Partial Birth Abortion: ARI vs. Ayn Rand

What is wrong with me? I keep scratching my behind, but I haven't gotten pregnant yet!

I've heard some convincing arguments that gluteal epidermis is just as human as a blastula.

Damn you universe for not instantiating my earnest convictions! Damn you!

I think it's Bush's fault.

Ted

Post 81

Wednesday, May 30, 2007 - 7:21pm

Ted, take your medication.

Post 82

Wednesday, May 30, 2007 - 7:33pm

But which, Jon? Which?

Post 83

Wednesday, May 30, 2007 - 11:10pm

I wrote (to Dennis), "I also don't agree with your view of abstract principles -- which, if I understand you correctly, is that they are simply rules of thumb that do not necessarily apply in all cases. The purpose of a moral principle is to serve as a guide to action. Yes, it has to be based on concretes, but as a principle it must be absolute and exceptionless, if it is to serve its intended purpose. This is not to say that principles are not context dependent, but the context must be included in the principles either explicitly or by implication, such that within that context, they are absolute and exceptionless."

He replied,

I must confess I find your wording utterly confounding. It is as though you want to sound like you grasp the significance of context when in fact you do not. No, I do not view principles as 'rules of thumb.' I regard them as abstractions which, to be applied, must involve consideration of the factual context. Appreciating the importance of the specific context is (very often) exception-making. Principles are not intended to be utilized while your brain is on idle.

Of course, utilizing principles requires intellectual discernment in identifying the relevant context and in determining what abstract principles are applicable. I certainly don't disagree with that, but don't abstractions apply without exception to all and only those concretes subsumed under them? For instance, the abstraction "flower" applies without exception to all flowers and only to flowers. It does not exclude any flowers and does not include any non-flowers. One cannot make an exception in the case of weeds. The same is true for abstract moral principles. As I said in the statement you quoted, context is certainly relevant, but it must be included in the principle, so that qua abstraction -- qua principle -- there are no exceptions to it.

You quoted the following from Peikoff: "Leaving aside the claims of children on their parents, no person by the mere fact of his existence or needs has a claim on the assets of others..." (OPAR, p. 287), and replied,

Hmmmm. Looks like an exception to a principle based on context.

It's not an exception to a legitimate principle of conduct, but is in fact a part of that principle. The principle Peikoff is referring to here is not that "no adult or child, by the mere fact of his existence or needs, has a claim on the assets of others." The principle is, "no person, by the mere fact of his existence or needs, has a claim on the assets of others, with the exception of the claims of children on their parents." This entire statement, including its exception clause, is the principle.

You again quoted Peikoff, this time on the virtue of honesty: "Lying is absolutely wrong--under certain conditions. It is wrong when a man does it to obtain a value...[But there are situations where it is moral to lie even though doing so does not represent a refusal to serve the ends of evil.] For example, lying is necessary and proper in certain cases to protect one's privacy from snoopers."

The principle to which Peikoff is referring is not that lying is wrong under all circumstances, but that lying is wrong when one does it to obtain a value. When one does it to protect a value, such as to thwart a kidnapper or protect one's privacy, then lying is perfectly legitimate. So the principle Peikoff is defending is that "lying to obtain a value (rather than to protect a value) is always wrong. That is his principle, and it is one that permits of no exceptions. The principle, "Thou shalt not lie" is not a legitimate principle, precisely because there are situations in which it is not only permissible but morally obligatory to lie. Is it your view that "Thou shalt not lie" is a legitimate principle, but one which nevertheless has certain exceptions? My view is that if there are legitimate exceptions to it, then it is not a legitimate principle to begin with.

