Crime and Punishment

Adam,

Really, Adam, your criticisms here amount to nothing more than blind assertions about my position. You did not even take 1 sentence and bother to refute it. What is worse, you keep asking for "grounding" in "self-interest" above and beyond the individual rights and actions of the criminal and his victim. When I demonstrate how it is in the self-interest of the victim to have his rights enforced (via my car thief example), your reply it has nothing to do with the exercise of rights. Let's repeat and paraphrase that remark from you again: "grounding" in "self-interest" has nothing to do with the exercise and enforcement of one's rights, you say. (Long whistle) Now just stop and think about that for a moment and compare it with the above quote of AR. It really is some concept of Objectivist ethics and self-interest you have.

Maybe you should take a good listen to AR on the topic as well through her tape "Objective law" where she endorses the proportionality principle to the extent of the rights violation of the criminal. Just as I have. And if I what I have written doesn't satisfy you, well, so be it. But maybe you have some bigger issues with Objectivist ethics and individual rights.

Michael

Post 101

Sunday, December 4, 2005 - 10:41am

Michael Moeller, that is about the most egregious mis-reading of an opponent's post I have ever seen! <sigh> You wrote:

Really, Adam, your criticisms here amount to nothing more than blind assertions about my position. You did not even take 1 sentence and bother to refute it. What is worse, you keep asking for "grounding" in "self-interest" above and beyond the individual rights and actions of the criminal and his victim. When I demonstrate how it is in the self-interest of the victim to have his rights enforced (via my car thief example), your reply it has nothing to do with the exercise of rights. Let's repeat and paraphrase that remark from you again: "grounding" in "self-interest" has nothing to do with the exercise and enforcement of one's rights, you say. (Long whistle) Now just stop and think about that for a moment and compare it with the above quote of AR. It really is some concept of Objectivist ethics and self-interest you have.

Maybe if you had quoted Adam, instead of doing your little "repeat and paraphrase," you wouldn't have gone astray. Here's what Adam said:

...you appear to deny any need for a non-circular causal link between the punishment of criminals and the self-interest of the innocent.

So the time has come to put things plainly. If you are not interested in grounding the punishment of the criminals in the self-interest of the innocent, please say so plainly. If you are interested in grounding the punishment of the criminals in the self-interest of the innocent, please say so plainly too. In either case, please give your reasons. In the latter case, please identify the causal mechanism grounding the first in the second. In the former, please specify how your criterion differs from Platonic-Kantian "cosmic Justice."

Here is a hint: consider the apparently circular claim,

"It is justice to punish criminals, because it is in the rational self-interest of the innocent to live in a society in which justice is done by punishing criminals."

Now, look: Adam is not claiming that self-interest has nothing to do with the exercise and enforcement of rights. He is saying that it has everything to do with it, but that you have not shown it! In particular, you have not justified punishment on the grounds of self-interest.

In justifying anything, you seek (in Adam's terms) a causal explanation. You ask "why?" and you keep asking it, until you have grounded it. In your process, you stop one step too soon. You say punishment is just because it's in our (or the victim's) self-interest to punish criminals. You see, this leaves the attempt to justify not grounded, but floating. It is a "just because" rationale. Punishment is just, just because it's in our self-interest to punish. But why is it in our self-interest? You have offered nothing better than: because it's how we implement justice for the victim.

My philosophical response to that is "ARRRRGH." As Adam has clearly and repeated said, your argument is circular. You need to keep going in a straight line, one more step, and explain to us, if you can, exactly why is punishment in our self-interest?

Maybe you should take a good listen to AR on the topic as well through her tape "Objective law" where she endorses the proportionality principle to the extent of the rights violation of the criminal. Just as I have. And if I what I have written doesn't satisfy you, well, so be it. But maybe you have some bigger issues with Objectivist ethics and individual rights.

It's truly wonderful that you have listened to one of AR's old tapes, but that tape is of absolutely no help in re Adam's and my concern. Nor is anything you have written so far.

The proportionality principle -- the justice of the quantity of punishment -- is an entirely different issue from the issue of the justice of punishment per se. It is an apparently rational constraint on how punishment (or penalties in general) should be applied, if it should be applied. But that ignores the question of whether punishment should be applied.

Please stop ducking the issue! And answer Adam's request, that you give a non-circular justification for punishment per se in terms of rational self-interest.

