now that was interesting

Ed:

But you're putting yourself into the same category as the universe.

?

I am not putting myself anywhere, that was my point; I am acknowledging that I exist in the universe, and that the universe, as it is without me, existed prior to the universe as it is with me, and that places certain restrictions on what I can and cannot do, via causality.

1] The universe, as it is, be it cold process including evolution or whatever, made me(meaning, me and those like me.)

2] I(meaning, I and those like me)made the universe.

3] Neither, but I'm(meaning, I am and those like me are)suddenly here anyway, made by ... nothing. Not only

0=0
A+ -A=0

but

A + -A + B + -B + C + -C + ... = 0

I'm not sure where or how I ended up starting from scratch and rediscovering Thales as a consequence of 'One skin, One driver'; I think you are trying to paint me as Wittgenstein's 'Solitary Man...'

I don't see how that follows from 'One Skin, One Driver', at least in my meaning of 'One Skin, One Driver.'

Self-drivers are perfectly capable of voluntarily submitting to authority, past and present, of weighing thought and agreeing with it or not. And, self-drivers are perfectly capable of voluntarily walking into Neitsche's retail outlet and donning a suit off the rack. Self-drivers are perfectly capable of entering into and benefitting from group arrangements of all kinds, including unions and corporations and political contexts and commerce and marriage and even 'history.' All of that is consistent with 'one skin, one driver,' ... as long as what drives them is not the point of a gun pointed at them by other/others.

regards,
Fred

Post 41

Friday, March 6, 2009 - 1:12pm

Fred,

Let me see if this works. I've tried to post here 2-4 times. At one time, it even looked as though my post went through. There was even a post by Bill Dwyer (post # 43) after my post # 42 -- Bill, please confirm this -- where Bill talked about being a creation of his parents. He then jibed about being endowed with unalienable rights ...

Bill (or others), please tell me that I am not going crazy!

Ed

p.s. Has anyone else had trouble logging in in the last 48 hours?

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/06, 1:14pm)

Post 42

Friday, March 6, 2009 - 1:24pm

Fred,

It looks like my post went through. The main difference between your view and Rand's (the official Objectivist position) is that you only ask two questions, whereas Rand asks three. The missing question is her first question, and it has to do with man's nature. Here are the questions:

(1) Who (what) am I?
(2) Where am I?
(3) What should I do?

Here are hard quotes from Rand on this:

In order to live, man must act; in order to act, he must make choices; in order to make choices, he must define a code of values; in order to define a code of values, he must know what he is and where he is�i.e., he must know his own nature (including his means of knowledge) and the nature of the universe in which he acts�i.e., he needs metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, which means: philosophy.--RM, 30

Philosophy studies the fundamental nature of existence, of man, and of man�s relationship to existence.--PWNI, 2

Fred, I notice from your extended profile that you have read The Romantic Manifesto (RM) and Philosophy: Who Needs It? (PWNI). Do you acknowledge how your outlined position is different from Rand's -- i.e., by leaving out, either deliberately or unintentionally, human nature?

Ed

Post 43

Saturday, March 7, 2009 - 10:45am

Ed:

re; The main difference between your view and Rand's (the official Objectivist position) is that you only ask two questions,

I'd agree with that. But, I am asking only two questions in the context of a personal path to form a usable meta-definition of 'what is religion?' Not 'what are examples of 'R'eligions, but what meta-definition defines 'religion.'

I doubt Rand was trying simply to formulate a meta-definition for 'religion.' I think she pretty much accepted the definition of 'religion' as boogeyman mysticism, etc, whereas I would view that assessment as referring to common examples of 'R'eligions, not a meta-definition of what 'religion' is.

I'll readily admit, because I've allowed it of myself, that my seeking of a meta-definition for 'religion' has had the side effect of purifying it a bit back to something more akin to 'a philosophy of life.' I can live with that.

So, it may be totally reasonable to compare 'my two questions that define religion' with 'Rand's three questions' on a clearly related topic.

I may or may not get into trouble by including 'me' as existing in the Universe, as it, readily including in that, me, I as I am, and would have no dispute with anyone splitting that concept into two or even two gazillion queries into the nature of that which is in the Univers, as it is.

Where I would split ways with either Rand or anyone speaking for Rand is agreement on the assumption that the answer to that first question is identical for all mankind, ("Who/what am I?") except on the most trivial pro-forma basis. The details of volitionally defining the answers to that question, not the pro forma answers, but the deep answers, are exactly what define individual freedom. If we ever get to the point where life on this earth is nothing more than competing factions of mobs asserting universal answers to that question, then... oh, wait a minute, too late, we're already there. Duck.

In my case, my desire to formulate a working meta-definition of 'religion' is because I live in a political context that refers to that term in the very first of an individual BoR. It also does so in the context of something called 'religious freedom.' So in that context, it hard for me to contemplate assertions that the answers to those questions are each unifromly meaningful when formulated as follows:

(1) Who (what) are we? (We might share some, but not all answers to this. On a pro-forma level, yes. Rand speaks to that. But not in the details, else we are really all just automatons, bees in a bee colony. I don't believe that.)
(2) Where are we? (On some level, this has a singlualr answer. But not even this, on the smallest level.)
(3) What should we do?

