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Post 200

Sunday, November 25, 2007 - 8:48amSanction this postReply
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Sherman,

Regarding deriving 'ought' from 'is' - your post #197 requests:

"yes, there may be a 'proof' out there I am unaware of. If so, I'd appreciate it if you'd call it to my attention."

My paper, "Objectivity and the Proof of Egoism," in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, 8, no. 2 (Spring 2007) 291-303, is an attempt to provide that proof.

Robert Hartford

Post 201

Sunday, November 25, 2007 - 1:29pmSanction this postReply
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Robert,

Yes, I would be interested in reading your paper. What's the best way to obtain a copy of the journal you mentioned?

Regards,
Sherman


Post 202

Sunday, November 25, 2007 - 5:55pmSanction this postReply
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Sherman (and others interested),

The below link is to the subscription form (including ordering of back issues) for
The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies

http://www.aynrandstudies.com/jars/subscribForm.asp

Robert Hartford



Post 203

Monday, November 26, 2007 - 9:12amSanction this postReply
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Bill,

Your lengthy post presents me with two choices, the "goodness" or "badness" of which I must judge ex ante while you will have the luxury of judging ex post: first, I could respond to each of your points using the "quote" format which we have been using for all of our discussion; or, second, I could respond in "essay" form concentrating on a single issue. I find the "quote" format aggravating because responses tend to be haphazard and pulling ideas together into a singular context is difficult at best. So I choose to respond with an essay.

However, before I begin I must point out a glaring error in your post. You write: "[Austrian economics] uses deduction, to be sure, but it isn't entirely deductive. Its principles are based on observable facts." The only fact which might be considered "observable" on which Austrian economic principles are based is the self-evident premise that "man acts with purpose." If this is what you meant by saying "it isn't entirely deductive," then your point is well-taken. However, the whole of Austrian economics is deduced from this premise. It is well known that Austrian economics eschews the statistical/mathematical method of inductive reasoning from "observable facts" (social/economic data) that is the hallmark of the economics taught in our universities. To misunderstand this point is to misunderstand Austrian economics.

I want to concentrate on the issue of human action, which we've been calling "choice," because it is at the heart of any further discussion we might have about freedom. We've been discussing human action in the context of economics. I contend that economics should be an objective science per se, i.e., free of internal value judgments. You contend economics should be a normative science per se, i.e., rife with internal value judgments. I thought it would be interesting to compare and contrast how our different versions of economics might explain this critical issue of human action (or human choice).

Austrian economics (my nominee for an objective science of economics) explains human action as follows. Each human individual is always in the position of choosing an action and judging its consequences ex ante, as you call it. At the moment a human acts he does not have the luxury of judging the consequences of his actions ex post. To be able to do so would be a contradiction in terms.

A man who chooses and acts ex ante always expects to "profit" from his action. By profit I mean he expects that his state of affairs judged ex post will be more satisfactory to his current state of affairs judged ex ante, when considered from his own point of view. This conclusion is deduced from the premise that man acts with purpose. Action requires energy. If a man does not expect his action to bring about a more satisfactory state of affairs, then he would not expend the energy to act. Mises explained that when a man feels an uneasiness he acts to relieve that felt uneasiness.

This quite simply is the Austrian explanation of human choice and action. Notice that all Austrian economic reasoning considers means and ends only in light of the subjective point of view of the actor. Thus, whatever principles are logically deduced apply to all actors no matter the specifics of the ends they seek. There is no standard of action against which the action of individual actors is objectively compared or contrasted. Therefore, the Austrian explanation of human action avoids the words "good" and "bad" which could have normative or pejorative connotations.

Now let's consider your version of normative economic reasoning as I understand it. Your normative economics would consider a man's action not from the actor's point of view but from the point of view of some objective good and bad. Judging ex post your economics could always determine whether a man's action was good or bad. Judging ex ante your economics could determine the goodness or badness of an action only sometimes.

According to your economics, the actor, judging ex ante, can sometimes know whether his action is good or bad, but sometimes cannot know because "[m]an is not infallible and must act within the limits of his knowledge." However, your economics per se is infallible and has no limits to its knowledge of good and bad because it can judge (ex post in all cases and ex ante in some) that a good or bad choice has been made by the actor even if the actor himself isn't aware of the goodness or badness of his act. In fact, in some cases your economics even knows that the actor "should have known" his actions were bad because appropriate "information" was "available at the time" and "[o]ne can acquire that knowledge by taking the time to learn more about the risks and the consequences before making a decision."

Further complicating your economics' explanation of human action is the fact that "good" and "bad" are not necessarily moralistic terms. For instance, "good" also describes the action of an actor who has calculated a logical problem without making an error. An actor who makes an error in calculation always acts "badly" in this sense. However, there is another possibility. Making an error in calculation might also be "bad" in the moralistic sense of the word if the actor erred on purpose. Presumably, your economics could always predict "bad" calculations ex ante because the logic of a mathematical calculation can always be properly deduced before the commencement of action.

Lastly, as a fall back position, your economics relies on ethics to sort out any nagging questions or problems your science of economics cannot resolve because ethics, the philosophy of moral behavior, is a science too.

Bill, from the above I think it is obvious which economics makes the most rational sense.

Regards,
Sherman


Post 204

Tuesday, November 27, 2007 - 8:26amSanction this postReply
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Sherman,

Hello. I'm curious how you arrived at the view that Austrian economics (or any other valid science, including mathematics) can be purely deductive.

To chose only three examples from your post:

1. "A man who chooses and acts ex ante always expects to "profit" from his action."

2. "Action requires energy."

3. "Mises explained that when a man feels an uneasiness he acts to relieve that felt uneasiness."



Aren't these all inductive generalizations?

Two, one might argue, is an exception, that it's just an explication of the concept energy, but many physicists would disagree.

Three is certainly an inductive generalization that, to the extent it's true, could only have been discovered by the observation of individual human beings and to which, clearly, there are many exceptions. Similarly, one.

Respectfully,
Jeff Perren



Post 205

Tuesday, November 27, 2007 - 2:55pmSanction this postReply
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Hi Jeff,

I know way more about Austrian economics than mathematics and I'm an expert in neither. However, as for Austrian economics, to the best of my understanding, the entire body of conclusions Austrians arrive at are deduced from the single premise: Man acts (with purpose).

I think of the quotes you raise #1 and #3 are deduced from this fundamental premise and #2 is my explanation of the premise. The premise itself is not arrived at by a process of inductive reasoning per se, but is held to be "self-evident" by Austrians, i.e., something we all understand by virtue of our being human. Obviously, if you disagree with the premise and hold it as untrue, than the whole of Austrian economics is suspect.

With regard to mathematics, my understanding is that mathematical theory precedes any practical, real world applications. For instance, non-Euclidean geometry preceded any real world relevance by some years (I think). A mathematical theory, again as I understand it, can be premised on virtually any relationship and the theory deduced from that relationship. Whether or not the relationship has any real world correlation must be verified later by the methods of the natural sciences.

The theory of deductive science in general is that if the premise is true then the entire body of correct deductions drawn from that premise must be true as well. This stands to reason at least from my point of view. The hitch is that if the premise is false then any deductions drawn from it are false, or at least unreliable. Mises wrote that a deductive theory of economics could be based on a premise that was totally unrealistic, but what sane human being would devote his life to a falsehood. So mathematicians and economists focus on drawing deductions from premises with a foundation in reality.

Regards,
Sherman     


Post 206

Tuesday, November 27, 2007 - 3:53pmSanction this postReply
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Sherman,

[I propose we set mathematics aside for the moment, as a special case requiring a more difficult and extended treatment. (It's true, for example, that it's possible to build mathematical structures on postulates not drawn directly from observation or prior inductive generalizations. And, non-Euclidean geometry, in particular, did arise out of denial of and proposed alternatives to one of Euclid's postulates. But it doesn't follow that mathematics is entirely purely deductive. Its origins or base, as Bill indicated above, are inductive based on observation. But, again, I'd like to save any extensive discussion of mathematics to later.)]

As to Austrian economics, can you indicate how one can deduce "when a man feels an uneasiness he acts to relieve that felt uneasiness" from "man acts with purpose"?

To be purely deductive, wouldn't such a proof have to rely solely on formal logic and not "smuggle in" any concepts derived from induction and/or observation? I can't envision how this would be done.

[Note: I use the term 'observation' here loosely, as is often done, not solely to indicate the process of perceptual awareness. E.g. one can 'observe' that people sometimes act self-destructively without being able to perceive 'self-destructiveness'.]

(Edited by Jeff Perren on 11/27, 3:55pm)


Post 207

Wednesday, November 28, 2007 - 5:28pmSanction this postReply
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Jeff,

In Post #203 I wrote: "Mises explained that when a man feels an uneasiness he acts to relieve that felt uneasiness." I don't want to be putting words in Mises' mouth, so here is an exact quote from Human Action where Mises mentions "uneasiness:"

We call contentment or satisfaction that state of a human being which does not and cannot result in any action. Acting man is eager to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory. His mind imagines conditions which suit him better, and his action aims at bringing about this desired state. The incentive that impels a man to act is always some uneasiness. A man perfectly content with the state of his affairs would have no incentive to change things. He would have neither wishes nor desires; he would be perfectly happy. He would not act; he would simply live free from care.

But to make a man act, uneasiness and the image of a more satisfactory state alone are not sufficient. A third condition is required: the expectation that purposeful behavior has the power to remove or at least to alleviate the felt uneasiness. In the absence of this condition no action is feasible. Man must yield to the inevitable. He must submit to destiny.

These are the general conditions of human action. Man is the being that lives under these conditions. He is not only homo sapiens, but no less homo agens. Beings of human descent who either from birth or from acquired defects are unchangeably unfit for any action (in the strict sense of the term and not merely in the legal sense) are practically not human. Although the statutes and biology consider them to be men, they lack the essential feature of humanity. The newborn child too is not an acting being. It has not yet gone the whole way from conception to the full development of its human qualities. But at the end of this evolution it becomes an acting being.