REB

Post 102

Sunday, December 4, 2005 - 11:03am

Roger,

Gimme a break Roger, I've explained it repeatedly and there is no need to lay it out one more time. If those explanations don't satisfy you, then fine. Speaking of "ARRGGGH", how about "visiting consequences" on the criminal that is just as well served by "shunning" and "noncoercive isolation" as it is incarceration.

Michael

Post 103

Sunday, December 4, 2005 - 11:06am

Michael Moeller has twice [make that THREE times--see above] mis-represented and ridiculed my position on crime and punishment (in posts 6 and 85), and I am going to set the record straight (no doubt so that he can yet again [a FOURTH TIME? Give ME a break!] distort it <sigh>).

Here is what I said:

I thought that the proper function of the government was primarily to use physical force to protect men's rights. (I get this rather heretical view from a source which seems to have been overlooked in the present discussion: "The Nature of Government," The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 131.)

And using force to protect rights in regard to a convicted criminal consists not of detering crime or giving him his "just deserts" (not to mention desserts!), but of two things and two things only: forcing the criminal to pay restitution to his victim and forcibly confining him if there is any likelihood that he will commit further violations of rights.

We use force against criminals, in other words, to force them to repair the damage they have done (if possible) and to forcibly restrain them from doing more damage. This defends the rights of the victim and the rights of potential future victims. This is the proper role of government's criminal justice system, not "punishing" (causing suffering to) the criminal.

If detering crime were the purpose, then incarcerating those not likely to repeat their crime would be unjust. If visiting suffering or other negative consequences on a criminal were the purpose, it could be served just as well by shunning, ostracizing, or otherwise non-coercively isolating him, without incarceration.

In my opinion, if "punishment" goes beyond what is needed to provide restitution to the victim (when possible) and to shield everyone from criminals who are dangerous and/or likely repeat offenders, then it is illegitimate.

Notice the next to last paragraph, which Michael Moeller repeated refers to as though it were my position on the matter. Note carefully. I say "if..." I am speculating about the deficiencies in the deterrence and retribution models of criminal justice. I am not advocating non-coercive dealing with criminals. And I am not denying the validity of incarcerating some criminals. I am just saying that neither deterrence nor punishment are valid ways to ground the use of force against them.

Michael is going round and round with Bill Dwyer and Adam Reed about this, and he continues, 100 posts into this thread, to try to wiggle out of directly facing and answering the burning question: what is the justification, in terms of rational self-interest and ethical egoism, for the coercive punishment of criminals? Not just locking them up to defend our rights against their further criminal acts, but to punish them. I say "round and round," because Michael has yet to offer a non-circular argument for why punishment of criminals is in our rational self-interest.

And I repeat my final sentence from the above quote early in this thread: In my opinion, if "punishment" (e.g., incarceration) goes beyond what is needed to provide restitution to the victim (when possible) and to shield everyone from criminals who are dangerous and/or likely repeat offenders, then it is illegitimate.

REB

(Edited by Roger Bissell on 12/04, 11:08am)

Post 104

Sunday, December 4, 2005 - 11:34am

From Roger's post:

If visiting suffering or other negative consequences on a criminal were the purpose, it could be served just as well by shunning, ostracizing, or otherwise non-coercively isolating him, without incarceration.

There was no distortion here. Yes I see your IF negative consequences were the purpose. Really Roger? Negative consequences are served "just as well", that is to say, the same as incarceration? "Shunning" imposes the same negative consequences as incarceration. That is some claim.

He also writes:

what is the justification, in terms of rational self-interest and ethical egoism, for the coercive punishment of criminals? Not just locking them up to defend our rights against their further criminal acts, but to punish them. I say "round and round," because Michael has yet to offer a non-circular argument for why punishment of criminals is in our rational self-interest.

As I have stated repeatedly, which you cannot seem to grasp, that each man is an end in himself and to pursue his self-interest means to pursue free from the use of physical force. That each man is his own causal agent, and that if he chooses to live by force among men, then he will see the negative consequences reflected back onto him--i.e. his own loss of freedom to the extent of his crime. Adam's claim that I was saying there is no self-interest in incarceration to prevent future, deterrence, etc. was his assertion, not mine.

Regards,
Michael

Post 105

Sunday, December 4, 2005 - 12:01pm

Michael Moeller:

Vigorous assertion demonstrates nothing.