You continue with the quote from Peikoff,

"An analysis covering such detail belongs, however, in a treatise on ethics...The proper approach is to recognize that virtues are broad abstractions which one must apply to concrete situations by a process of thought..." (OPAR, p. 278)

Here your ellipses indicate the omission of some important context, which I think should be included. (By the way, the portion you quoted is found on pages 275 and 276, not on page 278.) Quoting Peikoff:

In discussing integrity, I said that to be good is to be good "all of the time." I can me more precise now. To be good is to obey moral principles faithfully, without a moment's exception, within the relevant context -- which one must, therefore, know and keep in mind. Virtue does not consist in obeying concrete-bound rules ("Do not lie, do not kill, do not accept help from others, make money, honor your parents, etc.") No such rules can be defended or consistently practiced; so people throw up their hands and flout all rules.
The only thing I would quarrel with here is Peikoff's terminology. I wouldn't refer to these rules as "concrete-bound," but as precisely the opposite -- as "rationalistic abstractions" that ignore the concrete cases invalidating them.
The proper approach is to recognize that virtues are broad abstractions, which one must apply to concrete situations by a process of thought. In the process, one must observe all the rules of correct epistemology, including definition by essentials and context-keeping.

I agree with this. To keep context means to keep the full principle in mind (including its qualifications), which means (quoting Peikoff) "to obey moral principles faithfully, without a moment's exception." In other words, there are no legitimate exceptions to true moral principles, only to false ones.

- Bill

Post 84

Wednesday, May 30, 2007 - 11:38pm

Dennis wrote,

Now let me fully understand the implications of your position (which, incidentally, I believe Rand would find appalling in the extreme). "Rights begin at birth" is absolute and exceptionless. So if the mother is a psychotic sadist and wants to pummel the embryo/fetus in her belly on a daily basis and listen to its sounds of anguish, she has complete freedom to do so. If she wants to take thalidomide or other drugs in a deliberate effort to cause deformities--no problem from your perspective.
If she is going to carry the child to term and give birth to it, then she is morally obligated to ensure that it develops properly while in the womb. If not, then I would say that she has a moral obligation to abort it, rather than deliberately bring a deformed or crippled child into the world.
She has full license to mangle or torture the growing life inside her in whatever manner she pleases with impunity right up until her water breaks.

I and most other people, including Rand, would be appalled if the mother were to mistreat her fetus in this manner, because it would indicate someone who is mentally unstable (and probably shouldn't be bearing a child anyway). But if the principle is that "A child cannot acquire any rights until it is born" -- if that's a full and complete statement of the principle -- then a fetus could have no rights against such actions, despite the fact that the actions are callous and inhumane.

You say that Rand would be extremely appalled at the suggestion that her statement, "A child cannot acquire any rights until it is born" means exactly what it says, viz., that a child cannot acquire any rights until it is born! Why? What other interpretation could she reasonably expect us to draw? According to your interpretation of her statement, under what circumstance would a child not acquire any rights until it is born, or a fetus not acquire the right to be treated humanely? If, in your view, there isn't any, then it would make no sense for Rand to have stated such a principle, even granting the possibility of exceptions, since she would have meant its exact opposite!

Rand was once asked if animals didn't have rights against being tortured or treated inhumanely. She replied that such treatment would disturb her greatly, because she loved animals (she even had a pet cat), but she said that she still couldn't see any way in reason to prove that they had rights against being mistreated, although she would welcome an argument proving they did. How would that response go over on national television? And if it went over badly, would that prove that there's something wrong with it? Are we now supposed to base our philosophy on consensus? At any rate, I suspect that Rand would say the same thing about mistreating a fetus as she did about mistreating an animal.

Again, your view is not that "rights begin at birth, albeit with certain exceptions." What you're saying is that rights do not begin at birth -- that before birth, the offspring acquires the right to be treated humanely. So, I don't know why you continue to insist that you are in agreement with Rand on this issue.

In my view, the mother would be criminally liable for such deliberate and/or irresponsible conduct.

I agree, but only if she brought a deformed or injured child into the world bearing the effects of such conduct. And I suspect that Rand would agree as well, but that's because by bringing the child into the world under such conditions, the mother would be violating its birth rights -- the rights that it acquires at birth. If a child is going to be brought into the world, one must do so without deliberately injuring it. There is no relevant difference between bringing a child into the world after crippling it and crippling it after bringing it into the world. In both cases, one has deliberately or through neglect created a crippled human being.

As long as she is implicitly accepting the maternal role by carrying the child, she is legally obligated to nourish that life and protect its health. None of the behaviors I just described are legal extensions of her right to control her own body, which is the absolute, fundamental underlying principle justifying abortion. But if your "absolute" is "rights begin at birth" (a derivative, less fundamental principle), what legal recourse do you have to suggest she cannot treat that 'thing' inside her in any way she pleases?