To me, if nobody else, it is crucial to only accept the meaning of those questions when phrased as 'I' and not 'we.' So, except at the crudest, most pro-forma level, it isn't meaningful (to me) to consider universal answers to those questions. Believing that there are universal answers to the 'I' questions(except at the most pro-forma level, which Rand asserts) are equivalent to beliving that there is a singular answer to the 'we' form of the same questions.

As well, phrasing them as 'we' is the foundation of every war ever fought.

regards,
Fred

Post 44

Saturday, March 7, 2009 - 12:32pm

Ed wrote,

Let me see if this works. I've tried to post here 2-4 times. At one time, it even looked as though my post went through. There was even a post by Bill Dwyer (post # 43) after my post # 42 -- Bill, please confirm this -- where Bill talked about being a creation of his parents. He then jibed about being endowed with unalienable rights ...

You're right, Ed. My claim that it was my parents who created me and that I was not therefore endowed by my creator with certain inalienable rights has been wiped out -- no doubt by God himself. We all know from the Bible that God is a jealous God who will have no "creators" before him. So the Almighty has obviously hacked into our forum and deleted my heresy.

Well, I guess that proves it, doesn't it?! God exists, after all. But it was a nasty thing for Him to have done. He could have been a little nicer about it, but I guess he'd had it "up to here," with all of us unbelievers giving him the blind eye. [g]

- Bill

Post 45

Saturday, March 7, 2009 - 1:55pm

Fred,

Where I would split ways with either Rand or anyone speaking for Rand is agreement on the assumption that the answer to that first question is identical for all mankind, ("Who/what am I?") except on the most trivial pro-forma basis. The details of volitionally defining the answers to that question, not the pro forma answers, but the deep answers, are exactly what define individual freedom.

That is the existentialist view of the matter -- i.e., that we exercise personal choice in willfully defining ourselves. That that's what individual freedom means or must mean (a freedom from nature). Rand's way of dealing with this issue is to make a clear line between what's Metaphysical and what's Man-Made. She would say -- as she does in the quote above -- that there is a fundamental nature of man and of man's relationship to existence. Existentialists will have none of that. It's not "free" enough for them.

It's kind of late in the game but I think it might be proper to ask: Fred, are you a card-carrying existentialist (do you like Sartre, Camus, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche?)?

:-)

If we ever get to the point where life on this earth is nothing more than competing factions of mobs asserting universal answers to that question, then... oh, wait a minute, too late, we're already there. Duck.

I see it the other way 'round.

If we were prevented from ever getting to the point where universal answers were discovered regarding man's nature -- if we continue to believe that all there can be for an answer is the subjective perspective of competing mobs (i.e., of tribal warfare), that there isn't a common interest among men because there isn't a common nature, that life is merely a contest of wills, that everything in life is the outcome of an existentialist power struggle, that it's dog-eat-dog because man isn't (necessarily) any different from dogs -- then you'd get where we are today.

Then you'd get a U.S. president who's ready, willing, and able to violate your "universal" individual rights by saying that they are not "universal" (because man doesn't have a nature, or whatever). By saying that man's nature doesn't prescribe the individual rights of life, liberty, and a pursuit of happiness -- either because man's nature doesn't exist, or because it only subjectively exists. That the mathematical prescriptions of egalitarian equalizers are the closest thing to morality. That social engineering can and ought be performed in order to gain equality at the price of freedom.

In my case, my desire to formulate a working meta-definition of 'religion' is because I live in a political context that refers to that term in the very first of an individual BoR.

It seems like you are starting mid-stream, caring about 'religion' because of it's mention in a document somewhere. But what merit is in that?

What if, for example, someone in the Middle East tried to formulate a working meta-definition of 'prophet' in order to deal with the draconian machinations of Sharia Law against things like the Baha'i Faith -- where Mohammed isn't accepted as being the last prophet of God on earth?

It's illegal to practice the Baha'i Faith in Iran, for example. But what value or merit could there be in formulating a working meta-definition of 'prophet' then? Wouldn't you merely be intellectually buying into some wrong thing -- in order to try to make it or the outcome come out right? Rand (and others) said you don't defeat an evil by adopting its methods or standards. Wouldn't an individual's efforts to formulate a working meta-definition of 'prophet' -- in order to understand why Baha'i folks are getting persecuted by Muslims -- wouldn't that individual's efforts be an entire waste of time?

Wouldn't it be better to denounce mysticism, wholesale, on rational grounds -- rather than to partially buy-in to mysticism (even if only to work on defining mysticism's terms)?

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/07, 1:56pm)

Post 46

Sunday, March 8, 2009 - 5:32pm

Ed:

re:that there is 'a' fundamental nature of man

Well, there it is. The religious belief in the singular.

If there truly is just one of them(I don't share that clearly religuous belief, observation readily indicates otherwise), then the collectivists have a fundamental point. There is only a single fundamental nature of man, and all that is left is for history to decide what warring mob of True Believer's view of that singular nature prevails; the war of the 'we' against all 'I's.

