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Post 40

Sunday, November 27, 2005 - 9:54amSanction this postReply
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Hi Jon,
You would rather err on the side of the criminal, while I choose to err on the side of the victim.
I'd rather err on the side of rationality. Accordingly, brutishness toward anyone disturbs me. But I don't think abstaining from playing into the irrationality of a victim is brutish. I find it honorable.

Jon, I want to end by saying I sincerely commend you for and appreciate your honesty, and while I don't accept your view, I do sympathize with it.

Jordan


Post 41

Sunday, November 27, 2005 - 1:27pmSanction this postReply
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Well shit, Jordan, aren’t you nice. In the spirit of sympathizing with each other’s positions, let me say I too want to avoid “brutishness,” because I think I understand the spirit of what you are supporting. (In fact, the photo I use at Solo is aimed at brutes.)

I mean, for example, it would be brutish to treat my radio theft as though he had beaten me up by the tracks. Do you agree that it would be pussyish to treat he who beat me up by the tracks as though he had only stolen my radio?

I am with you in that we should avoid brutishness, but may we just barely avoid it? I have given two situations, the theft of my radio, and the father of a murdered daughter (or any other similarly victimized: the husband, children etc.) and the level of retribution, or whatever you say I should call it, that I consider appropriate for those cases, namely: Three hours cleaning public toilets for stealing my radio and the life (which could just be life without possibility of parole…) for the raped and murdered daughter. Are those brutish? Please really do answer this: What, if any, would you allow? Under your craziest hypothetical where deterrence is inoperative, rights are secure going forward because of X, Y, and Z—if there’s nothing left but retribution, no other theory of justice under which we could touch the guy who stole my radio—then how much, if any, retribution would you call shy of brutish? Please, if you answer only one thing from this, make it this last.

Oh, and thank you sincerely for the honesty compliment.

Jon


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Post 42

Sunday, November 27, 2005 - 3:25pmSanction this postReply
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Hey Jon,
Three hours cleaning public toilets for stealing my radio and the life (which could just be life without possibility of parole…) for the raped and murdered daughter. Are those brutish?
It depends. A worse crime often calls for a more severe deterrent, so punishment in proportion to crime is often a good idea, but not always. Sometimes we know of a less severe deterrent. Like maybe the murderer-rapist would be "cured" if we castrated him (erm...is castration less severe than life in prison?). Costs being equal (which is not usually a realistic assumption, but work with me here), it's worse to use a more severe punishment when a less severe punishment is available. The trouble is that it's often really hard to tell whether we've deterred the criminal, or whether his punishment deters other would-be criminals. I have trouble with our current system when we release criminals who walk out of prison still an obvious threat, often a worse threat than when they walked in.


Best,
Jordan

(Edited by Jordan on 11/27, 3:28pm)

(Edited by Jordan on 11/27, 9:04pm)


Post 43

Monday, November 28, 2005 - 1:53pmSanction this postReply
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Jon wrote, "Well shit, Jordan, aren’t you nice. In the spirit of sympathizing with each other’s positions, let me say I too want to avoid 'brutishness,' because I think I understand the spirit of what you are supporting. (In fact, the photo I use at Solo is aimed at brutes.)"

Yeah, but it makes you look like one yourself. Seriously, Jon, I'd can the photo, if I were you. All it does is give people the wrong impression. If you wear an attitude on your sleeve, people aren't going to know that it's reserved for those who deserve it (e.g., the brutes). They're going to think, with some justification, that it's directed to the world at large. You're an intelligent guy; don't mislead us into thinking otherwise.

- Bill



Post 44

Monday, November 28, 2005 - 3:47pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan wrote, "A worse crime often calls for a more severe deterrent, so punishment in proportion to crime is often a good idea, but not always. Sometimes we know of a less severe deterrent. Like maybe the murderer-rapist would be "cured" if we castrated him (erm...is castration less severe than life in prison?). Costs being equal (which is not usually a realistic assumption, but work with me here), it's worse to use a more severe punishment when a less severe punishment is available. The trouble is that it's often really hard to tell whether we've deterred the criminal, or whether his punishment deters other would-be criminals. I have trouble with our current system when we release criminals who walk out of prison still an obvious threat, often a worse threat than when they walked in."

