The Argument from Intimidation

(or even worse symbolic logic...thank god no one here does that.)

They've been trying, tho - see the counterfactual thread........

Post 321

Tuesday, November 8, 2005 - 3:52pm

There is nothing wrong with symbolic logic, so long as it stays clear of material implication. It's a good way to clarify the form of an argument and to ensure against logical fallacies and errors of inference.

- Bill

Post 322

Tuesday, November 8, 2005 - 4:11pm

Spot on, Bill.

Fact always must be separate from conceptual method - just as metaphysics is from epistemology. Physical entities are one thing and concepts are another.

Concepts of method (symbolic logic) will ultimately boil down to percepts, but the chain is long and the unit entities are either too varied to be held in focus, or they are concepts of consciousness.

At the end of Rand's life, she was studying algebra in order to work it into metaphysics and epistemology.

Michael

(Edited by Michael Stuart Kelly on 11/08, 4:12pm)

Post 323

Tuesday, November 8, 2005 - 7:29pm

Bill, my objection to symbolic logic is not that it is impossible that there is -ever- a place for it, but what it tends to exclude....that it tends to be used to move the discussion further away from the concrete, to pretend that a bunch of symbols obviates theh necessity for all the huge range of things I discussed previously.

I don't recall having seen an argument so complicated and difficult to follow that it required s.l. to make it clear. I'm not saying that can't happen...but I'm from Missouri (hee-haw) and I'm certainly willing for someone to show me one or a category of them.

Concretely.

Phil

Post 324

Wednesday, November 9, 2005 - 1:07am

Phil, you wrote, "I don't recall having seen an argument so complicated and difficult to follow that it required s.l. to make it clear. I'm not saying that can't happen...but I'm from Missouri (hee-haw) and I'm certainly willing for someone to show me one or a category of them."

Well, s.l. is simply a formalization of the principles of deduction and a way to check the logic of an argument, if you're not clear about it. For example, suppose a person were to argue as follows, "If John is an Objectivist, then he is an egoist. He is not an Objectivist. Therefore, he is not an egoist." Now, he might think that his reasoning is perfectly valid. But if he had studied formal logic, he would know that his argument commits the fallacy of denying the antecedent, which states that just because P implies Q, it does not follow that not-P implies not-Q. The fallacy is expressed symbolically in order to illustrate that it is an abstraction that applies to any P and any Q.

Phil, I sometimes get the impression that you are so concerned with fighting rationalism and floating abstractions that you have gone too far in the other direction and have become obsessively empiricist and concrete bound. There is nothing wrong with general principles of reasoning or with a formalized and systematic study of them, which is what logic is concerned with. Objectivists have recommended--and continue to recommend--three different books that deal with the subject of logic in symbolic terms: Lionel Ruby's Logic: an Introduction; H.W.B. Joseph's Introduction to Logic and our own David Kelley's The Art of Reasoning. Abstract principles and formal logic are by no means antithetical to Objectivism.

- Bill

Post 325

Wednesday, November 9, 2005 - 7:57am

There's a lot more wrong with your idea than that, Bill. You seem to be saying that people have to be able to overturn their most basic and foundational convictions, such as the will to live, just to prove they have your kind of contextless free will by flinging themselves over a cliff. Otherwise they don't have free will and are "psychologically determined." Yeah, right.

Post 326

Wednesday, November 9, 2005 - 10:05am

Casey Fahy wrote, "There's a lot more wrong with your idea than that, Bill. You seem to be saying that people have to be able to overturn their most basic and foundational convictions, such as the will to live, just to prove they have your kind of contextless free will by flinging themselves over a cliff. Otherwise they don't have free will and are 'psychologically determined.' Yeah, right."

No, I'm not saying that at all. And I truly don't know what you mean by "contextless free will." What I'm saying is only what I said -- that control does not require the ability to have chosen otherwise, which means that it does not require free will. If you disagree, perhaps you wouldn't mind addressing my argument for it.

- Bill

Post 327

Wednesday, November 9, 2005 - 10:30am

OK. I don't mind addressing your point, Bill.