See above.

Your supposed 'elucidation' of my position is utterly incoherent, so I will restate it here. In the usual biological scenario, "rights begin at birth" is a perfectly adequate way of describing the legal status of the fetus or baby. There is no reason to invoke the principle of viability.
But you're not upholding the principle that "rights begin at birth"; you're upholding the principle that rights begin before birth, because you're saying that the offspring has certain rights against being mistreated prior to its being born, even if the mother does not choose to bring it into the world.
However, if the mother becomes depressed or anxious or has other reasons to rid herself of a late-term fetus, a more fundamental principle--the mother's right to control her own body--comes into play. That principle--which certainly is an absolute--defines her freedom of action in that context. She can rid herself of the fetus, but only in a way that preserves the nascent capacity of the unborn life to survive on its own.
If she has an absolute right to control her own body, then why doesn't she have the right to rid herself of the fetus in the least painful and difficult way possible? Why doesn't she have a right to avoid the pain and discomfort of a normal birth by having a partial-birth abortion? You're still saying that the fetus has a right to be treated in a certain manner, e.g., one which preserves the capacity to survive on its own.
If there is a conflict between fetal viability and the mother's health or safety, the mother's interests prevail because she is an independent living entity and the child has not yet achieved that stature.

What about the interests of the mother in other respects, such as avoiding the pain and discomfort of a normal child birth? Why shouldn't those interests prevail over those of the fetus?

- Bill

(Edited by William Dwyer
on 5/30, 11:50pm)

Post 85

Thursday, May 31, 2007 - 3:05am

What I don't understand is how any Objectivist could actually believe that the reality of the psychological role wiped the biological role out of existence.

To me, any attempt at that would be Objectivism on its ear.

Well, if Objectivism had nothing to do with cognition, you'd be right!

Post 86

Thursday, May 31, 2007 - 8:26am

Jon:

Your "responsibility" argument is akin to saying that if a person knows that sitting too close to the television might impair his eyesight, but he does it anyway and it does impair his vision, it's wrong for him then to have corrective laser surgery. Why is that wrong?

What life of another is terminated in your 'akin' analogy? I don't see the analogy.

Here is your analogy readjusted to the current discussion: If through our actions we invite someone to share the beach with us, and they show up and end up blocking our vision of the sunset, is it wrong for us to obliterate them from existence with a laser?

Oh, but we didn't intend to invite them to the beach. We only intended to perform the precise same actions in this universe, as it is, that would result in their invitation. Say, we really, really enjoy creative writing, and we only intended to write an invitation to that person to come join us at the beach, and then we mailed it. As far as our deep psychological needs to participate in creative writing, that was the end of it. We were doing that in support of our psychological needs to write creative invitations, and that is all. We intended the universe of consequences of our actions to end right there.

But, any objective realilization of the universe, as it is, objectively sees a connection between invitation->mailing->delivery->acceptance->arrival at our doorstep of the invited.

But damn, when through our actions we invite them, and they show up, yes, I'd say we have an obligation not to wipe them out of existence. Its not like they were asking or demanding anything of us, including the invitation. The responsibility is ours, the obligation is ours.

Or not.

"Or not" provides us a better view of the sunset no matter what our actions are. At least, until the mob shows up for a better view, armed with bigger lasers.

regards,
Fred

Post 87

Thursday, May 31, 2007 - 8:51am

Dennis wrote,

I cited the "right to bear arms" as another example of the importance of maintaining a dual focus on abstract principle and concrete application, and you responded by saying that the scenarios I described would be prohibited because they both constituted "assault" or threats of violence.
I didn't use the word "assault."
So your position would be that gun ownership (or legal conduct in general) should be restricted by anything that others regard as a threat?
I didn't say, "what others regard as a threat." I was referring to what can rationally be considered a threat.
If that is your "absolute" principle, I presume you would allow the police to lock up men with loud voices and hot tempers but have no general restrictions on the commercial sale of assault rifles, machine guns or AK 47s.