But isn't there are a problem with the less severe punishment?--the problem being that the more we reduce the severity of the punishment, the greater are the chances of the person thinking that the crime is worth committing. So if all the murderer-rapist gets is castration, he might think that the act is worth doing, since there's no guarantee that he'll be apprehended and that even if he is, all he'll get is castration, which (let us say) he thinks he can live with. In other words, whereas before, murdering the victim was not a risk worth taking, now it does become worth taking, because if the victim is no longer alive, she won't be able to testify against him, so that even if he is apprehended, he may not be convicted. He may therefore find it in his interests to murder her in order to reduce the chances of a conviction, whereas if the punishment were more severe, he might think twice about it.

I do agree that we should judge a policy by its consequences. If a "proportional" degree of punishment had the effect of increasing the crime rate rather than reducing it, then it is difficult to see how it could be justified, unless our philosophy of punishment were rooted in retribution and indifferent to consequences. In fact, of course, proportionality does tend to produce the best consequences, if only because a greater punishment for greater offenses discourages them more than if the punishment were the same as for lesser offenses. That, I think, is the real reason why proportionality tends to be favored, even if not altogether consistently, over more draconian methods: it works.

What is interesting is that Objectivism is somewhat equivocal on the merits of the consequentialist and/or deterrence rationale. I had previously quoted a statement from Peikoff in OPAR, which suggests that his view is consequentialist (insofar as he bases his advocacy of principles on the consequences to which they lead). Nevertheless, in the January 1963 issue of The Objectivist Newsletter, Nathaniel Branden writes as follows: "Does the man who commits willful murder, in the absence of any extenuating circumstances, deserve to have his own life forfeited? Here, the answer is unequivocally: Yes. Such a man deserves to die--not as 'social revenge' or as an 'example' to future potential murderers--but as the logical and just consequence of his own act: as an expression of the moral principle that no man may violate the rights of another with impunity, that no man may take the life of another and still retain the right to his own, that no man may profit from an evil of this kind or escape the consequences of having committed it." (p. 3)

The question that Branden's statement leaves unanswered is, why? Why is taking the life of a murderer just? Branden says that the reason is not social revenge (retribution) or as an example to future potential murderers (deterrence), but as the logical and just consequence of the murderer's own act. Unfortunately, this answer tells us only what are not the reasons for executing the murderer, but does not tell us what are the reasons. It tells us that the murderer deserves to die not for the sake of retribution or deterrence, but as the logical and just consequence of his own act--as an expression of the principle that he may not profit from the murder. But, again, this answer is circular and question begging. What we want to know is: Why is taking the murderer's life the logical and just consequence of his own act--why is it the case that he must not profit from the murder? That is a question that begs for an answer, especially since both retribution and deterrence have been ruled out. I could understand it, if the reason that the murderer must not profit from his own act is that allowing him to do so sets a bad example for future potential murderers, but Branden explicitly disavows such a reason. Moreover, his answer (which is also Rand's, since she approved it as part of her philosophy) suggests a kind of rationalism or ethical intrinsicism: the murderer deserves to die, because executing him is logical and just. End of story.

In all fairness, it should be noted that Branden does not believe in capital punishment, but only because the criminal justice system is not infallible. If we could know for certain that an accused murderer is guilty, then his claim is that the person deserves to die.

- Bill


Post 45

Monday, November 28, 2005 - 4:07pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Bill,
But isn't there are a problem with the less severe punishment?--the problem being that the more we reduce the severity of the punishment, the greater are the chances of the person thinking that the crime is worth committing.
My point was that if the less severe punishment deters just at least as much as, if not better than,  the more severe punishment -- e.g., if castration deterred rape-murders just as much as life in prison deterred -- then there wouldn't be a problem with the less severe punishment. But if the less severe punishment failed to deter as much as the more severe punishment, then yes, that'd be a problem.

Also, like I said in post 42, it's not always the case that a more severe punishment equals a greater deterrent, or that a lesser punishment equals a worse deterrent. If we know 3 years in jail is what it tends to take to successfully deter a criminal, and ignoring for now the costs and that punishment's effect on crime rates, then it'd be wrong for us to stick the criminal in jail for, say, 10 years. Likewise, again ignoring costs and the effect on crime rates, it'd be wrong to jail a criminal for 3 years if we know it takes 10 to deter the criminal.

