now that was interesting

Fred,

re;With (1) your exclusive categorization of human characteristics as pro-forma things

No idea where you think I asserted anything remotely like 'human characteristics are exclusively pro forma things.'

I'll repeat it a third time. Human characteristics include both pro forma (things we all share) and individual characteristics.

The point wasn't that all characteristics are shared -- e.g. there could be only one man on earth with 17 fingers -- it was whether shared characteristics are essential and meaningful or non-essential and not.

In my opinion, you have gotten mileage, ambiguity mileage, out of the term "pro-forma." Before my discussion here with you, I had never heard of that term applied to human characteristics. You have not defined it either. I went to the dictionary and placed a definition on it (basic formula, formulaic, form-without-content) but you haven't commented on the definition.

I see no evidence of anything remotely like that, so I'm not going to lose sleep at night worrying that maybe humans really are like bees in a bee colony, interchangeable identical cogs.

That's a difference in how we view things, Fred.

I have gotten to the point where I don't need to wait for evidence that maybe humans are really like bees -- the point where I know (rather than merely believe) that they are not like bees. You merely believe that humans aren't like bees -- and you would be willing to question (or outright discard?) your "personal belief" about humans, if you see evidence of anything remotely like they are.

The name for this thinking style of yours (on this particular issue) is Empiricism, though I call it vulgar empiricism in order more accurately describe it. Here's Rand describing it:

... those who claimed that man obtains his knowledge from experience, which was held to mean: by direct perception of immediate facts, with no recourse to concepts (the Empiricists).

On the Empiricist view, humans can turn out to be just "like bees in a bee colony, interchangeable identical cogs" because -- on the Empiricist view -- there isn't a correct concept of man (there's just the observational perception of "immediate facts").

re; Well, what is it in your morality that would proscribe such behavior?

Do you mean, other than murdered rape are fundamental violations of the concept 'one skin, one driver?' The presumption is, on my part, that folks really don't want to be murdered or raped by others. Call me whacky for believing that. It seems to me that 'raping and murder' are classic examples of occupiers of skins driving other skins, ie. a violation of the axiom, 'one skin, one driver.'

That clears things up (a little). It differentiates 'one skin, one driver' from vulgar existentialism. It does so by incorporating individual rights. 'One skin, one driver' may still be a hedonist or an emotion-guided morality (further discussion will elucidate this) -- but it is not a rights-violating morality.

If 'one skin, one driver' is a terrible basis for a morality, then what alternative construct do you find superior?

1] One skin, many other drivers?
2] One skin, no driver, not even, self same?
3] One skin, an arbitrary and indeterminate number of drivers?
4] One skin, the same driver, an emperor of some kind?

5] One kind of skin, one right kind of driving (though you can and ought to experiment with driving where you want to go)

The fact is, when it comes to Objectivism, objectively, far less than 1% of the world will ever practically practice it. Even when it comes to Rands romantic vision of the world as it should be, only a tiny % of individuals ever live up to her vision.

Well, I wouldn't say that far less than 1% will ever practically practice it. I think that you are talking about how you feel, rather than about an official calculation you made. As for living up to Rand's romantic vision, I see it differently, too. When humans are presented with something ideal, then we have some choices:

(1) trash the ideal, because we will feel smaller if we don't (moral egalitarianism)
(2) dismiss the ideal, because we have adopted a theory-practice dichotomy (it's "just" an ideal for philosophers to talk about)
(3) have the perspective to note that morality is normative and that ideals can guide us on a never-ending, lastingly-joyous journey toward our own moral perfection

I like (3).

To the extent that ever is realized in the world, "one skin, one driver' provides more than ample opportunity, and the damage that possibility is greater, IMO, by validating any war of the we, even if it is a set of 'we' answers that we agree with.

I'd want to know whether 'one skin, one driver' is emotion-guided before I would agree with you.

There's no evidence in Rand's romantic image of what should be that her heros acted the way they did first and foremost because of what others thought or said that they 'should' act.

Right, there's actually damning evidence to the contrary -- i.e., Rand's notion of the "second-hander" (e.g., Peter Keating in The Fountainhead).

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/13, 8:33am)

Post 61

Friday, March 13, 2009 - 9:01am

Fred,

But, where does 'One skin, one driver' deviate from the axiom expressed in Galt's oath?