That's not my position at all, and I don't understand how you could have arrived at that conclusion. The two examples you gave in your previous post were that someone parks a tank on their front lawn and keeps it pointed at my living room and that my neighbor enjoys experimenting with hydrogen bombs in his basement. I said that these two actions should be prohibited on the grounds that they constitute a threat of physical force. The tank certainly does. Why should someone be able to point a tank or even a handgun at me for no reason? If he does that, I'm justified in viewing it as a threat to my safety. The same with the hydrogen bomb. Why would you conclude from that that I believe that men with loud voices and hot tempers should be locked up, but that there should be no general restrictions on the commercial sale of assault rifles, machine guns or AK 47s?

In any case, you need a principle by which to decide whether or not assault rifles, machine guns or AK 47s should be legal. If you decided that they should be illegal, what is the principle on which you made that decision? The point is, we decide these issues based on whether or not we think they fall under a general principle of conduct; we don't decide them irrespective of principles.

I certainly agree that "assault" should be against the law. The legal dictionary defines "assault" as the crime or tort of threatening or attempting to inflict immediate offensive physical contact or bodily harm that one has the present ability to inflict and that puts the victim in fear of such harm or contact. Clearly, however, the kind of explicit threat which constitutes an assault is a much narrower category than that of a "threat."

Well, a threat of force doesn't have to be immediate in order to justify intervention. If a person is planning to detonate a bomb in three days, and is caught drawing up the plans and gathering the explosives, he can justifiably be arrested. At any rate, I don't see the point of these examples, unless it's to illustrate that there are cases in which it is difficult to decide whether or not they involve a violation of rights. But that doesn't mean that legitimate principles are not absolute and unexceptionable.

It would simply not be possible for the government to intervene each and every time there was an apparent threat to use force.
"Apparent" threat. Do you mean that the threat isn't real or bona fide? Of course, if it isn't something that a reasonable person would consider a legitimate threat -- if it's just someone's paranoid fantasy -- then it shouldn't be against the law. If it is a real threat but the police cannot respond to it, that doesn't make it any less of a violation of principle.
Only those situations which amounted to the de facto initiation of force would justify intervention or retaliation--which is why assault (like any abstract principle) also requires a dual focus on concretes . . .

I agree that one has to identify which particular cases fall under the principle.

. . . and the application to specific situations necessarily involves exception-making.

No, it doesn't, because a principle qua principle permits no exceptions.

The freedoms of press, speech and assembly, the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to trial by jury--all of the rights delineated in the Bill of Rights--all must admit of various exceptions and conditions. Under your system of "absolute, exceptionless" rights, the freedom of the press would be extended to allow the revealing of secrets vital to national security, the right to a fair trial would be extended to enemy combatants and foreign dictators, and road owners could legally deny egress to other property owners in a given neighborhood.

Revealing secrets vital to national security is not what is meant by freedom of the press. There can be no such thing as the freedom to violate someone else's freedom, and that includes aiding and abetting those who would violate it. Freedom of the press is a special case of freedom of action, and there can be no such thing as the freedom to take an action that violates freedom of action. Revealing secrets vital to national security is not an expression of freedom to which we are entitled to make an exception; it is a violation of freedom to which we are entitled to make no exceptions.

As for the right to a fair trial being extended to enemy combatants, we already know they're guilty; if they weren't, they wouldn't be enemy combatants. There is no need for a fair trial, the purpose of which is to ascertain their guilt or innocence.

As for road owners legally denying egress to other property owners, people who are using and paying for these roads would do so only with the understanding that they have the right of egress as well as ingress. There are certain (explicit or implied) agreements in effect when using someone else's property; these agreements do not constitute an exception to property rights, but govern their scope and implementation. The principle that a property owner can evict you from his property, for example, does not mean that he can do so at 35,000 feet if his property happens to be an airplane on which you are a passenger. Again, this is not an exception to the principle of property rights; it is part of the principle.

As is so often the case, a concrete ethical/political issue has unearthed a much more fundamental difference on the deeper level of metaphysics and epistemology. And that would be fine, except for the fact you will no doubt continue to argue as an Objectivist instead of a Platonist.