We decide things like whether living is desirable or not. Such decisions, if we are attuned to nature, are rigorously consistent in their application, because we KNOW that one slip-up means death and the end of the whole game, especially when driving near cliffs.

That is NOT a "psychological" or any other kind of determinism -- the only thing determined here is reality, and absolute adherence to it is merely rational. I suppose it is "deterministic" that we never jam the bumper intentionally into the guardrail in the same way that one little whimsical jerk of the steering wheel means DEATH, absolutely, IN REALITY. To stay true to our primary conviction to live, we must accordingly drive carefully. Reality determines this, and it is only rational to obey.

This whole idea of being "psychologically" determined is nonsense if you're trying to suggest "determinism." WE determine that we will be unfailingly careful when driving because reality is unfailingly unforgiving of carelessness. And proving a trifling point about free will is not a good enough reason to jerk the wheel into the guard rail, my friend.

Post 328

Wednesday, November 9, 2005 - 11:30am

Casey,

One point seems to be slipping in between the cracks. We do not choose whether or not to have a volitional capacity. That is merely how we are made. We have one, like it or not. Ayn Rand called that "the given." (I have trouble using a word like "given" without a "giver," but that is just semantics.)

We don't even choose whether or not to use our volitional capacity. By having it we have to use it.

We do choose how we use it.

Michael

Post 329

Wednesday, November 9, 2005 - 1:33pm

Bill, you wrote:

The fact that all chosen action - including the choice to think and any subsequent thought processes - is determined by one's values does not mean that it is outside of one's control, nor does it mean that one is not the causal agent of one's action.

Is this to mean that values are determined prior to the choice to think or not? Are you implicitly endorsing *innate values*? AR called the choice to think or not (i.e. free-will) "the choice that controls all the choices you make", which includes one's value judgments.

Regards,
Michael

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 11/09, 1:40pm)

Post 330

Wednesday, November 9, 2005 - 3:17pm

Bill,
It's getting harder and harder to decide where you stand.

The "free will" vs. "determinism" debate is essentially about whether humans do or do not possess a capacity that allows them to take (some kind of) action that is NOT the inevitable outcome of antecedent compelling factors.

One either believes they have such a capacity, or one believes they do not, or one says "I don't know".

You seem to be conflating the existence of the capacity with the manner in which it is exercised.

Do you believe, or do you deny, that humans have the capacity to make choices that are not determined? (Remember 'determined' is not a synonym for 'caused'.)

Jeff

Post 331

Wednesday, November 9, 2005 - 6:52pm

Casey,

Here is my argument in a nutshell:

Control over one's action does not imply the ability to choose otherwise (as indicated by my example).
Free will does imply the ability to choose otherwise.
Therefore, control over one's action does not imply free will.

In order to challenge my argument, you must:

1. Challenge the truth of the first or second premise; or
2. Challenge the validity of the conclusion.
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Michael,

You quoted me as follows: "The fact that all chosen action - including the choice to think and any subsequent thought processes - is determined by one's values does not mean that it is outside of one's control, nor does it mean that one is not the causal agent of one's action."

And asked, "Is this to mean that values are determined prior to the choice to think or not?"

Yes, because in order to make that choice, you must value making it.

You continued, "Are you implicitly endorsing *innate values*?"

No. Strictly speaking, "innate values" would refer to values that one is born with. What we are born with is only the capacity to value. That capacity isn't realized until we have contact with reality, but a newborn does express his values as soon as he comes in contact with reality, as any mother will readily attest.

You wrote, "AR called the choice to think or not (i.e. free-will) 'the choice that controls all the choices you make', which includes one's value judgments." I would agree that it is one of the factors influencing one's subsequent value judgments, but, again, that choice is itself a reflection of one's prior value judgments. Value judgments precede and control all of one's choices, including the choice to think or not to think.
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Jeff,

You wrote, "The 'free will' vs. 'determinism' debate is essentially about whether humans do or do not possess a capacity that allows them to take (some kind of) action that is NOT the inevitable outcome of antecedent compelling factors."

I would agree with this characterization if you were to omit the adjective "compelling."

You then ask, "Do you believe, or do you deny, that humans have the capacity to make choices that are not determined? (Remember 'determined' is not a synonym for 'caused'.)