However, this discussion has been useful to me in focusing my own mind on the process of validation that grounds every argument Ayn Rand makes, not just this one. It is possible to assert a true fact (that individual rights are served by punishing criminals) without knowing it for a fact - that is, without having identified (and in this case, adamantly refusing to identify) the specific causal mechanisms by which this fact functions in reality.

It is nice to know that you can operate "The Objectivist Research CDROM," but quoting someone else's statements, even Ayn Rand's, is not knowledge. Knowledge is identification. Only identification is knowledge. As long as you refuse to identify the specific facts of reality by which a principle works, you do not know that principle. Grounding matters.

Post 106

Sunday, December 4, 2005 - 2:50pm

Well, Adam, at least somebody found some value in your criticism leading nowhere. It seems you regard yourself as some guru of Objectivist epistemology, but I can be spared the pontification, it does nothing for me. Although, when I was learning c++ and Java, I remarked to Chris Sciabarra on the close parallels of object-oriented programming with her process of concept formation and he remarked that Adam Reed was writing an article for JARS on that very topic. Now I know who you are and seen your arguments, I am curious to check it out. And speaking of "identification", when somebody says they listened to the tape, it probably means their CDROM was not much help in listening to it.

Michael

Post 107

Sunday, December 4, 2005 - 3:40pm

I thought that this thread was dead, but I see that it has been revived, and since Michael has replied to me twice without my response, I suppose that I should give him another reply, nice guy that he is. ;-)

I wrote, "Suppose someone's slaps me, and in retaliation I pull out a gun and shoot her. Have I violated her rights? You bet I have, because by resorting to excessive retaliatory force, I have, in effect, initiating force against her. Do you see the principle here? Well, it's the same with punishment administered by the state. It cannot be excessive, otherwise it violates the criminal's rights."

Michael replied, "Yes, Bill, but why is it 'excessive'? Because the force used in retaliation is greater than she initiated, which is what I have been saying all along in regards to the ~proportionality principle~. That is what you are affirming here. And what do we reference to see if retaliatory force is 'excessive'? The actions of the criminal in the first place, we do NOT measure it against any might-be actions of this criminal or any other criminals, i.e. deterrence."

The point is that "IF" we're going to punish someone, then we cannot punish him or her more than in proportion to the gravity of the offense. It is the proportionality principle that limits the degree of punishment and/or retaliation that we have "a right" to impose, but the proportionality principle does not require us to impose it. The only principle that requires us to impose it is future protection and deterrence. There is a difference between having a right to do something and being obligated to do. Although you cannot be obligated to do something without having a right to do it, you can have a right to do something without being obligated to do it. Do you see the difference? What I am saying is that it is the proportionality principle that limits the degree of punishment that we have a right to impose, but that it is the protection principle that obligates us to impose it. So what we have, then, are two different principles that apply to punishment, each serving a different purpose.

I wrote that "deterrence and protection (i.e., prevention) is the only justification for the kind of punishment that is consistent with individual rights. In other words, there is only one kind of punishment that is permissible--the one that is consistent with a respect for the criminal's rights--and the purpose for administering that KIND of punishment is deterrence and protection."

Michael replied, "Yes, Bill I read your revision in post #26 and your later revisions. But as long as you insist on saying that deterrence is the "only justification" for any kind of punishment, you will be starting with false premises."

Protection and deterrence are the only justification for imposing punishment, but not the only justification for limiting the extent of the punishment. The proportionality principle (the individual rights of the criminal) limits how much punishment we have a right to impose.

I wrote, "I agree that the state, AS A PROTECTOR, is justified in reining in the criminal because of this violation. So whom is the state seeking to protect? Future potential victims (including, of course, the victim himself), which is precisely what I'm saying is the purpose of just punishment (punishment that is consistent with individual rights)."

Michael replied, "Roger made this exact same argument earlier and it is a false view of 'protection'. 'Protecting' rights is not limited to an officer sitting outside your house and following you around all day."

Who said it was? And why on earth would you think that that is all that I meant by "protection"?

Michael continued, "Obviously, once a crime has happened, 'protection' in this narrow sense is no longer valid. [Of course!] However, the government 'protecting rights' means enforcing rights once they have been violated."

I agree. When did I ever suggest otherwise?

You continue, "If there was no enforcement, it would render rights meaningless."

It wouldn't render rights "meaningless." The meaningfulness of rights does not depend on their being enforced, even if there is a good reason to enforce them.