I had to read this twice before I realized what it is that you were trying to say. Obviously, I do argue "as an Objectivist instead of a Platonist," because I am an Objectivist instead of a Platonist. But I soon realized that what you were intending to say is that I argue "as if I were" an Objectivist instead of the Platonist that you think I am.

Again, I am not saying that we don't derive our principles empirically from observing reality, nor am I saying that we don't have to look at reality and take account of the context in order to apply them properly. I am simply saying that principles, understood within their proper context, permit of no exceptions. This is not Platonism, nor is it something that Objectivism or Peikoff disagrees with.

It would be so much better for everyone if we could simply acknowledge the fundamentality of the disagreement and move on. But that never happens, which is why these noxious threads end up being a total waste of everyone's time and energy.

I don't think they're a waste of time and energy at all. Much can be learned from these discussions, especially when one is forced to examine one's ideas and to clarify them.

Abandon hope for the future of Objectivism, all ye who enter here.

Oh, give me a break! :-/

- Bill

Post 88

Thursday, May 31, 2007 - 8:57am

Teresa:

Well, if Objectivism had nothing to do with cognition, you'd be right!

If Objectivism holds that the reality of Rand's romantic('as it should be')psychological role of sex wipes the biological role out of existence in the universe as it is, then you've convinced me that Objectivism has nothing at all to do with cognition.

We are not talking about the many instances of successfully willing the act to be recreational/psychological only. None of those successful instances result in a life, or the consideration of the need for an abortion.

We are talking about the objective failures to accomplish that, the failures in which the universe exposes the reality of the biological role of our actions, holy psychological intentions be damned. It is only those instances of failure that could possibly result in a consideration of the topic 'abortion.'

The reality of the psychological role is just as real in either case. But the existence of the biologiocal role is uneaffected, obviously, in the cases of failure which result in the need to consider an abortion.

There is not one biological requirement in one case ("I intend this act to be recreational/psychological") and another biological requirement in the other case ("I intend this to be an act of procreation.") The requirements of the universe, as it is, and with us in it as we are, are identical and unkowing and uncaring of our holy intentions in both cases. Healthy sperm meets healthy egg at right time and place. "I didn't will/wish/want/intend that to happen" does not impact the reality of it happening as a consequence of our actions, it only exposes our incompetence in acting responsibly to realize our intent.

regards,
Fred

Post 89

Thursday, May 31, 2007 - 9:00am

Fred: "What life of another is terminated in your 'akin' analogy? I don't see the analogy."

I wasn't addressing the argument that an embryo or fetus is the "life of another." I was addressing the argument that people must permanently accept the consequences of any of their actions, which is what I thought you were saying in this context.

"Here is your analogy readjusted to the current discussion: If through our actions we invite someone to share the beach with us, and they show up and end up blocking our vision of the sunset, is it wrong for us to obliterate them from existence with a laser?"

Well, if you put it that way, we're obviously back to the point that an embryo or fetus is an individual human being. It's just a living part of a woman's body, albeit with only half her genetic code. If you view it as an individual human being with a right to life, however, nothing is going to change your mind. You're going to think Ayn Rand was wrong on this issue regardless. All I can say is that you're conflating a mere potential person with an actual person, and I'll leave it at that.

Dennis, on the other hand, is claiming ARI is misrepresenting Ayn Rand on the issue. He seems to think AR didn't really believe that rights only apply after the point of birth, despite numerous times at Ford Hall Forum and elsewhere when she emphatically said an embryo or fetus isn't an individual human being and has no rights. I think Bill D. answered him excellently in his posts above.

I'll just add one point: A blatantly irrational woman who would torture a fetus would be viewed as disgusting under Objectivism, much like a person who tortures a dog or cat. But just as in the latter instance, the question of "rights" doesn't apply, and there's no proper role for government action here.

Post 90

Thursday, May 31, 2007 - 9:59am

As for the right to a fair trial being extended to enemy combatants, we already know they're guilty; if they weren't, they wouldn't be enemy combatants. There is no need for a fair trial, the purpose of which is to ascertain their guilt or innocence.

Claiming someone is an enemy combatant doesn't make it so - needs be proved, hence need for fair trial.....

