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Post 160

Saturday, September 20, 2008 - 5:00pmSanction this postReply
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Jeff,

As you know -- and as you know that I know -- your post 143 has a ring of truth. We need to uncover the whole bell though -- rather than to rest on an inference to indirect evidence such as a mere ring. Bill won't have it any other way. I am getting recharged in that uncovering so don't fear (you can rest, if you're tired or full of frustration).

:-)

Ed


Post 161

Saturday, September 20, 2008 - 5:03pmSanction this postReply
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Regarding post #158, I think Ted is applying the moniker of "smug" to the wrong person. And no, I'm not speaking of Bill.

Regards,
--
Jeff


Post 162

Saturday, September 20, 2008 - 5:05pmSanction this postReply
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Best wished Ed! :-)

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 163

Saturday, September 20, 2008 - 5:06pmSanction this postReply
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Steve,

Good points in post 147. You lose the exercise of your inalienable rights via performatory contradiction (when you violate those same rights in others). If you don't violate rightly held rights -- you shouldn't lose yours. In this case where Bill says that the victim loses her right to life by acting in her own self-defense, she's isn't violating rightly-held rights.

It's Bill's obligation focus that gets him off track. Our violation focus is objectively superior.

Ed


Post 164

Saturday, September 20, 2008 - 5:17pmSanction this postReply
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Ted writes:
    So the false alternative presented so smugly, of kill or be killed, in a circumstance no Objectivist would argue one should get himself into, is offered as if it is fundamental. Assuming evil circumstances, Jeff would chose not to sacrifice another to himself. How admirable. I am sure Bill would simply choose, as I would, to avoid the evil circumstance in the first place.

Hey Ted, these aren't my examples. They were presented by others and I came into this conversation well after it was chugging along. Of course you should work to not get yourself into these types of situations, but maybe, sometimes, they are unavoidable. In the person A/B/C example near the start of this thread, one would presume that B and C didn't create and then place themselves in those positions.

And I disagree with you that the thrust of this discussion with Bill is about understanding "if you want to commit a crime, and live, this is how you go about it." I am pretty sure that Bill, like me, is more interested in understanding how the Objectivist ethics applies (or does not apply) in extreme (i.e., non-normal) situations fo those of us who presume to be trying to life a life at a moral plane something above that of a rapist.

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 165

Saturday, September 20, 2008 - 5:20pmSanction this postReply
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Hey Joe:

Can you move the check mark away from the Reply button. I keep sanctioning "evil" in my quest for moral perfection! :-)

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 166

Saturday, September 20, 2008 - 5:22pmSanction this postReply
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Bill, in post 149 you say:

For instance, in Rand's example of breaking into the house and stealing the food, the innocent owner did not have a right against the survivor's stealing it. Otherwise, the survivor would have been obligated not to steal it.
That's not an effective interpretation. It puts the obligation before the right and then drops the context. Obligation then becomes a floating abstraction, with rights showering down upon those over whom it floats -- and rightlessness searing the flesh of those who have temporarily lost the cloud-cover provided by the floating "obligations cloud."

We're morally obligated to live happy human lives and that means living by principles. The innocent owner had property rights when the survivor stole his food, rights that were not exercised at the time -- but rights, nonetheless. It's the reason for reparation. Reparation to the innocent owner follows the act because his rights were violated during the act. The rights violation is key to the reparation.

Any other kind of action that we do does not morally require such reparation. We're not morally required to give someone money after we provide them with too good of a first impression of ourselves, for example (even though we know they'll be let down later, when they find us out). There's room for personal evaluation when it comes to that kind of behavior, so that we give reparation when we deem it valuable.

There's no room for personal evaluation when you violate another's rights. You owe them whether you see the value in it, or not. That's why we make criminals pay, even when they don't think it's right (because what they think or what they value is not the arbiter of the truth of that kind of objective matter).

Ed


Post 167

Saturday, September 20, 2008 - 5:27pmSanction this postReply
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Jeff, if you scroll down to the bottom left of the page, there is a "Post" button. The "Post" button does the same thing as the reply link beside the sanction button. Or you could try not moving the mouse while pressing the mouse button down, a skill that is highly valuable in a large number of situations!

