as to make the term "determinism" meaningless, since we are the "determiner" in this case) then what sort of "determinism" are we talking about? I think this is a confusion of the fact that we don't choose everything all at once every single moment. We decide fundamental issues first in order to direct the smaller choices. This does not mean the smaller choices are "determined" in the sense that term implies, that is, outside of "our" control. This is merely an accommodation of the crow epistemology and the fact that we cannot make all decisions, fundamental and incidental, every single conscious moment. Computer programs work the same way -- but just as we are a computer program in one sense with certain overriding basic rules, we are also the PROGRAMMER, the ones who chose those rules in the first place. That is the nature and means of our free will. Just because our free will is expressed in a particular way by particular means does not mean it is determinism -- it simply means that it has a nature. Unless we are holding up some diaphanous, omniscient standard of free will against which we are to be measured?

Post 312

Monday, November 7, 2005 - 2:31pm

Isn't it funny how so many different topics turn to a discussion of free will vs. determinism? I've watched this gone through on the microscopic level on several other forums. Personally, I think the entire argument is one that is falsely conjured up. The argument itself is more reflective of concerns, anxiety about it, than anything. Ever seen it go down to nature vs. nurture level? Nobody knows anything about it, it seems. Maybe one doesn't preclude the other. Two choices on the buffet, eh? Unlimited capacity to choose, or, that choice is a myth. One side is a bunch of perennial victims, the other in pyschological denial? I suppose the middle road is impossible.

rde
Never thought about it, too busy dealing.

(Edited by Rich Engle on 11/07, 2:32pm)

Post 313

Monday, November 7, 2005 - 6:04pm

Brant, you replied, "I don't understand freedom without psychological freedom in at least some choices; our psychologies pervade everything we say, think and do."

Fine. Now would you mind addressing the point at issue. This getting tiresome, people. Deal directly with the example and the point that I am making, please! I know that you're tempted to go off on a tangent and defend free will in various ways, but that's not what I'm concerned with here. I simply want to establish certain premises, so that I can advance an argument.

Do you or do you not agree that the man in my example can be said to control his car by keeping it on the road, despite the fact that he has no desire, interest, reason or motive to drive it over the cliff? If you can answer that question, then maybe we can get somewhere. If not, then I don't see much point in continuing the discussion.

- Bill

Post 314

Monday, November 7, 2005 - 6:59pm

He can be said to control the car.

--Brant

Post 315

Monday, November 7, 2005 - 7:59pm

I asked, "Do you or do you not agree that the man in my example can be said to control his car by keeping it on the road, despite the fact that he has no desire, interest, reason or motive to drive it over the cliff?"

Brandt answered, "He can be said to control the car."

Excellent. Second premise: If you have no desire, interest, reason or motive to do something, then it follows that you cannot choose to do it. If you grant that premise, then my conclusion follows inexorably: Control does not require the ability to have chosen otherwise, which means that it does not require free will.

- Bill

Post 316

Monday, November 7, 2005 - 11:37pm

> I have a real problem with all the different subtle meanings attributed to the word "determinism" and how they usually silently shift in the middle of a discussion. [MSK]

Yes:

So many of the technical i-dotting and t-crossing debates Oists waste long years on - determinism, flourishing vs. survival, prudent predator, emergency situations - descend either into battles over what referents a word has...with lots of shifting or imprecision... or otherwise involve semantic hassles rather than substance.

Floating abstractions all the way down. :-)

Post 317

Tuesday, November 8, 2005 - 7:12am

Ahh - you noticed that, Phil... wonder how many other have, as this problem of floating abstractions pervades immensely here...

Post 318

Tuesday, November 8, 2005 - 7:47am

Subject: cures for rationalism and floating abstractions and vague concepts

One cure for this is keeping what I would call the "abstractions to concretes ratio" in balance. Some of this is obvious once you think about it: Your posts, just like your thinking should not be solely or primarily long syllogistic chains (or even worse symbolic logic...thank god no one here does that.) That's a virtual guarantee of losing control (or context or definition) of the abstractions.

But more important, one should have examples, not merely a single one explored exhaustively, not merely the ones always used in textbook. Fresh examples. Varied examples. Multiple examples. In philosophy, your examples should not be wholly from bizarre or unearthly or emergency situations if you are doing ethics. Or Rand's examples of 'table' and 'man' if you want to address measurement omission or other aspects of concept theory. Or merely simple declarative sentences (as opposed to compound or complex...or hypothetical, imperative, or questions) if you want to develop a "proposition theory". Or merely scientific examples if you want to develop or debate the problem of induction or propound a theory. Or, if you want to talk about political philosophy or rights or advance them as think tanks like Cato or the conservatives do, not merely issues and example which have an economic focus (as opposed to civil liberties).

Chewing or thoroughly discussing an issue, even in a posting format, requires that one expend tremendous effort to spend -more time- on the concrete cases or contrasts or illustrations than on the abstract "one-liner".

Almost any good essay or piece of thinking on abstract issues (and the more abstract and the longer the chain back to reality, the more this is true) requires that more time and writing be on the concrete or relatively concrete than on the abstract.

Philip Coates
(I could probably write a mini-book on this, but this is enough for now)

Post 319

Tuesday, November 8, 2005 - 7:52am