Crime and Punishment

Roger wrote:
"However, that is not what government is for! It is not for the purpose of implementing the principle of "giving each man what he deserves," which for criminals supposedly means pain and suffering and loss of liberty. It is for the purpose of using force to defend our rights, pure and simple. That means that treatment of criminals must be aimed at restitution to the victim (to the extent possible) and protection of all individuals against future violations by the criminals. If we want those things, that is why we should "punish" criminals -- i.e., extract restitution from them and lock them up so they can't hurt others."

My head hurts...

So, how far does the system of justice go with the issue of "deterrence" for a petty thief? What if the victim wants him drawn and quartered? Does government continue to hand down sentences that balance with the crime, or does it project a more severe sentence for fear of what we know about the evolution of crime? Or will it simply concern it'self with the threat of future petty crimes by the accused? How will either of these scenarios square with the rights of the convicted if deterrence is the goal of justice?

Why should government concern itself with the future actions of individuals?

Maybe these questions have already been answered. I haven't read everything yet.

Post 21

Friday, November 25, 2005 - 3:55pm

Hi Moeller:

I don't think OJ's victims (if he had any) were made whole through restitution, and I do think that punishing him (guilty or not) would have some effect on whether future crimes would be committed (be those committed by him or others), so his is not a case that fits my question, which again is: "If the victim is made whole through restitution, and if punishing the criminal had no effect on whether future crimes would be committed, then why punish the criminal?" (I'm not sure the other question applies to you.)

The criminal is being treated according to his actions, he is held responsible for the harm he caused, what more do you need?

When you say we should treat a criminal according to his actions, I think you're saying we should treat a criminal as a criminal, which begs the question: how should we treat a criminal? I can't speak for Bill, but that's where I'm seeing circularity.

I'm also unclear on what you mean when you suggest we hold the criminal responsible? I'd think that means -- to make the criminal pay restitution to the victim. I don't see why that means -- spank the criminal.

And about proportionality, I'm guessing you think the principle should be "the worse the crime, the worse the punishment." I'm used to hearing this justified as according with some type of cosmic karma, that we must restore the balance. I open to hearing a different justification.

Jordan

Post 22

Friday, November 25, 2005 - 4:20pm

Jordan,
Regrettably, I'm not going to have time today to make good my IOU. But a quick comment and a couple of questions:
" I think you're saying we should treat a criminal as a criminal, which begs the question: how should we treat a criminal? I can't speak for Bill, but that's where I'm seeing circularity."

The only way I can see to satisfy you and Bill, if that's possible, and to break what you see as circularity is to discuss specific cases and then induce. It's unclear, to me at least, what you would regard, otherwise, as a non-circular answer. When analyzing abstractions, nearly everything resolves to a tautology, after all, until you get to concretes. (Perhaps you will regard this last as also circular. So be it.)

When doing so, think about this, please. OJ's victims (and there can be no reasonable doubt he had some) can never get restitution. Probably neither their family either, except partially. Also, no number of prior murder convictions seems to have deterred him. Now, do you think it was just that he walked? (Assuming, as is the case, that he was guilty -- which apparently you remain unconvinced of.) Paraphrasing a line from the final episode of the Firefly series: Does that seem right to you?

(Edited by Jeff Perren on 11/25, 4:22pm)

Post 23

Friday, November 25, 2005 - 4:26pm

One aspect I've not seen mentioned specifically is that a rights violator should never profit from his rights violation. This principle would seem to take care of the dictator who retires to a life of luxury. It might also justify the death penalty in some cases since that would be the only way to assure that a murderer did not gain from eliminating his victim.

Also, restitution doesn't mean simply restoring the situation to what it was before the rights violation (most likely an impossible goal) but also compensating for consequent losses including psychological ones.

Post 24

Friday, November 25, 2005 - 6:21pm

I distinguish between restitution and punishment.

"Punishment" is a primacy of consciousness error that demonstrates the futility of mysticism. Punishers think that their rage and anger will alter reality. Inflicting torment on another person is not how you get them to change their mind. They only become more determined to continue the conflict -- and causality demands that they increase the level of aggression. Tormenting someone will "change" their mind, of course. It makes them more violent. Punishment is what "society" demands. Everything about punishment ties back to collectivist, mysticist notions. The failure of punishment -- lenient or horrific; private or public -- stands alongside the general failure of all collectivisms and all mysticisms.