Post 168

Saturday, September 20, 2008 - 5:35pmSanction this postReply
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Jeff,

Modus tollens works in both directions. You get the results you do because you start with a faulty assumption. If you want to make your case, you are going to have to prove that self-preservation at any cost is one's moral duty to oneself in all circumstances.
There's something very compelling about that. Here's how it would look:

Self-preservation at any cost is one's moral duty.
In any situation where self-preservation becomes threatened (even those one brings on oneself), one's moral duty is to eradicate the threat.
==================
Therefore, crime is wrong unless you are a perpetrator (caught in the middle of your own crime) -- in which case even genocide would become moral, with the proviso that it led to one's self-preservation
Pretty hard to defend, I'd say.

Ed


Post 169

Saturday, September 20, 2008 - 5:49pmSanction this postReply
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Jeff,

What you're advocating is not egoism, because egoism says that the moral agent should always be the intended beneficiary of his own actions.

Ted writes,
Assuming evil circumstances, Jeff would chose not to sacrifice another to himself. How admirable."
I don't think it's admirable at all; for, in a conflict of interest, if he doesn't sacrifice another to himself, he will be sacrificing himself to another. From the standpoint of egoism, that is an immoral action.
I am sure Bill would simply choose, as I would, to avoid the evil circumstance in the first place.
Of course. But if, for some strange reason, I didn't, I wouldn't allow myself to be killed, if I the only way I could prevent it is by killing my assailant.

Contrary to Jon, it makes no difference whether I created the evil circumstance myself or whether it was forced upon me. If I value what my life has to offer, then I am justified in doing whatever is necessary to protect and sustain it, for once I am dead, that's it. There are no longer any values for me to achieve. This is so obvious, I'm surprised that anyone would question it.

- Bill

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Post 170

Saturday, September 20, 2008 - 6:48pmSanction this postReply
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Ed wrote,
One possible issue with the premise "rights impose obligations" is that rights aren't beings -- and beings exhaust the set of all of those things that could ever possibly impose anything. An argument against that might be something like: But gravity imposes that you'll fall if you lean over far enough! Gravity just is, and it is our valuing standing up that imposes us to work within the law of gravity, our center of mass, and the appropriate width of our base of support.
Ed, this is a silly objection. The statement of mine that you quoted was: "My reasoning is that if she did have a right against his killing her, then he would be obligated not to kill her, and since he has no such obligation in this situation, it follows logically that she has no such right."

Are you seriously suggesting that if you have a right against my killing you, I am NOT obligated to abstain from killing you?? If not, then what would it mean to say that you had "a right" against my killing you? It wouldn't mean a damn thing. How can you have a right against my killing you, if I am justified in killing you?

By the way, who said: "As to his neighbors, his rights impose no obligations on them, except of a negative kind: to abstain from violating his rights."? (bolded emphasis added) I'll give you a hint: her initials are AR. Of course, rights are not "beings," but that doesn't mean that they don't impose the (admittedly negative) obligation to abstain from violating them.

So, if your right against my killing you implies that I have an obligation to abstain from killing you (which it does), then if I have no such obligation, which I would not if killing you is necessary to my survival, it follows that you cannot have a right against my killing you.

Later, you presented the following argument as a characterization of my position:
Self-preservation at any cost is one's moral duty.
In any situation where self-preservation becomes threatened (even those one brings on oneself), one's moral duty is to eradicate the threat.
==================
Therefore, crime is wrong unless you are a perpetrator (caught in the middle of your own crime) -- in which case even genocide would become moral, with the proviso that it led to one's self-preservation.
I wouldn't say that self-preservation at any cost is one's moral duty. If one is suffering from an agonizingly painful case of terminal cancer, one may be better off ending one's life than prolonging a terminally painful condition. I would also not use the term "duty," as it has too much Kantian baggage. I would simply say that one "ought" to do whatever is necessary to sustain one's life, if one values it, and if the benefits to oneself outweigh the costs.

At any rate, to your characterization of my position, you added the following comment: "Pretty hard to defend, I'd say."

"Pretty hard to defend" is not an argument. If you wish to make an argument, please do so. By the way, would you say that dropping the A-bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the sake of American self-interest and self-preservation was genocidal and therefore "pretty hard to defend"? I suppose you would.