You asked:
As to Austrian economics, can you indicate how one can deduce "when a man feels an uneasiness he acts to relieve that felt uneasiness" from "man acts with purpose"?

My own take on it is as follows. Purpose implies a desire or a wanting. This desire or wanting is the uneasiness (dissatisfaction?) we feel with our current state of affairs which impels us to action. We act thinking our action will bring about a more satisfactory state of affairs, will result in a fulfillment of our desire or in a relieving of our uneasiness.

I don't believe all of the above -- i.e., the uneasiness, desire, wanting, dissatisfaction, call it what you wish -- needs to be "observed" in fellow human beings and then concluded inductively. I think we all understand these impulses in our selves, they're self-evident to us as humans. 

Does that answer your question?

Regards,
Sherman   


Post 208

Thursday, November 29, 2007 - 4:07pmSanction this postReply
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Sherman,

I prefer the quote-reply format, because most people don't re-read previous posts to check on what was actually said. It also helps to avoid misrepresenting someone's position and to discourage strawman arguments. You write,
I must point out a glaring error in your post. You write: "[Austrian economics] uses deduction, to be sure, but it isn't entirely deductive. Its principles are based on observable facts." The only fact which might be considered "observable" on which Austrian economic principles are based is the self-evident premise that "man acts with purpose." If this is what you meant by saying "it isn't entirely deductive," then your point is well-taken. However, the whole of Austrian economics is deduced from this premise.
Well, it's difficult for me to believe that someone who had no knowledge of economics could deduce the entire Austrian corpus, including its case against credit expansion, inflation, recession, price controls, etc., solely from the self-evident premise that man acts with purpose.
It is well known that Austrian economics eschews the statistical/mathematical method of inductive reasoning from "observable facts" (social/economic data) that is the hallmark of the economics taught in our universities. To misunderstand this point is to misunderstand Austrian economics.
If inductive reasoning or "observable fact" were confined to the statistical/mathematical method, I would agree with you that Austrian economics is entirely deductive. But empiricism is not equivalent to statistical probability. It pertains to any direct awareness, whether extrospective or introspective.
I want to concentrate on the issue of human action, which we've been calling "choice," because it is at the heart of any further discussion we might have about freedom. We've been discussing human action in the context of economics. I contend that economics should be an objective science per se, i.e., free of internal value judgments.
But the point I've been making ever since the beginning of our discussion is that economics (including Austrian economics) is not free of internal value judgments! Economics deals with value judgments as a core part of its discipline. It postulates utility or happiness as the end at which people are aiming, and proceeds to describe the best means of attaining that end. It argues, for example, that certain economic policies have unintended and undesirable consequences (e.g., unemployment, inflation, recession, housing shortages, farm surpluses, etc.) and that better economic policies should be employed in order to avoid these consequences.)
You contend economics should be a normative science per se, i.e., rife with internal value judgments.
I'm not saying that it "should" be a normative science; I'm saying that it is a normative science. What I'm saying "should" be done is for economists to make their value judgments known to policy makers instead or remaining in their economic ivory towers and claiming that their discipline is "value-free," when it obviously is not.
I thought it would be interesting to compare and contrast how our different versions of economics might explain this critical issue of human action (or human choice).

Austrian economics (my nominee for an objective science of economics) explains human action as follows. Each human individual is always in the position of choosing an action and judging its consequences ex ante, as you call it. At the moment a human acts he does not have the luxury of judging the consequences of his actions ex post. To be able to do so would be a contradiction in terms.
I agree.
A man who chooses and acts ex ante always expects to "profit" from his action. By profit I mean he expects that his state of affairs judged ex post will be more satisfactory to his current state of affairs judged ex ante, when considered from his own point of view.
I disagree with this. What about those who sacrifice their values for the sake of others? And please don't tell me that they value the self-sacrifice and therefore that it's really a selfish act. They value it only in the sense that they believe it is their moral obligation, but they don't view the expected outcome as more "satisfactory"; they view it as less satisfactory. That's what "self-sacrifice" is. It's the surrender of a greater value for a lesser one.
This conclusion is deduced from the premise that man acts with purpose. Action requires energy. If a man does not expect his action to bring about a more satisfactory state of affairs, then he would not expend the energy to act.
Not true. People sometimes engage in acts of self-sacrifice. It is true that a person's action must be motivated, but the motivation needn't be a more satisfactory state of affairs; it could be one that, for the actor, is less satisfactory. Now, if you simply mean that every action aims at a certain end or goal and that the actor is more "satisfied" to achieve that goal than not to achieve it, then I would agree. The altruist "wants" to achieve the end of self-sacrifice, so in that sense, he is more "satisfied" to achieve it than not to achieve it. But his utility or happiness is less, because his goal was to sacrifice it for the sake of others.
This quite simply is the Austrian explanation of human choice and action. Notice that all Austrian economic reasoning considers means and ends only in light of the subjective point of view of the actor. Thus, whatever principles are logically deduced apply to all actors no matter the specifics of the ends they seek. There is no standard of action against which the action of individual actors is objectively compared or contrasted.
Why couldn't the person's action be objectively evaluated according to how well it achieves the end for which it is chosen? For instance, suppose that a legislator chooses to vote for a rent-control law, on the premise that it will improve the lot of tenants. Economics could criticize his choice on the grounds that it will worsen the lot of tenants by creating a shortage of apartments.
Now let's consider your version of normative economic reasoning as I understand it. Your normative economics would consider a man's action not from the actor's point of view but from the point of view of some objective good and bad. Judging ex post your economics could always determine whether a man's action was good or bad. Judging ex ante your economics could determine the goodness or badness of an action only sometimes.
I don't know why you use the phrase "your economics." The value judgments you refer to here are not necessarily economic. To cite an example that was used in previous posts, a rational investment decision that incurred a financial loss could be judged as "good" ex ante, but "bad" ex post, but the "goodness" and "badness" would mean something different in the one case than in the other. Ex ante, the investment would be "good" in the sense of being rationally justified, but ex post, it would be "bad" (i.e., "not good") in an entirely different sense -- in the sense of not yielding a desired outcome. By contrast, the value judgments that economics is concerned with are those that pertain to the most economical means of obtaining desired ends. The science of economics (as such) is not concerned with portfolio theory or with individual investment decisions, which fall under the purview of Finance, not economics (although there may be some overlap). I don't disagree with Austrian economic theory, which simply evaluates the effects of human action as applied to the process of exchange in free and unfree markets.
According to your economics, the actor, judging ex ante, can sometimes know whether his action is good or bad, but sometimes cannot know because "[m]an is not infallible and must act within the limits of his knowledge." However, your economics per se is infallible and has no limits to its knowledge of good and bad because it can judge (ex post in all cases and ex ante in some) that a good or bad choice has been made by the actor even if the actor himself isn't aware of the goodness or badness of his act.
I didn't say "infallible"; nor did I say that "my economics has no limits to its knowledge of good and bad," whatever that's supposed to mean.
In fact, in some cases your economics even knows that the actor "should have known" his actions were bad because appropriate "information" was "available at the time" and "[o]ne can acquire that knowledge by taking the time to learn more about the risks and the consequences before making a decision."
Again, I was not talking about economic value judgments when I made that observation. I was talking about value-judgments in a much broader sense. E.g., a student should have known that if he didn't do his homework, he would do poorly on the test.
Further complicating your economics' explanation of human action is the fact that "good" and "bad" are not necessarily moralistic terms. For instance, "good" also describes the action of an actor who has calculated a logical problem without making an error. An actor who makes an error in calculation always acts "badly" in this sense. However, there is another possibility. Making an error in calculation might also be "bad" in the moralistic sense of the word if the actor erred on purpose.
I wouldn't say that people err "on purpose." They can, however, be morally responsible for their errors, if they fail to take adequate precautions. If, for example, a person drives while intoxicated and gets into an accident killing someone, he didn't cause the death or the accident on purpose, but he was nevertheless morally responsible for it. However, this has nothing to do with economic theory.
Presumably, your economics could always predict "bad" calculations ex ante because the logic of a mathematical calculation can always be properly deduced before the commencement of action.
What?? Where have I said anything resembling this? How you could have arrived at that conclusion from my previous statements, I have no idea. It is certainly not something I believe or would ever say.
Lastly, as a fall back position, your economics relies on ethics to sort out any nagging questions or problems your science of economics cannot resolve because ethics, the philosophy of moral behavior, is a science too.
No. That too is not something I would ever say. Ethics does not "sort out" economic problems. But it is the foundation for a proper politico-economic system. If an economist recommends that the Justice Department invoke the antitrust laws against Microsoft, say, the science of ethics would condemn such an action as a violation of Microsoft's property rights. But a proper economic theory would, presumably, find no economic downside to a monopoly that is not the result of coercive intervention by the government.

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer on 11/30, 8:58am)


Post 209

Thursday, November 29, 2007 - 4:50pmSanction this postReply
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Sherman,

Yes, it does. Thank you for replying.

Post 210

Saturday, December 1, 2007 - 8:46amSanction this postReply
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Bill,

You wrote:
I prefer the quote-reply format, because most people don't re-read previous posts to check on what was actually said. It also helps to avoid misrepresenting someone's position and to discourage strawman arguments.

Fine. Have it your way. I'll keep posting so long as I profit from the experience. :)

You wrote:
Well, it's difficult for me to believe that someone who had no knowledge of economics could deduce the entire Austrian corpus, including its case against credit expansion, inflation, recession, price controls, etc., solely from the self-evident premise that man acts with purpose.

Is it equally difficult for you to believe that the principles of logic can be deduced from the premise: "A is A?" Or that the principles of arithmetic can be deduced from the premise of counting? Or that all the complex propositions of Euclidean geometry can be deduced from a few simple axioms? Sure it's a lot of deducing for a single individual, but in the case of Austrian economics it was a collaborative effort. 

You wrote:
But empiricism is not equivalent to statistical probability. It pertains to any direct awareness, whether extrospective or introspective. 