Restitution (or "remedy" as the law would have it) is in accordance with the facts of reality. It restores to whatever extent possible that which the victim has lost. (And I agree with Rick Pasotto that subsequential losses are important.)

Consider this for what it is worth. Michigan has had no death penalty since 1847. Texas does and always has. Both states have about the same murder rate per capita. In fact, Michigan's is a bit lower, but perhaps not statistically important. The harshest of punishments apparently has no effect on the worst crimes.

We speak here of the injustice of punishing people for "victimless crimes." I concur, of course. However, I also point out that in this day and age anyone who smokes pot is a sociopath, a self-defined outsider, perhaps a genetic deviant who not only will not be within the mainstream, but cannot. Criminal behaviors aggregate. Perpetrators associate.

Objectivists are not alone in idolizing the criminal as an outsider, an individualist who is not bound by the laws of society. We Objectivists trash the notion of Robin Hood, but Robert O' Locksley and his men were "honest outlaws." Psychologically, they might have been no different than Thomas Edison who was in constant trouble in school as a child -- and who, as an adult electrocuted dogs to "prove" that alternating current is unsafe. So, how many times do you drag young Tom Edison into the woodshed before he agrees with you to sit down, shut up, and do as he is told? And if he did that, would he invent the light bulb? Futhermore, I submit that punishing young Tom is what made Old Tom cruel.

Post 25

Friday, November 25, 2005 - 7:49pm

Roger,

Don�t belittle the victim�s wish to feel right again. His sense of his universe has been disrupted by the immoral, usually vicious actions of a criminal who should be held responsible for said disruption just like other damages. Two weeks ago, a window of my van was broken and my radio stolen (the radio being a three month old gift from wife.) The window cost me $75 (haven�t found the time to put it in yet) and the radio will be $400, but the damage done is so much greater. I�ve been made to feel less secure in my person and property. Several neighbors feel shook by the event, they feel generally less safe, like me. My level of benevolence toward strangers is, at least temporarily, diminished. This is a common crime, so multiply these effects on my neighbors and me by many, many thousands of such events each day. I consider even petty thieves to be major destroyers for this reason. They suck the trust and benevolence out of a community. This is their true crime and I rate it as being much greater than a focus on monetary restitution to me can possibly illuminate.

While I am crawling around struggling with a six foot long piece of interior paneling it will occur to me more than once that he should suffer two, maybe three times that much. The vision of him suffering so will make me smile and help me stay positive while I do the replacement job. Call me sick but actually seeing him so suffer would make me feel even better, and I think I have a right to that because it�s his fault I feel so bad about having to crawl around with a screwdriver for an hour just because asshole criminal is still stealing radios. Other victims, bigger than me perhaps, may be able to transcend these animal urges, but I apparently cannot. (This latter is the criminal�s problem, you take your victim as you find him: A punch that a young person would have shaken off, but that kills your eighty-year-old victim is tough luck for the perp�it�s murder.)

�What would be so bad about not implementing punishment,� is that victims will be further victimized by having to bear the knowledge that destroyers are enjoying life instead of having their asses kicked routinely.

The right of the victim to revenge-type pain for the criminal grows as the seriousness of the crime increases. The father of a raped and murdered girl is just as much the murderer�s victim as she is (less harmed, but his victim, no less.) It is a further torment, directly at the hands of the criminal, that his daughter�s murderer gets to see the sun rise each morning and dream on his future while his daughter only gets to continue decomposing. The murderer forfeited his life when he took hers, so if anyone alive who is even remotely victimized by said murderer and who thinks it will make them feel better to do X to said scum, then I say give them what they want.

I want the guy who broke my glass and stole my radio to suffer three wasted hours for my one (preferably cleaning public toilets) and I think the father can have his daughter�s murderer�s life if he so much as has a hunch it will make him feel better.

I suppose I really am talking about naked revenge, Roger. So, what bad would happen if we administered justice as I�ve described in these cases? What�s so bad about revenge? A lot of victims in varied situations describe it as central to making them whole, so what�s the problem with it? Some bad people get hurt� but what else?

Jon

Post 26

Saturday, November 26, 2005 - 12:35am

Michael Moeller notes, "Peikoff has a lecture on tape called 'What to do About Crime' given in 1995 after OPAR. He did more research for this talk. Check it out."

Thanks, Michael, I will!

He continues, "Yes, both schools are wrong, Bill, which includes the consequentialism (utilitarian) justifications that you are partially endorsing."