- Bill



(Edited by William Dwyer on 9/20, 7:27pm)

(Edited by William Dwyer on 9/20, 9:23pm)


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Post 171

Saturday, September 20, 2008 - 7:12pmSanction this postReply
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CJS in Post 155: " It does not matter whether the life-threatening circumstances that one faces are the result of a natural calamity, are man-made or are self-inflicted. ...  but that is just a matter of degree."

Thank you.  I agree 100%.  Ayn Rand was wrong.  Emergencies -- so called -- are just everyday life moreso.  There is nothing about any emergency that is not a matter of degree versus a difference in kind.  I hghly recommend Stuart Hayashi's essay on Arbitrary Metaphysics archived here on RoR and also on Objectivist Living.  In Luke Setzer's recent article on Florida Tech's Outreach, he tells of the old sea captain who was asked what to do if shoals are at port and a storm at starboard and the old man says that you avoid that before it happens.

So, too, with these kill or be killed scenarios.  I discussed this in the radioactive octopus riff.

My wife and I spent the month of August unemployed and homeless and for some apparently personal failing of our own (according to the crypto-looters here on RoR), it never occured to us that we had a "temporary emergency right" to steal.  What we did not pay for, we went without because it was our problem, not everyone else's.


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Post 172

Saturday, September 20, 2008 - 8:14pmSanction this postReply
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Bill writes:
    for, in a conflict of interest, if he doesn't sacrifice another to himself, he will be sacrificing himself to another. From the standpoint of egoism, that is an immoral action.

Bill:

I truly do understand your logic, but I still disagree with you because I do not believe that the choice is to "sacrifice another" or "sacrifice oneself".

We face life-and-death situations all the time and if we are unable to surmount them and die, we do not call that a sacrifice. If you are caught on a mountainside during an avalanche and cannot get out of the way, you are going to die - but that loss of life would not be sensibly classified as a sacrifice. It is just the unfortunate byproduct of these circumstances. Now, if only I had a jet pack, I could have flown to safety. But that option wasn't available to me , so I die.

Now, take the person A/B/C example. B finds himself forced into a life-threatening position because of A's action. Unlike the avalanche situation, it appears that he does have one existential option to save himself, which is to kill C. However, as a rational egoist, B recognizes that C is not responsible for B's predicament and further recognizes that morally, he has no more right to C's life than A has to his. So he refuses to murder C. For the moral person, the option of killing C is just as inaccessible as the jet pack is to the person on the mountainside. Just to avoid confusion, let me reiterate my point: Yes, B has an existential option available, but that is precluded by the moral factor. Now it is true that B is likely going to die at the hands of A for failing to do his bidding, but the choice B makes is no more a sacrifice of his life than is that of the person on the mountain. Both deaths are tragic but unavoidable as neither had a valid option available to them. In my formulation, there is an option that does not involve the sacrifice of oneself or of another, and that is the moral course which must be taken.

I understand that you believe that in a situation like A/B/C, conventional morality no longer applies. B, no longer constrained by any moral code whatsoever with respect to others - all of their rights having vanished in the context of the situation - is free to act in what you classify as his own best interest, including killing C if necessary for his survival. You quote Rand that "Morality ends where a gun begins." Rand may have had a perfectly valid point to make with that aphorism (offhand, I don't know the context), but I disagree with the sentiment as it applied to the situations we are discussing (even if it means disagreeing with Rand herself). My disagreement with your approach is three-fold.
  1. I do not agree that morality ends with the initiation of force. Even under duress I hold that a person remains responsible for their actions and the choices that they make are therefore moral choices. I have not heard any convincing argument that morality does not apply, other than for this to be simply declared.

  2. I hold that the right to life resides with each person and that no action taken or situation experienced by a third party can have any bearing on that right. Therefore, there is no context where my predicament can eliminate another's rights and make it permissible for me to kill an innocent person. Even in the less serious case of breaking into a house and taking food, the homeowner's full property rights remain in effect. Otherwise, the turning in of oneself and making restitution required by Rand would not be necessary. Certainly the same must be true in the more serious case of murder. And since no restitution is possible, no conceivable action against another's right to life could be considered.