From "Mises Made Easier" by Percy L. Greaves Jr.: 
Induction, n. inductive, adj. In logic, assuming the truth of a general (or universal) premise from the knowledge that individual or particular instances of the generality conform to the premise. Example: Assuming that all men speak English because all the men you know speak English.

Perfect induction is when the premise is based on the knowledge of all instances. In such cases, the induction is merely the statement of a known totality or generality.

Imperfect induction is when the premise is based on the knowledge of less than all the individual instances, i.e., on a sample. In the sciences of human action, imperfect induction can never provide scientific certainty. At best, it provides only a probability. However, imperfect induction is an epistemological basis of the natural sciences.

Empiricism. The theory that the only source of human knowledge is experience. Empiricism assumes a regularity in the flow of events and proclaims that experiments and observation are the main instruments for the acquisition of knowledge.

What Mises has to say in "The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science", Page 8:
Reasoning is necessarily always deductive. This was implicitly admitted by all the attempts to justify ampliative induction by demonstrating or proving its logical legitimacy, i.e., by providing a deductive interpretation of induction. The plight of empiricism consists precisely in its failure to explain satisfactorily how it is possible to infer from observed facts something concerning facts yet unobserved.

All human knowledge concerning the universe presupposes and rests upon the cognition of the regularity in the succession and concatenation of observable events. It would be vain to search for a rule if there were no regularity. Inductive inference is conclusion from premises that invariably include the fundamental proposition of regularity.

The practical problem of ampliative induction must be clearly distinguished from its logical problem. For the men who embark upon inductive inference are faced with the problem of correct sampling. Did we or did we not, out of the innumerable characteristics of the individual case or cases observed, choose those which are relevant for the production of the effect in question? Serious shortcomings of endeavors to learn something about the state of reality, whether in the mundane search for truth in everyday life or in systematic scientific research, are due to mistakes in this choice. No scientist doubts that what is correctly observed in one case must also be observed in all other cases offering the same conditions. The aim of laboratory experiments is to observe the effects of a change in one factor only, all the other factors remaining unchanged. Success or failure of such experiments presupposes, of course, the control of all the conditions that enter into their arrangement.
See below my discussion of the principle of ceteris paribus.

The conclusions derived from experimentation are not based upon the repetition of the same arrangement, but upon the assumption that what happened in one case must necessarily also happen in all other cases of the same type. It would be impossible to infer anything from one case or from an innumerable series of cases without this assumption, which implies the a priori category of regularity. Experience is always the experience of past events and could not teach us anything about future events if the category of regularity were merely a vain assumption.


You wrote:
But the point I've been making ever since the beginning of our discussion is that economics (including Austrian economics) is not free of internal value judgments!

And I've been making the contrary point!

You wrote:
Economics deals with value judgments as a core part of its discipline. It postulates utility or happiness as the end at which people are aiming, and proceeds to describe the best means of attaining that end.

This is where you are mistaken. Indeed, economics (and when I write "economics" I mean Austrian economics) postulates that individuals aim at "happiness," but happiness is an abstract concept. Economics sets no concrete standards for individual "happiness." Mises explains "happiness" thusly in "Human Action" Page 14:
In colloquial speech we call a man "happy" who has succeeded in attaining his ends. A more adequate description of his state would be that he is happier than he was before. There is however no valid objection to a usage that defines human action as the striving for happiness.

But we must avoid current misunderstandings. The ultimate goal of human action is always the satisfaction of the acting man's desire. There is no standard of greater or lesser satisfaction other than individual judgments of value, different for various people and for the same people at various times. What makes a man feel uneasy and less uneasy is established by him from the standard of his own will and judgment, from his personal and subjective valuation. Nobody is in a position to decree what should make a fellow man happier.

To establish this fact does not refer in any way to the antitheses of egoism and altruism, of materialism and idealism, of individualism and collectivism, of atheism and religion. There are people whose only aim is to improve the condition of their own ego. There are other people with whom awareness of the troubles of their fellow men causes as much uneasiness as or even more uneasiness than their own wants. There are people who desire nothing else than the satisfaction of their appetites for sexual intercourse, food, drinks, fine homes, and other material things. But other men care more for the satisfactions commonly called "higher" and "ideal." There are individuals eager to adjust their actions to the requirements of social cooperation; there are, on the other hand, refractory people who defy the rules of social life. There are people for whom the ultimate goal of the earthly pilgrimage is the preparation for a life of bliss. There are other people who do not believe in the teachings of any religion and do not allow their actions to be influenced by them. 

Praxeology is indifferent to the ultimate goals of action. Its findings are valid for all kinds of action irrespective of the ends aimed at. It is a science of means, not of ends. It applies the term happiness in a purely formal sense. In the praxeological terminology the proposition: man's unique aim is to attain happiness, is tautological. It does not imply any statement about the state of affairs from which man expects happiness.

You wrote:
It argues, for example, that certain economic policies have unintended and undesirable consequences (e.g., unemployment, inflation, recession, housing shortages, farm surpluses, etc.) and that better economic policies should be employed in order to avoid these consequences.)

Here again economics, as a science, merely deduces conclusions from premises. Individual actors who follow the logic of economics and learn from it decide for themselves how this knowledge should best be applied in their own lives and in their own society.

By using terms such as "economic policies" you imply that economics prescribes social or political policies for some social or institutional entity. This is not the case. Austrian economics is individualistic in its concept and method. On this Mises writes (from The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, Page 3):

The authors who think that they have substituted, in the analysis of the market economy, a holistic or social or universalistic or institutional or macroeconomic approach for what they disdain as the spurious individualistic approach delude themselves and their public... ...But if one deals with a system in which more than one man's striving after definite ends directs or affects actions, one cannot avoid tracing back the effects produced by action to the point beyond which no analysis of actions can proceed, i.e., to the value judgments of the individuals and the ends they are aiming at.

The macroeconomic approach looks upon an arbitrarily selected segment of the market economy (as a rule: upon one nation) as if it were an integrated unit. All that happens in this segment is actions of individuals and groups of individuals acting in concert. But macroeconomics proceeds as if all these individual actions were in fact the outcome of the mutual operation of one macroeconomic magnitude upon another such magnitude.

You wrote:
I'm not saying that it "should" be a normative science; I'm saying that it is a normative science. What I'm saying "should" be done is for economists to make their value judgments known to policy makers instead or remaining in their economic ivory towers and claiming that their discipline is "value-free," when it obviously is not.

Your point here is contradictory. Why is it necessary "for economists to make their value judgments known to policy makers" (if, indeed, economists do make value judgments) if economics is in fact "obviously" not "value-free?" If it is obvious, then these "value judgments" of which you speak must be obvious as well. And, if these are obvious, then they must be obvious to policy makers. What purpose is served by economists making "their value judgments known to policy makers?"

I still don't understand your refusal to accept the reality that economics as a science can be objective and value-free while at the same time those who do economics can have social and political opinions and can use the knowledge gleaned from their science to buttress their social and political arguments? For instance, to use my earlier example, the value-free science of physics says nothing about whether a nuclear reaction is good or bad but physicists themselves, like Einstein and Oppenheimer, can hold strong opinions one way or the other.

Moreover, you imply that economists secure in their "economic ivory towers" somehow inhibit the knowledge produced by their science from being disseminated among the public in general and policy makers in particular, that this isolation somehow inhibits economic findings from influencing the course of history.

I don't believe economics is a normative science. Neither do I believe that it is necessary for economics to be a normative science in order for its "value-free" findings to be known to "policy makers" or any other persons of influence and intelligence. Mises comments on this in his introductory comments to his seminal work "Human Action", Page 9:
Then there are people who assert that something must be wrong with the social sciences because social conditions are unsatisfactory. The natural sciences have achieved amazing results in the last two or three hundred years, and the practical utilization of these results has succeeded in improving the general standard of living to an unprecedented extent. But, say these critics, the social sciences have utterly failed in the task of rendering social conditions more satisfactory. They have not stamped out misery and starvation, economic crises and unemployment, war and tyranny. They are sterile and have contributed nothing to the promotion of happiness and human welfare.

These grumblers do not realize that the tremendous progress of technological methods of production and the resulting increase in wealth and welfare were feasible only through the pursuit of those liberal policies which were the practical application of the teachings of economics. It was the ideas of the classical economists that removed the checks imposed by age-old laws, customs, and prejudices upon technological improvement and freed the genius of reformers and innovators from the straitjackets of the guilds, government tutelage, and social pressure of various kinds. It was they that reduced the prestige of conquerors and expropriators and demonstrated the social benefits derived from business activity. None of the great modern inventions would have been put to use if the mentality of the precapitalistic era had not been thoroughly demolished by the economists. What is commonly called the "industrial revolution" was an offspring of the ideological revolution brought about by the doctrines of the economists. The economists exploded the old tenets: that it is unfair and unjust to outdo a competitor by producing better and cheaper goods; that it is iniquitous to deviate from the traditional methods of production; that machines are an evil because they bring about unemployment; that it is one of the tasks of civil government to prevent efficient businessmen from getting rich and to protect the less efficient against the competition of the more efficient; that to restrict the freedom of entrepreneurs by government compulsion or by coercion on the part of other social powers is an appropriate means to promote a nation's well-being. British political economy and French Physiocracy were the pacemakers of modern capitalism. It is they that made possible the progress of the applied natural sciences that has heaped benefits upon the masses....

...It is true that economics is a theoretical science and as such abstains from any judgment of value. It is not its task to tell people what ends they should aim at. It is a science of the means to be applied for the attainment of ends chosen, not, to be sure, a science of the choosing of ends. Ultimate decisions, the valuations and the choosing of ends, are beyond the scope of any science. Science never tells a man how he should act; it merely shows how a man must act if he wants to attain definite ends.

It seems to many people that this is very little indeed and that a science limited to the investigation of the is and unable to express a judgment value about the highest and ultimate ends is of no importance for life and action. This too is a mistake. However, the exposure of this mistake is not a task of these introductory remarks. It is one of the ends of the treatise itself.