What do you mean that I am "partially" endorsing? I am not partially endorsing the kind of consequentialism you're referring to, because that particular view does not recognize individual rights. I don't partially endorse any view that does not recognize rights. What I do endorse is the idea that whatever system of ethics you advocate, it must be based on consequences. In that sense, and that sense alone, I am a "consequentialist." So is Peikoff, and so was Rand.

You continue, "That's why I said study them so you can see that each is wrought with collectivism, that's how I found out in Criminal Law class (I hope you didn't think I was endorsing traditional retributivism). To give Peikoff's quote more context, retributivism (Kantian style) seeks to sacrifice individuals to the moral principle of "justice", not justice tied to any harm inflicted upon an individual human by a criminal. They call their brand of justice "social justice". Utilitarians on the other hand look forward to future actions (via deterrence, rehabilitation, prevention) of the would-be criminals. Their allegiance is not to individual victims, but to yet-to-be victims of possible-future actions--i.e. not individual victims but crime rates. They speak of the "social utility" of punishment. Isn't the collectivism of both of these obvious?"

As I understand it, Peikoff's objection to traditional utilitarianism is not its concern with deterrence and prevention (i.e., with future consequences), but its rejection of principles. Rational principles, it must be remembered, have their foundation in consequences. It is the consequences to which we must ultimately appeal in deciding the appropriateness of any action, including punishment. So, I'm afraid I don't understand your point about allegiance to individual victims, if it means something more than simply making the victims whole to whatever extent possible. Once you've done whatever is possible to compensate the victims (which is not punishment but restitution), any act of punishment must be justified by how well it prevents future crimes. When I used the term "deterrence," I was referring both to physical restraint through incarceration and discouragement against committing future crimes. But, strictly speaking, deterrence refers only to the effect of a given policy on the criminal's motivation and does not include protection through incarceration. So, I am revising my original position to say that the proper purpose of punishment is be to protect people from having their rights violated. This would include deterrence, of course, but it would also involve incarceration--the removal of the criminal from society. What I don't think it involves is any kind of "payback" beyond what is required for restitution. Any further act of retaliatory force levied against the criminal must be justified by how well it protects people from future crimes. You can correct me, if I am wrong, Michael, but I get the impression that when you talk about "allegiance to individual victims," it is precisely this kind of additional "payback" or "retributive justice" that you are invoking.

You continued, "What's missing? The harm done to the individual victim and that each criminal should be treated according to the actions he has committed. Vacuous and circular? Bill, what the HELL are you talking about? You seem to be searching for some wider justification. Why is the fact that an individual harmed another not enough for you?"

Because punishment does not restore the harm done to the victim. Remember, we are talking about punishment here, not restitution. So, if you are going to punish the criminal, there has be some other justification for it. If you say, but the criminal deserves to be punished for harming the victim, that's simply another way of saying that we ought to punish him for it, in which case, the question arises as to why we ought to do that?--for the sake of what end or goal? You have to show what value is served by the punishment and how it is served by it? Don't say the value is "justice," because it is justice that we are seeking to explain. Justice is not an irreducible primary; it is a principle whose justification and proper application depends upon the consequences that it serves. That doesn't mean, as Peikoff points out, that the consequences are to be considered independently of abstract principles, but it does mean that without them our principles are nothing more than categorical imperatives.

You write, "The criminal is being treated according to his actions, he is held responsible for the harm he caused, what more do you need?"

Of course, the criminal is responsible for the harm he caused. But you need to show why it's proper to punish him for it. You're acting as if this were simply self-evident, requiring no further explanation.

You wrote, "In your search for some wider justification you are straying into the collectivist land of 'social utility' (without realizing it)."

Please explain what you mean by "social utility" and what you believe is wrong with it. Is it your view that to punish someone in order to prevent and deter future crimes is a form of collectivism? If so, it's not one that I'm familiar with.

You continue, "And I don't even want to get into the blatant subjectivity of utilitarian strategies, the worst among these is the alleged 'preventative laws'. You noted one earlier with the curfew example and then rescued yourself by an appeal to a system based on individual rights."

So what's wrong with preventative laws (laws that prevent crime), so long as they don't violate individual rights?

You continue, "Sundry collectivists make no such appeal (and they dominate the justice system). If they totally had their way I am sure they would send violent criminals to garden rest homes to be 'rehabilitated' by a bunch of feel-good-Dr. Phil-type psychologists. Puke."

Why are you lumping me in with collectivists who want to rehabilitate criminals rather than incarcerate or punish them? Where did I ever indicate that that was my view?