No, I don't carry cards. That's kind of the point.

regards,
Fred

Post 47

Sunday, March 8, 2009 - 5:37pm

Ed:

re: dog eat dog

One skin, one driver is not 'dog eat dog'

It is neither 'one skin uber alles' nor 'most skins uber alles.'

It is one skin, one driver.

I haven't seen a more appealing morality presented. It may not be pure Rand-- I can live with that.

regards,
Fred

Post 48

Sunday, March 8, 2009 - 8:35pm

Fred,

re:that there is 'a' fundamental nature of man

Well, there it is. The religious belief in the singular.

But "religious" is an adjective that relies on faith, and faith is a notion that is independent of reason -- it is a conviction independent of reason. So, when you say that the idea that man has a fundamental nature is a religious belief, then you are saying that that idea is independent of reason -- i.e., you are saying that there aren't good reasons to think it. Now, you've read Rand so you know that she didn't just say things like:

You know, I had a revelation the other day: there's a fundamental nature of man.

You know, God spoke to me and He told me that there's a fundamental nature of man.

You know, I don't really know this, but I have to leave room for faith: there is a fundamental nature of man.

You don't give Rand (or me) enough credit. A better way for you to respond to this phrase is to state reasons why it's religious. Can you do that (state reasons)?

If there truly is just one of them (I don't share that clearly religuous belief, observation readily indicates otherwise), then the collectivists have a fundamental point. There is only a single fundamental nature of man, and all that is left is for history to decide what warring mob of True Believer's view of that singular nature prevails; the war of the 'we' against all 'I's.

It's an old fallacy to point to the differences of folks in order to claim they have no shared nature. You don't seem to understand Rand. You don't seem to understand how my point about common nature is the reason why humans don't have to be like cut-throat animals -- because we're "different." You just keep believing -- without providing reasoning -- that any commonality of man will lead us to mob war (just like animals). Rand talked about mob war in the books you've read, yet you seem to not remember. Here is an example:

Tribalism (which is the best name to give to all the group manifestations of the anti-conceptual mentality) is a dominant element in Europe, as a reciprocally reinforcing cause and result of Europe�s long history of caste systems, of national and local (provincial) chauvinism, of rule by brute force and endless, bloody wars. As an example, observe the Balkan nations, which are perennially bent upon exterminating one another over minuscule differences of tradition or language. Tribalism had no place in the United States�until recent decades. It could not take root here, its imported seedlings were withering away and turning to slag in the melting pot whose fire was fed by two inexhaustible sources of energy: individual rights and objective law; these two were the only protection man needed.--PWNI, 42

What do you think about this quote, Fred? Rand brings up a "supposed" fact about man -- a supposedly fundamental issue about man -- that individual rights and objective law are objective needs for man on Earth (because of man's nature). What do you think about that?

Ed

Post 49

Monday, March 9, 2009 - 4:37am

Fred,

One skin, one driver is not 'dog eat dog'

It is neither 'one skin uber alles' nor 'most skins uber alles.'

But it's empty of content, so it has no preclusive nature, so it could be these things (dog eat dog, etc), even if not for you right now. Rand linked existentialism to the Eastern Philosophy of Buddhism. I noticed that the Columbine High School murderers committed their rampage during Eastern Philosophy class. Perhaps I'm grabbing at straws there, trying too hard to explain a heinous act by linking it to a philosophy.

But then what about Ian Brady and Myra Hindley from England? Myra would trick kids into her car (boys and girls), Ian would rape and kill them. Ian was a devout existentialist, willfully defining himself. Still reaching?

But then what about Heidegger and the 'warring mob' of the Third Reich?

I see a pattern here. Do you?

Would you if I provided more examples of how existentialist philosophy kills? Would that make it a less appealing morality for you?

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/09, 4:38am)

Post 50

Monday, March 9, 2009 - 2:43pm

Ed:

re; It's an old fallacy to point to the differences of folks in order to claim they have no shared nature.

And, it's an old fallacy, or maybe a brand new fallacy, but either way, a fallacy, to point to the similarities of folks in order to claim that mankind not only shares attributes, but every instance of us is identical, resulting in the conclusion that there is a singular answer to the 'Why am I? questions, which permits us the leglifting tactic of posing them as 'Why are we?'

So, which of us is doing either of those things?

If I claim--which I already did, that mankind shares pro-forma characteristics, that is not the same as either claiming that mankind shares no characteristics(I didn't do that), nor that all instances of mankind shares all characteristics(I hope you didn't do that.)

Re;What do you think about that? (Quote from Rand on tribalism)

I think it and most of her assertions are an overwhelmingly pro-forma assertion by her, a romantic statement of what she believes 'should be,' not 'what is,' based on observation.

Based on observation, there is no singular 'a' nature of man, except on the most pro forma level. (Important, but trivial.) That is why I would assess it as a religious/faith based statement, the deeper she makes the claim, or more aptly, the deeper those interpreting her make the claim on her behalf; a belief not based on observation, ie. faith. Faith in her romantic vision of what should be, even if I agree with her should be(in fact, especially if I agree with her should be.)

Or, what I really believe Rand meant by that, a romantic assertion of what 'should be.'