Jordan


Post 46

Monday, November 28, 2005 - 11:41pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Jordan,

I wrote,

But isn't there are a problem with the less severe punishment?--the problem being that the more we reduce the severity of the punishment, the greater are the chances of the person thinking that the crime is worth committing.

Jordan replied,

My point was that if the less severe punishment deters just at least as much as, if not better than, the more severe punishment -- e.g., if castration deterred rape-murders just as much as life in prison deterred -- then there wouldn't be a problem with the less severe punishment. But if the less severe punishment failed to deter as much as the more severe punishment, then yes, that'd be a problem.

Right, and I agree with your conditional hypothesis. My point was that the antecedent of the conditional will never in fact be satisfied, because people respond to incentives, so that if the incentives against rape and murder are reduced by virtue of a lighter sentence, then more rapes and murders will result. Your assumption is that in some cases a lighter sentence will not increase the tendency to commit these crimes, but in fact reduce it. That is a premise that needs to be checked, because it suggests that incentives don't matter.

I agree that castration, to the extent that it reduced the rapist's desire to have sex with an unwilling victim, might very well reduce his incentive to commit this crime more than would a prison term of limited duration. But the question is: would such a punishment deter potential future rapists who had not yet been castrated? I don't think so. In fact, to the extent that castration was viewed by them as amounting to a lighter sentence, it would increase the likelihood of their committing this crime, because they would have less to lose from a lighter sentence than from a heavier one.

- Bill

Post 47

Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 7:56amSanction this postReply
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"Your assumption is that in some cases a lighter sentence will not increase the tendency to commit these crimes, but in fact reduce it. That is a premise that needs to be checked, because it suggests that incentives don't matter."

Or it could indicate that in some cases we need to experiment to adjust the severity. It doesn't imply that incentives don't matter, so much as imply that in some cases we may not yet have the "let the punishment fit the crime" formula as precise as it can be made.



Post 48

Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 7:58amSanction this postReply
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Jordon confessed during a custodial interview: "I'm a third year law student, and Moeller is also in law school."
I went back and read everything both of you wrote.  I agree more closely with you than with the other Michael M.  However, in no case did I read anything particularly compelling. 
All of this gets complicated.  Why do people live in communities?  Whence the assumption that doing so creates obligations or the recognition of rights?  Why are these rights so different from one community to another? While the Ninth Amendment is a good argument for the right to privacy, in a perfectly capitalist world without public property (a contradiction in terms), there would be no right to travel.  Of course, today, you could argue for such a right.  Does it exist?  These questions impinge directly on the arguments for punishing people who violate the "rights" of others as well as for demanding restitution for the violation of a "right."

I like to contrast any proposed libertarian society (just like now, but different) with the Spacer worlds of Asimov's robot mysteries.  (We see more of Aurora and Dawn and less of Solaris, if I remember the details.)  These planets are thinly populated by isolationists served by machineries and mechanisms of various intelligences.  The people live on huge estates and rarely come into contact with each other. Not even the hint of "government" is evident.  I wonder how such a society would perceive "freedom of speech" or even "title."  If through action or inaction you damaged your neighbor's robot plow, that could be handled by direct restitution.  However, in those societies, showing up on someone's doorstep unannounced would be a breech for which there might be no possible compensation.  ("I felt so violated!" said the victim.)

I serve on a city-county citizen advisory board for community corrections.  At one meeting, the county prosecutor said to me, "Every business depends on repeat customers, even ours."

(Edited by Michael E. Marotta on 11/29, 8:02am)


Post 49

Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 9:44amSanction this postReply
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Ahh - but his is not a business he runs, and the 'customers' are hardly voluntary...

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Post 50

Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 10:12amSanction this postReply
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Hi Bill,
so that if the incentives against rape and murder are reduced by virtue of a lighter sentence, then more rapes and murders will result.
I think you think that the greater the punishment, then the lesser the incentive to avoid crimes; while the lesser the punishment, the greater the incentive to commit crimes. Such is not the case. First, we have empirics that show that at some point a harsher punishment does not deter anymore than a lesser punishment, that something like 10 years won't deter more than 3. Second, we have empirics that show that some lesser punishments deter more than greater punishments, that rehab or a halfway house or a fine deters more than prison time. (Indeed, this aligns with  Jeff's appeal to empirics.)