- Bill

Post 27

Saturday, November 26, 2005 - 8:15am

Hi Jeff,

Regrettably, I'm not going to have time today to make good my IOU.

That's okay. If you want to look into certain cases, that's fine, but OJ's case isn't an example of a case that works for my question because I think his (alleged) victims weren't restituted, and I think punishing him would've had effect on whether future crimes would be committed. I think we'd be better off with hypothetical cases.

For example, what if we catch a thief. The thief perfectly restitutes his victim(s). Then immediately following the restitution, in some freak accident he loses all his limbs, or goes seriously mentally retarded, or gets the clockwork orange effect where he's simply unable to commit more crime. Whatever the case, it's clear to us that his days as a thief (or let's say, even a criminal!) are over. In addition, the statistician kings convincingly show us that the consequences of the thief's case -- be him punished or released -- would have no effect on whether future crimes would be committed. Why punish him? Like I said, I usually find the retributivist argument as an appeal to cosmic karma, to restoring the balance, whatever that is. I, on the other hand, find it perfectly okay to let him go.

Jordan

Post 28

Saturday, November 26, 2005 - 10:16am

I could go for that, Jordan. So long as you are sure that my radio thief�s limbs are gone for good, I will not demand that he clean public toilets for three hours.

Post 29

Saturday, November 26, 2005 - 10:36am

Seriously though, Jordan. I�m not seeing a problem justifying retribution. The victim wants it; it�s part of making him whole. You can denigrate the victim�s wish for retribution, call it a reptilian urge, or such�but it�s not the victim�s problem that he has strong reptilian urges; rather it�s the criminal�s problem. Next time, he should victimize someone like you, who will demand less in return. But when he victimizes someone who wants a lot of revenge�well, that�s just another hazard of criminal life. What am I missing?

Jon

Post 30

Saturday, November 26, 2005 - 12:18pm

Hey Jon,

My second question of post 13 applies to you: "If punishing the criminal does not help make the victim whole -- or worse, if it further harms the victim -- then why punish the criminal?"

I think you should say that we shouldn't punish in this case because you are arguing for revenge as a form of restitution. Please note that if this is your argument, it is not one for retribution. Retribution is usually measured by the type of crime committed, not by how well it restores the victim(s). To the above question, the retributivist would still say we should punish the criminal for some reason.

So what's wrong with revenge as a form of restitution? To answer, let's just see what's wrong with revenge. According to Objectivism, we have the right to defend ourselves against someone initiating force upon us. Does this mean we can defend ourselves any way we like? In my view, no, principles shouldn't fly out the window when on the battlefield. Moreover, that might be where we need them most, where our actions will bring severe consequences one way or other.

So what principle governs how we ought defend ourselves? In my view, it's the principle of "least amount of force necessary" (LAOFN). If we are to strive toward the heroic, then we should avoid using the tools of brutes when possible. That is, if we can defend ourselves without resorting to force, we should. To use unnecessary force is brutish. And if we must resort to force, then we should only use no more an amount than necessary to successfully defend ourselves. To use more force than necessary is also brutish. Put another way, if we use more force than necessary, we become the aggressor, thus abandoning Objectivism's "non-initiation of force" (NIOF) principle. The LAOFN is a corrolary to the NIOF.

Revenge, if it occurs outside of self-defense, is brutish or contrary to the NIOF and LAOFN. Thus, revenge as a form of restitution is contrary to the NIOF and LAOFN, and is unjustifiable as a form of punishment. The bigger picture here is that revenge trades a wrong for a wrong, which is the antithesis of Objectivism's trader principle.

To be sure, I readily acknowledge and sympathize with many a victim's desire for revenge. But acting on one's desires isn't always rational, and I think acting on revenge would be one of those irrational cases. (Sidenote: I am, however, quite comfortable with people acting on small tidbits of revenge among friends; I call it "playful revenge," which is usually conducive to relationship building.)

Just in case, someone might still want to ask: What if the victims can't be made whole without having their aggressor punished? Others might disagree with me here, but I say: too bad. The better methods of restitution cannot employ irrational means. If some victims can be restituted only through irrational means, then a rational criminal justice system cannot help them. Granted, in my view the primary purpose of a criminal justice system is to restitute the victims, but not at the expense of rationality.