Post 91

Thursday, May 31, 2007 - 10:28am

I hate to get off topic, Bill, but I have to agree with Robert Malcolm and regretfully take you to task for this:

"As for the right to a fair trial being extended to enemy combatants, we already know they're guilty; if they weren't, they wouldn't be enemy combatants. There is no need for a fair trial, the purpose of which is to ascertain their guilt or innocence."

This position doesn't make sense. If we can "know" whether someone is an enemy combatant prior to a fair trial and therfore a fair trial is unnecessary, how come we can't ever "know" beforehand whether someone is a murderer and also dispense with a fair trial? Or a rapist? Or any other aggressor?

The purpose of a criminal trial is not to fundamentally to ascertain a person's guilt or innocence. The purpose of a criminal trial is to require the government to publicly prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt (this is why the verdict is always "guilty" or "not guilty", and not "guilty" or "innocent"). This is just as important in cases of people accused by government officials of being "enemy combatants" as it is in any domestic criminal case. I see no essential difference here.

Post 92

Thursday, May 31, 2007 - 10:30am

When through our our own actions we create a conflict, what life are we willing to immolate to resolve the conflict?

This is Rand's glaring contradiction, and through it, she invites the mob to run roguhshod over her entire philosophy.

She squirms to rationalize it by clinging to a temporal bias-- "that mass of protoplasm."   Sperm are cells. Eggs are cells.    Sperm+Egg is something else altogether, and a specific act of invitation must occur to realize same.

"That mass of protoplasm" is in the midst of a continuous individual process that begins at conception and does not end until death. There is no discontinuity of the individual process at 12 weeks, at birth, at age 5, at 13, at 21, at 50, at 65, or at 76.8 years.    That individual process arises by way of our explicit actions.   That individual process does not ask or demand anything.   There is nothing that is required of 'others' other than to refrain from the agressive act of killing it in order for that individual process to become an independent individual process, in even less of an actively dependent role that when an infant. An infant must be selarately fed, and is actively dependent. A pregnant mother has no means of or requirement to 'separately' feed her fetus!   The fetus has no way of demanding anything, and only requires that Mom not kill either herself or the fetus in order to achieve its potential. A fetus is not a parasite.   Parasites come into being without our actions or responsibility.   A fetus does not come into being on its own. A fetus comes into being as the consequence of our actions in the universe as it is.

The argument that a fetus/mass of protoplasm is 'dependent' upon another is factually less true than an infant. A comotose mother could yet feed her fetus, a comotose mother could not feed her infant. Her infant can vocally make demands, her fetus cannot.

No, all we need to do to see that 'that mass of protoplasm' is indeed life is to do nothing.

Run this experiment 6 billion times(its already been done.)   Here are 6 billion unopened boxes in the same existential state of being, but you don't know what is inside of them.     Destroy 3 billion of them at random.   Come back in 9 months, open up the remaining 3 billion boxes, and you find 3 billion infant individuals.    Can you make any reasonable conclusions about what you would or would not have found in the 3 billion other randomly chosen boxes if you had not destroyed them?   If they trulty contained nothing but 'masses of protoplasm', then in 9 months, we should expect to find 'dried up masses of protoplasm.'

I don't personally object to abortion-as-washing-hands on moral or religious grounds. I object to it on the basis of the foundational damage it does to Rand's Objectivism.    This glaring contradiction is Rand's license to the Tribe for 'others' to take what they want from any individual --including the very foundational prerequisite of that individuals life, its;' unfurling DNA process-- in any conflict based on the whim of the Tribe's convenience and/or Tribe's holy needs, holy intent, or God save us from nonsense, the Tribes Holy psychological needs as a freshly 'unified' mind/body collective.

We definitely should aspire to be more than just our cold unfurling DNA process, no doubt.   But, whater we can and should and might be or aspire to depends first on us individually, each of us, inescapably, to posess ownership of that process.    From the first moment of the first cell division, our process is contained inside of a single skin, a boundary that uniquely and objectively defines 'I' from 'others.'

One skin, one driver. That is Rand in 3 words, the most important 'one' to us each individually used twice.