Is that stating 'reason' enough? because I am not about to thump any of Rands works as Bibles, as if she had written gospel. When I see Objectivists doing that, and they do it often, it looks and sounds just like appeals to JohnGalt3:16 to me, I can't help it. It's a total personal preference, I find it much more illuminating when folks digest and synthesize, not regurgitate. That's just me. I have to pass on that. The world's got plenty of Bible thumpers, it doesn't need even one more, certainly not me, neither my heart nor my head would be in it.

If she truly meant it as an 'is', it is also contradictory. If Rand really means that there 'is' a single nature of man, as opposed to her romantic 'should be', then the collectivists have a fundamental point, and she is simply yet another leg lifting contender in the war of the we. (I don't believe that of her for a second. If I did, I'd burn that part of my library.) I only believe that those intent on jarringly deifying her and marching behind her fasce believe that. And in so claiming, validates the war of the we. If I am going to march behind any philosopher, it is going to be behind one which invalidates the war of the we outright.

Based on observation, one of the favorite tactics of the religious war of the we over the I is to paint competitors in the war of the we as religious mystics, as opposed to what true believers should believe. Durkheim did it. (All but social scientology was religion.) So nay have Rand. (All but Objectivism was religion, or 'false philosophy' of life.) I say that as someone who admires both Rand and her Objectivism, without worshiping either.

Especially without worshiping either. I read Rand, and have self-summarized several many thousands of words as 'one skin, one driver.' Galt's 'oath' is just a little longer than that, and his speech, longer still, and all of Rand, much longer still. But, 'one skin, one driver' suits me fine as a succinct summary. Rand isn't nearly that complicated as we'd like to believe. However, if she had simply published 'one skin, one driver', she'd have clearly starved to death. She made a good living beating those four words to death, and still far too few in the world have gotten her wave off message of all the creative inter-skin alternatives the tribe is constantly dreaming up.

But, I'm not blaming Rand for 'One skin, one Driver', that is my personal mess here. Still, 'one skin, one driver' now can somehow be interpreted as a justification of rape and murder? I don't see that.

If a proper question directed to me and my solo religion is "Are you an existentialist?" then my answer is 'no' if you claim that means I as a cold process existentialist could somehow justify rape and murder via 'one skin, one driver.

Because you lost me with that. I'd view 'rape and murder' as a deeply fundamental violation of 'one skin, one driver.' One of the deepest. I'm having a hard time getting across the point that I don't regard 'one skin uber alles'(crime) as an example of the axiom "one skin, one driver."

Oddly, many (not me) of Rand's critics accuse her of advocating 'my skin uber alles.' It is one of the most common criticisms I hear of her. I never got that from reading her, and don't see how anybody can get that from reading her. For example, Galt's oath clearly had two symmetric parts, it applies in 'two directions.' I mean that to be implicit in 'one skin, one driver.' I'm not equating that with 'my skin, one driver,' which is, I think, your association of that with existentialism(not mine.)

For example, I'd be able to apply the axiom 'one skin, one driver' to an instance of rape, and easily conclude that the rapists had violated that axiom in committing rape/murder. "Existentialists" may or may not, not my concern, no matter what else we might have in common...

re; that *any* commonality of man will lead us to mob war

Where did I assert that? It's true, I distinguish 'commonality on a pro-forma basis' with 'deep commonality.' There is nothing in my already acknowledgment of a 'pro-forma commonality of man' that can be interpreted as meaning that I don't believe in *any* commonality in man. Only that whatever that commonality is(in terms of what 'is', not in terms of what 'should be'), is only on a pro-forma basis. It's my assertion that insistence on a 'deep commonality of man', well beyond a pro-forma basis ("Man needs values, and some of those values are...")is the very leg lifting act that leads to war. When we are so imbued with the righteousness of our deep 'should bes' that we actually reach for the guns and march off to war to line up mankind like self similar bees in a bee colony, other than to defend ourselves from competing wars of the we('most skins uber alles'), or individual wars of 'one skin uber alles (crime.)', then we've gone off the deep end, IMO.

To me, 'one skin, one driver' is plenty axiom enough to govern a usable morality to govern life in a tribe. That is not 'Wittgenstein's Solitary Man.' That is not 'one skin uber alles, dog eat dog.' That is, when there is the odd dispute over playing nice among the tribe, the axiom 'one skin, one driver' is plenty sufficient to resolve it. The alternative paradigms, "One skin, other drivers" is all the variants of leg lifting and slavery and so on, and rationalizing our own very precious really, really good ideas for all of mankind. If they are all that good, then other skins are free to accede to them, and if not, then I can still sleep at night and live my life.

The 'we are all similar bees in a bee colony' view of mankind, ready to march lockstep behind a single fasce, if only we could decide what that singular fasce is, is no more appealing when Rand's followers are clinging to the fasce and claiming 'should be' than any other marching mob. To me, it is the very act of claiming that mankind either should or must line up in file behind fasces of any (except the most trivial and pro forma kind) that leads to the war of the we.

The entire concept of an army of marching Randians is so bizarre to me that I'd readily -- and gladly-- admit, "I didn't get Rand" if that is one of the conclusions I must reach to join the club and carry a card and join the march...