Jordan

(Edited by Jordan on 11/26, 8:20pm)

Post 31

Saturday, November 26, 2005 - 1:27pm

Jordan,
It may slightly off the point, but

"Retribution is usually measured by the type of crime committed, not by how well it restores the victim(s)."

doesn't that statement tend to show just why the "restitution" vs. "retribution" is a false dichotomy? And, indeed, why adherence to either philosophical camp should be rejected in favor of a third alternative for properly understanding the issue?

The whole debate reminds me very much of the rationalists vs. the empiricists. The subjectivists vs. the intrinsicists. etc. (Not making any personal accusations, here. And, by the way, these distinctions didn't originate with Rand -- they go back centuries -- so there's no reason anyone here need get offended.) In short, the whole thing reminds me of philosophy classes at my alma mater.

Post 32

Saturday, November 26, 2005 - 2:26pm

Jordan,

I�m not seeing any value in examining the implications of: What if victims feel even more victimized when their tormenters are punished, or: What if deterrence is somehow impossible or inoperative? In reality, as a rule, they don�t feel more victimized and deterrence does operate.

The purpose of my posts in this thread has been to demonstrate that retribution is legitimate, not that it is the central principle in justice, just that it is often, if not usually, proper. Your answer is that such is brutish. I disagree. I am not turned off by brutishness toward those who wreck the general peace and harmony. They kill, steal, and destroy. They are truly the enemies of mankind, criminals are.

You write, �Principles shouldn't fly out the window when on the battlefield.� And later raise the concern that retribution is contrary to the trader principle! I�m sorry for this, Jordan, but the trader principle has indeed gone out the window since the moment the criminal threw it out there! The rules, as applied in context to him, have changed�because *he changed them* with his atrocious actions.

You finish by saying �too bad� to the victims! To the victims! I say we should say that to the destroyers. All the benefit of the doubt with regard to who gets hurt too much or not enough, goes to victims and against criminals.

One last thing about your wise warning about revenge and the possible irrationality of pursuing it: I agree with you, as you seem to mean personal revenge. I am talking throughout about justice system revenge. Personal revenge must be outlawed and its proper use handed to the courts. My concern, brushed off by Roger but serious indeed, is that the courts must fulfill this function and other functions of justice properly, including applying punishment, or people will reject the justice system, never mind calling the police, lock and load, etc. I�m saying that to be successful, to work at all, a justice system must capture the people�s confidence that things are being done roughly about the way they would be if we didn�t relinquish our right to retribution to the courts, but applied it ourselves.

Jon

Post 33

Saturday, November 26, 2005 - 3:12pm

Jeff,

doesn't that statement tend to show just why the "restitution" vs. "retribution" is a false dichotomy?

I'm not seeing it. I think restitution and retribution are useful and distinct categories, regardless of whether they are worth adopting.

Jon,

Again, retribution is not restitution.

Next, you're saying that once a criminal is a criminal, then to hell with principles; we can do whatever we want to him, at least to the extent that it satisfies our desire for revenge?

You also seem to be saying to hell with the victim who doesn't want to seek revenge. You're basically saying to hell with most Buddhist, Quaker, Amish, and other pacifist victims. Bummer.

justice system revenge

What is that? And on whose behalf does such a system seek justice?

Also, I agree that as a practical matter, people won't tolerate a system of justice if it falls too far from their preferences. But people can learn to not act on their desire for revenge, and to accept a system that doesn't administer revenge specifically. I think this is largely the status quo in many jurisdictions today.

Jordan

Post 34

Saturday, November 26, 2005 - 3:47pm

Jordan wrote,

"So what principle governs how we ought defend ourselves? In my view, it's the principle of 'least amount of force necessary' (LAOFC). [Shouldn't the abbreviation be LAOFN?] If we are to strive toward the heroic, then we should avoid using the tools of brutes when possible. That is, if we can defend ourselves without resorting to force, we should. To use unnecessary force is brutish. And if we must resort to force, then we should only use no more an amount than necessary to successfully defend ourselves. To use more force than necessary is also brutish. Put another way, if we use more force than necessary, we become the aggressor, thus abandoning Objectivism's 'non-initiation of force' (NIOF) principle. The LAOFC is a corollary to the NIOF."

Jordan, here's what bothers me about your argument: Suppose someone steals my car, and the least amount of force necessary to retrieve it imposes no adverse consequences on the criminal. Suppose, for example, that I can retrieve my car by locating it at his home and demanding that he return it. The thief pays no price for his crime, which, means that he is free to commit the crime with impunity. He is free to steal my car and when discovered, can simply return in order to avoid suffering any adverse consequences; for if he is willing to return it, no force is necessary to retrieve it, and the thief loses nothing by having stolen it. What then is the incentive for someone to refrain from stealing someone else's property? Absolutely none.