The perceived conflict between skins in this instance that is used to terminate the process of another is squarely on the shoulders of the adults in the room.   The act of invitation to proceed, if not intentional, is factual. Sex does not "accidentally" happen, and the biological consequences, and more important, the philosophical consequences, of irrationally trying to separate cause and effect in the universe as it is are what I find damaging to Rand's Objectivism.

The 'Tribe' Tribe says "Objectivists? Sure they're the folks who at their core proudly support immolation of individual life based on all kinds of squirmy rationalization about what constitutes a valuable/viable life, ultimately decided by the Tribe/others. We thank them for their help with this one, without it, we'd just be beating folks over the head with rocks."

regards,
Fred

Post 93

Thursday, May 31, 2007 - 11:10am

Jon:

All I can say is that you're conflating a mere potential person with an actual person,

..and, the only requirement separating the potential person from the actual person is for you and I to do nothing.

OTOH, it requires an act of aggression of the most absolute kind to prohibit the potential from being an actual. Objectivists apparently justify this use of force in the following scenario:

1] In the face of a conflict that arises from our own actions
2] We are empowered to aggressively terminate the continuity of the life process of another to solve our self imposed problem.

Using a condom is not an act of aggression against a life already in process.

Taking the pill is not on act of aggression against a life already in process.

Pulling out is not an act of aggression against a life already in process.

Spilling ones' seed is not an act of aggression against a life already in process.

...

But, terminating a life already in process is an act of aggression against a life already in process.

Rationalizations based on 'mere potential' apply equally as well to one year old infants.  Unplug a fetus, sure enough, it often dies. Leave a one year old infant outside on its own? Ditto. There is no appreciable increase in 'viability' or 'potential' at birth, in fact, what happens is the arrival of the most dependent stage of our existence, one requiring our deliberate and non-comatose attention.

A comatose mother can yet feed her fetus. A comatose mother cannot feed her one year old infant.    A mother cannot choose to 'not' feed her fetus, she could choose to not feed herself, and in so doing, starve herself and her fetus, but her(normal) fetus cannot and does not place any explicit separate demands upon her.

Rand was perfectly comfortable having just this one little/ what I perceive as a contradiction in her philosophy. I don't know why, I don't live inside of her skin. Maybe she wanted it, because she wanted it, and she rationalized it. Moot.

I get Rand, and exactly because of that, I don't cult worship even her, which is another glaring contradiction that has sprung up in her wake, but that is another topic. I can sleep at night believing she accepted this contradiction because she valued its worth more than its cost.   I can admire and respect and appreciate the body of her work, her romantic ('how things should be')writings, etc. without ever once believing that she was as infallible as her romantic/heroic characters. To do so would be, in my opinion, an act of immense ingratitude, as if I hadn't understood her at all.

But, this belief of hers did come with a cost. We can try to blink it out of existence -- cognitive dissonance -- but that cost is still there, monumental.   In her philosophical universe, this is the one area where 'others' are permitted to sit in judgement of the viability/potential of individual lives before them, and pass summary judgement; exist or not. This is your meaning, This is your viability. This is your potential. This is your hurdle for existence, and the disposition of your continued existence is in my/our hands.

If fathers/mothers/others can justify that in the face of conflict brought on by their very own actions, than so can the Village/Tribe over any one of us. Bring on the Barbarians.

regards,
Fred

Post 94

Thursday, May 31, 2007 - 1:02pm

Fred, what's your main argument? That we must always be stuck with the consequence of our own action, even if we still have a recourse to change it (which I addressed in my analogy), or that an embryo or fetus has individual rights?

Fred: "the only requirement separating the potential person from the actual person is for you and I to do nothing.

OTOH, it requires an act of aggression of the most absolute kind to prohibit the potential from being an actual."

One can't commit "an act of aggression" against a potential human being. One can only commit an act of aggression against an actual human being. At the time when a woman has an abortion, the embryo (in early pregnancy) or fetus isn't yet an actual human being. Therefore, abortion isn't aggression.

The fact that the "life process" has already started at conception is irrelevant. Individual rights only apply to individual persons, not to anything that's alive, including a mass of human cells.

Post 95

Thursday, May 31, 2007 - 1:51pm

Is an eight-month viable fetus, just a "mass of human cells"?