You wrote:
I disagree with this. What about those who sacrifice their values for the sake of others? And please don't tell me that they value the self-sacrifice and therefore that it's really a selfish act. They value it only in the sense that they believe it is their moral obligation, but they don't view the expected outcome as more "satisfactory"; they view it as less satisfactory. That's what "self-sacrifice" is. It's the surrender of a greater value for a lesser one.

Good grief! Are you denying that some people put more value in the promise of life here after than in the actual life they are living here and now? Are you denying that a critically depressed or despondent person or a person dying in severe pain might seriously long for the peace of death? Are you seriously suggesting that you know without doubt what's in the mind of a person who sacrifices his life for friends or for principle? How do you know this for certain? Supply me with the evidence of the postmortem interviews you've conducted that verify your opinions.

You wrote:
Not true. People sometimes engage in acts of self-sacrifice. It is true that a person's action must be motivated, but the motivation needn't be a more satisfactory state of affairs; it could be one that, for the actor, is less satisfactory. Now, if you simply mean that every action aims at a certain end or goal and that the actor is more "satisfied" to achieve that goal than not to achieve it, then I would agree.

Then we agree.

You wrote:
The altruist "wants" to achieve the end of self-sacrifice, so in that sense, he is more "satisfied" to achieve it than not to achieve it.  

Great. You're on the verge of becoming an Austrian economist! :)

You wrote:
But his utility or happiness is less, because his goal was to sacrifice it for the sake of others.

Now there you go again putting yourself in the private minds of other individuals. (You're not really The Amazing Kreskin in disguise, are you?) Why is "sacrifice for the sake of others" automatically verboten on your list of all possible ends? Again how do you know that an individual who sacrifices his life for the sake of others must necessarily be unsatisfied and unhappy ex ante.

You wrote:
Why couldn't the person's action be objectively evaluated according to how well it achieves the end for which it is chosen? For instance, suppose that a legislator chooses to vote for a rent-control law, on the premise that it will improve the lot of tenants. Economics could criticize his choice on the grounds that it will worsen the lot of tenants by creating a shortage of apartments.

Well, maybe you're not on your way to becoming an Austrian economist! :)

An Austrian knows that rent-control is simply a means to an end. An Austrian could not criticize rent control on the basis that it "will worsen the lot of tenants." An Austrian knows that rent control will prevent some tenants from achieving their goal of having housing. But he also knows that rent control will allow some tenants to achieve their goal of having cheap housing into perpetuity. The only certainty from the point of view of economics is that rent control will reduce the market supply of housing available to all (ceteris paribus!).  Voters are smart enough to decide for themselves what is in their own best interests. They don't need some sanctimonious economic "scientist" preaching to them about what is best for all.

The principle of "ceteris paribus," i.e., all else being equal, is extremely critical to this discussion. Your harping claim that economics is a normative science assumes that economics as a science can exactly determine the real world outcomes of policies it recommends, that what policies or means (or value judgments, as you call them) are best suited for accomplishing virtually every social or political goal. Economics doesn't work that way. 

The economist deduces economic principles in the abstract, drawing conclusions from premises. He can mentally isolate one economic phenomenon from another by making a simple, abstract assumption: ceteris paribus. This allows him to study the theoretical causes and effects of any particular economic action separate from the causes and effects of other simultaneous and competitive economic actions. 

However the real world does not operate this way. In the real world causes and effects from many simultaneous economic actions are inextricably tied together in a jumble making economic prognosticaion and prescription inexact and conditional. As a result, if your normative economic scientist prescribes policy for any specific, real world circumstance, he should be aware that he cannot predict with absolute certainty the consequences of his prescribed policy. Mises comments on this in "Human Action", Page 31:

There are two main branches of the sciences of human action: praxeology and history. History is the collection and systematic arrangement of all the data of experience concerning human action. It deals with the concrete content of human action. It studies all human endeavors in their infinite multiplicity and variety and all individual actions with all their accidental, special, and particular implications. It scrutinizes the ideas guiding acting men and the outcome of the actions performed. It embraces every aspect of human activities. It is on the one hand general history and on the other hand the history of various narrower fields. There is the history of political and military action, of ideas and philosophy, of economic activities, of technology, of literature, art, and science, of religion, of mores and customs, and of many other realms of human life. There is ethnology and anthropology, as far as they are not a part of biology, and there is psychology as far as it is neither physiology nor epistemology nor philosophy. There is linguistics as far as it is neither logic nor the physiology of speech.

The subject matter of all historical sciences is the past. They cannot teach us anything which would be valid for all human actions, that is, for the future too. The study of history makes a man wise and judicious. But it does not by itself provide any knowledge and skill which could be utilized for handling concrete tasks.

The natural sciences too deal with past events. Every experience is an experience of something passed away; there is no experience of future happenings. But the experience to which the natural sciences owe all their success is the experience of the experiment in which the individual elements of change can be observed in isolation. The facts amassed in this way can be used for induction, a peculiar procedure of inference which has given pragmatic evidence of its expediency, although its satisfactory epistemological characterization is still an unsolved problem.

The experience with which the sciences of human action have to deal is always an experience of complex phenomena. No laboratory experiments can be performed with regard to human action. We are never in a position to observe the change in one element only, all other conditions of the event remaining unchanged. Historical experience as an experience of complex phenomena does not provide us with facts in the sense in which the natural sciences employ this term to signify isolated events tested in experiments. The information conveyed by historical experience cannot be used as building material for the construction of theories and the prediction of future events. Every historical experience is open to various interpretations, and is in fact interpreted in different ways.

The postulates of positivism and kindred schools of metaphysics are therefore illusory. It is impossible to reform the sciences of human action according to the pattern of physics and the other natural sciences. There is no means to establish an a posteriori theory of human conduct and social events. History can neither prove nor disprove any general statement in the manner in which the natural sciences accept or reject a hypothesis on the ground of laboratory experiments. Neither experimental verification nor experimental falsification of a general proposition is possible in its field.

Complex phenomena in the production of which various causal chains are interlaced cannot test any theory. Such phenomena, on the contrary, become intelligible only through an interpretation in terms of theories previously developed from other sources. In the case of natural phenomena the interpretation of an event must not be at variance with the theories satisfactorily verified by experiments. In the case of historical events there is no such restriction. Commentators would be free to resort to quite arbitrary explanations. Where there is something to explain, the human mind has never been at a loss to invent ad hoc some imaginary theories, lacking any logical justification.

In the field of human history a limitation similar to that which the experimentally tested theories enjoin upon the attempts to interpret and elucidate individual physical, chemical, and physiological events is provided by praxeology. Praxeology is a theoretical and systematic, not a historical, science. Its scope is human action as such, irrespective of all environmental, accidental, and individual circumstances of the concrete acts. Its cognition is purely formal and general without reference to the material content and the particular features of the actual case. It aims at knowledge valid for all instances in which the conditions exactly correspond to those implied in its assumptions and inferences.
[Ceteris paribus.]

Its statements and propositions are not derived from experience. They are, like those of logic and mathematics, a priori. They are not subject to verification or falsification on the ground of experience and facts. They are both logically and temporally antecedent to any comprehension of historical facts. They are a necessary requirement of any intellectual grasp of historical events. Without them we should not be able to see in the course of events anything else than kaleidoscopic change and chaotic muddle.

 
You wrote:

I didn't say "infallible"; nor did I say that "my economics has no limits to its knowledge of good and bad," whatever that's supposed to mean

No, you did not say "infallible." I concluded your normative economics is infallible "because it can judge (ex post in all cases and ex ante in some) that a good or bad choice has been made by the actor even if the actor himself isn't aware of the goodness or badness of his act."

Do you disagree with my conclusion? I drew that conclusion from your comments in earlier posts. Are you going to make me go back and scour them for specific quotations?

You wrote:
Again, I was not talking about economic value judgments when I made that observation. I was talking about value-judgments in a much broader sense. E.g., a student should have known that if he didn't do his homework, he would do poorly on the test.

But we are arguing about economics! Why bring up a broader sense of the word? Why cloud the discussion by bringing in senses of terms which can have "broader" definitions than the ones we are using, unless your goal is to muddy the waters.

You wrote:
I wouldn't say that people err "on purpose." They can, however, be morally responsible for their errors, if they fail to take adequate precautions. If, for example, a person drives while intoxicated and gets into an accident killing someone, he didn't cause the death or the accident on purpose, but he was nevertheless morally responsible for it. However, this has nothing to do with economic theory.

Agreed, this has nothing to do with my economics. It's your call as to whether or not it has something to do with your normative version. It is hair-splitting in its essence.

You wrote:
What?? Where have I said anything resembling this? How you could have arrived at that conclusion from my previous statements, I have no idea. It is certainly not something I believe or would ever say.

Again, you didn't say that. I clearly stated it was my presumption based on the logic of your normative economics. Do you agree or disagree that the "the logic of a mathematical calculation can always be properly deduced before the commencement of action."

You wrote:
No. That too is not something I would ever say. Ethics does not "sort out" economic problems. But it is the foundation for a proper politico-economic system. If an economist recommends that the Justice Department invoke the antitrust laws against Microsoft, say, the science of ethics would condemn such an action as a violation of Microsoft's property rights. But a proper economic theory would, presumably, find no economic downside to a monopoly that is not the result of coercive intervention by the government.


I respect that you would never say it. On the other hand, if "the foundation for a proper politico-economic [emphasis mine] system" is ethics, and if ethics is a science, and if economics is a normative science, then what other conclusion can be drawn? Moreover, your example proves my case.

Your example speaks of an economist who fails to advance a "proper" economic theory, i.e., his normative prescription for action is improper considered from the normative prospective of his science. However, economists are only human. Who determines what is the "proper" prescription for the normative science of economics? Two armchair economists slugging it out in a RoR Forum? A majority vote? More importantly, how is such a determination made? Purely by logic? Purely by observation of the prescription's consequences? Or some combination of the two? Ah, but then one runs up against the problem of ceteris paribus!