There is Rand's romantic 'should be,' which, even if I agree with and admire her 'should be', is not a statement of 'what is,' no matter how deeply we might want to deify her and her words.

regards,
Fred

Post 51

Monday, March 9, 2009 - 3:16pm

Ed:

re; that there isn't a common interest among men

Is or should be? By observation, not all men, and not even all Americans, in our single political context.

Not even, in the context of our political context, the once American Experiment. Not 'is, only 'should be.'

That common interest 'should be' the Paradox of American Freedom.

In America, men 'should have' a common interest in being free from the unfettered arbitrary overwhelming mob force of each other. It is such an important keystone to the concept of freedom that Americans should be willing to mob up to defend it.

Ie, in America, we should mob up in order to defend our right to be free from mob rule. It's codified in our individual BoR.

We once had a common interest to see that our mob was fettered and not arbitrarily empowered, but that has turned out to be a more or less wish on paper. The biggest beast in the jungle will always eat what it wants, because it can, period, even when it may not.

Fettered, meaning, restrained from totally arbitrary biggest beast in the jungle whim. The mob as the biggest beast in the jungle.

That is a paradox, I call it the paradox of American freedom, it helps define what used to be the American experiment, which has rapidly devolved to pure democracy and political populist factionalism, a nearly now unfettered courting of enough of the mob.

Whatever that 'a' nature of man is, with our common interests -- not what 'should be', but 'what is' -- as a group project, we've been barely up to it.

regards,
Fred

(Edited by Fred Bartlett on 3/09, 3:18pm)

Post 52

Tuesday, March 10, 2009 - 8:30am

Fred,

I'd like to get to everything you said but here are my responses to the first half of your post 50:

And, it's an old fallacy, or maybe a brand new fallacy, but either way, a fallacy, to point to the similarities of folks in order to claim that mankind not only shares attributes, but every instance of us is identical, resulting in the conclusion that there is a singular answer to the 'Why am I? questions, which permits us the leglifting tactic of posing them as 'Why are we?'

What you describe -- which is "naive realism" -- is old, but it's not what I'm saying (and it's not what Rand said, either).

So, which of us is doing either of those things?

You are (I'm pretty sure).

I am hearing you say that, because man goes off in so many directions, speaks so many languages, has so many cultures, tries so many life-experiments -- that there, therefore, cannot be a "human nature ("essential" characteristics common to us all). Existentialist philosophers often quip that it is man's nature not to have 'a nature.' But this misses the point by over-comparing / over-contrasting man against other things (which have more obvious natures).

For instance, it's easy to say of fish that they swim, it is in their nature to do so, and this is obvious after even the shortest observation of them. Saying, as an example, that it is in man's nature to think is not so perceptually obvious, even if it is a fact that can be objectively known by means that go beyond mere perception.

If I claim--which I already did, that mankind shares pro-forma characteristics ...

Pro-forma (formal, formulaic, basic format) characteristics -- e.g., everyone having a mouth -- are non-essential characteristics which don't necessarily guide human actions like essential characteristics do. I think we can both agree that man has non-essential characteristics. We both agree that they don't matter. But you're saying that that's all we have, and I'm disagreeing.

Re;What do you think about that? (Quote from Rand on tribalism)

I think it and most of her assertions are an overwhelmingly pro-forma assertion by her, a romantic statement of what she believes 'should be,' not 'what is,' based on observation.

The issue here is that of the "necessary need."

You seem to disbelieve that man has any necessary needs that derive from a common human nature. With fish, we can easily say that they need water and that they need it "necessarily." The reason is because they die without it. Now, your criticism of Rand here is very much like an intellectually-mischievous kid who -- after hearing someone proclaim that fish always need water -- who then pulls a fish out of the water and says that the statement can't be true (has to be "faith", etc). The kid points to the fish in his hand and says:

"See, it's not true that all fish necessarily need water. This fish in my hand is existing without water right now! Your statement that fish need water is not a statement of fact -- it is not a statement of "what is" (because this fish in my hand disproves that!) -- it is only a statement of what "should be" and, being "only" romantic rather than a metaphysical fact, I can dismiss your statement and start living my life based on the assumption that fish don't need water. I can be "correct" in doing that."

The conflation is the man-made with the metaphysical. The kid has it in his power to alter temporary outcomes and -- on that -- he claims that you can't know about the reality of the situation when it comes to fish (needing water). The kid in this example attempted what Rand warned against: to attempt re-write reality. The metaphysical need of water which fish have, in reality, never went away -- even when or while the kid held the fish out of water to claim that "observations" tell us something different.

The upshot is that your criticism of romanticism or of a "should be" (rather than a "what is") doesn't, pun intended, hold any water.

Based on observation, there is no singular 'a' nature of man, except on the most pro forma level. (Important, but trivial.) That is why I would assess it as a religious/faith based statement ...

That's begging the question: 'Based on my observations (actually, my conclusions) of man, I would assess your statement as religious/faith based. Therefore, you have to agree with my conclusions of man (and, therefore, with my assessment of your statement as religious/faith based).'