Post 96

Thursday, May 31, 2007 - 2:02pm

Jon:

One can't commit "an act of aggression" against a potential human being. One can only commit an act of aggression against an actual human being. At the time when a woman has an abortion, the embryo (in early pregnancy) or fetus isn't yet an actual human being. Therefore, abortion isn't aggression.

We understand each other, we disagree. I've repeatedly referred to the concept 'temporal bias' in my argument, and in fact, you correctly underline 'at the time' to emphasize that as the basis for your argument. Some of us recognize space and time, some of us just recognize space, so I'll address your completeness argument in your preferred subset of the dimensions we objectively live in. I don't actually experience the entirety of my life in an instant, but I'll do my best to imagine the implications of your assertions in that universe by applying the same precise same reasoning to just space.

So, in 3/4ths of the universe as it is, why not a spatial bias, as well? From the knees down, a human is not an actual complete human being. From the knees down, a human is literally just a pile of meat and bones. My expressed subset of a human's continuous existence in space is entirely analogous to your subset of a humans continuous existence in time, and apparently, you place great weight on reasoning based on subspaces of R4.

However, in your temporal bias, you justify the obliteration of the compete 'life process', for all of time and space, while in my less agressive spatial bias, I only want the legs. So, is it aggression to cut off a fellow human's legs below the knees if they are inconveniently blocking my view, or can I now rationalize that as well? Many have, you know.

The fact that the "life process" has already started at conception is irrelevant.

Individual rights only apply to individual persons, not to anything that's alive, including a mass of human cells.

Yes, you've declared both of those beliefs.    But that is progress.   We've gone from 'mass of protoplasm' to 'life process that has already started ... that's alive...human cells.'    Good grief, you are practically burning down abortion clinics.  Careful, I think you're a good looking choir boy away from declaring yourself a Pat Robertson Pro-Lifer.

Now I have to understand the divining nature of when you divide that continuous unfurling DNA process to the Magic Moment. "viability" on its own? "viability on its own outside of the womb? Slippery one, that, requires pretzel logic.   But, I'll handle the 'where', you fill me in on the 'when.'

Which reminds me; anybody without limbs is spatially incomplete, and not a viable human being, so is therefor without rights. As well, on to IQ, Huxley's Brave New World, and while we are at it, GATTACA.   So says the Tribe that Objectivists are helping to enable with this failure to defend individual rights at the most fundamental definition of 'individual,' based on nothing more substantive than the conveinience of 'others' to do so, which is exactly, precisely the license the Tribe needs to put a ribbon on its naked aggression.

Perhaps I wasn't clear. My argument with abortion is the damage it does to Rand's Objectivism in the face of a Tribe looking for exactly this justification to eat any one of us on precisely this same line of reasoning.    The abrupt 'neck snap' required to say 'yes' to M'other/others and 'no' to just others is my objection.

regards,
Fred

(Edited by Fred Bartlett on 5/31, 2:08pm)

Post 97

Thursday, May 31, 2007 - 3:54pm

Okay, Fred. You've left the realm of reason for that of nonsense. Your talk of "spatial vs. temporal bias" is pure rationalization. I'll just respond to one thing you said and then bow out.

"My argument with abortion is the damage it does to Rand's Objectivism in the face of a Tribe looking for exactly this justification to eat any one of us on precisely this same line of reasoning."

Don't worry, Fred. It doesn't do any real damage to Objectivism. At worst, it frustrates conservatives who are attracted to Ayn Rand's defense of free markets but can't shake their rationalistic method.

Post 98

Thursday, May 31, 2007 - 5:50pm

If Objectivism holds that the reality of Rand's romantic('as it should be')psychological role of sex wipes the biological role out of existence in the universe as it is, then you've convinced me that Objectivism has nothing at all to do with cognition.

Radiation therapy wipes out cancer, is that bad too?
Cancer exists in the universe. It has a biological "role."

You're basically saying that there is no recourse for the biological result, so if one gets cancer from an occupation, AIDs from a partner, a back ache from lifting, or a headache from unknown causes, there is no recourse. One must deal with the result of one's actions without remedy.

That's how I'm reading you.

Post 99

Thursday, May 31, 2007 - 7:18pm