Just as society needs an ultimate arbiter to settle social conflict, your normative economics needs an ultimate arbiter to settle conflicts of economic propriety -- and that arbiter can only be your ultimate normative science of ethics.

Regards,
Sherman 

(Edited by Sherman Broder on 12/01, 10:05am)


Post 211

Saturday, December 1, 2007 - 9:16amSanction this postReply
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Sherman,

Thanks for your lengthy reply including all of the Austrian economic citations. But you didn't provide any references for them. Could you go back and edit your post by including the page numbers from the various sources you cited?

Thanks,

Bill

Post 212

Saturday, December 1, 2007 - 9:35amSanction this postReply
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Bill,

Sure, be happy to. By the way, all the books from which the quotes are taken are available online in their entirety at the Ludwig von Mises Institute website. [No problems here with the books selling like hotcakes vis-a-vis Rand. :)]

Human Action is here.

The Ultimate Foundation of Human Action is here.

Regards,
Sherman


Post 213

Saturday, December 1, 2007 - 9:39amSanction this postReply
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P.S.

Percy L. Greaves Jr.'s Mises Made Easier is here.


Post 214

Saturday, December 1, 2007 - 3:44pmSanction this postReply
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Sherman,

Thanks for supplying the page numbers to your quotes from Mises, et al. I'm not going to address each of your statements point by point much as I would like to, because it would stretch my reply beyond a reasonable length. But I will address what I consider to be the key points of your reply.

My problem with saying that the whole of Austrian economics is deductive is that the subject pertains to issues that can only be grasped by knowledge that goes beyond the premise that man acts with purpose. To understand credit expansion, for example, one must have a knowledge of lending and borrowing; to understand the problems of inflation, one must understand the relationship between the quantity of money and the supply of goods and services; to understand recessions and depressions, one must understand unemployment; to understand the relationship of price controls to shortages and surpluses, one must understand the laws of supply and demand. One cannot deduce all of this simply from the fact that man acts with purpose.

Now you quote Mises who says that reasoning is necessarily always deductive. To be sure, the premise of uniformity or regularity is a presupposition of induction, but that doesn't mean that reasoning is always deductive (i.e., never inductive, unless Mises simply means that induction always incorporates an element of deduction by inferring that like causes beget like effects). Obviously, Newton did not arrive at the law of gravity solely by a process of deduction. He generalized from observed particulars. Yes, regularity (i.e., the law of identity) is an underlying premise of induction. One has to include the premise that the same thing will act the same way under the same conditions, in order to reason inductively. But it is only by observing reality that one can arrive at the law of identity -- at the principle that a thing is what it is. All knowledge is ultimately empirical -- i.e., based on perceptual observation. There are no innate ideas -- no ideas that exist prior to any experience.

I wrote: "Economics deals with value judgments as a core part of its discipline. It postulates utility or happiness as the end at which people are aiming, and proceeds to describe the best means of attaining that end." You replied,
This is where you are mistaken. Indeed, economics (and when I write "economics" I mean Austrian economics) postulates that individuals aim at "happiness," but happiness is an abstract concept. Economics sets no concrete standards for individual "happiness." Mises explains "happiness" thusly in "Human Action" Page 14:
In colloquial speech we call a man "happy" who has succeeded in attaining his ends. A more adequate description of his state would be that he is happier than he was before. There is however no valid objection to a usage that defines human action as the striving for happiness.

But we must avoid current misunderstandings. The ultimate goal of human action is always the satisfaction of the acting man's desire. There is no standard of greater or lesser satisfaction other than individual judgments of value, different for various people and for the same people at various times.

Not true; this is subjectivism. There is such a standard, and it exists independently of an individual's judgments of value. An individual can judge that an action will make him happy and be dead wrong. For example, an individual who judges that taking drugs like meth or heroine will make him happy will soon discover his mistake. An individual who judges that he can drive while intoxicated will sooner or later have an accident or be arrested for drunk driving. An individual who shirks his responsibilities, shows up late for work, and spends beyond his means will find that he does not have enough money to meet his needs and the needs of his family. The fact that one "judges" that an action is worth taking -- the fact that one chooses the action -- does not mean that one has made a wise or responsible choice -- a choice that promotes one's happiness. Certain objective conditions are required for human happiness -- ones that are consonant with a person's needs as a certain kind of living organism -- and if these needs are not met, the person will not be happy.
"What makes a man feel uneasy and less uneasy is established by him from the standard of his own will and judgment, from his personal and subjective valuation. Nobody is in a position to decree what should make a fellow man happier."
Nonsense! A person's own will and judgment is the means for evaluating and choosing an action according to a standard of value; it is not the standard itself. To say that it is the standard itself would mean that any choice a person makes promotes his happiness simply because he chooses it.
"Praxeology is indifferent to the ultimate goals of action. Its findings are valid for all kinds of action irrespective of the ends aimed at. It is a science of means, not of ends. It applies the term happiness in a purely formal sense.
But happiness is not some nonspecific or "purely formal" state; it is a real condition -- one of supreme importance to its beneficiary.
"In the praxeological terminology the proposition: man's unique aim is to attain happiness, is tautological. It does not imply any statement about the state of affairs from which man expects happiness."
Amazing! So if a person destroys his life through shortsighted, irresponsible conduct and winds up homeless and living on the street, he can be just as happy as if he had taken responsibility for his life and succeeded in his chosen career. This is value nihilism in the guise of scientific erudition.

I wrote: "[Economics] argues, for example, that certain economic policies have unintended and undesirable consequences (e.g., unemployment, inflation, recession, housing shortages, farm surpluses, etc.) and that better economic policies should be employed in order to avoid these consequences.)"
Here again economics, as a science, merely deduces conclusions from premises. Individual actors who follow the logic of economics and learn from it decide for themselves how this knowledge should best be applied in their own lives and in their own society.

By using terms such as "economic policies" you imply that economics prescribes social or political policies for some social or institutional entity. This is not the case. Austrian economics is individualistic in its concept and method.
So, Austrian economics can't criticize the socialist or interventionist policies of a government by recommending that they be replaced by ones that favor a free market? If so, then why do Mises and other Austrians spend so much time criticizing socialist and interventionist policies?

I wrote: "I'm not saying that [economics] 'should' be a normative science; I'm saying that it is a normative science. What I'm saying 'should' be done is for economists to make their value judgments known to policy makers instead or remaining in their economic ivory towers and claiming that their discipline is 'value-free,' when it obviously is not."
Your point here is contradictory. Why is it necessary "for economists to make their value judgments known to policy makers" (if, indeed, economists do make value judgments) if economics is in fact "obviously" not "value-free?" If it is obvious, then these "value judgments" of which you speak must be obvious as well. And, if these are obvious, then they must be obvious to policy makers. What purpose is served by economists making "their value judgments known to policy makers?"
You're missing the point. I'm saying that, to those who are familiar with it, it's obvious (or should be obvious) that the science of economics isn't value-free, but that the specific values and policies of free-market economists (including those of the Austrians) are not obvious to policy makers, many of whom are not familiar with them and are therefore not aware of what is wrong with interventionism, price controls, etc. Free-market economists need to be more vocal about their findings and to take a more pro-active public policy stance.
I still don't understand your refusal to accept the reality that economics as a science can be objective and value-free while at the same time those who do economics can have social and political opinions and can use the knowledge gleaned from their science to buttress their social and political arguments? For instance, to use my earlier example, the value-free science of physics says nothing about whether a nuclear reaction is good or bad but physicists themselves, like Einstein and Oppenheimer, can hold strong opinions one way or the other.
First of all, objectivity does not require that a science be free of value judgments. This is a misconception that is widespread in the intellectual, academic community, and it rests on the view that value-judgments are inherently subjective.

Secondly, as I stressed repeatedly throughout our dialogue, insofar as economics criticizes the means for attaining particular ends, which Austrian economics does, it is necessarily involved with judgments of value. Economics is a social science, whereas physics is not. Physics, by itself, does not prescribe the building of a nuclear reactor. Economics does prescribe that, given certain ends -- happiness, well-being, prosperity, standard of living, full employment, a relatively stable price level, etc. -- certain economic policies are desirable and ought to be employed in order to achieve these ends.
Moreover, you imply that economists secure in their "economic ivory towers" somehow inhibit the knowledge produced by their science from being disseminated among the public in general and policy makers in particular, that this isolation somehow inhibits economic findings from influencing the course of history.

I don't believe economics is a normative science. Neither do I believe that it is necessary for economics to be a normative science in order for its "value-free" findings to be known to "policy makers" or any other persons of influence and intelligence. Mises comments on this in his introductory comments to his seminal work "Human Action", Page 9:
Then there are people who assert that something must be wrong with the social sciences because social conditions are unsatisfactory. The natural sciences have achieved amazing results in the last two or three hundred years, and the practical utilization of these results has succeeded in improving the general standard of living to an unprecedented extent. But, say these critics, the social sciences have utterly failed in the task of rendering social conditions more satisfactory. They have not stamped out misery and starvation, economic crises and unemployment, war and tyranny. They are sterile and have contributed nothing to the promotion of happiness and human welfare.

These grumblers do not realize that the tremendous progress of technological methods of production and the resulting increase in wealth and welfare were feasible only through the pursuit of those liberal policies which were the practical application of the teachings of economics. It was the ideas of the classical economists that removed the checks imposed by age-old laws, customs, and prejudices upon technological improvement and freed the genius of reformers and innovators from the straitjackets of the guilds, government tutelage, and social pressure of various kinds. It was they that reduced the prestige of conquerors and expropriators and demonstrated the social benefits derived from business activity. None of the great modern inventions would have been put to use if the mentality of the precapitalistic era had not been thoroughly demolished by the economists. What is commonly called the "industrial revolution" was an offspring of the ideological revolution brought about by the doctrines of the economists. The economists exploded the old tenets: that it is unfair and unjust to outdo a competitor by producing better and cheaper goods; that it is iniquitous to deviate from the traditional methods of production; that machines are an evil because they bring about unemployment; that it is one of the tasks of civil government to prevent efficient businessmen from getting rich and to protect the less efficient against the competition of the more efficient; that to restrict the freedom of entrepreneurs by government compulsion or by coercion on the part of other social powers is an appropriate means to promote a nation's well-being. British political economy and French Physiocracy were the pacemakers of modern capitalism. It is they that made possible the progress of the applied natural sciences that has heaped benefits upon the masses....