Is that stating 'reason' enough?

No. But I'll stop there for now.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/10, 9:27am)

Post 53

Wednesday, March 11, 2009 - 6:07am

Ed:

re: Pro-forma (formal, formulaic, basic format) characteristics -- e.g., everyone having a mouth -- are non-essential characteristics which don't necessarily guide human actions like essential characteristics do. I think we can both agree that man has non-essential characteristics.

Well, non-essential, or pro forma, or obvious characteristics.

At the level of "man must think", surely that is a pro-forma characteristic.

To me, extrapolating from the pro-forma "man must think" to "man must all think the same things, including the answer to 'why am I here, what should I be doing now?' is a massive leap of faith.

Clearly, from observation, men do not. Maybe they should, maybe they shouldn't, that is what the wars of the 'we' are all about.

A morality based on 'answer as you will within your skin, but then live within your skin the consequences' is fine with me. I'd much prefer that world, then one in which any warring tribe of we is actually given rein to wage its war of we uber alles, even if it is a tribe I agree with, and if I understand the basis of the tribe correctly, especially if it's a tribe that I agree with.

The very act of engaging in the war of the we validates the wars of the we. Surely there is room in the world for one tribe that does not validate the wars of the we.

regards,
Fred

Post 54

Thursday, March 12, 2009 - 9:15am

Fred,

I see two debate tactics that you are using on me, which are merely your lines of reasoning, as expressed here in this thread. Now, let me be clear, it's not wrong to use debate tactics (lines of reasoning that express your thinking about an ongoing debate). Debate tactics help us understand each other and they help us communicate our ideas. Ultimately, they help us to understand underlying issues better. Here they are:

(1) The pro-forma characteristic.
(2) The war of the we.

With (1) your exclusive categorization of human characteristics as pro-forma things (having only an arbitrarily shared form, without any meaningful content), you have created the notion of not just a blank-slate with regard to the mind, but a blank-slate with regard to ethics. If, as you say, we don't have characteristics that delimit what kinds of things we need or what kinds of things which can be good for us -- then we cannot develop anything but an entirely independent and personal morality. A morality of one.

This is something, as I've shown, which can allow for an Ian Brady (a child rapist / murderer). Your argumentative defense on that point was the unconvincing retort of something I'd characterize as: "Well, I don't (personally) believe that. I don't (personally) think my morality could lead to the behavior of such a predator." Indeed, if we have no shared characteristics that are meaningful to our flourishing (as you say we don't), then there can be no moral principle for an individual to even work to avoid being at ground zero of a nuclear explosion! Not having any shared features which matter, who are we to prescribe the avoidance of nuclear explosions to another?

Now, your argumentative defense on this point about Ian Brady was the unconvincing retort of something I'd characterize as: "Well, I don't (personally) believe that. I don't (personally) think my morality could lead to such behavior."

Well, what is it in your morality that would proscribe such behavior?

With (2) you have created a defense against collectivism with the zeal of an Eric Hoffer. However, in fighting collectivism, you have also made a casualty out of individualism. That's why I made the initial comment that it seems to me that you have had to defend yourself against religion-mongers -- and that that has changed the way that you both think and argue about the issue of collectivism. The boldest statement that you have made damaging individualism is this one:

("Man needs values, and some of those values are...") is the very leg lifting act that leads to war.

The reason that this is damaging is that it leaves humanity an ethical blank-slate, with no judgment standard other than the numbers of your own ethical "group" -- the very thing which leads to war. That's why I argued before that what you are arguing for leads to war, and that what you are arguing against -- when you say things like the above -- is precisely that thing that can prevent all-out tribal warfare on earth. Now, I recognize how fine this line is. Brutal dictators have always said that they were bringing about world peace (via submission). But just because humans (Hitler, Stalin, etc) have tricked masses of folks with an ethics, doesn't mean that there isn't a correct ethics for man on earth.

You argue against dictators by shaking your fist and telling them to leave you alone so that you can do it "your way." You tell them, and everyone within earshot, that there isn't a best or right morality for man. You warn that, historically, the notions of such a common morality are what has led to gas chambers (for the recalcitrants). Well, I could make a similar argument against science leading to nuclear weapons. Science isn't wrong, there's just a right way to do it and apply it. It's the same for morality, there is a right way.

Aristotle and Rand are on the same page here. Both of them would say that "[m]an needs values, and some of those values are ..." Here is a quote from Rand showing this to be true of her:

The objective theory holds that the good is neither an attribute of �things in themselves� nor of man�s emotional states, but an evaluation of the facts of reality by man�s consciousness according to a rational standard of value. (Rational, in this context, means: derived from the facts of reality and validated by a process of reason.) The objective theory holds that the good is an aspect of reality in relation to man�and that it must be discovered, not invented, by man. ...

... The objective theory of values is the only moral theory incompatible with rule by force. Capitalism is the only system based implicitly on an objective theory of values�and the historic tragedy is that this has never been made explicit.