Nor under your theory, is there any justification for incarcerating a criminal in order protect others from being victimized in the future, since the incarceration would involve more force than is necessary to defend against the initial crime. Suppose, for example, that someone commits a murder. Once the victim is murdered, there is no longer any need to defend him. The least amount of force necessary in this case is none. Does that mean that the murderer gets away scot free, since, under your theory, there is no longer any warrant for using force against him? Apparently so. The murder is a done deal, requiring no further intervention. So under your LAOFC principle, someone could literally get away with murder. He would be free to walk the streets and kill again with complete immunity from prosecution.

Isn't protection and deterrence also a rational goal of a criminal justice system (in addition to restitution)? It is true that one should use no more force than is necessary to accomplish these goals, but to say that one should use no more force than is necessary to defend against the initial crime seems ludicrous to me, for it would undoubtedly cause an increase in crime and result in the unnecessary endangerment of people's lives and property. I would not want to live in a society in which your theories were implemented. Can you blame me?

- Bill

Post 35

Saturday, November 26, 2005 - 5:08pm

Jordan,

You are not fair in your characterization of what I�ve written.

�Next, you're saying that once a criminal is a criminal, then to hell with principles; we can do whatever we want to him��

No, not whatever we want. I�ve expressed three hours of sweat for my one in the case of my radio, and the murderer�s life in the case of the raped and killed daughter. What�s wrong with that much retribution?

�You also seem to be saying to hell with the victim who doesn't want to seek revenge. You're basically saying to hell with most Buddhist, Quaker, Amish, and other pacifist victims��

Oh, no. I see no reason why we shouldn�t exclude retribution in each case where a competent victim wants it that way. Why do think I would oppose that? I insist retribution is a legitimate aspect of the justice system, and I think most victims would wish there to be proportional retribution. Excluding it where individual victims request such is fine with me. (More stolen Amish radios, fewer of mine.) I support doing other things for victims, too. They should be kept informed of the status of cases, given seats at criminal trials, allowed to make long statements, and more.

�And on whose behalf does such a system seek justice?�
I have been saying, on the behalf of the victims who demand the retribution.

��justice system revenge�
What is that?�

I simply meant to distinguish vigilante from justice-system-imposed punishment.

Jon

Post 36

Saturday, November 26, 2005 - 8:38pm

Hi Bill,

Isn't protection and deterrence also a rational goal of a criminal justice system (in addition to restitution)? It is true that one should use no more force than is necessary to accomplish these goals, but to say that one should use no more force than is necessary to defend against the initial crime seems ludicrous to me, for it would undoubtedly cause an increase in crime and result in the unnecessary endangerment of people's lives and property. I would not want to live in a society in which your theories were implemented. Can you blame me?

Good points, and I agree with you. From an Objectivist standpoint, I would say deterrence is just another form or part of self defense. Merely restituting the victim is often insufficent as a form of self defense. A restored self isn't necessarily a protected or safe self. Sometimes we need additional defenses, e.g., deterrents. Deterrence is secondary, but still usually quite important.

There's another response to this which is based on how we can't violate the NIOF if we interfere (using the LAOFN) only with the liberties that criminals forfeit as rights in committing their crimes. But I'll leave that be for now.

Hi Jon,

You're still calling revenge retribution, but I'll let that go.

I have been saying, on the behalf of the victims who demand the retribution.

Okay. I thought you'd want to punish criminals even if the victims didn't want you to. Would you punish criminals more if the victims wanted more punishment? Like what if a $5 pick-pocket victim wanted to send his aggressor to the electric chair? Would you oblige?

I insist retribution is a legitimate aspect of the justice system, and I think most victims would wish there to be proportional retribution.

It's hardly a justification to appeal to what most people, much less most victims, think. You still haven't justified why revenge is rational, only that you and (allegedly) others want it.

Jordan

Post 37

Sunday, November 27, 2005 - 7:56am

I can actually see the angels dancing on the head of a pin. I don't suppose anyone here is actually a lawyer, or a police officer, or a probation officer, or a judge... You know, someone with some substantive knowledge of the subject...

Post 38

Sunday, November 27, 2005 - 8:51am

Michael,

I'm a third year law student, and Moeller is also in law school.

Jordan

Post 39

Sunday, November 27, 2005 - 9:29am