It would or could deviate if you adopt the theory-practice (ideal-practical, moral-practical) dichotomy. A theory-practice dichotomy would leave (some) room open in your mind for the notion that humans are like bees in a bee colony. On the notion of man and morality, it would lead you to mistrust your own judgment. It would make you look to the people around you for evidence to support what you (romantically) want to believe. It would deviate if you look at John Galt and say:

"He's just a concretized ideal, I don't have to worry about him, or about Aristotle's 'magnanimous man,' for that matter. They're just ideals. Far less than 1% of the world will ever practically practice such well-intentioned fantasies. Few ever live up to such out-of-reach visions. Ideals lead to war. What's needed is not an ideal to aspire to, but pragmatism. Pragmatism is the real ideal; the non-ideal ideal."

Allan Gotthelf wrote something guiding on this notion in the Wadsworth booklet "On Ayn Rand" (p 96):

"Heroism" ... refers, from outside, to that person's success in exemplifying a moral ideal. The term designates the "exceptional", but this need not be a statistical exception. A rational ideal is the exceptional only as measured against all other possibilities taken together. As a rational ideal, Ayn Rand's vision of moral greatness is open to everyone. ...

I have observed--to speak now in my own voice--that good people sometimes fail to reach the view of the universe and of human possibility that we have been discussing, because, on the issue of life's possibilities, they have insufficient trust in their own judgment and their own souls. They base their view of what's possible--in the building of one's character, in love relationships, in life in general--on what they see in the people around them and not on what they see in their own souls as possible to man and to themselves. As a result, they miss out on so much in life.

Ed
(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/13, 9:02am)

Post 62

Friday, March 13, 2009 - 10:20am

Ed:

re; So I'll take half of the blame for that.

I'll take the other half, for not being clear. I meant for the parenthetical comment to apply to the bit directly immediately preceding it, so 2] was my meaning.

"Man needs values, and some of them are..." to me, is clearly an incomplete specification of individual characteristics. It is applicable to mankind in general, and in that pro-forma sense, men individually, but does not fully define men individually.

You might have the gain on your radar turned up too high, or maybe not.

I'm going to introduce another 1] and 2] alternative, because this is the crux of our misunderstanding, I think. Let me be clear, my choice again is 2].

A child is educated, which I define to mean, has realized sufficient skill levels to be able to self educate for life. ie, he is beyond mere instruction. That now aware adult asks the following questions:

"Why am I here? (Beyond 'how' am I here, which we all might well share the asnwer to without consequence.)"
"What am I supposed to be doing with my life as a result of that?"

A child can only be told the answers to those questions, by others. That is instruction. But adults are otherwise fully able to answer them, appealing to their education(which hopefully is not relying merely on instruction.)

So, according to the most strict interpretation of Rand, would an Objectivist adhere to 1] or 2] below?

1] The deep, not just pro-forma, but complete individial answers to -those- questions were formed centuries before you were born, and are thus the same for every individual on earth, and thus, are logically answerable as a single answer to the same questions posed as 'we' questions.

2] The complete, deep, not just pro-forma, but individual answers to those questions are formed only after an educated individual makes the focused effort to answer them, individually, as evidenced by their individual lives.

re: pro-forma. Example; a pro-forma contract is not an instance of an actual contract; it is more like a template for a class of contracts. An actual instance of a contract of that class is completed by filling in the individual instance details. (Or, if you prefer C++, the difference between a class/type, and an instance of that class, objectively, an object. However, in Rand's case, I don't think her pro-forma specification is nearly that detailed or restrictive as any C++, so the C++ comparison is too restrictive.)

Rand's non-fictional essays, as detailed as they are, are pro-forma contracts for her view of morality. They are not complete specifications of individual instances of beings living a moral life, not even her vision of a moral life. Her romantic novel characters are painted fictional examples of instances of her vision, her non-fiction philosophical essays are the pro-forma contracts--and even her painted fictional examples are not anywhere near complete specifications.

It is entirely reasonable to apply Rand's pro-forma specification when filling in your details. You and I and 120 other people could all agree on that, not the issue.

The issue is, who should fill out the -details- and sign your personal contract; you, or others for you? If we believe that not just the pro-forma contract, but the actual instance details have long been written, the ink has been dry for centuries, then all that remains is for us to show up and sign the contract.

Let's say, let's even stipulate that you and I and everyone within earshot is in agreement on the ideas expressed in her pro-forma contract. We are, our locally tribe of we, fully convinced that we've got it right, and are now convinced that we have the Right Stuff to go enter into the raging War of the We.