If one knows that the good is objective�i.e., determined by the nature of reality, but to be discovered by man�s mind�one knows that an attempt to achieve the good by physical force is a monstrous contradiction which negates morality at its root by destroying man�s capacity to recognize the good, i.e., his capacity to value. Force invalidates and paralyzes a man�s judgment, demanding that he act against it, thus rendering him morally impotent. A value which one is forced to accept at the price of surrendering one�s mind, is not a value to anyone; the forcibly mindless can neither judge nor choose nor value. ...

--CUI 22, 23

Fred, in light of this, do you still think that either man doesn't need values, or that he doesn't need any specific values -- either because we share no meaningful characteristics, or because shared values inevitably lead to war? And, if you think that the very notion of universally-shared values are what it is that leads man to war, then how do you justify war being bad (a dis-value for humans) -- if 'nothing is good or bad, but (individual) thinking which makes it so.'?

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/12, 1:55pm)

Post 55

Thursday, March 12, 2009 - 9:27am

Fred,

The 'we are all similar bees in a bee colony' view of mankind ...

I wouldn't apply that statement to Objectivist ethics, because it contradicts human nature. Perhaps this is part of our difference -- that you, Fred, WOULD apply that statement to any kind of objective or universal ethics of man. But humans are not bees. Don't you see that? We are not even bees if we "say" we are. We are not even bees if we dress up in black and yellow, wearing paper mache` wings. Nothing, no human act, can alter that fact about us -- that we can't live (for any length of time) like bees.

This is a universal moral prescription: Do not try to live like a colony of bees. How do we know (beforehand) that it is wrong to attempt? Because we know about human nature. We know fish won't do well without water, and we know man won't do well mimicking bees. Fred, I realize that you don't want me to cite chapter and verse out of Rand -- that you'd rather have a more personal dialogue. I think I (and you) have been quite good about coming up with our own thinking and our own analogies. That said, I'd really like to get your response to this quote from Rand:

The Objectivist ethics holds that the actor must always be the beneficiary of his action and that man must act for his own rational self-interest. But his right to do so is derived from his nature as man and from the function of moral values in human life�and, therefore, is applicable only in the context of a rational, objectively demonstrated and validated code of moral principles which define and determine his actual self-interest. It is not a license �to do as he pleases� and it is not applicable to the altruists� image of a �selfish� brute nor to any man motivated by irrational emotions, feelings, urges, wishes or whims.

This is said as a warning against the kind of �Nietzschean egoists� who, in fact, are a product of the altruist morality and represent the other side of the altruist coin: the men who believe that any action, regardless of its nature, is good if it is intended for one�s own benefit. Just as the satisfaction of the irrational desires of others is not a criterion of moral value, neither is the satisfaction of one�s own irrational desires. Morality is not a contest of whims . . .

A similar type of error is committed by the man who declares that since man must be guided by his own independent judgment, any action he chooses to take is moral if he chooses it. One�s own independent judgment is the means by which one must choose one�s actions, but it is not a moral criterion nor a moral validation: only reference to a demonstrable principle can validate one�s choices.

---VOS, ix

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/12, 1:58pm)

Post 56

Thursday, March 12, 2009 - 3:06pm

Ed:

What you said I said:

The boldest statement that you have made damaging individualism is this one:

("Man needs values, and some of those values are...") is the very leg lifting act that leads to war.

What I actually said:

It's my assertion that insistence on a 'deep commonality of man', well beyond a pro-forma basis ("Man needs values, and some of those values are...")is the very leg lifting act that leads to war.

For some reason, you left out the qualifier "It's my assertion that insistence on a 'deep commonality of man', well beyond a pro-forma basis(..."

I'm sure it was alot more fun responding to what you think I said, than what I actually said.

I did not say "Man needs values, and some of those values are..." is the very leg lifting act that leads to war, or anything like it.

But "well beyond" does not mean 'same as', and leaving it out changes the meaning of what I wrote in full context.

So, I can't really respond to your post. You are debating something I didn't assert.

regards,
Fred

Post 57

Thursday, March 12, 2009 - 3:26pm

Ed:

There are time honored traditions on the in-ter-net, and among the most cherished are:

1] talking past each other.
2] mischaracterizing each other.

re;With (1) your exclusive categorization of human characteristics as pro-forma things

No idea where you think I asserted anything remotely like 'human characteristics are exclusively pro forma things.'

I'll repeat it a third time. Human characteristics include both pro forma (things we all share) and individual characteristics. If that wasn't the case, then humans would really be interchangeable drone bees in a bee colony, and there would be no distinction between any of the 'I' answers and the 'we' answers. The individual details do not, else 'individual' has no meaning, other than, 'sack of skin and meat.'

The pro forma characteristics may indeed have 'we' answers, the deeper individual characteristics have only 'I' answers, else we'd all be identical. I see no evidence of anything remotely like that, so I'm not going to lose sleep at night worrying that maybe humans really are like bees in a bee colony, interchangeable identical cogs.

re; Well, what is it in your morality that would proscribe such behavior?

Do you mean, other than murdered rape are fundamental violations of the concept 'one skin, one driver?' The presumption is, on my part, that folks really don't want to be murdered or raped by others. Call me whacky for believing that. It seems to me that 'raping and murder' are classic examples of occupiers of skins driving other skins, ie. a violation of the axiom, 'one skin, one driver.'