  3. I do not think it is actually in B's "best interest" to kill C, because I argue that preservation of the "self" is what morality should be about and not just preservation of "life". And this is especially true if an act of sacrifice is involved.


Bill writes:
    This is so obvious, I'm surprised that anyone would question it.

Bill, I know how you feel! :-)

Regards,
--
Jeff

Post 173

Saturday, September 20, 2008 - 8:55pmSanction this postReply
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I cannot find a thing wrong with Bill's point of view. It is a superior point of view as far a predicting behavior, it is rational, it is contextual. Bravo Bill!
Question: Do others think that a rapist or robber is likely to be a deep philosophical thinker concerned with other peoples' intrinsic right to their own life? No? Then how can you say they "ought" to act as if they were? Aren't we better served by identifying principles that allow us to make good predictions about how people will actually act? I mean, for our own self preservation.

Michael M: "according to the crypto-looters here on RoR" [!???!] Where the hell did this come from? Is this how you elicit sympathy?

Post 174

Saturday, September 20, 2008 - 11:36pmSanction this postReply
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"Round and round she goes, and where she stops nobody knows." -- Said by the carnival barker at the Merry-Go-Round.

Jeff writes,
We face life-and-death situations all the time and if we are unable to surmount them and die, we do not call that a sacrifice. If you are caught on a mountainside during an avalanche and cannot get out of the way, you are going to die - but that loss of life would not be sensibly classified as a sacrifice. It is just the unfortunate byproduct of these circumstances. Now, if only I had a jet pack, I could have flown to safety. But that option wasn't available to me , so I die.

Now, take the person A/B/C example. B finds himself forced into a life-threatening position because of A's action. Unlike the avalanche situation, it appears that he does have one existential option to save himself, which is to kill C. However, as a rational egoist, B recognizes that C is not responsible for B's predicament and further recognizes that morally, he has no more right to C's life than A has to his. So he refuses to murder C. For the moral person, the option of killing C is just as inaccessible as the jet pack is to the person on the mountainside. Just to avoid confusion, let me reiterate my point: Yes, B has an existential option available, but that is precluded by the moral factor. Now it is true that B is likely going to die at the hands of A for failing to do his bidding, but the choice B makes is no more a sacrifice of his life than is that of the person on the mountain. Both deaths are tragic but unavoidable as neither had a valid option available to them.
But, unlike the hiker on the mountainside, B did have a valid option available, namely to kill C in order to save his own life. You say that it wasn't a moral option, but that begs the question, because the question is, since it's an existential option, can it be chosen morally? To which the egoist would answer, yes. The hiker on the mountainside did the best he could for the purpose of self-preservation. He died, because there was nothing else he could do to sustain his life. He didn't willingly sacrifice his life when he could otherwise have preserved it. If he did have another option -- say a jet pack that would carry him to safety, but he was too proud to use it -- then he would be guilty of self-sacrifice.

The same is true for B if he refuses to kill C and dies at the hands of A. If life is a value, one must choose those options that promote one's survival when and if they are available. To say that sacrificing C is not morally available to B begs the question, because the egoist would argue that it is morally available, precisely because B ought to choose it in order to preserve his own life.
In my formulation, there is an option that does not involve the sacrifice of oneself or of another, and that is the moral course which must be taken.
But don't you see, it DOES involve the sacrifice of oneself, because one is choosing to die when one could have chosen to survive by sacrificing the other person.
I understand that you believe that in a situation like A/B/C, conventional morality no longer applies. B, no longer constrained by any moral code whatsoever with respect to others - all of their rights having vanished in the context of the situation - is free to act in what you classify as his own best interest, including killing C if necessary for his survival. You quote Rand that "Morality ends where a gun begins." Rand may have had a perfectly valid point to make with that aphorism (offhand, I don't know the context), but I disagree with the sentiment as it applied to the situations we are discussing (even if it means disagreeing with Rand herself). My disagreement with your approach is three-fold.
I do not agree that morality ends with the initiation of force. Even under duress I hold that a person remains responsible for their actions and the choices that they make are therefore moral choices. I have not heard any convincing argument that morality does not apply, other than for this to be simply declared.
There is a sense in which morality still applies under threat of force, and a sense in which it doesn't.