...It is true that economics is a theoretical science and as such abstains from any judgment of value. It is not its task to tell people what ends they should aim at. It is a science of the means to be applied for the attainment of ends chosen, not, to be sure, a science of the choosing of ends. Ultimate decisions, the valuations and the choosing of ends, are beyond the scope of any science. Science never tells a man how he should act; it merely shows how a man must act if he wants to attain definite ends.

Compare this last statement of Mises with the following from Ayn Rand in her essay, "Causality versus Duty":
Reality confonts man with a great many "musts," but all of them are conditional; the formula of realistic necessity is: "You must, if--" and the "if" stands for man's choice: "--if you want to achieve a certain goal." You must eat, if you want to survive. You must work, if you want to eat. You must think, if you want to work. You must look at reality, if you want to think -- if you want to know what to do -- if you want to know what goals to choose -- if you want to know how to achieve them. (Philosophy: Who Needs it, pp. 118, 119)


It seems to many people that this is very little indeed and that a science limited to the investigation of the is and unable to express a judgment value about the highest and ultimate ends is of no importance for life and action. This too is a mistake. However, the exposure of this mistake is not a task of these introductory remarks. It is one of the ends of the treatise itself. (Human Action, p. 9)

Of course, unlike Mises, Rand recognizes the existence of an ultimate end, which for any given human being is his own life and happiness. Like Mises, however, Rand rejects Kant's categorical imperative and recognizes only the existence of a conditional or hypothetical imperative. According to both Rand and Mises, science (including the science of ethics) can never tell a person how he should act (categorically), but only how he must act if he is to achieve a specific end or goal. In other words, science (and ethics) cannot prescribe ultimate ends; only the means to an end. It can, however, identify one's ultimate end or value and thus establish the conditional basis of moral obligation.

In any case, observe that Mises is here exalting economics for its beneficial effects; he's saying that it is a valuable science, because it promotes material well-being: "It was they [the economists] that reduced the prestige of conquerors and expropriators and demonstrated the social benefits derived from business activity. None of the great modern inventions would have been put to use if the mentality of the precapitalistic era had not been thoroughly demolished by the economists. What is commonly called the 'industrial revolution' was an offspring of the ideological revolution brought about by the doctrines of the economists. The economists exploded the old tenets: that it is unfair and unjust to outdo a competitor by producing better and cheaper goods; that it is iniquitous to deviate from the traditional methods of production; that machines are an evil because they bring about unemployment; that it is one of the tasks of civil government to prevent efficient businessmen from getting rich and to protect the less efficient against the competition of the more efficient; that to restrict the freedom of entrepreneurs by government compulsion or by coercion on the part of other social powers is an appropriate means to promote a nation's well-being. British political economy and French Physiocracy were the pacemakers of modern capitalism. It is they that made possible the progress of the applied natural sciences that has heaped benefits upon the masses...."

And yet in the face of comments like this from one of the key pillars of Austrian economics, you persist in telling me that economics is a "value-free" science!

To be continued....

- Bill


Post 215

Sunday, December 2, 2007 - 6:23pmSanction this postReply
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Bill,

Some quotes from your last post and my initial reaction:

1.
All knowledge is ultimately empirical -- i.e., based on perceptual observation. There are no innate ideas -- no ideas that exist prior to any experience.

You are an empiricist then? What about the idea of God or a supernatural being? Or the idea of "infinity?" Or the principles of logic itself? Have you experienced God? Or infinity? Or a contradiction?

2.
An individual can judge that an action will make him happy and be dead wrong... ...Certain objective conditions are required for human happiness -- ones that are consonant with a person's needs as a certain kind of living organism -- and if these needs are not met, the person will not be happy.
You have either forgotten the entire part of our discussion about ex ante and ex post choices or you have chosen to ignore it and begin anew from square one.

3.
First of all, objectivity does not require that a science be free of value judgments. This is a misconception that... ...rests on the view that value-judgments are inherently subjective.


Please explain to me your concept of "value judgments" and your concept of "objectivity." (Your insistence that science be normative makes me wonder why Rand named her philosophy "Objectivism" rather than "The Science of Objectivism,"  or, even more properly, "The Science of Normativism.")

4.

Physics, by itself, does not prescribe the building of a nuclear reactor. Economics does prescribe that, given certain ends -- happiness, well-being, prosperity, standard of living, full employment, a relatively stable price level, etc. -- certain economic policies are desirable and ought to be employed in order to achieve these ends.
Well, given the certain end of building a nuclear reactor, doesn't physics prescribe certain steps that must be followed in order to attain that end? (And for the umpteenth time, economics doesn't prescribe "policies" that are "desirable and ought to be employed" to achieve particular ends. Economics studies the relationship between ends and means; it studies means that are not suited to attaining particular ends efficiently and means that are suited to attaining particular ends efficiently. Economics does not hold that some means are "desirable and ought to be employed to achieve" particular ends. You may want it to hold such, but it just doesn't -- at least the economics with which I'm familiar.   

5.
According to both Rand and Mises, science (including the science of ethics) can never tell a person how he should act (categorically), but only how he must act if he is to achieve a specific end or goal. In other words, science (and ethics) cannot prescribe ultimate ends; only the means to an end. It can, however, identify one's ultimate end or value and thus establish the conditional basis of moral obligation.
Whew! First of all let me say that you're the first person I've heard refer to "the science of ethics." Maybe I've been out of circulation too long. I even Googled "science of ethics" and there doesn't seem to be a lot of other people using the term either, at least not as you use it.

Second, you say in the quote above that science cannot "prescribe ultimate ends" but can "identify one's ultimate end" and "establish a conditional basis of moral obligation." This is either a contradiction in terms or nonsense. You'll have to amplify. Here's the logical problem as I see it: 

You say in #1 above that "All knowledge is ultimately empirical." [Law of identity, I presume.] You say in #2 above that "[c]ertain objective conditions are required for human happiness -- ones that are consonant with a person's needs as a certain kind of living organism -- and if these needs are not met, the person will not be happy." I assume, from quote #1 that your knowledge that this statement is true is empirical. However, this statement doesn't sound like a conditional statement to me. It sounds like a categorical truth about the "end" of "happiness." And if it is, then how can your "science of ethics," which is also based on empirical knowledge, establish a "basis of moral obligation" regarding the human end of happiness which is "conditional" rather than categorical?

Regards,
Sherman 



Post 216

Monday, December 3, 2007 - 2:54pmSanction this postReply
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I wrote, All knowledge is ultimately empirical -- i.e., based on perceptual observation. There are no innate ideas -- no ideas that exist prior to any experience." Sherman replied,
You are an empiricist then? What about the idea of God or a supernatural being? Or the idea of "infinity?" Or the principles of logic itself? Have you experienced God? Or infinity? Or a contradiction?
I'm not saying that you have to experience something in order to have an idea of it. I'm saying that all knowledge and all ideas are based on experience. You weren't born with ideas about God, infinity or logic. You acquired these through experience. According to Objectivism, man is born tabula rasa -- as a blank tablet. That doesn't mean that one isn't born with certain innate capacities, only that one isn't born with preformed ideas.

For instance, the idea of God is that of a pure, disembodied consciousness. One acquires one's knowledge of consciousness introspectively, through direct experience, but the idea of a disembodied consciousness is a non-sequitur -- an error in logic -- because consciousness requires a body -- it requires sense organs, a brain and a nervous system -- in order to exist and function.

The idea of infinity is a valid concept insofar as it pertains to a quantity that has no set limit beyond which it cannot potentially be extended. For example, the real number system has no last or largest number. We know this from our recognition that a unit can always be added to any given number. But the idea of an actual infinity is a contradiction, because, as Aristotle pointed out, in order to exist, a thing must have a definite identity, but an infinite existent is something indefinite and therefore cannot exist.

As for one's knowledge of a contradiction, one acquires that from experience -- from the recognition that since existence is identity, contradictions cannot exist in reality, only in consciousness. Recalling Hume's example, one can have an idea of a golden mountain, even though one has not seen or experienced it, but that idea's constituent concepts -- "golden" and "mountain" -- must themselves be acquired through experience.

I wrote, "An individual can judge that an action will make him happy and be dead wrong... ...Certain objective conditions are required for human happiness -- ones that are consonant with a person's needs as a certain kind of living organism -- and if these needs are not met, the person will not be happy."
You have either forgotten the entire part of our discussion about ex ante and ex post choices or you have chosen to ignore it and begin anew from square one.
I haven't forgotten the distinction, but it doesn't apply here. Recall that I was responding to a direct quote from Mises in which he states: "There is no standard of greater or lesser satisfaction other than individual judgments of value, different for various people and for the same people at various times." He''s equating a standard of value with a judgment of value; and it is that that I'm taking issue with here, as I stated, "There is such a standard, and it exists independently of an individual's judgments of value. An individual can judge that an action will make him happy and be dead wrong." I then explained that "a person's own will and judgment is the means for evaluating and choosing an action according to a standard of value; it is not the standard itself. To say that it is the standard itself would mean that any choice a person makes promotes his happiness simply because he chooses it." For Objectivism, the standard is the man's life and happiness, even if a person doesn't recognize it and acts in ways that violate that standard.