By -entering- that fray(entered by claiming "All Should Thus..."), we validate the wars of the we. As soon as we do that, reason is out the door. What determines the outcomes of wars of the we is brute force, strength of numbers, leglifting, deceit, hairpulling, aka, history. We can enter that fray and leglift 'reason' all we want, but we screwed up as soon as we entered the fray, because 'rason' is not one of the groundrules of combat in that arena. Yes, it should be, and yes, if folks were reaosnable, they'd agree with our subtribe, lather, rinse, repeat, war of the we.

There is another alternative. Keep the same morality, and drop only one element of it: the "All Should Thus...".

The detriment of validating "All Should Thus..." far outweighs any benefit, shared by tribal leaders everywhere and summarized as the worthless thought "if only the world lined up and marched behind our fasce, then wouldn't this be Utopia?" -- because the world is never going to do that, ever. I'm not sure what emotion is behind that tribal leader thought, but it is one that is at the foundation of every war ever fought.

If I am understanding you correctly, then because Rand spoke so forcefully as she pulled so hard on her side of the "I/We" tug rope, you interpret her as advocating another variant of 'All Should Thus...', it just so happens, the right variant. ie, one you agree with rationally, and so on. You might be right, and either one of so inclined(not me)to pour through the scriptures to find evidence of that might be able to support it either way. But totally not necessary, because even if we did, I would see it only as a correctable flaw in her position, not gospel.

"One skin, one driver." Live with the consequences of your choices is plenty, I can live without the utopic zealotry of "All Should Thus..." and am still searching for a sub-tribe, somewhere, that is unwilling to validate the wars of the we.

regards,
Fred

Post 63

Friday, March 13, 2009 - 10:39am

Ed:

re; Ideals lead to war.

Not my assertion. My assertion is more akin to "mobs of we claiming that 'All Must Thus' -- even if Thus is an expression of Ideals -- is what leads to war. Not because of the ideals, but because of the validation of the 'war of the we.' The implicit validation of all such wars of the we, including competing visions based on no such ideals.

Here are two contrasting alternatives. Again, I pick 2]

Let's say I adhere to ideals. In fact, let's say me and mine, the local sub tribe, adhere to ideals. Following are two political choices:

1] I enter a conflict claiming 'All should have these ideals.' Me and mine, we and ours, are convinced we are right.

2] I claim no such thing, but merely live those ideals. I perish or prosper. In so doing, I either validate or repudiate those ideals. Others are free to choose, and I have not validated any war of the we, by ever claiming 'All Should Thus..."

Rand took a huge swipe at the war of the we, but the war isn't over, we're still in the jungle. I'm suggesting, the war shouldn't be fought on the we's turf using the we's terms.

(It's as bad as conceding the term 'THE ECONOMY', as if it means anything to non-statists.)

regards,
Fred

Post 64

Saturday, March 14, 2009 - 5:53am

Fred,

"Man needs values, and some of them are..." to me, is clearly an incomplete specification of individual characteristics. It is applicable to mankind in general, and in that pro-forma sense, men individually, but does not fully define men individually.

Yes, but nothing fully defines men individually. I think you are looking for a word different from define. The purpose of definition is differentiation -- to sort something from or against other things. That's why justice is defined as treating equals equally -- so that we see the injustice of treating unequals equally (or equals unequally).

If you are looking for something that fully defines men -- in the sense of define just mentioned -- then DNA would work (except for identical twins). Someone's DNA fully differentiates them (fully defines them) from others. In the case of identical twins, you'd have to go to phenotypic differences -- such as fingerprints -- which are fully 50% discordant even though the genes are the same.

But I think you mean something else when you say: "define."

"Why am I here? (Beyond 'how' am I here, which we all might well share the asnwer to without consequence.)"
"What am I supposed to be doing with my life as a result of that?"

A child can only be told the answers to those questions, by others. That is instruction. But adults are otherwise fully able to answer them, appealing to their education(which hopefully is not relying merely on instruction.)

So, according to the most strict interpretation of Rand, would an Objectivist adhere to 1] or 2] below?

1] The deep, not just pro-forma, but complete individial answers to -those- questions were formed centuries before you were born, and are thus the same for every individual on earth, and thus, are logically answerable as a single answer to the same questions posed as 'we' questions.

2] The complete, deep, not just pro-forma, but individual answers to those questions are formed only after an educated individual makes the focused effort to answer them, individually, as evidenced by their individual lives.