It still applies insofar as one has a choice to do the coercer's bidding or suffer the consequences. In the A/B/C example, Rand says that it doesn't make any moral difference which alternative B chooses -- to kill C in order to survive -- or refuse to kill C and be killed by A. The choice could be considered morally optional, depending on whether B finds himself incapable of killing C, because killing an innocent man is too horrible to contemplate, or whether he is capable of going through with it. It he's not capable of going through with it and prefers to die instead, because killing an innocent man is simply too painful, Rand would say that there is no moral breach, and if he is capable of going through with it, she would say that there is also no moral breach, because the alternative was to lose his own life and all other values along with it. That is certainly a legitimate way to view this kind of forced choice. However, if B does have the stomach to kill C, then I would argue that he ought to go through with it in order to preserve his own life.

But there is also a sense in which morality does not apply under threat of force, and that is the sense in which B is not morally responsible for murdering C if he is forced to do so by A, any more than a business that is forced by the Mafia to pay protection money is morally responsible for supporting organized crime. A person is not morally culpable for an action that he is forced to perform under threat of death or bodily harm, which is something that our legal system already recognizes. If an innocent person is forced by a criminal gang to rob a bank, he or she is not responsible for the crime. The criminal gang is. That, I think, is what Rand means in Galt's speech, when she says that "morality ends where a gun begins."
I hold that the right to life resides with each person and that no action taken or situation experienced by a third party can have any bearing on that right. Therefore, there is no context where my predicament can eliminate another's rights and make it permissible for me to kill an innocent person. Even in the less serious case of breaking into a house and taking food, the homeowner's full property rights remain in effect. Otherwise, the turning in of oneself and making restitution required by Rand would not be necessary.
Not true. Let me explain why. You are obliged to pay back the food or its monetary value, because once the emergency is past, you no longer need it to survive, and must therefore return it (along with any interest that it might have accrued). You have a moral right to it only insofar as it enables you to survive the emergency itself. You have in effect "borrowed" it for the duration of the emergency, but must repay it (with interest) once the emergency is past and you are capable of doing so.
Certainly the same must be true in the more serious case of murder. And since no restitution is possible, no conceivable action against another's right to life could be considered.
It's different in the case of murder, because although one's survival necessitated the murder, no restitution is possible in that case, unless of course the victim has surviving beneficiaries who deserve to be compensated, in which case, restitution is required.
I do not think it is actually in B's "best interest" to kill C, because I argue that preservation of the "self" is what morality should be about and not just preservation of "life". And this is especially true if an act of sacrifice is involved.
What do you mean, preservation of the "self"?? How does death preserve the self? Once you're dead, your "self" no longer exists!

- Bill
(Edited by William Dwyer on 9/20, 11:48pm)


Post 175

Sunday, September 21, 2008 - 12:55amSanction this postReply
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Bill,

“You have in effect "borrowed" it for the duration of the emergency, but must repay it (with interest) once the emergency is past and you are capable of doing so.”

“although one's survival necessitated the murder, [following on the heels of the rape] no restitution is possible in that case, unless of course the victim has surviving beneficiaries who deserve to be compensated, in which case, restitution is required.”

You say, “with interest.” What rate of interest, on top of the value of the life, do the surviving beneficiaries get? Is it steeper than the rate on old crackers left in a cabin? Or is it a flat rate, whether on old crackers or a life? Know what I mean? Like, ‘It’s been two months since you took my old cabin crackers. You owe me the value of those, plus something for my having gone for two months without those old crackers’—is that the same rate of interest as like when, ‘It’s been two months since you took my sister, you owe me the value on her, plus something for having gone without my sister/dollar-value-of-sister, for like sixty days now.’?

And what is to be the value of the life?

On the private roads thread you have been arguing that a fair price cannot be established in the absence of a voluntary exchange.

Cannot be established.

Yet “surviving beneficiaries […] deserve to be compensated, in which case, restitution is required.” So how much?

How much is owed, how does it get figured?