I wrote, "You say that he has 'forfeited his own freedom,' which is another way of saying that he no longer has a right to it. Fair enough. But to say that he no longer has a right to it is not to say that we should therefore deprive him of it."

You replied, "Bill, a thief just stole your car, he has 'no right' to it, does that mean you should deprive him of it? Hell YES."

It doesn't follow that just because he has no right to it, I should therefore deprive him of it. I should deprive him of it, only if it is in my interest to deprive him of it. Now, it happens to be true that if the police can recover it and return it to me, they should do so. But they should do so not simply in order to deprive him of something he has no right to, but in order to protect and defend my rights. The state should also punish (e.g., incarcerate) him for stealing it, not simply in order to harm him in proportion to the harm he inflicted on me, but in order to protect people's rights in the future through restraint and deterrence.

You wrote, "Now, a criminal violation is an impingement on somebody's freedom, and the price the criminal pays is his own loss of freedom to the extent of the force he has initiated. This answers the question 'what do we do about it'. He has forfeited his freedom and he will be deprived of it and continued to be deprived until he learns to live among rational men."

I agree.

You continue, "This DOES send a message to the criminals that they will pay for their crimes (i.e. deterrence) but it is the consequence (i.e. 'secondary') of enforcing individual rights."

Of course, it's not just deterrence; it's protection (through restraint) as well. But, in any case, the primary purpose of punishment is the defense of people's rights. It isn't simply to "get back at" the criminal for what he did.

You write, "Bill, it seems like the Average Joe could recognize there is something wrong with the administration of justice when you let a murderer go because punishment would not deter 1 criminal from 1 crime."

But that's not going to happen, because arresting and incarcerating a murderer does serve to protect people's rights and deter crime. The point is strictly hypothetical. "IF" it didn't serve such a purpose, "THEN" there there would be no reason to punish him. But that's clearly not the case, nor do I suspect that it will ever be the case.

You continue, "Doesn't this position disturb you? Don't you think some revision in your position is necessary here, Bill? After all, when you see a family crying outside a courtroom because the murderer who killed one of their family members got off, are those tears because this and/or other criminals would not be deterred? I think not. The tears are because the murderer was not held responsible for his actions and was not punished, i.e. justice was not done."

I'm sure that the family members would be upset if the criminal were let go even if punishing him had no effect on reducing the crime rate, because they want to get back at the murderer for what he did. They want to avenge the death of their loved one. But you can't use the vindictive desires of emotionally distraught family members as a basis for deciding whether or not to punish a murderer, any more than you can use their desires as a basis for deciding what punishment is appropriate. Punishment must be determined (and administered) dispassionately. It cannot be based on anger or vindictive emotion.

Furthermore, what does it mean to hold someone responsible for his actions? It simply means to recognize that he is their author and to take that into consideration when dealing with him. It does not mean that we must punish him for whatever bad conduct he is responsible for. All it means is that we must not punish him for the bad conduct that he is not responsible for.

- Bill

Post 108

Sunday, December 4, 2005 - 3:55pm

Bill,

Actually, I only replied to you once (sufficiently) and I too wanted to let the thread die. At any rate, I have to let you register the last word, I've got exams (tomorrow!!!) and I've already spent too much time with this one. In parting, I can say there is a lot I agree with, particularly your 2nd to last paragraph (and that is not what I was suggesting). Maybe we will have future opportunities to hash it out more.

Best Regards,
Michael

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 12/04, 4:12pm)

Post 109

Sunday, December 4, 2005 - 5:53pm

"Vengence is a dish best served cold" - old Klingon proverb...
.......because only then does Justice have a chance to be rendered..

Post 110

Sunday, December 4, 2005 - 6:26pm

Hi Ed,

Good hearing from you on this topic. I didn't realize that you had replied to me, and just managed to catch your post, after I noticed that the thread had picked up again.

I wrote that "the only justification of punishment that does not violate the rights of the criminal is deterrence and protection."

You replied, "Rights are freedoms that innocent men may exercise fully, they are not freedoms that guilty men may exercise fully. Rights are always retained (because of the nature of man), but are not always fully exercised (because of the criminal actions of men). Retribution does not violate the rights of the criminal, though it temporarily restricts the exercise of them. To say that limiting the exercise of a criminal's rights is wrong -- fatally ignores the tie between innocence and rights exercising."