I think I understand you, but maybe not. Let's see if I can re-state you. You're against 1] and you're for 2]. What you like about 2] is the apparent wiggle-room for individuality to thrive -- how it straightforwardly appeals to the process of self-discovery / self-actualization (something only educated adults do real well, but not children). What you don't like about 1] is the deep commonality which apparently leads to war.

Is that right?

Before you answer, let me respond about the questions themselves: I don't like them.

Reading the questions sincerely, one has to think that there has got to be some kind of an "excuse" for one's existence -- as if one's existence is a blight on the universe which needs to be explained. Following right after the excuse question, is the "duty" question. These questions smuggle-in a bad sense of life, they pretend to be "I" questions, but for every individual to ask (which is just a diabolical way of saying "we" have to answer them individually -- so they are really "we" questions, at root), and leave us with a false sense of individualism as we each fill-in our respective answers.

The reason that the sense of individualism is false is that, like God for a True Believer, our individual existence does not need to be explained in the manner of coming up with some kind of excuse for us to be here -- taking up space in the universe. There isn't an outside excuse or an outside purpose. There is needed, instead, an inside acceptance of one's own existence, and an inside acceptance of the personal responsibility to one's self of flourishing. That's what Rand meant when she wrote in Anthem:

I need no warrant for being, and no word of sanction upon my being. I am the warrant and the sanction.

Post 65

Saturday, March 14, 2009 - 8:00am

Ed:

Re: There isn't an outside excuse or an outside purpose.

Exactly. Which is entirely the point in limiting the answering of those questions to 'I' questions and not 'we' questions. Outside of what is exactly the point.

Apparently, we once again have to agree to agree, even though I will readily cop to being a sloppy adherent of right thinking, and so on.

Having lurched externally from existentialist to empiricist, let me observe another data point for my personal lab notes, even as I share them; we really are deeply, atavistically wired as difference engines. It is demonstrated all the time. It clearly used to help our surviving ancestors find the lion in the grass. Our non-surviving ancestors, not so much. When we cant see the lion, we turn the gain up really high on our lion radar, still looking, because it often served our ancestors best to assume the lion is there, even when he isn't, and most often, that is when we're the most convinced he's really there.

And so, today, we have the spectacle of conflict at suburban Little Leagues across America. Not finding enough real conflict in our life, we just plain make shit up to safely go to war over. If you have kids, and/or have been through the Little League experience, you know exactly what I mean. It is just a little inappropriately combative(not on the field, the kids are fine, I'm talking about in the stands), but mostly safely fun all the same.

Not just little league. I was at a basketball game down in Philly a few weeks back, Penn Charter vs Chestut Hill, to watch my nephew play. Stands full of stock brokers and neurologists and so on watching their prep school kids preparing to be fans of the NBA someday, nothing serious. Tiny little gymnasium, like 4 rows of bleachers, everybody is sitting right next to the court. Some yutz in the stands is screaming "you loser!" and so on at some 17 year old kid from the other team, whose mom is sitting 2 rows in front of him. Now, there was some truly meaningless conflict. In all arenas, our propensity to manufacture differences, we vs them, to create totally artificial conflict, is apparent. It is the naked sweaty ape part of our wiring, that persists.

regards,
Fred

Post 66

Saturday, March 14, 2009 - 8:15am

Ed:

re; Reading the questions sincerely, one has to think that there has got to be some kind of an "excuse" for one's existence

I don't think a self-defined purpose for one's life is an excuse.

I think another's/externally defined purpose for one's life is an abomination. It is certainly a violation of 'one skin, one driver.'

And, there is no excuse for that.

regards,
Fred

Post 67

Saturday, March 14, 2009 - 12:57pm

Okay, Fred, but to ask the first question: "Why am I here?" (as in "Why do I exist?") is an appeal to an outside cause, force, or purpose (if not a "chain of events", culminating in a "you" or a "me"). It's not amenable to a "self-defined purpose" like you say it is (again, I question your use of "define").

It may not be what you meant when you typed it, but that's what those words mean. Another way to say this is that there isn't some deep reason for each of us to exist (like God's will, for instance) -- even though each of our own existences have a deeply meaningful importance.

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/14, 1:05pm)

Post 68

Sunday, March 15, 2009 - 7:46am

Ed:

re; Okay, Fred, but to ask the first question: "Why am I here?" (as in "Why do I exist?") is an appeal to an outside cause, force, or purpose

That depends entirely on who I am asking and answering to.

If I was asking you, or God, or Society, or the State, or a long list of also other skins, philosophers or pet therapists, either living or dead, whatever, then that would clearly be an appeal to an outside case, force, or purpose.