Two points might be causing confusion here. First, different people are deterred in different ways because they respond differently to different incentives. different different different. Have I said "different" enough? Gah. A particular cocaine-addicted thief might be better deterred through rehab than through jailtime. A particular rapist might be better deterred through castration than through jailtime. A particular insider trader might be better deterred through a hefty fine than through jailtime. Given this, rather than say "punishment should fit the crime," we should say "punishment should fit the criminal."

Second, there're two types of deterrence: specific and general. Specific deterrence focuses on deterring a particular criminal. General deterrence, somewhat harder to define, focuses on deterring some population from committing the crime that some particular criminal or criminals were punished for. Example: We jail a thief for 3 years. By jailing him for 3 yeras, we specifically deter him from committing more thefts, and we generally deter other would-be thieves from committing similar thefts.

I was hoping to avoid this distinction because it complicates things a bit. I think you, Bill, might be worried that castration, even if it specifically deters, doesn't generally deter. IOW, while the castrated rapist will not commit more rapes, you worry that other would-be rapists will not be deterred with castration as their only prospective punishment. This problem is largely mitigated with a "punishment should fit the criminal" approach. We could have a barrage of different punishments for different rapists. The would-be rapist who is better deterred by a prospective punishment of 15 years in jail would have that as his prospective punishment, while the would-be rapist who is better deterred by a prospective castration would have that as his prospective punishment.

In other news, I find general deterrence difficult to justify under Objectivism because it tends to use one person as a means to the ends of others. Say we catch a thief. This thief could be specifically deterred, never to commit theft again, if jailed for 1 year. But this would not generally deter other would-be thieves; a 3-year sentence would. What do we do? Utilitarians have an easy time justifying the 3-year sentence. I think libertarians (including Objectivists) have a harder time. Again, I think "punishment should fit the criminal" is a good way to avoid the problems with general deterrence.

Jordan


Post 51

Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 10:07amSanction this postReply
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what abut psycopath and sociopath ? foks that cant understnad that they did somthing wrong and will do that agin if nobody starts to give them nanobots in ther brain or some other brainchemcials  that they start too feel empathy ?

Post 52

Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 12:04pmSanction this postReply
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polaris
what abut psycopath and sociopath ? foks that cant understnad that they did somthing wrong and will do that agin if nobody starts to give them nanobots in ther brain or some other brainchemcials  that they start too feel empathy ?
Ignoring cost and general deterrence, then give 'em the nanobots, unless you can find a lesser punishment that equally or better deters.

Jordan


Post 53

Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 12:05pmSanction this postReply
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Can someone tell me where to find info about this site closing? I don't know anything about it but just read Phil's post.

Post 54

Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 12:08pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan-
There is a big announcement from Joe at the very top of the home page.


Post 55

Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 12:27pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Jordan,

Good post. However, I have a bone to pick. You wrote,

I was hoping to avoid this distinction because it complicates things a bit. I think you, Bill, might be worried that castration, even if it specifically deters, doesn't generally deter. IOW, while the castrated rapist will not commit more rapes, you worry that other would-be rapists will not be deterred with castration as their only prospective punishment. This problem is largely mitigated with a "punishment should fit the criminal" approach. We could have a barrage of different punishments for different rapists. The would-be rapist who is better deterred by a prospective punishment of 15 years in jail would have that as his prospective punishment, while the would-be rapist who is better deterred by a prospective castration would have that as his prospective punishment.

The problem is determining what punishment best fits a particular individual. How are you doing to do that? Moreover, even if you could do it for a particular criminal once he or she has been convicted, which is unlikely, you don't know who the future criminals are going to be. Therefore, if you are going to fashion a punishment in order to deter would-be criminals, it has to be a general punishment. It can't possibly be made to fit their individual idiosyncrasies, because you don't know who they are and what would or wouldn't be likely to deter them as individuals. You can assume only that they respond to incentives and that they are more likely to be deterred by a greater punishment than by a lesser one.

- Bill

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Post 56

Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 1:55pmSanction this postReply
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Bill,

Sorry, but it is difficult for me to continue, mostly because I have exams in a week.  But secondly, I am frustrated by what I think are obvious points.  As far as I can see, the only thing "circular" are the hoops you are jumping through to make "deterrence" the primary goal.  Also, I would suggest getting ahold of Robert Bidinotto's article on this topic, I think it is significantly better than Peikoff's tape.