I wrote that "objectivity does not require that a science be free of value judgments. This is a misconception that... ...rests on the view that value-judgments are inherently subjective."
Please explain to me your concept of "value judgments" and your concept of "objectivity." (Your insistence that science be normative makes me wonder why Rand named her philosophy "Objectivism" rather than "The Science of Objectivism," or, even more properly, "The Science of Normativism.").
A value judgment is "objective" insofar as it is based on a rational standard of value. Not everything that a person judges as valuable is in fact valuable -- for example, the idea that the ultimate standard of value is obedience to God or Allah. The fact that someone chooses his actions based on such a standard doesn't mean that they're conducive to his life and happiness.

Objectivism is a philosophy, but it is also a science, if we define "science" as an organized body of knowledge. Not every science is a philosophy, but every rational philosophy is a science. Of course, the term "science" as it commonly used suggests a discipline in which controlled experimentation is employed in order to gain knowledge of a particular subject. But that is too narrow an application of scientific inquiry. Science can be philosophical as well, provided the philosophy is based on reason and not on faith in the supernatural. As for why Rand didn't call her philosophy, "The Science of Objectivism" instead of "The Philosophy of Objectivism," the answer is that Objectivism is a particular kind of science -- a rational philosophy.

I wrote, "Physics, by itself, does not prescribe the building of a nuclear reactor. Economics does prescribe that, given certain ends -- happiness, well-being, prosperity, standard of living, full employment, a relatively stable price level, etc. -- certain economic policies are desirable and ought to be employed in order to achieve these ends."
Well, given the certain end of building a nuclear reactor, doesn't physics prescribe certain steps that must be followed in order to attain that end?
Sure, and physics is "normative" in that sense as well, but we were talking about normativity as it applies to actions that contribute to human well-being, which, in a fundamental sense, is the concern of morality, and economics does prescribe policies that are conducive to that end.
(And for the umpteenth time, economics doesn't prescribe "policies" that are "desirable and ought to be employed" to achieve particular ends. Economics studies the relationship between ends and means; it studies means that are not suited to attaining particular ends efficiently and means that are suited to attaining particular ends efficiently.
But that's all it means to proscribe or prescribe means to an end. To "proscribe" means to an end is simply to point out that they are not suited to the end sought, and to "prescribe" means to an end is simply to point out that they are suited to the end sought.
Economics does not hold that some means are "desirable and ought to be employed to achieve" particular ends. You may want it to hold such, but it just doesn't -- at least the economics with which I'm familiar.
Yes, it does. You're simply not recognizing what it means to say that certain means are desirable and ought to be employed to achieve particular ends. To say that they're desirable and ought to be employed is simply to say that they accomplish the ends sought (in the best or most efficient way possible).

I wrote, "According to both Rand and Mises, science (including the science of ethics) can never tell a person how he should act (categorically), but only how he must act if he is to achieve a specific end or goal. In other words, science (and ethics) cannot prescribe ultimate ends; only the means to an end. It can, however, identify one's ultimate end or value and thus establish the conditional basis of moral obligation."
Whew! First of all let me say that you're the first person I've heard refer to "the science of ethics."
Then you haven't read Rand's essay "The Objectivist Ethics," in which she writes as follows:
In the sorry record of the history of mankind's ethics -- with a few rare, and unsuccessful, exceptions -- moralists have regarded ethics as the province of whims, that is: of the irrational. Some of them did so explicitly, by intention -- others implicitly, by default. A "whim" is a desire experienced by a person who does not know and does not care to discover its cause.

No philosopher has given a rational, objectively demonstrable, scientific answer to the question of why man needs a code of values. So long as that question remained unanswered, no rational, scientific, objective code of ethics could be discovered or defined. The greatest of all philosophers, Aristotle, did not regard ethics as an exact science; he based his ethical system on observations of what the noble and wise men of his time chose to do, leaving unanswered the questions of: why they chose to do it and why he evaluated them as noble and wise.

Most philosophers took the existence of ethics for granted, as the given, as a historical fact, and were not concerned with discovering its metaphysical cause or objective validation. Many of them attempted to break the traditional monopoly of mysticism in the field of ethics and, allegedly, to define a rational, scientific, nonreligious morality. But their attempts consisted of accepting the ethical doctrines of the mystics and of trying to justify them on social grounds merely substituting society for God.

The avowed mystics held the arbitrary, unaccountable "will of God" as the standard of the good and as the validation of their ethics. The neomystics replaced it with "the good of society," thus collapsing in to the circularity of a definition such as "the standard of the good is that which is good for society." This meant, in logic -- and, today, in worldwide practice -- that "society" stands above any principles of ethics, since it is the source, standard and criterion of ethics, since "the good" is whatever it wills, whatever it happens to assert as its own welfare and pleasure. This meant that "society" may do anything it pleases, since "the good" is whatever it chooses to do because it chooses to do it.
(VOS, p. 14)
Maybe I've been out of circulation too long. I even Googled "science of ethics" and there doesn't seem to be a lot of other people using the term either, at least not as you use it.
That's because Rand is perhaps the first philosopher to refer to it using that term. But if science is simply an organized body of knowledge that is based on rational criteria, then there is no reason to exclude ethics from its domain.
Second, you say in the quote above that science cannot "prescribe ultimate ends" but can "identify one's ultimate end" and "establish a conditional basis of moral obligation." This is either a contradiction in terms or nonsense. You'll have to amplify. Here's the logical problem as I see it:

You say in #1 above that "All knowledge is ultimately empirical." [Law of identity, I presume.] You say in #2 above that "[c]ertain objective conditions are required for human happiness -- ones that are consonant with a person's needs as a certain kind of living organism -- and if these needs are not met, the person will not be happy." I assume, from quote #1 that your knowledge that this statement is true is empirical. However, this statement doesn't sound like a conditional statement to me. It sounds like a categorical truth about the "end" of "happiness." And if it is, then how can your "science of ethics," which is also based on empirical knowledge, establish a "basis of moral obligation" regarding the human end of happiness which is "conditional" rather than categorical?
I used the term "categorical imperative," not "categorical truth." My point was that you cannot prescribe an end, because a prescription requires an answer to the question: "for what?" I.e., for the sake of what value? If you tell your son that he "ought" to do his homework, the implication is that he ought to do it for the sake of some end or goal, e.g., to get a good grade on the test or to learn the material that he is studying. But what sense would it make to say that you "ought" to pursue happiness, if happiness is your ultimate value? "Ought to" for the sake of what end or goal? There isn't any end or goal beyond that of happiness for the sake of which you "ought" to pursue it. But that doesn't mean that you can't identify that happiness is your ultimate goal, which is different from saying that you ought to pursue it for the sake of some end or goal.

Let me put it another way. Suppose someone said that you "ought" to drink five cups of coffee a day. Wouldn't you ask why? Implicit in your question would be your recognition of the fact that he must give you a reason for such an action, if he expects you to perform it -- some value that you would gain by doing it. Absent any such reason or value, you would regard his prescription as having no discernible basis in reality. The reason or value that you're asking him for is the end to which the action of drinking five cups of coffee is a means. But the pursuit of an ultimate end or value can have no such reason, and therefore cannot be prescribed.

- Bill


(Edited by William Dwyer on 12/03, 3:49pm)


Post 217

Monday, December 3, 2007 - 6:12pmSanction this postReply
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But if science is simply an organized body of knowledge that is based on rational criteria, then there is no reason to exclude ethics from its domain.
Nor, for that matter, its applied aspects - aethetics and politics, the personal and the social.....


Post 218

Wednesday, December 5, 2007 - 6:03pmSanction this postReply
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Dear Bill,

I'm not saying that you have to experience something in order to have an idea of it. I'm saying that all knowledge and all ideas are based on experience.
Doubletalk. There is no meaningful distinction between knowledge which is gained by experience and knowledge which is based on experience.

You weren't born with ideas about God, infinity or logic. You acquired these through experience. 
More doublespeak. I know how I, personally, acquired these ideas: from elementary school teachers. However, epistemologically speaking, how did man first acquire these ideas?
According to Objectivism, man is born tabula rasa -- as a blank tablet. That doesn't mean that one isn't born with certain innate capacities, only that one isn't born with preformed ideas.

Evasion. Obviously, man isn't born with "preformed ideas" of God, infinity or logic. The question is how does man acquire such ideas, epistemologically speaking?
For instance, the idea of God is that of a pure, disembodied consciousness. One acquires one's knowledge of consciousness introspectively, through direct experience, but the idea of a disembodied consciousness is a non-sequitur -- an error in logic -- because consciousness requires a body -- it requires sense organs, a brain and a nervous system -- in order to exist and function.
Red herring. The idea of God is not necessarily that of a "disembodied consciousness." The idea of God is commonly that of a supernatural consciousness. A supernatural being does not require a body in order to exist and function.

Contradiction: Epistemologically, introspection and extrospection are two different things. Introspection refers to examining your self, i.e., your own mental state. I suppose you could say you directly "experience" your self when you contemplate your navel, but you certainly don't experience anything outside yourself.

Extrospection refers to considering and observing things external to your inner self. If by "direct experience" you mean knowledge can be gained by directly experiencing your own thoughts, then you contradict your earlier statement that all "knowledge is ultimately empirical." If by "direct experience" you mean knowledge is gained empirically by considering and observing things outside your self, then you contradict your statement that one "acquires one's knowledge of consciousness introspectively."

The idea of infinity is a valid concept insofar as it pertains to a quantity that has no set limit beyond which it cannot potentially be extended. For example, the real number system has no last or largest number. We know this from our recognition that a unit can always be added to any given number. But the idea of an actual infinity is a contradiction, because, as Aristotle pointed out, in order to exist, a thing must have a definite identity, but an infinite existent is something indefinite and therefore cannot exist.
Obfuscation. You stated: "All knowledge is ultimately empirical...." I challenged that statement by suggesting that ideas exist that are not ultimately empirical, namely, the idea of infinity. Thank you for recognizing that the idea of infinity in mathematics is a "valid" concept. Now then, how is man's knowledge of this concept "ultimately empirical," since "our recognition [emphasis mine] that a unit can always be added to any given number" is not a recognition at all in the sense of an extrospective empirical observation but an introspective conclusion of logical ratiocination?
As for one's knowledge of a contradiction, one acquires that from experience -- from the recognition that since existence is identity, contradictions cannot exist in reality, only in consciousness.
Tautology. Forget Hume's analogy, focus on what you've just written. You've argued that a man acquires knowledge of logic by using logic!
The fact that someone chooses his actions based on such a standard doesn't mean that they're conducive to his life and happiness.