If an educated adult human being asks that same question of themselves, that is not an appeal to an outside case, force, or purpose. It is 'one skin, one driver.'

Maybe we have a different bias when it comes to asking questions. As a child, a question is something that I most often asked my teacher or another outside skin, but even then, it started as a question I asked myself. As an educated adult, that restriction no longer applies. As an educated adult, I ask myself questions all the time, and as a now educated adult, it is not out of the question that I answer those questions as well. I no longer have a bias that cements 'questiona' as something I direct only at others, or that are answered only by others.

As well, answer to who? The point I tried to make long ago was, our individual lives are our explicit answers to those questions, whether we knowingly ask those questions of oursleves or not. We answer them, even when we dont knowingly ask them, by living our lives. My meta-definition of engaging in 'religion' is, the knowing asking of those questions. In my specific case, my choice of 'one skin, one driver' as a guiding axiom of my morality, I pose those questions as 'I' questions, and only when I engage in the time honored cherished tradition of competing 'R'eligions lifting their legs and pissing on other 'R'eligions do I express the opinion that competing religions that insist on expressing those as 'we' questions having only singular OneSizeFitsAll 'we' answers is the basis for every war ever fought.

Maybe your point is, we don't even have to ask those questions, even of ourselves? Well, that's true enough, we don't have to ask those questions. We can just wing it, and often do.

But did you also mean to assert, 'All should not' ask those, questions, even of themselves? Or just of others? I think we are both in agreement, there is no need to ask others/outside appeal. Exactly. To Hell with the 'we' form of those questions, which is exactly where we go when we validate them in that from.

Because I think we are atavistically wired for it -- how else to explain the widespread popularity of populism, tribalism, herdism, collectivism, the deep urge to mob up and define only 'we' answers?-- some many of us consider those questions as only having 'we' answers, and some of those even politely share answers without negative consequences to others. But some othere fraction of those enter the war of the we, and some fraction of those go to actual war. Some fewer of of us consider those questions as having only 'I' answers, and some fraction of those enter the war of the 'I' (crime) unguided by no morality that would inhibit that. I'm content that 'one skin, one driver' let's me sleep at night, I don't begin to see how it would ever condone rape or murder or stealing or cheating other skins, etc.

Durkheim and the social scientologists are a glaring example of a clearly religion playing a political game, as examples of warriors in the war of the we. By claiming to define irrational religion as what other 'R'eligions did, the social scientologists attempted to leg lift their religion to scientific 'truth' status. "Religion is what those other guys are doing when they are telling you how to live your life." That is the ultimate political tactic, the transparent attempt to paint competing political thought as 'religion' in the war of the we.

I'd rather not validate any such war of the we, so I don't.

regards,
Fred

Post 69

Sunday, March 15, 2009 - 9:40am

Fred,

For me, this internal self-thinking / self-questioning doesn't include asking 'why' (I'm here) or 'for what reason' (am I here). In asking the question, you are validating (somewhat) the collectivists who say you need a good (read: an 'outside') reason to live. Rand explains this notion in her essay Faith and Force: The Destroyers of the Modern World ...

The basic principle of altruism is that man has no right to exist for his own sake, that service to others is the only justification of his existence ...

For me, this internal self-thinking runs thusly:

Accepting the fact of reality that I'm here and that I can live and breathe or choke and die; that I can work to get food or lay down and starve; that I can learn to grow and love or shake my fist at the responsibility that that requires and remain alone, inept, and afraid; that I can work to flourish on all levels or wait in desperate fear for spurious moments of reprieve from the otherwise-constant suffering of my own existence -- accepting all this, which of these alternatives do I want (and what does my choice require from me)?

Ed

(Edited by Ed Thompson on 3/15, 6:38pm)

Post 70

Monday, March 16, 2009 - 4:17am

And, for the collectivist 'war of the we' folks, one could ask about their psychology:

Why or for what reason do they believe they are here (alive)?

Then, the potential answers would vary according to the collectivist doctrines: to serve others, to do God's will, to protect and defend the Aryan race, to enlarge the State, etc. The notion that they need no warrant or sanction for being or flourishing needn't cross one's mind because, in their mind, they are serving a 'higher' purpose than that -- and view themselves and their lives as merely instrumental values.

Ed

Post 71

Monday, March 16, 2009 - 5:59am

Ed:

Thank you for these exchanges, and the thoughtful criticism. I enjoyed all of them.

regards,
Fred

Post 72

Monday, March 16, 2009 - 7:01am