Ed, I think something got lost in translation here. What I was saying is that if one is going to punish a criminal, the punishment cannot be excessive relative to the offense, otherwise it violates the criminal's rights. If you steal my wallet and I shoot you in the back, that's excessive punishment, and it violates your rights. But assuming that the punishment is not excessive, what then is its justification? The answer is: the defense of people's rights, i.e., protection and deterrence.

You wrote, "Objective law is something that is agreed to by rational men -- men who understand the inherent justice in getting what you deserve."

Yes, justice is getting what you deserve, but to say you deserve it is simply another way of saying that you ought to receive it, which is but another way of saying that someone else ought to give it to you. The question is why ought someone else to give to you? Why is it in his or her (or our) self-interest to punish you? That is a question that needs to be answered before punishment can be justified.

You continue, "Just as it is right for a producer to reap the reward of his intelligence and labor (for no other fact than that he earned it), so it is right for a criminal to 'reap' the temporary limitation on the exercise of their rights. We must not fail to pass judgment, to reward virtue and punish vice."

Under the appropriate circumstances, yes. The question is, why? In what way is it in our self-interest to do these things? There are answers, of course, but the answers need to be given.

You write, "We should initiate and sustain -- by rational, deliberate, and objective means -- objective (retributive) justice. The reason that we should do this, is for the peace, prosperity, and happiness that are made possible only if we do do this."

Yes, but if the reason for the justice is peace, prosperity and happiness, the justice is not retributive but consequentialist.

You continue, "Folks ought to get what they deserve."

Of course, folks ought to get what they deserve, but again this is circular. What people deserve is what they ought to get, so to say that people ought to get what they deserve is simply to say that they ought to get what they ought to get.

You continue, "When they do, we will thrive as a species. When they don't, we are as good as dust. I give you all of written history as an example."

What you are saying is that people ought to be treated in a certain way, and that if they aren't, dire consequences will follow, which is certainly true, but you haven't indicated precisely what way that is. Ed, I don't think we disagree, but my focus was on the justification for punishment--on the reason why we should be administering punishment in the first place. To say that we should punish people because they deserve it doesn't answer that question. What we want to know is, why do they deserve it? What goal is being served by punishing them? Don't say "justice," because that doesn't answer the question either, since justice is defined as "giving people what they deserve."

- Bill

Post 111

Monday, December 5, 2005 - 1:15pm

Thanks for the response, Bill. I will think about your specific questions/criticisms and get back to you ...

Ed

Post 112

Monday, December 5, 2005 - 8:32pm

Thanks for the response, Bill.

Ed, I think something got lost in translation here. What I was saying is that if one is going to punish a criminal, the punishment cannot be excessive relative to the offense, otherwise it violates the criminal's rights. If you steal my wallet and I shoot you in the back, that's excessive punishment, and it violates your rights. But assuming that the punishment is not excessive, what then is its justification? The answer is: the defense of people's rights, i.e., protection and deterrence.

The reason that retribution is not an instance of excessiveness, is that objective law (ie. a consistent proportionality between crime & punishment) is pre-ordained by rational men -- it is agreed to, like a social contract. If I steal, then I should expect X days in jail (because I -- and all other rational men -- have agreed to have objective laws that assign X days, as my retributive punishment for that rights violation).

Why is it in his or her (or our) self-interest to punish you? That is a question that needs to be answered before punishment can be justified.

For the same reason that it is in his or her self-interest to allow me to be rewarded for producing value on Earth -- humans thrive best with a complete and total reciprocity; one that tracks their value production, or rights-violating destruction, as close as rational men can ascertain.

Yes, but if the reason for the justice is peace, prosperity and happiness, the justice is not retributive but consequentialist.

I'm not clear-headed on this. Why can't consequentialism be retributive (ie. getting what is earned)? It seems to me that they are somewhat synonymous conceptions. The reason to let folks earn profit -- to allow them to productively interact with reality -- seems to me to be consequentialist (it's good, because of the inherent consequences for acting human agents) and, at the same time retributive (they're getting what they deserved). And I don't see how a substitution of crime for production changes this any.

Of course, folks ought to get what they deserve, but again this is circular. What people deserve is what they ought to get, so to say that people ought to get what they deserve is simply to say that they ought to get what they ought to get.