Do you believe an individual who chooses his actions based on such a standard ("the idea that the ultimate standard of value is obedience to God or Allah) cannot be happy?
Of course, the term "science" as it commonly used suggests a discipline in which controlled experimentation [Editor's note: Sherman would add "and logical deduction from self-evident premises."] is employed in order to gain knowledge of a particular subject. But that is too narrow an application of scientific inquiry.
Please present a rational argument why I -- or anyone, for that matter -- should accept your defintion of science in the broader sense instead of the commonly accepted usage of science in the narrower sense? I am aware that you also said: "But that is too narrow an application of scientific inquiry. Science can be philosophical as well, provided the philosophy is based on reason and not on faith in the supernatural." But these are a couple of assertions, not a rational argument.
Sure, and physics is "normative" in that sense as well, but we were talking about normativity as it applies to actions that contribute to human well-being, which, in a fundamental sense, is the concern of morality, and economics does prescribe policies that are conducive to that end.
Well, we will have to agree to disagree on this. In my opinion your concept of a "normative" science is bizarre. Moreover, you continue to insist that (Austrian) economics is a normative discipline that advocates policies that contribute to human well-being. I find that your attempts to prove what you claim is true are obscure, illogical and unpersuasive. Any time spent trying to refute your claims point by point would be unprofitable from my point of view.
But what sense would it make to say that you "ought" to pursue happiness, if happiness is your ultimate value? "Ought to" for the sake of what end or goal? There isn't any end or goal beyond that of happiness for the sake of which you "ought" to pursue it. But that doesn't mean that you can't identify that happiness is your ultimate goal, which is different from saying that you ought to pursue it for the sake of some end or goal.

Look, no matter how you parse it, you claim that you can "identify" certain objective conditions that are required for human happiness and I claim that you can't. I haven't been persuaded by any of your arguments. You haven't been persuaded by mine. What purpose is served by continuing to kick this dead horse?

And, frankly, if we can't agree on this there is little hope for agreement elsewhere. From my prospective the good news is that politically we can agree on a great many things regardless of our disparate philosophies, the most important of which are life, liberty and property.

Regards,
Sherman 


Post 219

Thursday, December 6, 2007 - 1:19amSanction this postReply
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I wrote, "I'm not saying that you have to experience something in order to have an idea of it. I'm saying that all knowledge and all ideas are based on experience." Sherman replied,
Doubletalk. There is no meaningful distinction between knowledge which is gained by experience and knowledge which is based on experience.
Look, when I said that you don't have to experience something in order to have an idea of it, I was referring to something like a golden mountain. I haven't seen a golden mountain, but I nevertheless have an idea of it. Instead of jumping on my statements, taking the worst possible interpretation of them and then pouncing with glee on what you think is fallacy, why not make an effort to understand what I'm saying?! What good does it do to claim that you've refuted someone's arguments, if your refutation is based on a misunderstanding of what the person is saying?!

I wrote, "You weren't born with ideas about God, infinity or logic. You acquired these through experience."
More doublespeak. I know how I, personally, acquired these ideas: from elementary school teachers. However, epistemologically speaking, how did man first acquire these ideas?
I don't know how man first acquired the idea of God. Perhaps through the attempt to explain things in nature that he couldn't understand. So he postulated a supreme being as an explanation. As for infinity, it's simply the idea that something can be extended without limit. One can arrive at a concept of infinity by an understanding of a limit and that of extension, knowledge of which is gained through experience. Logic is an abstract concept that is ultimately acquired from observing reality and abstracting it's fundamental nature -- of identifying the nature of being qua being, as Aristotle would say. Logic, in other words, is ontological; it is reality based.

But why are you asking this kind of question? What is the point that you're trying to make here? If you agree that man wasn't born with these concepts, then wouldn't you agree that he acquired them by generalizing from his experience?

I wrote, "According to Objectivism, man is born tabula rasa -- as a blank tablet. That doesn't mean that one isn't born with certain innate capacities, only that one isn't born with preformed ideas."
Evasion.
Okay. Evasion. Then what is it that you think I'm evading?
Obviously, man isn't born with "preformed ideas" of God, infinity or logic. The question is how does man acquire such ideas, epistemologically speaking?
Do you want me to spell out the precise evolution of the concepts from their base in perceptual awareness? Why? For what purpose? If you're really interested in the Objectivist epistemology and its theory of concept formation, you can always read Rand's ITOE.

I wrote, "For instance, the idea of God is that of a pure, disembodied consciousness. One acquires one's knowledge of consciousness introspectively, through direct experience, but the idea of a disembodied consciousness is a non-sequitur -- an error in logic -- because consciousness requires a body -- it requires sense organs, a brain and a nervous system -- in order to exist and function."
Red herring. The idea of God is not necessarily that of a "disembodied consciousness." The idea of God is commonly that of a supernatural consciousness. A supernatural being does not require a body in order to exist and function.
Well, if the idea of God is a supernatural consciousness, which does not require a body in order to exist, then doesn't that imply a consciousness without a body? You say that a supernatural consciousness does not require a body in order to exist. Then how does it perceive reality without sense organs, or think without a brain or do anything else that bodies are required for? You say that it can do these things because it's a supernatural being. What do you mean by a "supernatural" being? One that is above the laws of nature? By that definition, a supernatural being is impossible, because it would violate the principles of identity and causality.
Contradiction: Epistemologically, introspection and extrospection are two different things. Introspection refers to examining your self, i.e., your own mental state. I suppose you could say you directly "experience" your self when you contemplate your navel...
I'm talking about an awareness of your own process of awareness. Consciousness can only be understood ostensively by introspection. Contemplating your navel is not introspection.
but you certainly don't experience anything outside yourself.
You're confusing the process of experience with the object of experience. The object of experience is external to consciousness; the process internal to it.
Extrospection refers to considering and observing things external to your inner self.
Of course.
If by "direct experience" you mean knowledge can be gained by directly experiencing your own thoughts, then you contradict your earlier statement that all "knowledge is ultimately empirical."
No, that's not what I mean. I mean direct experience of both the external world and one's own process of awareness.
If by "direct experience" you mean knowledge is gained empirically by considering and observing things outside your self, then you contradict your statement that one "acquires one's knowledge of consciousness introspectively."
I mean both. Look, one is aware of the external world by directly experiencing it -- extrospectively, AND one is aware of one's process of awareness by directly experiencing it -- introspectively.

I wrote, "The idea of infinity is a valid concept insofar as it pertains to a quantity that has no set limit beyond which it cannot potentially be extended. For example, the real number system has no last or largest number. We know this from our recognition that a unit can always be added to any given number. But the idea of an actual infinity is a contradiction, because, as Aristotle pointed out, in order to exist, a thing must have a definite identity, but an infinite existent is something indefinite and therefore cannot exist."
Obfuscation. You stated: "All knowledge is ultimately empirical...." I challenged that statement by suggesting that ideas exist that are not ultimately empirical, namely, the idea of infinity.
And I replied that there is no such thing as actual infinity, because the concept violates the law of identity. Therefore, there is no such thing as "knowledge" of an actual infinity, because actual infinity doesn't exist. As I said, there is such a thing as potential infinity, but all it means is that there is no preset limit on the continued extension of a given size or quantity. There is no largest number, because another unit can always theoretically be added to any given number, no matter how large. But that is an idea that one arrives at by observation, by learning the number system and what it means to add one more unit to something.
Thank you for recognizing that the idea of infinity in mathematics is a "valid" concept. Now then, how is man's knowledge of this concept "ultimately empirical," since "our recognition [emphasis mine] that a unit can always be added to any given number" is not a recognition at all in the sense of an extrospective empirical observation but an introspective conclusion of logical ratiocination?
I don't know why you use the word "introspective" here, unless you equate introspection with any act of thinking, but that's not normally how the term is used. To be sure, one arrives at the idea of infinity by thinking or reasoning, but one's reasoning is based ultimately on one's observations -- on the evidence of one's senses.

I wrote, "As for one's knowledge of a contradiction, one acquires that from experience -- from the recognition that since existence is identity, contradictions cannot exist in reality, only in consciousness.
Tautology. Forget Hume's analogy, focus on what you've just written. You've argued that a man acquires knowledge of logic by using logic!
What I was trying to say is that one acquires knowledge of the principle of contradiction -- i.e., of the law of (non)contradiction -- by observing reality -- by observing that a thing is what it is and cannot simultaneously be something else.

I wrote, "The fact that someone chooses his actions based on such a standard doesn't mean that they're conducive to his life and happiness."
Do you believe an individual who chooses his actions based on such a standard ("the idea that the ultimate standard of value is obedience to God or Allah) cannot be happy?
He cannot be as happy as he otherwise would, if the commandments of God or Allah prohibit actions that promote his life and happiness.

I wrote, "Of course, the term 'science' as it commonly used suggests a discipline in which controlled experimentation [Editor's note: Sherman would add "and logical deduction from self-evident premises."] is employed in order to gain knowledge of a particular subject. But that is too narrow an application of scientific inquiry."
Please present a rational argument why I -- or anyone, for that matter -- should accept your defintion of science in the broader sense instead of the commonly accepted usage of science in the narrower sense?
Quoting Webster:

"Science: 1a: possession of knowledge as distinguished from ignorance or misunderstanding. b: knowledge attained through study or practice. 2a: a department of systematized knowledge as an object of study. 3: knowledge covering general truths or the operation of general laws."
I am aware that you also said: "But that is too narrow an application of scientific inquiry. Science can be philosophical as well, provided the philosophy is based on reason and not on faith in the supernatural." But these are a couple of assertions, not a rational argument.
See the above definitions.

- Bill



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