Which brings me to another point, please recognize differences consequentialism in law and consequences in action.  Most definitely do NOT put AR or LP and the former category.  If you have heard AR's tape on "Objective Law", you would see she most definitely rejects this.  To be more specific, she speaks about the complete non-objectivity of "preventative laws", another favorite of the utilitarians (and it seems you as well).  And NO, Bill, I am not putting you in the category with the other utilitarians, I am just pointing out what is down the road and that they, in fact, are more consistent.  You are trying to salvage with an appeal to an individual right system, it can't be done when you take the focus off the individual actors.

Let me try with a couple of last scenarios to see if this improves anything.  Say, for instance, your best friend or your wife were coming out of a store and some thug came up to them, stabbed them in the neck, and took off with all their money.  Now, if you knew that punishing him would have NO deterrent effect--it would not deter one criminal from committing one crime--would you punish him?  Since there is no deterrent effect, do you see any reason to punish the criminal or would you let them continue to roam the streets like any other citizen?

Another mistake you make, very common to most utilitarians, is to treat criminals as the "economic man" where they sit down and perform a cost/benefit analysis on committing this crime or that crime and weight it against the punishment.  I hate to tell you this, Bill, but a 30-year sentence for petty theft will not necessarily turn a thief into a murderer.  You are working off of a faulty assumption that I do not think is supported by crime rate statistics.  But it does bring me to a 2nd question:  if it was proven that cutting off a hand did reduce theft crimes and there was NO increase in other more violent crimes, would you favor it?  In other words, this heavier sentencing has a greater deterrent effect on that specific crime with no effects on other crimes, would you advocate it?  If not the cutting off of a hand, how about a 30-year sentence in prison under the same scenario (if you don't like the physical brutality of it, even though it fits the deterrence theory)? 

Last question: how do you make a rape victim or murder victim "whole" again?  I want to repeat one thing I wrote to Jordan, I am not against "restitution" per se. I think it is fine if a criminal works to pay some measure of damages as part of an overall punishment, but one that is based on incarceration.

Regards,
Michael

(Edited by Michael Moeller on 11/29, 2:09pm)


Post 57

Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 1:58pmSanction this postReply
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Thanks Jody,

Bill,

Figuring out which punishment best fits a particular individual is indeed tricky, but not impossible. We are learning more and more about the idiosyncracies of classes of criminals. We can see stuff like culture, lifestyle, childhood experience, income level, job type, age, and family relationships as factors in crime and deterrence. We can measure how a class of criminals who share a similar income, age, culture, or whatever responds to different punishments.

For example, we can study how jail affects cocaine-addicted thieves. Studies show that a cocaine-addict's demand for cocaine is quite inelastic. That is, he won't stop buying cocaine even if we substantially raise its cost. If he can't afford it, he'll go to greate lengths -- i.e., he'll steal -- to get it. Currently, part of cocaine's cost is the risk of punishment. Because the cocaine-addict's demand for cocaine is quite inelastic, making his prospective crime 3 years or 5 years or even 10 years jailtime won't make a difference. Crime rates and recidivism rates for cocaine-addicted thieves won't change. Meanwhile, other studies show that what will make a difference is 1-year rehab through a drug court.  

Jordan


Post 58

Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 2:22pmSanction this postReply
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Jordan writes:
Figuring out which punishment best fits a particular individual is indeed tricky, but not impossible. We are learning more and more about the idiosyncracies of classes of criminals. We can see stuff like culture, lifestyle, childhood experience, income level, job type, age, and family relationships as factors in crime and deterrence. We can measure how a class of criminals who share a similar income, age, culture, or whatever responds to different punishments.
This is the end of the road of the utilitarian position--selective punishment.  So instead of the punishment fitting the crime, we tailor punishments to criminals and their "idiosyncracies".  Why not lump criminals into some ad hoc "classes" to dole out punishment based on their "income", "culture", "age", "job type", etc., or so they say.  Hmmmm, let's see, we have a 25 year old white male who drives a delivery truck, makes $40K/year, listens to classic rock, comes from a single family home....what do the statistics say about how this "class" responds to different punishments?  Talk about the arbitrary.  Good Lord, Jordan. 

Michael


Post 59

Tuesday, November 29, 2005 - 2:37pmSanction this postReply
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Oh, let him have his selective punishments, Michael. With some luck, my radio thief would turn out to be a one-in-million-weirdo for whom only castration would deter.

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