Circularity is not inherently useless for understanding actuality, though vicious circularity is. Take the axiom that existence exists. Circular? Yes. Useless? No. When a nature of a thing is discovered, facts about it become circular (definitions can be said to be circular). Here is an example: a dog is a domesticated animal that barks. If it's an animal, domesticated, and barks -- it's a dog. Or how about helium being element 2? There is an identity here (a collapse of 2 things into one), and one that is not -- in this world -- useless. Take the identification of the Morning Star with the Evening Star under the new moniker: Venus. Nothing factual was added, but understanding improved. It is quite alright to be circular in this manner, which I believe I have been.

What you are saying is that people ought to be treated in a certain way, and that if they aren't, dire consequences will follow, which is certainly true, but you haven't indicated precisely what way that is.

It is up to a body of rational law-makers to determine a universal, objective sentence-proportionality to the various rights violations committed. It is up to the citizen to hoot & holler if a non-universal, or a non-objective, punishment is on the books. Universality and objectivity, those are the 2 conditions that justify the proportional punishments which men may -- criminally --earn. Rand spoke of judging folks on their behavior (and specifically not their presumed internal state of mind). She said that -- in judging others -- it must be presumed that a human is adult and rational; mentally competent. In this case, actions will lead to consequences, good and bad. And proportional actions will lead to proportional consequences, good and bad. I hate to say it, but I'm with Hegel on this one, Bill. There can be no coherent concept of justice without retribution (justice logically depends on retribution).

Ed

Post 113

Tuesday, December 6, 2005 - 2:10pm

Warning, I'm armed.

I have in my immediate possession a book on punishment & justice (MJ Adler's Great Ideas book). Here's what it says (paraphrased):

1. Justice is rendering each his due.

2. Justice consists in obeying laws only if the laws themselves are just (though Hobbes and even Spinoza disagree).

3. Natural justice is applied universally.

4. Aeschylus of ancient Greece wrote as if it is immoral to punish for an ulterior purpose (e.g. for reforming the criminal, for deterring others) and that nothing except retribution justifies punishment.

5. Hegel said crime is evil, but punishment is not (punishment rights a wrong).

6. If you adopt a superficial attitude toward punishment, you brush aside the objective treatment of righting a wrong.

7. Hegel said that when you are concerned with reforming or deterring, you are treating the wrongdoer not as a man who deserves to be punished because he has done wrong, but as an animal you are trying to train. It is all right to punish animals for this reason, but men deserve to be punished strictly as a matter of justice.

8. Oliver Wendell Holmes said that retribution is just disguised vengeance.

9. Roussea said that there is not a single evildoer who could not be turned to some good.

10. Utilitarians would punish an innocent man, if the deterrant effect had enough benefit to it.

11. Aquinas said that retribution is not only the primary but the essential, indispensable condition in punishment.

There, 11 potential points of discussion. Any takers?

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 12/06, 2:11pm)

Post 114

Tuesday, December 6, 2005 - 6:01pm

Ever read Otto Bird's The Idea of Justice ?

Post 115

Tuesday, December 6, 2005 - 7:03pm

No I haven't, Robert. Though from knowing you and taking a small gamble, I'd guess he's a retributivist. Is that true?

Ed

Post 116

Tuesday, December 6, 2005 - 7:27pm

He takes no position, but points out three basic understandings as to the nature of what is considered 'justice', following a 10 point 'plus or minus' set of positions [been many years since reading him, so is all memory at the moment]...it is an attempt to let one understand how other persons holding different views of justice can thus hold them... Rand reccommended it, so that indicates about how long its been since reading it......

Post 117

Wednesday, December 7, 2005 - 4:15pm

Just read Bidinotto's fine piece of work ...

To this end, I have recommended what I call "progressive sentencing." A first-time felon gets a jail term of X. Upon his second conviction�even for a less serious felony�he gets a mandatory minimum term of at least 2X. For felony number three, he would get 4X. The geometric increases in prison terms would insure that chronic criminals would soon take themselves out of circulation for good.

Hah, love it!

Ed

Post 118

Friday, December 9, 2005 - 1:05pm

How's this?

Humans need an environment of just desserts -- in order to act well and gain value. Punishment is the social enforcement of that aspect of reality (a metaphysical actuality), that hinges on the relation of human nature and our social environment.

Proportional retribution is in the interests of all potentially-productive moral agents. Proportional retribution tracks actions to consequences in a manner that lets humans navigate the moral waters best. It's good to know good from bad, but it's better to know really good from good and bad, and really bad from good and bad. Proportional retribution does this better than any alternative.

Ed

Post 119

Friday, December 9, 2005 - 2:58pm