I deny that human beings have the capacity to make choices that are not necessitated by antecedent factors. (Remember, "necessitated" is not a synonym for "compelled.") But that denial is not essential to the argument that I am presenting here and which I have asked Casey to address. One could believe that human beings have the capacity to make choices that are not determined (i.e., necessitated by antecedent factors) and still accept that argument.

- Bill

Post 332

Wednesday, November 9, 2005 - 7:19pm

> "If John is an Objectivist, then he is an egoist. He is not an Objectivist. Therefore, he is not an egoist." Now, he might think that his reasoning is perfectly valid. But if he had studied formal logic... [Bill]

Bill, I'm dubious about the mental capacity of anyone who needs either a formal logic course (or symbolic logic) to see what is wrong with this example or anything comparably simple - all it requires is that one focus on what is being asserted. As I said, this doesn't mean there is -never- a need for s.l...but you still haven't shown it by giving a good concrete example.

Burden of proof, dude! :-)

[And, no, I don't deny the value of deduction or formal logic, nor do I advocate empiricism.]

Post 333

Wednesday, November 9, 2005 - 7:26pm

Bill writes: "No. Strictly speaking, "innate values" would refer to values that one is born with. What we are born with is only the capacity to value. That capacity isn't realized until we have contact with reality, but a newborn does express his values as soon as he comes in contact with reality, as any mother will readily attest."

Bill, if one is not born with values and they are not products of the choice to think, then how do they get there? You mean to say that as soon as a baby is born, reality thrusts them into his head, like when the infant sees his mother? There is some sort of automatic recognition? And, henceforth, all value judgments are nothing but a series of propagations from these "antecedent value judgments" and all subsequent choices to think are a slave to these? Good lord, that doesn't say much for the process of discovering one's values.

Regards,
Michael

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 11/09, 7:37pm)

Post 334

Wednesday, November 9, 2005 - 8:07pm

Bill,

You seem like a reasonable fellow, but it's difficult to escape the conclusion that what you are presenting (or at least your style) is pure sophistry.
But I'll give it one more go.

"Yes, because in order to make that choice, you must value making it" -- Inductively false. Also, reverses the dependency of free will and values.
Either that, or you will simply make the proposition true by fiat by adjusting the definitions of 'choice' and 'value' until it becomes true. (As in the tired example: "A: Everyone really is selfish, because ultimately everyone does what he wants." B: How do you know? A: Because whatever you do implies that's what you really wanted to do." That's a form of begging the question, as I'm sure you know.)

"Control over one's action does not imply the ability to choose otherwise (as indicated by my example)." Your example notwithstanding, this is inductively false. (Not to mention trading on an ambiguity in the word 'control'.)

Bill, your arguments imply that altruism is literally (psychologically, as you might put it) impossible.

The strongest argument for free will, and the only one necessary, is inductive. It's a self-evident fact, available to introspection. The only way doubt gets cast on it is through an incorrect view of causality.

Since, it's unclear where you stand on causality in relation to free will, and you seem intent on making distinctions without a difference ("Remember, "necessitated" is not a synonym for "compelled."), I don't see any productive way to continue the discussion. You may have the last word.

Jeff

(Edited by Jeff Perren on 11/09, 9:03pm)

Post 335

Wednesday, November 9, 2005 - 8:23pm

Bill,

You are forgetting that reality does not allow even one plunge off the cliff. It is not that we can not choose to commit suicide -- if that is our goal, we are fully capable of accomplishing it. In order to protect our values there are some things we must do with absolute consistency, however -- not because we are pawns of determinism but because we live in reality and cause and effect are absolute. What stops you from driving off a cliff? Some deterministic force, or the knowledge that base-jumping in an automobile will destroy all of your values instantaneously and you cannot take back such an irrevocable action? In fact, the LESS control you have over yourself the more easily a fatal cliff-dive becomes. If we are drunk or high on LSD we might not take the guardrail seriously or momentarily believe we can fly. The more in control we are the more we realize that even one such action is too many to survive. The reason we don't stub our toe over and over on the same rock is that once we are aware it is there and we are aware that it is an absolute fact of reality. It's not because we have lost our free will and can no longer bring ourselves to stub our toe on the rock -- it's because the rock is really there and cannot choose to have a different effect on our toe not because we can't choose to stub our toe on it again. We can easily enough stub our toe on the rock anyway and feel the consequent pain -- because we know the consequences won't threaten all of our other values. In the case of the car and the cliff, we are aware that the consequences are, indeed, total threats to all of our values, so we are commensurately more serious about never going over the cliff if we have any choice in the matter. This is a matter of being observant of the laws of reality, which are determined for us and it would be insane not to recognize this.