Post 176

Sunday, September 21, 2008 - 1:59amSanction this postReply
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As a brother of the victim I can imagine having different “settlement” points.

If sis had been one of those pain-in-the-ass types who has to argue everything, and I can just see her saying, “like hell you’ll rape me, pimple-face!” like an idiot—instead of being rational, retaining her right against being murdered, and riding it out and surviving—then I can imagine being like, “Dude, one hundred bucks and no hard feelings.” (Ten would do it. So imagine the coup if he pays $100!)

But if she had been one of those easy-going types who isn’t prone to go all hot-headed and threaten the life of a rational egoist—then I can see being really pissed at what he did. I wouldn’t buy the dire emergency story of his. I’d be like: “Dude, I’ve raped her. She wasn’t the type to cause a fuss. You owe me like, a bazillion dollars.”



Post 177

Sunday, September 21, 2008 - 3:07amSanction this postReply
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Bill:

Thanks for taking the time with all of your detailed responses on this thread. I'm afraid that we simply have to agree to disagree here. None of my arguments appear to address your point of view on this matter and none of your counter arguments speak to my points as I see them. We each believe that we are approaching the matter from a rational egoist perspective, but we are both stymied in our attempts to formulate an argument that will appear convincing to the other. When I read your post #174, all I can glean from it is a number of assertions that contradict my points without providing anything that seems to me to be an actual argument. In other words, I agree that we are on the merry-go-round, and I can find nothing of a meta-nature that is letting me step off and see things differently. But that is not a criticism, because I can also see that my posts appear to you in a similar light. It seems to me that somewhere we are each making to very different assumptions about some fundamental philosophical point that causes us to see the application of ethics in these widely diverging ways. But I have thought long and hard about it and I am at a loss to identify what it is.* Maybe it is something metaphysical, or more likely, epistemological. But, until that key is found, I'm afraid that we are locked in this circular chain of unproductive reasoning. So, until I feel that I have something truly unique to contribute, I am going to drop out of this discussion for the time being. Nevertheless, I appreciate your tireless efforts to communicate clearly and forcefully for your point of view.

Regards,
--
Jeff

* One thing I do know is a part of our difficulties is that, despite both of us making an effort to clearly define our terms, we seem to continue to use words like "rights" and "sacrifice" in significantly different ways. But even with this awareness, I cannot pinpoint why that happens.

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Post 178

Sunday, September 21, 2008 - 5:50amSanction this postReply
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Jeff,

You have the position that its better to die than kill an innocent person when killing the innocent person is your only option to survive.

Bill has the position that its better to kill an innocent person and survive when killing the innocent person is your only option to survive.

So Jeff, you have a rule, "One must not ever kill an innocent person", which you think should never be broken under any circumstance imaginable. Bill does not take the position that the rule is unbreakable.

Jeff, in this, you are treating morality as a rule book instead of as a tool to achieving goals. In the A/B/C context, "morality" still applies. From Jeff's prospective, its still applies as a rule book, one must not kill an innocent person. From Bill's prospective, it still applies as a tool for accomplishing his goals, he realizes that killing an innocent person is usually extremely contradictory to his goals, but in this context killing an innocent person is a required dependency for him to achieve any other goal.

Hopefully before B kills C, or C kills B, one promises the other that they will eventually kill A (assuming A was malicious).

What else is there to say? : P

Post 179

Sunday, September 21, 2008 - 6:37amSanction this postReply
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Mike Erickson: "Aren't we better served by identifying principles that allow us to make good predictions about how people will actually act? I mean, for our own self preservation."

Ah, the Stadtler Principle!  What can you do when you have to deal with people?  They don't think!  You are justified in doing whatever you have to to survive and if someone else gets hurt, well, that's just too bad for them.  It isn't your fault.  You didn't create the problem. 

Check your premises.  Again, Stuart Hayashi's "metaphysical impossibilities" and Setzer's Old Sea Captain, point to the solution to this seeming contradiction. 

Furthermore, these armchair problems come with arguments from people who never face the actual events.... or who do and then find to their own surprise that they acted differently than their announced values would have predicted... or who never gave it much thought and then having acted find ex post facto justifications to reduce their cognitive dissonance.

Has anyone in this discussion ever taken a human life?


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