A morality that condoned rape and murder would be 'my skin uber alles.' I'mnot sure why you are interpreting 'one skin, one driver' as 'my skin uber alles', but I don't.

You have claimed that is a cop out by me, haven't a clue why.

Yes, I don't interpret 'one skin, one driver' as 'my skin uber alles' or 'most skins uber alles', and am not sure what debating tactic slight of hand I am pulling for pointing that out, but God bless the 1st Amendment.

I've asserted that my personal summary of Rand in 4 words is 'one skin, one driver.' You seem to disagree. I can live with that.

If 'one skin, one driver' is a terrible basis for a morality, then what alternative construct do you find superior?

1] One skin, many other drivers?
2] One skin, no driver, not even, self same?
3] One skin, an arbitrary and indeterminate number of drivers?
4] One skin, the same driver, an emperor of some kind?

One skin, one driver does not condone rape or murder. It also doesn't condone or recognize political leg lifting, as in:

"Give me control of your skin, because I speak for a] God b] Society c] this dead list of former philosophers."

As long as I see no violation of 'one skin, one driver', I'm happy as a clam with my morality. 'Wrong-philosophy of life' is its own reward or punishment, and not something I get to legliftingly define for others.

The fact is, when it comes to Objectivism, objectively, far less than 1% of the world will ever practically practice it. Even when it comes to Rands romantic vision of the world as it should be, only a tiny % of individuals ever live up to her vision. To the extent that ever is realized in the world, "one skin, one driver' provides more than ample opportunity, and the damage that possibility is greater, IMO, by validating any war of the we, even if it is a set of 'we' answers that we agree with.

There's no evidence in Rand's romantic image of what should be that her heros acted the way they did first and foremost because of what others thought or said that they 'should' act.

Was even Anthem really that subtle, that today, Objectivists are arguing in the name of the wars of the we?

regards,
Fred

Post 58

Thursday, March 12, 2009 - 4:11pm

Ed:

re; That said, I'd really like to get your response to this quote from Rand:

It's a perfectly agreable statement of pro-forma characteristics of mankind that Rand and you and I agree mankind should share, but doesn't. And, you and I and Rand can agree that where doesn't happens, there is Hell to pay.

So, what to do about that?

1] Enter the wars of the we, validating all such wars of the we.

2] Advocate a restrictive morality that in no way violates any of Rands tenets, "one skin, one driver," that does not validate any wars of the we; including, wars of the we asserting "one skin, one driver." There is nothing in that axiom or my beliefs that negates the existence of pro forma shared human characteristics, history, or appeals by authority. Only leglifting, and the political running of skins by others via anything other than consent.

I've synthesized Rand's romantic should be, and concluded, for me, "2]," in the context of this thread, as part of defining religious freedom. (Not 'religion' narrowly defined as boogeyman faith, but my meta-definition of religion, the seeking of personal answers to those personal 'I' questions in a political context based on an individual bill or rights and complete religious freedom. Leg lifting arguments attempt to paint all 'religion' as what the competing political religions do, in the war of the we.)

And then, you and I got into this side thing disagrreing over whether those should be fundametnally 'I' questions, or fundamentally 'we' questions, and then, the round and round about bees in bees colony (which we agree, mankind isn't) and so on.

And then, the pro form characteristics as opposed to individual characteristics. Rand, IMO, is adressing only the pro forma characteristics in her should be arguments, not the deeply individual characteristics. I don't see how either of us could interpret Rand as arguing that each and every one of us either does or should have the identical answers to any but the most pro forma of those "I" questions, and then, you have interpreted that as me advocating rape and murder somehow. I don't see how, but moot.

The implications of 'one skin, one driver' are that it is not your or my deep and final responsibility when another skin self chooses 'wrong,' and feel free to define to 'wrong' anyway you like, including, Rand's definition. Free to succeed means free to fail as well. If the marketplace is ideas, and if I understand Rand at all, then I see no way to put Rand or anyone advocating her ideas in the role of chief warrior in the war of the we.

If that is me self choosing a morality( as opposed to what alternative of choosing?) then I can live with the one I've chosen. I've yet to see where it breaks down, even in the context of accurately representing Rand's assertion of the existence of a rational morality.

She tried in AS to represent that morality in ever briefer terms: AS, then Galt's speech, then Galt's oath.

Well, "one skin, one driver", to me, is a four word continuation of that ever more succinct series. How does it significantly differ from its next more wordy version, Galt's Oath?

I think you think it does, but I'm not sure why. Here is Galts oath:

"I swear -- by my life and my love for it -- that I will never live for the sake of another man, nor ask another man to live for mine."

My four word summary: "One skin, one driver"

Three words, the most important 'one' used twice.

Rand made a living expanding this in great detail. She wrote a ton of books, expanding these ideas in great detail. But, where does 'One skin, one driver' deviate from the axiom expressed in Galt's oath?

regards,
Fred

(Edited by Fred Bartlett on 3/12, 4:14pm)

(Edited by Fred Bartlett on 3/12, 4:23pm)

Post 59

Friday, March 13, 2009 - 7:48am