It seems like you are suggesting that because human beings don't blank out everything they know and expose their values to total annihilation they don't have free will. Why does free will only consist of throwing out every single choice you have made and every value you have chosen? How does such an insane context-dropping qualify as free will but choosing scrupulously to observe the laws of reality in order to defend ones' values qualifies as determinism?

Post 336

Thursday, November 10, 2005 - 7:44am

If we are drunk or high on LSD
haaaaaaaaaaaaa! you finally admitted it!
Ciro

Post 337

Thursday, November 10, 2005 - 8:16am

Yeah, Casey... it all makes sense to me now, you hippie freak. :)

I'll never accept determinism. The more data determinists throw on the wall, the farther from pragmatic, real living they get. They just backpedal into physiology. Hell, they'll take it to quantum physics. The interesting question is: why would someone be so vigorous to endorse determinism. The real reason. I think it's because it provides a ready excuse. I remember when I was a kid, I was reading this book by Alan King, it was called Help! I'm a Prisoner in a Chinese Bakery. He did this really funny piece in there about a toy called Mr. Machine. I actually owned one of these things when I was about 5, it's one of the best toys I've ever seen, yet strangely....disturbing.

Anyway, the gist of the piece was that a kid who got one figured out pretty quickly that whenever he fucked up, he could tell his parents "Mr. Machine did it!".

And, the way the thing ran around, you could kind of buy into that.

That's what I think determinism is really about, not the quest for the truth. It's the same reason Skinner pisses me off.

rde
Wow, I could just look at my pores in the bathroom mirror for days.

(Edited by Rich Engle on 11/10, 8:17am)

Post 338

Thursday, November 10, 2005 - 9:08am

In order to illustrate the importance of formal logic, I gave the following example: Suppose a person were to argue: "If John is an Objectivist, then he is an egoist. He is not an Objectivist. Therefore, he is not an egoist." I then stated, "Now, he might think that his reasoning is perfectly valid. But if he had studied formal logic, he would know that his argument commits the fallacy of denying the antecedent, which states that just because P implies Q, it does not follow that not-P implies not-Q. The fallacy is expressed symbolically in order to illustrate that it is an abstraction that applies to any P and any Q."

Phil Coates replied, "Bill, I'm dubious about the mental capacity of anyone who needs either a formal logic course (or symbolic logic) to see what is wrong with this example or anything comparably simple - all it requires is that one focus on what is being asserted. As I said, this doesn't mean there is -never- a need for s.l...but you still haven't shown it by giving a good concrete example."

Okay, how about "a good concrete example" from real life. The following discussion took place on OWL back in April of 2004 between Neil Goodell and George Smith on the subject of determinism and free will:

Neil: "[I]f determinism is denied, there can be no morality. If specific causes do not lead to specific effects (i.e., indeterminism) then effects are arbitrary and a person cannot be held responsible for them."

George: "If this were true, then we could hold a rock or a tree or a snail morally responsible for its behavior -- for in all such cases specific causes lead to specific effects."

Observe that George is committing the very fallacy that I illustrated in my original example. Neil argued that not being determined implies not being morally responsible -- or symbolically: If not-D, then not-R. George countered that if this were true, then being determined would imply being morally responsible -- or symbolically: if D, then R -- which is the fallacy of denying the antecedent.

Phil, are you dubious about the mental capacity of George Smith, widely acclaimed author of Atheism: The Case Against God? George is an intelligent and scholarly intellectual. Yet he committed a logical fallacy of the very sort that I have been discussing.

- Bill

Post 339

Thursday, November 10, 2005 - 9:59am